THE LINGUISTICS OF NARRATIVE:
THE CASE OF RUSSIAN

Elena Paducheva
All-Russian Institute of Scientific and Technical Information

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To the memory of Roman Jakobson
**Preface**

The aim of this work is to demonstrate the possibility of describing the meaning of narrative text with the help of the conceptual apparatus, methods of study and, most importantly, the factual knowledge which modern linguistics now possesses. Linguistics has made great advances in recent years in describing the semantics of linguistic units, both lexical and morpho-syntactic. At the same time, however, the main context for examining the unit of language was the individual sentence or, at best, the individual utterance. The present work aims at applying these results to description of the semantics of linguistic units in a text, namely, in a text of fictional narrative. We shall deal, in the first instance, with aspects of textual semantics which are connected with Bakhtin’s polyphony and Vinogradov’s “image of the author”.

The initial premise of the present study is that the textual functions and meanings of linguistic units should be described not in themselves, but as products of their meaning in an individual utterance and the shifting communicative context: the textual functions of linguistic elements should be looked upon as derivative from their functions in a separate utterance. A striking example of this is the textual function of the Russian verbal aspect, which is clearly different from its function in a separate utterance (in a text the aspect takes upon itself the main burden of expressing the relationship of precedence and simultaneity of events — a function which it does not have in an isolated utterance), but obviously a product of it.

For clarity we could divide our initial premise into two.

1) We shall discuss the semantics of narrative text, making the fullest possible use of what is already known about the semantics of the individual units, lexical and grammatical, in linguistics.

2) Following Wittgenstein’s well-known maxim, we shall deal only with phenomena which can already be described in fairly precise terms, without pretending to describe the semantics (and even less the artistically relevant structure) of narrative text as a whole.

Thus, we shall endeavour to describe the semantics of linguistic elements with a more explicit account of the new context in which they appear in narrative. First and foremost, this is the context of the inadequate communicative situation. Naturally, we begin with those units which in this context experience the most perceptible shifts of interpretation.
We do not proceed from the assumption that a text has a structure similar to the syntactic structure of a sentence — this would be too strong an assumption and one that has to our knowledge not been proved.

The “text-linguistics” of the 1960s and 1970s, with its searching for a “basic unit” of text (such as paragraph or suprasentential unity), was oriented on syntax. It sought to describe the text in the same way as a sentence. The approach adopted in the present work differs in several respects. Firstly, it has a more immediate orientation on semantics, i.e., on revealing those aspects of the text that have meaning for the reader. And, secondly, it makes a profit from the change of the basic paradigm that occurred during the last decade and focuses not on the generation of the text, which is impossible without a preliminary hypothesis as to its global structure, but on its semantic interpretation. If what interests us are general rules for interpreting a text, we can examine individual rules more or less independently of one another, even without hypotheses as to the structure of the text as a whole.

Unlike text-linguistics which had a syntactic orientation our approach may be called pseudo-lexicographical, the subject of study being phenomena which can theoretically be described independently of one another: their only common feature is that they are connected with the communicational aspect of language.

It is now clear that earlier linguistic conceptions of the structure of the text were obviously limited, if even for the fact that the analogy with the sentence dictated the idea of a static structure in the text. By turning to interpretation, i.e., understanding the meaning, we are forced to search for fundamentally new ideas of the structure of the text. Understanding is a dynamic process; in the process of reading new images do not “adhere” to the old one, but modify them in one way or other way. To be in any way adequate, our idea of textual structure should reflect this dynamics.

It often happens that the essence of a linguistic phenomenon is revealed in comparing it with another one, even though the latter may not be similar in all respects. Cf., such important affinities as the analogy between nominal and temporal anaphora (Partee 1984); or between the “event — state” opposition and the opposition of countable and uncountable nouns (Mehlig 1992). In fact, crucial for the present work was the analogy between deixis and modality, two most important, although extremely different, categories of egocentrical elements, i.e., elements semantically imply-
ing the speaker and thus relying upon the communicative situation. This deep and by no means obvious propinquity between deixis and modality was discovered by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 1957/1972). Uniting deixis with anaphora that became possible due to Reichenbach made the field of research still wider. Deducing all the possible conclusions from these seminating ideas has yet to be done.

It is only natural that the subject of the analysis should be literary texts. However, to paraphrase G. O. Vinokur (1990: 245), we could say that the subject of our study is not narrative, but certain phenomena in the Russian language which are observed using examples taken from narrative texts. This explains the fact that our field of vision often includes texts that are too well known or, on the contrary, not of any special literary value. The author’s aim is to demonstrate the basic possibilities of the linguistic apparatus.

The main ideas which form the basis of this work were set out earlier in the articles Paducheva 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1993a.

Some sections of the book are based on material published earlier in Russian. Part I (Chapters I.1–I.3) makes use of material from the monograph Paducheva 1985 and also the introduction to “Novoe v zarubežnoj lingvistike”, № XVI. Chapter II.4 was written together with Anna A. Zalizniak, see our publication Zalisniak, Paducheva 1987.

The author is grateful to the members of the seminar held in spring 1994 at the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Berkeley, California, for taking part in the discussion of problems of linguistic structure of the narrative, and also to Professor Alan Timberlake who suggested the idea of this seminar to the author. Special thanks to my teacher, Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, without whom this book would never have been even begun. In the final stage of work on it the author received invaluable assistance from Sergey A. Krylov, her first reader, sympathetic critic and editor, who suggested a number of literary examples and provided valuable bibliographical data.

It is also a pleasure to express my gratitude to Nina Jakubova and Ekaterina Gorbunova for their invaluable help in typing and editing the text, checking transliteration and bibliographical references, drawing tables and diagrams.

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INTRODUCTION.
THE LANGUAGE OF FICTION AS THE SUBJECT OF LINGUISTICS

A narrative text is written in the same language in which everyday communication takes place. At the same time, in ordinary conversation language functions somewhat differently from the way it does in a narrative text, and in a narrative text very differently from other literary genres, such as the lyrical poem, for example. The aim of this book is to identify the specific features of interpreting language elements in a narrative text which distinguish narrative from conversational discourse, traditionally regarded as the main subject of study in linguistics, and from other types of literature.

The present study is based on the following two complementary assumptions:

(1) that the description of the specific characteristics of the language of fiction, including the special features of the semantic interpretation of its words and constructions, comes within the competence of linguistics; and

(2) that the theory of literature and literary criticism cannot manage without linguistic analysis of the text, i.e., literary critical analysis of the text is not complete if it is not preceded by a more “primitive”, yet at the same time more basic (and objective) linguistic analysis. In interpreting the text one must, first and foremost, uncover in it those meanings which are embedded in it solely by virtue of the fact that it was written in that particular language. Only after this and on the basis of this can one “read” into it the meanings which result from the numerous contexts — social, historical, literary and so on.

1. EGOCENTRICAL ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE
IN A NON-CANONICAL SPEECH SITUATION

Contemporary structural linguistics, which has elaborated a fairly sophisticated apparatus for semantic textual analysis, regards as its subject language as a means of communication, i.e., strictly speaking, conversational language. Yet the language of fiction has its own special features. They constitute not a violation of the general rules of language, but a certain transformation of these rules, a transformation which, as we shall endeavour to show, is motivated, i.e., contextually conditioned. This work is consistently based on the hypothesis that a change in the rules of interpreting the language elements in narrative
as compared with conversational language is motivated by a change in the conditions of communication — by a special communicative regime of language functioning. A change in the interpretation of language elements in narrative results from the inadequacy (non-canonicity) of the communicative situation in which the reader of the literary text finds himself. The same non-canonicity characterizes the communicative situation implied by lyrical poetry (see Kovtunova 1986). The linguistic differences between these types of literature are explained, as we shall show, by a difference in the ways of overcoming this inadequacy in the communicative situation. Hence the different types of conventions (elevated into the norm) and different sets of permissible strategies for interpreting the various categories of language elements. In other words, we proceed from the assumption that a change in the functions of language elements in the narrative as compared with conversational language is motivated, and only by identifying this motivation can we arrive at the general significance of the language unit, abstracted from differences produced by the sphere of use. Thus the present study is of value not only for “applications” (in this particular case, for poetics), but also for linguistics as such.

The language of narrative consists for the most part of the same words and syntactical constructions as conversational language. But only for the most part: some elements of conversational language are not permissible in narrative (or at least in a certain form of it), while others — and there are quite a lot of them — change the interpretation. For example, in the sentence *Vot pošel Ivan v les* ‘Here Ivan went into the forest’, a typically narrative one, neither the particle *vot*, usually translated into English as ‘here is’, nor the morpheme of the past tense have their usual interpretation: *vot* (unlike its basic meaning) is not associated with an indicating gesture by the speaker, not even a mental one, because such a gesture demands a synchronic addressee, a listener, and the present tense of the verb; on the other hand, the past tense does not perform its usual distancing function here, because it does not fit in with the semantics of the particle *vot*. Even more indicative is the particle *von* ‘over there’, which is quite impossible in the traditional narrative; if *von* appears in narrative, it means that this is not the main body of the text, but a “lyrical digression”, and one must expect the “author” himself to appear shortly:
They lie, these seducer-mystics, there are no Caribbean seas on earth. There isn’t anything and never has been! That stunted lime tree over there [von], and the iron railings and the boulevard beyond. Oh, gods, my gods, poison, bring me poison.’

The language of narrative is an amputated language in that some of the most important elements of conversational language cannot be used in it, or at least not at their face value. The development of new narrative forms (such as free indirect discourse, see below) may be seen as a way of trying to overcome the restrictions imposed upon the language of narrative by an incomplete communicative situation.

Linguists usually regard conversational language, i.e., language in its communicative function, as a paradigm for the use of language in general. However the case when language is marked by communicative intent cannot be taken as the only use of language. There are cases of language use “which do not readily conform to the communicative model. Foremost among such uses is the literary use.” (Banfield 1982: 8). Narrative has its own rules of use and interpretation of egocentricals, which is demonstrated by the examples below (from Banfield 1982). In the spoken language these sentences are ungrammatical (the tense and adverb contradict each other), whereas in narrative they are acceptable:

*Tomorrow was Monday; 
*Now he crawled to her house; 
*Where were her drawings now?

An analysis of literary texts is, of course, essential if one is to understand which aspects of language undergo an interpretation shift in the transition from the spoken language to the literary text. While in no way seeking to belittle this, we would insist, however, that within certain limits one can predict in advance which language elements will tend to have a different interpretation in a literary text from that in conversational language. Insofar as the change in interpretation takes place under the influence of a changed communicative situation, the language elements to be affected first and foremost will be those which are semantically connected with the communicative situation.
We shall refer to these language elements as egocentricals, that is, words and constructions which contain a reference to the speaker (EGO). Words and constructions the semantics of which contain a reference to the person to whom the speech is addressed (TU), and there are quite a lot of these as well, also contain a reference to the speaker, so that “TU-centricity” assumes EGO-centricity as a prerequisite. The term “egocentric particulars” was first coined by Bertrand Russell for deictic words and is used in this sense in Apresyan 1986 and Kevtunova 1986. Its broader use is discussed in Paducheva 1990. Chapter II.1 of the present work deals with egocentrical elements of language and their interpretation in different narrative forms.

The main general question which must be solved in describing narrative is who is the substitute for the speaker in the narrative.

2. Traditional narrative.

The narrator as an analogue of the speaker

It is natural to proceed from the assumption that the unity of the structure and composition of a literary text is an expression, in the final analysis, of the unity of the consciousness standing behind it.

On the other hand, a literary text is a work of speech, and as such is characterized first and foremost by its speaking subject. In conversational language this would obviously be the speaker. And one might think that in a narrative text it should be author, the creator of the text. In fact, the matter is more complicated, however, and there is no direct correspondence between the speaker in conversational language and the author-creator of a literary text. When we set ourselves the task of describing the semantics and functioning of the language in a literary work, we can speak only of analogues of the speaker. The role of the author-creator in a literary work must not be identified with the role of the speaker in a linguistic utterance for a number of reasons.

Firstly, because of the inadequacy of the communicative situation of the perception of the literary text, a situation in which the author is separated from his/her statement and the reader is dealing with the text alone, and with its creator — only insofar as the latter is reflected in the text. In this inadequate communicative situation many important mechanisms of natural language cease to function. For example, the author cannot serve as
the spatial and temporal guide which the reader must have if he/she is to carry out deictic references as in ordinary conversation. For example, the word “here” cannot indicate the place of action through the place where the author is at the present moment, because the author and the reader do not share the same present moment or the same field of vision.

Another reason is invention. In fiction the author creates a fictional reality, which is usually presented as a description of a fragment of the real world. In conversational discourse, however, the speaker as a person belongs to the real world about which he is speaking. Yet the author of a literary text does not belong to the world of the text created by him (many literary devices derive from the play on these distinctions, see Chapter III.2 on Nabokov’s short story “Recruiting”).

The evaluations and opinions which the author has put into his work may only be an indirect reflection of his real evaluations and opinions. Here, incidentally, the speaker and the author are linguistically similar: the speaker, in a speech situation, may also lie, prevaricate, and hide behind a mask; and the devices with the help of which we — sometimes — uncover these subterfuges bear no relation to the linguistic rules of semantic interpretation of the text.

In short, in the communicative situation of the narrative the analogue of the speaker is not the author himself, but more likely the “image of the author”, or, in other words, the narrator: the narrator is the subject of consciousness which is directly embodied in the text and with which the reader deals. And it is also the narrator who becomes the centre of the system of space-time coordinates that is essential to put into action the ramified mechanism of deictic (indexical) reference embedded in the language and actively at work in any narrative text.

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1 The terms “narrator” and “image of the author” (and sometimes simply “the author”) are used in specialist literature as synonyms; thus, Vinogradov (1980: 205) with reference to the end of Chapter One in “The Queen of Spades”, when after Tomski’s closing remark (Odnako pora spat’, uže bez četverti šest’ ‘It’s time to go to bed, it is already a quarter to six’) comes the sentence V samom dele už rassvetalo ‘It was indeed already beginning to grow light’, writes: “at the end of chapter one the author descends into the world which he is portraying”, because the “indeed” makes this utterance a dialogical reaction. We could say, less metaphorically, that in this sentence the narrator reveals his presence.
The author may be present in the text not only as the narrator of events taking place in a particular world, but also as the creator of a world which is known to be imaginary. For example, in Pushkin’s lines *Onegin, dobryj moj prijatel’* ‘Onegin, my dear friend’, *Mne nravilis’ ego čerty* ‘His features were pleasing to me’ and *Ja byl ozloblen, on ugrjum* ‘I was embittered, he morose’ we see the first person narrator. Whereas the lines *Bez niţ Onegin dorisovan* ‘Onegin’s well portrayed without them’; *A ta, s kotoroj obrazenovan Tat’jany milyj ideal* ‘And she, from whom Tatyana’s sweet ideal is formed’ and others unambiguously present Onegin and Tatyana as creations of the author and the author as the creator (on these two hypostases of the author in “Eugene Onegin” see Pomorska 1980). However, insofar as the figure of the author-creator destroys the illusion of reality, we regard it as a sign of violation of the narrative norm (for more about this, see Chapter III.2).

A convenient (although perhaps somewhat oversimplified) model of the communicative situation in narrative is one in which the narrator also appears as the speech subject: what we read can, without stretching a point too much, be taken as being conveyed to us by the narrator. In this case one can do away with the author entirely in the linguistic description of the text and present the communicative situation of the narrative as “narrator-reader” interaction. The narrator remains in charge of the whole system of egocentrical elements of language.

If we assume a single consciousness ensuring the unity of the text’s structure and composition, the figure of the narrator is the embodiment of this consciousness.

This assumption is justified — with certain reservations which are discussed below — within the framework of what can be called traditional narrative. In non-traditional narrative (see Section 3 on free indirect discourse) unity of composition is ensured by a somewhat more complex construction.

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2 A specially oral form of narrative is frequently used with good effect in Ven. Yerofeev’s “Moscow-Petushki”, for example, when the author finishes the list of “cocktail” recipes offered to the reader with the words: *Vý šel’ čto-nibud’ zapisat’ uspeli? Nu vot, poka dovol’no s vas* ‘Did you manage to jot anything down? Well, that’s enough for you for the time being’. 14
Let us dwell briefly on those aspects of the figure of the narrator that are essential for the linguistic structure and typology of the narrative. The following distinctions are of interest.

The narrator may be personified — when he is one of the characters in the text and thus enters the world of the text, for example, by performing certain actions, having albeit a very sketchy biography and even, perhaps, having his own name. In other words, he is a diegetic narrator who belongs to the inner world of the text. An example of this is the narrator I in Pushkin’s “The Shot”. On the other hand, the narrator may be exegetic, i.e., not personified and not entering the inner world of the text, like the narrator in Bulgakov’s novel “The Master and Margarita”, who appears only as the subject of evaluations or dialogical reactions, and also in lyrical or rhetorical digressions (e.g., in the appeal Za mnoj, čitatel’! Za mnoj i tol’ko za mnoj, i ja pokažu tebe takuļu ljubov’ ‘Follow me, my reader! Follow me and me only, and I will show you such a [true] love’ at the beginning of Part Two).

If the narrator refers to him/herself in the first person only and all the predicates relating to him are of a metatextual nature (as, for example, in the following quotations from Pushkin’s “The Blizzard”: Poručiv baryšnju popečeniju suđby i iskusstvu Tereški-kućera, obratimsja [my] k molodomu našemu ljubovniku ‘Leaving the young lady to the mercy of fate and the art of Tereshka the coach-driver, let us now turn to our young lover’; No vozvratimsja [my] k dobrym nenaradosvskim pomeščikam ‘But we shall now return to the good Nenaradovskoye landowners’), he should be still regarded as exegetic.

A narrator who is a character in the text may also be called a storyteller, whereas the narrator in “The Queen of Spades”, say, is not a storyteller (so for us the narrator and the story-teller are not synonyms, as. e.g., in Chudakov 1971: 30). The story-teller does not exclude the exegetic narrator.

The exegetic narrator differs from the diegetic one in the following important respect. A narrator who does not belong to the world of the text is not expected to adopt any kind of spatial or temporal position in this world. The question does not arise as to where he is standing when he describes events which are presented as taking place before his own eyes. Whereas for the diegetic narrator this problem does exist. In Nabokov’s prose more often
than not there is a play on the oscillation between these two types of narrators. Thus, in the novel “Pnin” the narrator is sometimes an abstract figure not defined in space and time, but then suddenly turns into a concrete person, and this oscillation, which violates one of the important norms of the narrative (namely, the opposition between the story-teller and the exegetic narrator) is undoubtedly a literary device very dear to the author’s heart (sometimes this oscillation may be interpreted as an allusion to Pushkin, who also used this device although more sparingly, see Paducheva 1993).

Works on poetics distinguish between first-person and third-person narrative. This distinction is not a sufficiently clear one. It usually refers to the person of the main character. This feature is not in itself very important for the typology of narrative forms, however. For example, in Atarova, Lesskis 1989 free indirect discourse (FID) is seen as a kind of third-person narrative. However, for identification of free indirect discourse (see section 3) the deciding factor is the elimination of the narrator while the grammatical person of the main hero does not play an important role.

Thus in traditional narrative we shall distinguish between Ich-Erzählung (first-person narrative), where one of the characters is the story teller, and authorial narrative with an exegetic narrator (third-person narrative).

The narrative norm demands unity of viewpoint: within the limits of a single narrative (direct speech does not count, of course) one and the same character should, generally speaking, appear in the same way, either always in the first or always in the third person. Kozhevnikova (1994: 18) quotes examples of the breaking of this rule which are conditioned and justified by the fact that the story teller — “I” — sees himself in childhood as a different person, as in Bunin’s story “At the spring of life” or in Petrov Vodkin’s novel “Khlynovsk”3. Like many other narrative norms, this is used to good effect by Nabokov, in his story “Heavy Smoke”, to say nothing of his novel “The Gift”; in Levin 1981 shifts in the pronominal system are presented as shifts in the communicative situation underlying Nabokov’s narrative.

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3 In Yuri Trifonov’s novel “The Old Man” we find the reverse relationship: “on the level of the present” the main hero is presented as Pavel Evgrafovich Letunov (and the narrative is in the Past Tense), whereas “on the level of reminiscences” he is “I” (and the grammatical Tense is the Present).
A change of viewpoint takes place if an embedded story-teller (or situational narrator, see Chapter III.2) appears. Thus, in Lermontov’s “A Hero of Our Time” in the story “Bela” Maksim Maksimych appears in the third person in relation to the main narrator “I” and in the first person in those parts of the story which form its main content (Vot raz ugovoril menja Pečorin ežat’ s nim na kabana. Ja dolgo otnekival'sja. Nu čto mne za dikovinka kaban! ‘One day Pechorin persuaded me to go boar hunting with him. I resisted for a long time. As if I’d never seen a boar before!’).

There are also other features by which narrators in different texts may differ from one another (or a narrator in a single text adopt different positions).

There is an important contrast between the omniscient and the pragmatically motivated narrator. The omniscient narrator does not inform us about the sources of his knowledge; he describes the inner states of the characters, regardless of the fact that they are not accessible to the outside observer. He possesses unlimited opportunities to change the spatial orientation and move backwards and forwards on the time axis. The pragmatically motivated narrator is bound — for reasons of verisimilitude — by natural limitations in all these points.

This contrast is significant primarily for the exegetic narrator. The story-teller, i.e., the narrator-character, should be motivated: he either tells his own story or describes events which he himself has observed, so that any violations are perceived as oversights by the author. Whereas the exegetic narrator is given freedom of choice: he can be both omniscient and pragmatically motivated, setting up all sorts of hedges (such as probably or evidently) between himself and the inner world of the characters to which he is presumed not to have access.

The exegetic narrator may adopt an emphatically external position in relation to the hero and describe the hero’s inner states not in themselves but through their symptoms, unmistakable signs, etc. In other words, the exegetic narrator may — if the author so wishes, of course, — assume the role of a detached observer. This is often a device aimed at making it difficult to understand what is going on, as in Hemingway’s short story “Hills
like white elephants” which is full of hints and allusions that the reader has to work out for herself.

Another parameter which distinguishes narrators — definite moral and emotional attitude vs. a dialogical position towards the characters: the author may refrain from personal commentary altogether, like the omniscient and indifferent, objective observer in Bunin’s story “Light Breathing”. The degree of the narrator’s ideological intervention (“authorial evaluations”) may alternate freely within one and the same text.

There is also opposition as to the distance in time and space between the narrator and the textual world. The narration time may coincide or not with the time over which the events take place (Kozhevnikova 1994: 19). Simultaneous reporting (chronicle or diary) contrasts in this respect with retrospective reporting of events with a known ending; summary narrative is opposed to scene (Friedman 1955). For example, in Chapter Three of “The Queen of Spades” in the paragraph which begins with the words Hermann byl syn obrusevšego nemca ‘Hermann was the son of a German’ the whole of Hermann’s previous life unfolds, while each of the following paragraphs describes one scene.

All these oppositions, except for the first (the narrator as a character or not) are not of fundamental importance for the identification of the narrative form. The position — outer vs. inner — of the exegetic narrator and the degree to which he is motivated, dialogical, etc. may change throughout one and the same text and do not determine the narrative form.

Thus, traditional narrative is narrative form in which the consciousness of the narrator ensures the compositional unity of the text. Within traditional narrative we can distinguish first-person narrative (Ich-Erzählung) and the so called third-person narrative (auctorial form, as in Stanzel 1970, with the exegetic narrator). In the third-person narrative “authorial subjectivity” (a term used by Kozhevnikova 1994) is not excluded, but is restricted by the limits of lyrical and rhetorical digressions. In first-person narrative subjectivity is also possible in the main body of the narrative.
3. **Free indirect discourse**

Traditional narrative may be contrasted with the narrative form which has become known as free indirect discourse (FID); FID is analysed from the linguistic point of view in Banfield 1982; see also Ehrlich 1990. Whereas in traditional narrative the narrator is an analogue of the speaker, in free indirect discourse this role is played by a character. The character ousts the narrator, taking over the egocentrical elements of language.

Classic examples of free indirect discourse are the novels of D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, William Faulkner, Virginia Woolf. In Russian literature Bulgakov’s novel “The White Guard” may be taken as an example of free indirect discourse, see the following passage from the beginning of the novel:

<...> I molodye Turbiny ne zametili, kak v krepkom moroze nastupil belyj, mox-natyj de kabr’. O, elochnyj ded naš, sverkajuşčij snegom i sčast’em! Mama, svetlaja koroleva, gde že ty!

‘<...> and the young Turbins did not notice the advent of December, white and shaggy, in a heavy frost. Oh, Santa Claus of ours, shining with snow and happiness! Mamma, our radiant queen, where are you?’

The *ours* belongs to the young Turbins, not to the narrator. Chekhov’s story “Rotshild’s violin” begins with the words:

Gorodok byl malen’kij, xuže derevni, i žili v nem počti odni tol’ko stariki, kotorye umirali tak redko, čto daže dosadno.

‘It was a small town, worse than a village, and almost the only people living in it were old men, who died so rarely that it was actually quite irritating.’

The mystery of the inappropriate irritation is solved when we learn that it belongs not to the narrator, but to the main character — an undertaker. For more detail about free indirect discourse see Chapter II.5 and for “The White Guard” Chapter III.1.4 of the present work.

Free indirect discourse is practically impossible in its pure form. The narrator (exegetic as a rule) invariably retains certain positions. James Joyce’s short story “Eveline” is a classic example of free indirect discourse and abounds in lexical items and constructions typical of this narrative form. For example, the heroine’s lapsing into memories of the past (“One time there used to be a field there”) is not preceded, as it would be in tradi-
tional narrative, by an explicit remark from the narrator. Yet the narrator’s presence cannot be denied here also, as can be seen from the beginning:

She sat at the window watching the evening invade the avenue. Her head was leaned against the window curtains, and in her nostrils was the odour of dusty cretonne. She was tired.

The coherence of an FID-text is based on a complex harmony of the voices of the different characters with one and another and with the voice of the narrator.

It must be said that within the framework of traditional narrative a character is also allowed to possess egocentrical elements to some extent: moral judgements may belong to a character and descriptions often reflect the character’s point of view (Kozhevnikova 1994: 10). Traditional narrative allows fragments which may be identified as free indirect discourse. They must be contextually motivated, however, as internal monologue, reported speech, etc.

In general, there is a fair degree of convention involved in ascribing a literary text to this or that narrative form: it is always a question of proportions. There is also an intermediate narrative form, between free indirect discourse and the traditional narrative, which one finds, for example, in Chekhov’s later stories (“The Bishop”, “The Bride” and others) and which has been called the personal form, see Mann 1991. A brilliant example of the personal form is Solzhenicyn’s “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”.

Whereas traditional third-person narrative limits the expressive possibilities of language by being a projection of language onto a reduced speech situation, free indirect discourse enables the author to restore some of the linguistic possibilities lost in traditional narrative — although not with auctorial interpretation, but with an orientation on the character.

Free indirect speech must be distinguished from the phenomenon which it is natural to call quotation, see Chapter II.6. In a narrative text we can only speak of quoting when an utterance which is made by the narrator is interspersed with elements that can be interpreted only with reference to a character. Cf. the following example from Voloshinov 1930: 128:

Oni [poljaki] gromko zajavljali, čto “pan Mitja” predlagal kupiti ič čest′ za tri tysjači ‘They [the Poles] announced loudly that “Pan Mitia” had offered to buy their honour for three thousand’ (Dostoevsky. “Brothers Karamazov”).
It is the Poles and not the narrator who call Dmitry Karamazov “Pan Mitya”. Thus the narrator is partially quoting the characters and not simply conveying the content of their speech. An excellent work on quotation belongs to Wierzbicka (1970), from which we have borrowed the term. In Kozhevnikova 1994 this phenomenon is examined under the heading “nesobstvenno-avtorskoe povestovanie”.

In connection with free indirect speech a word must be said about the “skaz”. The “skaz” is defined in Kwiatkowski 1966 as “a special form of authorial speech retained throughout the whole literary work in the spirit and language of the person in whose name the narration is being carried on.” According to this definition the “skaz” should be regarded as an extreme form of quotation: functionally, it is the speech of the narrator, i.e., the author, as it were, but in fact the author is hiding behind a quotation, consisting of the whole text. Many of Leskov’s stories are written in the style of the “skaz”, for example, “Lefty”.

4. The narrative and the lyrical.
Analogues of the listener in the narrative

Thus, in the communicative situation of everyday conversation there is a speaker and a listener and the utterance is interpreted by the listener in the presence of the speaker. A literary text, however, assumes an inadequate communicative situation. From the reader’s point of view this situation is characterized by the detachment of the utterance from the speaker: from the author’s point of view by the absence of a synchronic addressee. In fact there are two ways of overcoming this communication deficiency. In the auctorial form narrative reduction of the expressive possibilities of language corresponds to the reduced communicative situation. In a lyrical work the inadequate situation is seemingly turned into an adequate one, cf. Kovtunova 1986. In other words, the difference between the narrative and the lyrical is that the lyrical “pretends” that the communicative situation is an adequate one (so that the linguistic originality of the language of the lyrical compared with conversation can be reduced to the fork between the real and the imaginary), and the narrative looks truth in the eye more soberly.
It must be stressed that ascribing a literary work to this or that type (in this case to the lyrical or the narrative) is not connected with its form — prose or verse, and although the lyrical tends towards verse and the narrative towards prose, in fact, both epic, i.e. narrative, so to say, poetry and lyrical prose are possible; take, for example, lyrical passages in prose, the so called lyrical digressions (as, e.g., in Gogol’s “Dead Souls”). The lyrical digression is also a passage of narrative text which presupposes the communicative situation of the lyrical, i.e., the situation of pretending that the addressee is present. Close to the lyrical — in this respect — are rhetorical digressions:

Kto pri zvezdax i pri lune
Tak pozdnno edet na kone?
‘Who rides a horse so late ‘neath moon and stars?’ (Pushkin. “Poltava”), which also presuppose an addressee, even if the addressee is the author himself.

At first glance it would seem that the language of the lyrical is further removed from conversational language than the more “normal” language of the narrative (“it is precisely the language of the lyrical that shows the most originality”, Kovtunova 1986: 15). In fact, however, the language of the lyrical is closer to conversational language in many structural respects — in the auctorial form narrative the reduction of the communicative situation results in a corresponding reduction of egocentrical elements, whereas in the lyrical text all that happens is a shift of interpretation: the secondary, background components of the semantics of egocentrical elements, such as the presence of the speaker and observability, become the main ones.

Generally speaking, the lyrical hero in lyrical texts corresponds to the narrator in a piece of narrative. Yet there is a difference between these two figures. The narrator in a narrative text is not obliged to be present in the world generated by the text: his presence in this world is a matter of choice. In lyrical writing the lyrical hero must be present in the world generated by the text. This, incidentally, is why the diegetic world of the lyrical text is easily identified with the real world; in fact all that is needed is for the lyrical hero of a poem to be identified with its author.
However, the main difference between narrative, on one hand, and conversational discourse or lyrical text, on the other, is the addressee. Insofar as the lyrical text (according to Plato) *imitates* the conversational situation, it also imitates the presence of an addressee (see Vinokur 1990: 137 on imitation). Whereas there is an analogue of the speaker in all types of literature, albeit in the reduced role of the subject of consciousness, this is not the case with the addressee.

A distinction is made between the internal addressee (one of the characters in the text) and the external one, namely, the reader.

In narrative the internal addressee is usually absent in the main, descriptive body of the text; an addressee appears only in lyrical and rhetorical digressions, and this addressee is external. A lyrical text, however, as a rule has an internal addressee. For example, he manifests himself in addresses (as in Pasternak’s *Ne spi, ne spi, xudožnik!* ‘Do not sleep, artist, do not sleep!’, cf. the analysis of addresses in Kovtunova 1986).

V. V. Vinogradov writes with respect to the use of pronouns in the lyrical poetry of Anna Akhmatova: “In speech addressed to the ‘beloved’ or to someone we know well in general, particularly in a diary which we write for ourselves, it is enough to refer to them and those who should will understand. But others (i.e., readers) must try to guess the meaning of such references from the hints (concerning them) which follow” (Vinogradov 1976: 445). In fact, in the poem *Celyj god my s toboj nerazlुčny* ‘You and I have been inseparable for a whole year’ there is an *I* and a *you* and also the reader who does not know what the characters *I* and *you* know. In other words, in a lyrical text the second person *you* (in Russian *Vy / ty*) may designate a character from a diegetic world, just like the first person in the narrative. Thus in a lyrical text we can distinguish an exegetic second person, the reader, who is also the external addressee, and a diegetic second person, a character, who is also the internal ad-

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4 Exceptions are possible, of course, cf. “Surely there could be no possibility of my living with Nina <...>? Nonsense! So what was I to do with you, Nina, how was I to get rid of that store of sadness which had been steadily accumulating from the repetition of our seemingly carefree, but actually hopeless meetings?” (Nabokov, “Spring in Fialta”). It is important that the second person pronoun is in apposition (*with you, Nina*), otherwise the shifting of the viewpoint and Nina’s transition from the third person of a character to the second person of the addressee would have made the text quite incomprehensible.
dressee: the multiplication of entities to which the first person is subject in the narrative extends to the second person in a lyrical text.

Vinogradov points out that Akhmatova likes to make a play with ambivalence, when you cannot say whether the addressee is an internal or an external one. “Particularly tiresome are the emotional impressions from indefinite indications when the poem is directed towards an ‘interlocutor’, who remains hidden right up to the end. The illusion is created that the words are addressed to a ‘direct second person’, consequently they may relate to the reader in general, to ‘me’” (Vinogradov 1976: 447).

The transition from conversational language to the language of fiction has the most radical consequences for the semantics of the second person and all the language elements which presuppose the second person — the address, the imperative mood and the question (see Kovtunova 1986); the missing components of the speech situation are “made up for by the imagination” in the lyrical text, but are absent in the narrative.

The following difference between the addressee and the listener must be stressed: the listener is an addressee who receives a communication at the same time as it is made. The lyrical text, unlike the narrative, presupposes a listener, not just an addressee. Chapter II.2 is concerned with the function of verbal tenses. It would seem that a change in the interpretation of the grammatical tense in narrative as opposed to conversational language is connected with the absence of a synchronic addressee — this explains why the basic tense for the narrative is the past tense. Only in genres for which the basic tense is the present can the spontaneous generating of the text be imitated in a natural way (cf. Zholkovsky 1992: 276 on Mandelshtam’s poem “I drink to the military asters”), insofar as this demands perception of the utterance simultaneous to its generating. In genres based on the past tense, such an imitation is impossible in a loss of the illusion of reality, cf. Chapter III.2 in connection with Nabokov’s story “Recruiting”.

However, the second person is excluded only in third-person narrative. On the basis of first-person narrative a refined narrative form arises, which makes use of the second person in the main body of the narrative text.
To begin with, the form of the second person does not necessarily designate an addressee. One occasionally finds a generalized-personal use of the second-person pronouns “ty” and “vy” and also use of the verb with a kind of omitted second-person pronoun (in such contexts as Tiše edeš', dal'se budes' ‘More haste, less speed’ [lit. “The slower you go, the further you will get’], when the form of the second person does not designate the addressee. Peshkovsky writes commenting on the following words by Osip in Gogol’s “The Government Inspector”:

And if you don’t want to pay him [the coach-driver], good enough. Every house has a pair of gates at the back and front, and you can nip in and out so not even the devil himself will find you:

“the word you does not mean the ‘you who are listening to Osip’ (in fact no one is listening to him), but any ‘you’, ‘you’ in general” (Peshkovsky 1938: 340). In Bulygina 1990 a special lexeme is introduced — a generalized-personal pronoun which can have two contextual variants, a null one, as in the first example above, and a non-null one, as in the second example (with a complicated rule of distribution). This generalized-personal meaning of the second person is contrasted with the ordinary, addressee one. Both these uses — the addressee use and the generalized-personal use — are found in the narrative.

We shall begin with the addressee use. The addressee use of the second person in the narrative is possible in the context of a lyrical or rhetorical digression, cf.:

Soznajtes' [vy], odnako ž, čto Maksim Maksimyč čelovek dostojnyj uvaženija? Esli vy soznayetes' v ėtom, to ja vpolne budu voznagrazden za svoj, možet byt', sliškom dlinnyj rasskaz. (Lermontov. “Bela”)

‘You must surely admit that Maksim Maksimych is a man worthy of respect? If you admit this, I will be fully rewarded for my, perhaps, excessively long story.’

The use of the second person in the main body of the narrative is possible only in the context of a special narrative form. An excellent example of this can be found at the beginning of Chekhov’s story “Ward No. 6”:

V bol'ničnom dvore stoit nebol'soj fligel', okružennyj celym lesom repejnika, krapivy i dikoj konopli. <...> Esli vy ne boites' ožeč'sja o krapivu, to pojdemte po uzkoj tropinke, veduščej k fligelju, i posmotrim, čto delaetsja vnutri. Otvoriv dver', my vxođim v seni. <...> Dalee vy vxođite v bol'shuju, prostornuju komnatu <...> Vonjaet kisloju
kapustoj, fitil'noj gar'ju, klopami i ammiakom, i ēta von' v pervuɉu minutu proizvodit na vas takoe vpečatlenie, kak budto vy vxoɉite v zverinec.

‘In the hospital yard stood a small wing surrounded by a whole forest of burdock, net-tles and wild hemp. <...> If you are not afraid of getting stung by nettles, let us walk along the narrow path leading up to the wing and see what is going on inside. Opening the door, we go into the lobby. <...> After that you enter a large, spacious room <...> It stinks of sour cabbage, burnt candle-wicks, bed bugs and ammonia, and at first this stench gives you the impression that you are entering a menagerie’.

The forms of the second person here, as in conversational discourse, designate an addressee, and the only difference from an ordinary speech situation is that here the presence of the addressee in the scene being described is imaginary. A most important component of the semantics of this passage is the speech act in which the narrator, definitely a first-person narrator, urges the addressee to imagine himself as a direct participant in the situation being described; after this the situation is described through its imaginary perception by the addressee.

Thus this text records what is for narrative an untypical communicative situation in which the reader is given the part of a fictitious participant in the scene being described; in this way he is also an observer of it. The narrative form of this extract can be called lyrical. It is not second-person narrative, as claimed in Kozhevnikova 1994: 102, because the subject of speech remains a first-person narrator. The second-person pronoun designates the addressee of the speech, probably an external addressee, because it is a person who will very soon disappear, so it can hardly be called a character. As already noted, the lyrical form is characterized by the speech regime of the use of the verbal forms: the basic tense of the story is the present. Cf. further on in the same story:

V komnate stojat krovati, privinčennye k polu. Na niɉ sidɉat i lezat ljudi v sinii bol'nicyx ťalatax <...>. Ėto sumasšedšie.

‘There were beds screwed to the floor in the room. People in blue hospital dressing gowns were sitting and lying on them <...> These were the madmen.’

In Russian the Tense of the verbs is the Present.

Yuri Kazakov’s story “The Candle” provides an example of the lyrical narrative form:

My byli s toboj odni v našem bol'šom, svetlom i teplom dome. <...> Ja vyśel na kryl'co pogljadet', net li doždja... Doždja ne bylo. Togda my s toboj odelis' poṭeplee i pošli guljaɉ. No snačala ja xoču skazat' tebe o tvoej strasti.
‘You and I were alone in our large, bright, warm house. <...> I went onto the porch to see if it was raining... It was not. So you and I put on some warm clothes and went for a walk. But first I want to tell you about your passion’.

The basic tense of the story is the present, as can be seen from the last sentence of this quotation; the Past Tense refers to the past.

The second-person addressee in a lyrical form narrative is often a child, cf. another story by Kazakov, “You cried so sadly in your sleep”, which is also addressed to a child. In this context the form of the second person receives a natural motivation — a person is told about events in which he was a participant or witness, but the meaning of which he did not understand. In fact, of course, this motivation is a convention to a large extent — no grown-up person is presupposed in the narrator’s present tense: the “you” in the narrator’s present tense has the same age as in the textual time of the story; further on in the story we read: <...> смешным, который бывает только у таких маленьких как ты детей ‘<...> laughing as only small children like you laugh’.

The same communicative situation, when one of the characters is the narrator’s addressee, can be found in extended form in A. A. Milne’s book “Winnie-the-Pooh”. Christopher Robin asks his father to tell Winnie-the-Pooh a story. “What sort of story does he like?” “About himself.” As a result in the stories which the father (the first-person narrator) tells, Winnie-the-Pooh is the main hero and Christopher Robin appears as a secondary character, but as the narrator’s addressee:

So Winnie-the-Pooh went round to his friend Christopher Robin <...>. “Good morning, Christopher Robin”, he said. “Good morning, Winnie-the-Pooh”, said you.

There is another version of the addressee use of the second person in the narrative, when “you” is the narrator addressing himself (for example, himself in the past). In this case the narrator dissolves, as it were, in the addressee. This form can indeed be called second-person narrative. A well-known example of it is Michel Butor’s novel “La Modification”. Cf. also the second-person narrative in R. Kireev’s novel “The Victor”.

Concerning the generalized-personal meaning of the second person, it is rightly pointed out in Bulygina 1990 that in some contexts this generalization may disappear, with the result that the form of the second person simp-
ly designates the speaker. Thus in using the second-person singular form prideš’ ‘[you] come’ in (1) and the second-person plural pronoun in (2), the speaker is simply designating himself (examples from Bulygina 1990):

(1) Tut za den’ tak nakuvyrkaes’ja!
Prindeš’ domoj — tam ty sidiš’
‘By the end of the day [you]’re so knackered!
[You] come home and you just sit and stare.’ (Vysocky);

(2) O, kogda b vy znali, kak toskuetsja,
Kogda vas sto raz v tečen’e dnja
Na şodu na şodstvał lovit ulica
‘Oh, if only you knew how your heart aches, when the street catches you out a hundred times a day with likenesses’ (Pasternak)

It is important, however, that the action of the generalized second person (prideš’ ‘[you] come’, vas <…> lovit ulica ‘the street catches you’) should be repetitive: in (1) a verb in the perfective prideš’ is used as in a “visual example” meaning (nagljadno-primerno značenie); in (2) an imperfective verb lovit has the iterative meaning. In the sentence Gor’ko ėto, synok, gor’ko, kogda netu u teb’ja otčego doma ‘It’s hard, son, hard, when you don’t have your father’s home’ (Kazakov. “The Candle”) the repetition is expressed by the word kogda ‘when’.

No wonder that in narrative the generalized-personal second person designates the narrator. The following passage is taken from Bunin’s “Antonov Apples”:

Vspominaetsja mne urožajnyj god. Na rannej zare, kogda ešče kričat petuži i počernomu dymatsja izby, raspašneš’, byvalo, okno v prošladnyj sad <…> i ne uterpiš’ — veliš’ poskoree zasedlyvat’ lošad’, a sam pobežiš’ umyvat’ja na prud.
‘I remember when the harvest was good. At early dawn, when the cocks are still crowing and the log cabins stand black in the mist, you would throw open the window to the cool garden <…> and fyou order them impatiently to saddle a horse at once, while you ran out to wash in the pond.’

This passage is clearly identified as first-person narrative.

The question remains as to the semantics of the generalized-personal use of the second-person: if the second person merely designates the speaker/narrator, why not simply use the first person? Obviously the generalized-personal meaning of the second person retains a link with the primary addressee
meaning: the semantics of this use includes the component ‘I want you to put yourself in my place and imagine that everything I am saying about myself is actually happening to you.’ In fact, in the last part of Bunin’s story, which is told in the first person, this component is lacking:

Vot ja vižu sebja snova v derevne, glubokoj osen′ju. Utrom ja sažus′ v sedlo i s odnoj sobakoj, s ruž′em i s rogom uezžaju v pole. Celyj den′ ja skitajus′ po pustym ravninam.

‘I see myself back in the village again, in late autumn. In the morning I get into the saddle and ride off into the open countryside with a dog, a gun and a horn. And all day I wander round the deserted plains.’

The heightened frequency of the generalized-personal use of the second person is a characteristic feature of the literary style of Iosif Brodsky. The following quotations are from the book “Remembering Akhmatova. Iosif Brodsky — Solomon Volkov. Dialogues”, Moscow, 1992:

V rezultate tendencija ēta prevratilas′ v instinkt, žertvoj koego okazyvajutsja obstojatel'stva ne tol'ko tvojej sobstvennoj žizni, no i čužoj

‘As a result this tendency turned into an instinct, to which was sacrificed the circumstances not only of your own life, but of someone else’s’;

Voobšče est′ čto-to soveršenno potrashaščee v pervom čtenii velikogo poēta. Ty stalkivaeš′sja ne prosto s interesnym soderžaniem, a prežde vsego — s jazykovoj neizbežnost′ju

‘Actually there is something quite shattering about reading a great poem for the first time. You are confronted not simply with an interesting content, but first and foremost with a linguistic inevitability’;

Kogda reguljarno čitaeš′ novye stiži, kak ēto delaju ja, to vidiš′, čto v načinatel'noj stepeni ēto podražanie

‘When you read new poems regularly, as I do, you see that for the most part they are imitations’;

Ponačalu [my] daže i ne sobiralis′, a prosto ty pokazyval svoi stiži čeloveku, s č′im nnieniem ščitalsja. I togda načinalsja dovol′no ščestj razgovor.

‘At first [we] did not even meet, but you simply showed your poems to a person whose opinion was respected. And then a rather cruel conversation began’.

As these examples show, the semantics of the second-person form does contain an element of generalization after all: the action designated by the verb is attributed, generally speaking, to an arbitrary person, but to the speaker in the first instance, insofar as it is a person who occupies a special place in the denotative space of the utterance.
5. TYPOLOGY OF NARRATIVE FORMS.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF NARRATIVE FORMS

Thus, there are three narrative forms which differ as to the type of narrator.

I. Traditional narrative.

a) Narrator-as-a-character form, or first-person narrative; the narrator is personified, i.e., a story teller, and diegetic — belonging to the textual world. He may be in the first person (as, for example, in Pushkin’s “The Shot”), but he may also be in the third person, like Maxim Maximych in “Bela” (Lermontov, “A Hero of Our Time”).

b) Auctorial form, or third-person narrative; the narrator is exegetic (as in Pushkin’s “The Queen of Spades”);

II. Free indirect discourse (FID); the narrator is absent throughout the whole text or in substantial parts of it; at least, he is not the only consciousness that takes part in the organization of the narrative (as in “The White Guard” by M. Bulgakov).

The term “traditional narrative” is used in the book in two senses: a broad one, when Ich-Erzählung is included, and a narrow one implying an exegetic narrator.

Mention has been made above of a fourth form as well, the lyrical form, which can be looked upon as a more complex form of I.a), when the text has not only a narrator in the first person, but also a synchronic addressee-listener in the second. This form can also be called a dialogical form, because it is characterized by the speech regime of the use of verbal tenses.

The narrator himself may also be the addressee, so the lyrical form can also include such genres as the diary, notes, etc., cf. the chapter “Princess Mary” from “A Hero of Our Time” and many other texts in which the basic tense is the present. An interesting example of this version of the lyrical form is part one of Yuri Olesha’s novel “Envy”.

A brief history of narrative forms is given in Friedman 1955, Gukovsky 1959, Banfield 1982. Free indirect discourse displays a purely literary way of using language that did not appear until the end of the 19th century. Indeed in the history of narration we can distinguish various stages of auc-
torial extinction, a gradual decline in the use of direct comment. At the beginning of the 20th century the tendency to diminish the role of the author (i.e. of the exegetic narrator) in the narrative becomes even stronger.

Theoretical recommendations to eliminate the author first began to appear at the end of the 19th century, cf. Spielhagen 1883. In 1950 a critic wrote: “the most significant change in the fiction of our time is the disappearance of the author” (cited in Friedman 1955). Henry James must be mentioned as an author who was obsessed by the idea of eliminating the author. His motto was “The story should tell itself”. In his prefaces of 1907–1909 he wrote about his intention to frame the action inside the consciousness of one of the characters. This mode of narration contrasts with the traditional one in which the narrator tells the story as he knows it. Henry James not only announced in theory, but followed in practice the principle of having the story told as if by one of the characters in it, but in the third person. He pointed out that this enables the author to avoid the distancing in time that is necessitated by retrospective first-person narration.

Even earlier Flaubert was an enthusiastic proponent of this new aesthetic norm. His idea was that the author must be present everywhere, but seen nowhere.

Works on the history of narrative forms in Russian literature also emphasize the diminishing of authorial subjectivity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. “The path of Russian literature in the 19th and 20th centuries is a path from the subjectivity of the author to the subjectivity of the character” (Kozhevnikova 1994: 10); in our terminology — from the traditional narrative with its subjective narrator to free indirect discourse). The same path was also traversed by some individual writers. In its most obvious form this applies to Chekhov, see Chudakov 1971.

6. THE NARRATOR AND THE AUTHOR.
THE “IMAGE OF THE READER”

Let us now return once again to the relationship between the narrator and the author. Two types of manifestations of the narrator in the text can be delimited — spacio-temporal and emotional-ideological. The spacio-temporal position of the narrator hardly bears any connection with the author at
all. As for “subjective evaluations”, the question as to which of them are shared by the author and which are invented like the plot is a problem of interest to the historian of literature, but of little meaning for the linguist: it cannot be solved on the basis of the meaning of the text alone, without turning to the writer’s biography, his experience of life, personal statements, etc. This applies even more to the events of the imaginary world. No study of the text can enable us to say, for example, whether S. Dovlatov’s cycle of stories “The Zone” is autobiographical, i.e., whether the author really was a guard in the Mordovian camps in his army years. A priori all one can say is that the “I” who travels by post-chaise from Tiflis and listens to Maksim Maksimych’s stories, etc. is not quite Lermontov and the narrator in “The Master and Margarita” is certainly not Bulgakov. See Lotman 1988 on relationship between Pushkin and his protagonist in “The Captain’s daughter”.

The same can also be said of the relationship between the priority consciousness of the text and its creator in free indirect discourse: the question of whether the author “inhabits” a character or, on the contrary, disassociates himself from him/her, like the question of whether or not the ideological positions of the author and narrator coincide, go beyond the framework of a linguistic analysis of the text. Thus, in Chekhov’s story “The Bride” Nadya’s internal monologue (“And that sort of life will come sooner or later!”) does not, in spite of what Soviet textbooks on literature say, give us grounds for considering that Chekhov believed in a radiant future for Russia.

For reasons of parallelism one might think that if, within the framework of literary communication, the analogue of the speaker is not the author but the narrator, the analogue of the listener should be not the reader himself, but a representative of the reader. In fact, however, there is no need for such a double (see Toolan 1992): the narrator’s addressee in a communicative situation of narrative is not a representative of the reader, but the reader himself.

The figure of the reader arises in the ideal representation of the text whenever the narrator is not the final instance in its literary composition. Let us take a text in which one can sense the author’s ironical attitude to the narrator, for example, Okudzhava’s story “The Girl of My Dreams”, in which the narrator in the first person clearly arouses irony on the part of the
The author’s ironical attitude to his narrator is a phenomenon which could be regarded as the planned (by the author) participation of the reader in the interpretation of the text. On the “image of the reader” see Arutyunova 1980 and Stepanov 1984.

In the same way one can approach the problem of the unreliable narrator, see Booth 1961. A well-known example of the unreliable narrator can be found in Agatha Christie’s “The Murder of Roger Ackroyd”, in which the narrator actually turns out to be the murderer himself. This device was used earlier by Chekhov in his story “Drama on the hunt”. See also Ingham 1986 on the unreliable narrator in Leskov’s story “The White Eagle”. In all these cases the author entrusts the reader with the task of discovering the hidden meaning of the narrative. Modern linguistics, however, is hardly competent to tackle the formalization of such a procedure.

Pushkin’s “The Station Master” provides an excellent example of a misleading narrator. The author’s concealed irony with regard to the main hero is expressed through the narrator, who hides first behind one, then behind another “limited” direct observer of the events (Samson Vyrin himself and the boy Vanya at the end) without bothering to give us his own interpretation of them. The fact that what actually takes place is not the seduction of a poor maid by a passing hussar, but a “conflictless happy union of the characters” (Zholkovsky 1992: 104) Pushkin indicates only by a hint which he leaves the perceptive reader to work out.

It is up to the reader to detect the narrow-minded narrator, such as Maksim Maksimych in Lermontov’s “A Hero of Our Time”. On the other hand the function of ridiculing Maksim Maksimych is partly taken on by a narrator of a higher class — “I”.

On the role of the reader see Mayenowa 1974/1978: 441, which says that texts with a “deficient cohesion mechanism <...> necessarily contain several interpretations, the details of which depend on the reader”. The reader acts as the guarantor of the cohesion of the text in modernist literature (e.g., in Mandelstam’s “Egyptian Mark”, which is described in Zholkovsky 1992: 164 as “one of the first examples of Russian surrealist prose”).
7. TOPICS IN POETICS
CONNECTED WITH THE FIGURE OF THE SPEAKER

In his valuable articles “Linguistics and poetics” (Jakobson 1960) and “Poëziola grammatiki i grammatika poëzii” (Jakobson 1961), Roman Jakobson argues that linguistics is indispensable for literary studies and attacks those who do not agree. We shall take this indispensability for granted.

From the whole area of literary theory we shall concentrate on one group of topics only, namely, those associated with the “image of the author”. They include:

— the image of the author in a literary work (see, for example, Vino-gradov 1980 on Pushkin’s “The Queen of Spades”);
— quasi indirect speech (Voloshinov 1930/1973/1986);
— poetic space — the place of the author — observer in the created world (see Gukovsky 1959, Lotman 1988 on Gogol’s “Starosvetskie pomeščiki”);
— the figure of the observer in landscape descriptions (see Gasparov 1990 on different orderings of descriptions in Tyutchev’s poems as compared, e.g., with Pushkin);
— destroying the illusion of reality by revealing the creative frame (see Levin 1990 on Nabokov).

All these topics owe their existence to one and the same fact, namely, that in ordinary language the utterance is non-detachable from its creator, the speaker. Why is it so that the author is present in every literary work, but not necessarily in every painting. Linguistic phenomena are discussed that may throw some light on these problems.

One of the most important notions in this connection is that of polyphonic novel and polyphony introduced by M. Bakhtin. Bakhtin’s ideas have influenced thinking not only in literary studies, but also in philosophy, psychology, theory of perception, and epistemology (see Morson, Emerson 1990). Bakhtin’s way of thinking may best be defined by the term “dialogism” (though it was never used by Bakhtin himself), see Holquist 1990. Crucial for Bakhtin is the distinction between SELF and OTHER. The relationship between these two entities is a dialogue.
Of the various kinds of dialogical relations what interested Bakhtin as a literary critic was the relationship between the author and the characters, particularly in the novel. Hence his notion of polyphony.

Polyphony occurs when several independent points of view are present within one story, i.e., when many voices sound together. We speak of polyphony when we can distinguish several speaking subjects in a literary work, each with his or her own ideological position, language, perceptions, prejudices and background knowledge, etc. The author is merely one of these subjects.

The status of the authorial voice in narrative differs from writer to writer. The dialogical status of the author is contrasted with the totalitarian position. Bakhtin compared Dostoevsky’s novels with those of Tolstoy. In Dostoevsky’s novels the voice of the author is always only one part of the dialogue, whereas Tolstoy (with his glorification of the instinctive and intuitive forces in life) takes the totalitarian position of the almighty judge.

What Bakhtin needed as a support was a linguistic theory of dialogue, a theory of the use of language by speakers, but this did not exist in the 1930s — at the time when Bakhtin developed his theory. Indeed Bakhtin reproached contemporary linguistics for not providing an answer to the most vital questions concerning the utterance and its relation to reality and the speaking subject. “The lack of a well-developed theory of the utterance as a unit of communication leads to an imprecise distinction between the sentence and the utterance, and frequently to complete confusion of the two." A great many linguists and linguistic schools are held captive by this confusion, and what they study as a sentence is essentially a kind of hybrid of a sentence (a unit of language) and an utterance (a unit of speech communication)”, Bakhtin 1986, p. 75. “When the sentence figures as a whole utterance, it is as though it has been placed in a frame made of quite definite material. "A sentence that is assertive in form becomes a real assertion in the context of a particular utterance” (p. 83). Bakhtin says that only the utterance bears a definite relation to reality and to the speaking subject: a sentence has no truth value and no author.

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It would be more accurate to say that such a theory was just beginning to emerge at that time. Among the predecessors of modern pragmatics one must mention Gardiner 1932, Bühler 1934 and Bally 1930).
All these points of Bakhtin’s theory of language have become axiomatic for modern linguistics, but only recently, not before the late 1970s. The linguistics of Bakhtin’s days did not take the problems of language as a means of communication seriously. It did not even suspect that they came within its province. For so-called structural linguistics everything beyond the sentence was extra-linguistic by definition.

Present-day linguistics can provide a factually based response to Bakhtin’s challenge. Linguistics has now been enriched by the theory of speech acts (see Austin 1962; cf. also Searle 1969); by the theory of reference (developed partly by linguists, such as K. Bühler, W. Quine and É. Benveniste, and partly by logicians, such as Russell, W. Quine and Reichenbach); and, finally, by pragmatics, in particular by studies of subjective (expressive) layers of language, see Wierzbicka 1991. Linguistic pragmatics now forms a substantial and mature area of linguistics, with a large array of facts and a fairly deep understanding of the fundamental laws underlying the linguistic behaviour of speakers in communication.

On the other hand, modern linguistics is not confined to conversational language. Linguistic semantics, for example, sees its task as constructing rules of interpretation for all kinds of texts. Linguistics strives to “imitate” the linguistic competence of a language bearer — the abilities of a language bearer to generate and understand all kinds of texts, not only texts of the spoken language, but also literary, e.g., narrative ones. The only limitation is that linguistics is confined to the abilities a person has as a language bearer and not, e.g., as a scholar — not because of his or her extra-linguistic knowledge. For example, the analysis of inter-textual allusions in the text, which may be essential in order to understand the author’s intentions, remains the prerogative of poetics: a knowledge of specific texts is not the same as a knowledge of language.

Thus, modern linguistics, having answered Bakhtin’s challenge and coped with the problem of conversational language, is now ready to participate in a study of the narrative, in an analysis of polyphony, namely, in the problem of distinguishing the author’s voice from the characters’ voices in the narrative.
Obviously not all the features of a literary text can be deduced from its specific speech situation of the detachment of the author from his utterance, and they remain outside the framework of the present exposition. These include, for example, the heightened metaphorism or intentional ambiguity of a literary text, i.e., the non-uniqueness of the interpretation on a purely linguistic level. Jakobson 1960 qualifies the intentionally ambivalent text as a communication oriented towards a communication. Indeed, for conversational language ambiguity is more in the nature of a deviation (not counting puns, see Paducheva 1987). For a literary text this is the norm: a literary text by its very nature should have several levels of meaning (see Vygotsky 1968 on interpretations of “Hamlet”). All these aspects of the literary text are not the object of our attention in the present work, which is the linguistics of narrative forms. We shall deal with only one type of ambiguity — the ambiguity of voice- attribution (see Chapter II.5).

8. GENERAL PLAN OF EXPOSITION

There are many scholarly works on the structure of the narrative. Most of these studies, however, have a literary critical orientation (cf. Genett 1980, Chatman 1978, Toolan 1992), whereas the present work is a linguistic study. On the other hand, the fundamental works on the linguistics of narrative which have appeared in recent years (as, e.g., Banfield 1982) do not use Russian material. Thus the field represented by such original masters of literary form as Dostoevsky, Bulgakov or Venedikt Erofeev remains untouched, and even the narrative innovations of Nabokov have not been described consistently from the linguistic point of view.

The general plan of the present work is characterized by its linguistic orientation. Attention is focused on the concept of the narrative form. We have set ourselves the task of outlining the group of language phenomena which are decisive for ascribing a text to a particular narrative form.

The book consists of three parts. Part I introduces general linguistic concepts from the sphere of the theory of speech acts, the theory of reference and pragmatics, which represent the essential conceptual apparatus for the study.
The concept of the canonical communicative situation is introduced, which provides a basis for defining the concepts of the speaker and listener.

Part II examines phenomena of natural language, the interpretation of which depends crucially on the type of communicative situation. These are deixis, including temporary deixis, and subjective modality. The phenomenon of parenthesis is discussed, which plays a fundamental role in the analysis of free indirect discours. A classification of egocentricals is proposed which makes it possible to predict the possibility of their use and interpretation in different narrative forms. The plan of exposition is roughly the same in all the chapters of part II: this or that phenomenon of natural language is first examined in a canonical speech situation, i.e., in conversational language, then the question is discussed as to how it is transformed in the various narrative forms depending on the parameters of each of these forms.

Part III consists of illustrations, i.e., examples of how to use the proposed methods for analysing literary texts.
PART I

SPEECH THEORY. THEORY OF REFERENCE. PRAGMATICS

CHAPTER I.1

SPEECH ACT THEORY AND THE NOTION OF UTTERANCE

1. PERFORMATIVE SENTENCES

The theory of speech acts is associated, in the first place, with the name of the Oxford school philosopher John Austin (Austin 1962), who was the first to attract attention to the fact that, in pronouncing an utterance, the speaker not only conveys information, but also performs a variety of other actions. In the process of communication people do not just construct sentences but use them to perform such actions as informing, questioning, ordering, warning, promising, requesting, advising, expressing gratitude, etc. All these actions are speech acts. Speech acts use sentences; but they should not be confused with sentences. The need for such a differentiation can be illustrated by the use of pronouns. For example, in (1) the pronoun that refers to the sentence with the preceding remark, i.e. the content of the sentence is declared to be a lie, whereas in (2) it refers to the speech act framing the sentence, i.e. it is the very fact that the request was made that is proclaimed to be an impudence:

(1) — He is an impostor! — That’s a lie!
(2) — Give me your fur-coat. — That’s impudent, you know.

The speech act theory begins with the discovery of the existence of performative sentences by Austin. Performative sentences have the structure of statements, yet their unique peculiarity is that the utterances in which they are used do not describe the corresponding action but are equivalent to the performance of these actions. Thus, the utterance I promise you to come at two is a promise; the utterance I ask you to come as early as possible is a request; I advise you to consult a physician is advice; cf. also I declare a break; Thank you for your attention; I congratulate you!; I wish you a good trip!; I beg your pardon.

The uniqueness of performative sentences is very clearly stated by É. Benveniste: ‘The utterance Ja kljanus’ ‘I swear’ is the act of undertaking an obligation, and not a description of this act <...>. The distinction be-
comes evident if we substitute *I swear* for *He swears*. Whereas *I swear* is an obligation, *He swears* is merely a description — of the same kind as *He runs, He smokes* etc.” (Benveniste 1996/1974: 299).

From a logical point of view the main peculiarity of performative sentences is that they cannot be true or false. To be more exact, a performative sentence is pragmatically self-verifiable (see Karttunen 1978:166): such a sentence is trivially true in every utterance, by the mere fact of uttering it. The utterance *He is an impostor* may be, generally speaking, true or false (it can be confirmed or denied); but the sentence *I claim that he is an impostor* is trivially true in every instance of its uttering.

Of course, not all statements that are not performative are empirically verifiable. There are, for example, emotive sentences, i.e. implicitly or explicitly evaluatory ones; various types of modal sentences, etc. As Vendler (1967: 710) states, “not all propositional attitudes generate the parameter of truth”. For example, a sentence beginning *I want* can hardly be classified as true or false.

Performativity, i.e. the property that ensures the performative use of a sentence, is a specific peculiarity of some verbs. According to Lyons 1978: 736, the number of performative verbs in English amounts to some three hundred; a list of speech act verbs is given in Wierzbicka 1987. E.g., *to promise, to thank* are performative verbs, whereas *to want, to be sorry* are not: the statement *Sožaleju, čto ne smog vas izvestit’* ‘I am sorry that I could not inform you’, at least in its Russian version, cannot be true by the very fact of its utterance.

Apart from being used performatively, every performative verb may also be used in a ‘normal’, descriptive way, cf. *I promise I’ll come* and *He promised to come; I beg your pardon and I have been begging your pardon for two hours already*. Normally only those sentences can be used performatively that contain a performative verb in the first person present indicative (*I advise you; We ask you; I promise you*). Yet under some circumstances a performative verb may form a performative sentence even when used in the 3rd person, cf. *The passengers are asked to boarding gate 15; The Transport engineering Institute invites application for a vacancy of Assistant lecturer*, see Paducheva 1994.
Benveniste deduces pragmatic peculiarities of performative verbs from the essential role of the component ‘say’ in the meaning of these verbs (e.g., *salūtáre* = ‘to say Salus’) and calls these verbs delocutive.

2. **Illocutionary Force**

The theory of speech acts considers speech communication to be a kind of goal-oriented behaviour governed by certain rules. Every utterance (i.e. every speech act) has three distinct aspects. In other words, three acts performed by the speaker are distinguished, namely, 1) the act of sentence uttering proper (locutionary act); 2) the propositional act (including the act of reference, i.e. attracting certain objects to the field of attention, and the act of predication, i.e. attributing certain properties to these objects); and 3) the illocutionary act — expressing a request, a promise, gratitude, confirmation; giving an order, or advice; asking a question — in general, realizing the communicative intent of the speaker.

The utterance may also be aimed at influencing the listener in a certain way, e.g., to embarrass, insult or frighten him, i.e. to produce a definite perlocutionary effect. However this aspect of the speaker’s intent is not his locutionary intent. It is essential that the content of an illocutionary act can be explicated verbally: there must be a certain performative verb which corresponds to the illocutionary act (for example, one can say *I warn you that the gun is loaded* and, by these very words, perform the act of warning). But there is no performative verb corresponding to the perlocutionary intent of the speaker. Utterances like *I threaten you* or *I insult you* do not count as acts of threatening or insulting respectively: these actions are not confined to the mere pronouncing of the corresponding verbs.

Every utterance has a definite illocutionary force and, thus, belongs to a special type of illocutionary act. For every type of illocutionary act there are certain conditions that should be observed in order to perform this illocutionary act successfully. Austin called them happiness conditions. These conditions are classed in a certain order: there are preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions and simply essential conditions, see Table 1 (approxim-

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Act</th>
<th>Happiness conditions</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparatory and essential conditions</td>
<td>Sincerity conditions</td>
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</table>
| Acts of statement (assert, affirm)  | 1. S has evidence (reasons) for the truth of P  
2. It is not obvious to S that H knows P (and does not need to be reminded) | S believes p                                                   |
|                                     | 1. This act counts as a message about the real state of affairs  
2. The statement is introduced into the common field of vision of H and S |
| Acts of obligation (promise)        | 1. S is able to do A  
2. S believes A in H’s interests  
3. Both H and S believe A is not likely to occur in the normal course of events | S is going to do A                                             |
|                                     | This speech act counts as S’s obligation to do A |
| Acts of urging (request, order)     | 1. S believes H is able to do A  
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events | S wants H to do A                                              |
|                                     | This speech act counts as S’s attempt to make H to do A |
| Act of question (ask)               | 1. S does not know the answer  
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will provide the information without being asked  
3. S believes that H knows the answer | S wants this information                                      |
|                                     | This speech act counts as S’s attempt to elicit information from H |

The role of happiness conditions in the semantics of a performative sentence is analogous to the role of truth conditions for an ordinary indica-
tive sentence. Indeed, for a situation to be true, its truth conditions must be observed. In a similar way, for a performative sentence to be successful, its happiness conditions should be observed. An utterance of a performative sentence may be a failure, for instance, because the speaker’s authority is doubted, his/her sincerity is in question, or the social status of the speaker at the moment of speech may not be fitting.

The happiness conditions of a speech act are the components of the semantic decomposition of the corresponding speech act verb — with the Speaker (S) and the Hearer (H) among its arguments (Lakoff 1975:261).

Austin compiled a preliminary list of illocutionary forces (omitting statements, on the one hand, and curses, on the other). More precisely, he gave a list of those verbs that make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance. This list has not lost its significance. Below we cite Austin’s five classes with examples of verbs.

I. Verdictives (such as reckon, characterize, interpret as, understand, describe) give a verdict — “of fact or value which is for different reasons hard to be certain about” (Austin 1962: 150).

II. Exercitives (appoint, vote, order, advise, warn etc.) are “the exertion of powers, rights or influence”.

III. Comissives (e.g., promise, propose, guarantee, swear) “commit you to doing something”.

IV. Behabitives (apologize, congratulate, condole, greet, protest etc.) have to do with social behaviour.

V. Expositives (reply, assume, argue, deny, ask, agree etc.) “make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation” (Austin 1962: 151).

Besides basic speech acts there are many minor types. Wierzbicka (1980:298) describes a peculiar speech act that can be illustrated by the example You’ve got a new haircut or You are unwell. As these utterances violate the preparatory condition of all acts of statement, namely ‘It is nor evident for S that H knows that p’, they are not statements and inevitably have some other illocutionary force.
An important linguistic type of illocutionary act is the uncertain statement (Mittwoch 1976). This utterance expresses the wish of the speaker to find the hearer’s support to his / her hypothesis. As to its form, a sentence with this illocutionary potential is a question, but the set of usual co-occurrence restrictions characteristic of interrogative sentences is violated here, which is a means to distinguish an uncertain statement from an ordinary question. For example, in a true question in Russian the particle -nibud’ (corresponding to English any) should be used, whereas in an uncertain statement the particle -to (corresponding to the English pronoun some) may be used, see example (1); in a question one cannot use the parenthetical words vozmožno ‘possibly’, k sčast’ju ‘luckily’ whereas they can be used in uncertain statements:

(1)  
a. Razve on zažvatil kakie-nibud’ dokumenty?  
‘Did he get hold of any documents?’

b. Neuzeli on zažvatil kakie-to dokumenty?  
‘He didn’t get hold of some documents, did he?’

(2)  
a. *On, vozmožno, znaet ob ětom ili net?  
‘*Does he, possibly, know about it or not?’

b. On, vozmožno, znaet ob ětom?  
‘He possibly knows about it?’

Utterances with such verbs as I want, I think, I suppose, I fear, expressing the propositional intent of the speaker, constitute a specific illocutionary type. Such utterances, as well as performative ones, are more likely to be evaluated with respect to their sincerity than truthfulness. For example, That’s a lie in reply to I want you to win means ‘Your speech is insincere’ rather than ‘Your statement is untrue’. According to Wierzbicka 1980, wishes, conjectures, fears etc. are expressed but not stated by the speaker, i.e. have illocutionary function ‘expression’. The semantic decomposition of a speech act of expression contains the semantic component ‘S feels p’, and not ‘S thinks p’.

One of the various tasks of speech act theory is the description of how illocutionary acts combine naturally in discourse (see Paducheva 1982b). Indeed, a reaction to the act of proposing may be the acceptance of the suggestion, its rejection, a counter-suggestion or discussion of the conditions; a natural reaction to a question is an answer, etc. A question is an utterance the purpose of which is, by definition, to stimulate a response which, also, is an utterance (Benveniste 1974).
The illocutionary force of utterances that do not contain performative verbs is very often ambiguous; for instance, a promise is formally similar to a threat and to an ordinary statement concerning an event expected in the future. The utterance *Ty za čto pučiš′ sem′ let* ‘You’ll get seven years for that’ may be either a warning or mere information. A correct understanding of the illocutionary force of an utterance is sometimes intricately determined by the situation. Consider the following example. A child phones his mother at work:

(7) — Pozovite, požalujsta, Annu Ivanovnu! ‘May I speak to Anna Ivanovna?’
— Ona vyšla, pozvonite popozže. ‘She is out, please call later’
— Ladno. ‘All right’

The child reacted to the utterance ‘Please call later’ as to a request, whereas the situation required that it should be interpreted as advice and answered not with ‘All right’, but with ‘Thank you!’; in other words, the expected reaction should have been gratitude, not consent.

Lewis Carroll’s pun in ‘Through the Looking Glass’ (Chapter “Looking Glass House”) is based on the ambiguous illocutionary force of an utterance:

“The horror of that moment,” the King went on, “I shall never, never forget!”
“You will, though,” the Queen said, “if you don’t make a memorandum of it.”

The King’s utterance is a statement of a fact, perhaps, a regrettable one, whereas the Queen interprets it — because of its verb in the I\textsuperscript{st} person singular present — as a promise and gives him the advice on how to fulfill this promise in the best way possible.

The illocutionary force of the utterance may be clarified by its translation into indirect speech. The Listener L may report the utterance *I′ll come at two* as either ‘S promised to come at two’ or ‘S threatened he′ll come at two’, depending on how L understood it (cf. Lyons 1978:736).

One might think from the foregoing that every type of illocutionary act has a corresponding performative verb which expresses adequately a given illocutionary force. But this is not always so. Among different illocutionary types of speech acts there is the act of threat, which differs from the act of promise in that it contains the component ‘evil wishes on the part of the speaker’, cf. *You′ll pay for that!* However, the verb *threaten* cannot be used performatively. Other examples: there are no performative verbs which are
capable of expressing adequately the illocutionary force of exclamatory sentences such as *What a nice belt you have!*; and there are no performative verbs corresponding to indirect illocutionary acts (see Searle 1979).

The inability of such verbs as *brag, reproach, hint, threat, rebuff, shut smb up* to be used performatively⁶ (though they may be used indirectly to convey the speech act of the 3-d person, cf. Wierzbicka 1980) has a natural explanation. Indeed, the performative use of any of these verbs would be tantamount to the speaker’s ‘illocutionary suicide’, see Vendler 1976.

3. FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PRAGMATIC CONTEXT OF THE UTTERANCE

In linguistic literature the term ‘utterance’ tends to be used in two different meanings: 1) as a synonym for the term ‘speech act’ and 2) to denote the text produced in the process of performing the speech act and considered in the context of this speech act. Here, in all instances except direct quotation from somebody else’s works, we use it only in its second meaning.

M. Bakhtin in a number of articles rightly reproaches traditional syntax for ignoring pragmatics. His main idea is the following: “The lack of a well-developed theory of the utterance as a unit of communication leads to an imprecise distinction between the sentence and the utterance, and frequently to complete confusion of the two.<...> A great many linguists and linguistic schools are held captive by this confusion, and what they study as a sentence is in essence a kind of hybrid of a sentence (unit of language) and the utterance (unit of speech communication)”, Bakhtin 1986: 75.

Actually, there is a great distance between a sentence and its use in an utterance: “When the sentence figures as a whole utterance, it is as though it has been placed in a frame made of quite different material.” (ibid.)

Then follows a very precise description of the differences between the sentence and the utterance: “<...> a sentence that is assertive in form becomes a real assertion in the context of a particular utterance” (p.83). Only

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⁶ However, the verb *yožvastat’sjja* ‘brag’ can be used performatively in Russian: *Xoču vam poyožvastat’sjja: moj syn postupil v Moskovskij Universitet* ‘I want to brag: my son has passed the exams to Moscow University’.
the utterance bears a definite relation to the speaking subject, says Bakhtin: a sentence has no author.

Linguistic approach is inconsistent indeed. On the one hand, in many cases, the analysis of an utterance is substituted for the analysis of the sentence, which is clearly happens when the relation of the sentence to reality is discussed. On the other hand, this substitution is not made explicitly, i.e. this transition from sentence to utterance is never stated clearly, and instead of taking account of the speech act in its full context, namely with its author, the author’s intentions, the addressee of the author etc., linguists confine themselves to an oversimplified and reduced notion of speech act: “In the analysis of such an individual sentence it is usually perceived as a completed utterance in an extremely simplified situation: the sun has risen, and the Speaker states: “The sun has risen” <...> In fact, however, every communication of this kind is addressed to someone, produced by something and has a certain aim, i.e., is an actual link in the chain of speech communication” (Bakhtin 1979: 213).

In order to demonstrate how traditional analysis shifts from sentence to utterance and vice versa, suffice it to look at traditional semantic description of mood, which uses the category of the speaker, though the sentence under analysis may not even contain the the 1st person singular pronoun, as in Prišel by on poran′še! ‘It would be nice if he comes a bit earlier’. For example, in Vinogradov 1947: 581 we read: “The category of mood reflects the speaker’s point of view on the relation of the action to the acting person or object”. Evidently, traditional grammarians implied — but never stated it explicitly — that the sentence should be analyzed in the context of the speech act within which it can be naturally used; in Wunderlich 1980:298 it is said that linguistic semantics describes the meaning of the sentence in the context of a ‘neutral’ utterance.

The final goal of semantic description of language should be to establish the rules governing the relations between sentences and their meanings. It appears, however, that relevant components of sentence meaning are revealed only when a sentence is placed in the context of speech act — and this is actually a transition from sentence to utterance. Thus, the traditional grammatic
classification of sentences into indicative, interrogative, imperative and exclamatory ones is meant to define “predestination” of a sentence for use in speech acts with a certain illocutionary force, cf. the notion of sentence’s ‘illocutionary potential’ in Huddleston 1971: 5. The core part of the semantics of mood (at least, the essence of the opposition ‘indicative vs. imperative’) also concerns the illocutionary force of a sentence when used as an utterance.

Placing a sentence in the context of a speech act is an excellent background for analysis of various particles and adverbs. Take, for instance, the English hardly that acquires the meaning ‘not quite’, ‘possibly not’ in such contexts as This definition is hardly precise enough while the literal meaning of hardly is ‘with difficulty’. It can be explained by the fact that in such contexts the scope of hardly is not the explicit sentence predicate but the happiness condition of the illocutionary act performed by this predicate, i.e. the implicit component ‘may be called’ or ‘may be considered precise enough’. Another illustration is the Russian particle -taki (that can only roughly be rendered by the English adverb really) in the sentences

(6) On-taki ubil ee ‘He really did murdered her (as he intended to)’;
(7) Ona-taki blondinka ‘She really is a blonde indeed (as I stated earlier)’.

The particale -taki has different meanings in (6) and (7): in (6) it refers to the semantic component ‘He was going to murder her’ definitely present somewhere in the preceeding part of the text, whereas in (7) it refers to the preceeding part of the discourse where the issue was discussed whether she was a blonde or not.

4. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENTS OF THE UTTERANCE.
THE NOTION OF PROPOSITION

When a sentence is analyzed from the point of view of its use in a speech act, the notion of the proposition arises. Indeed, the basic principle of the speech act theory is to draw a distinction between the propositional content of the utterance and its illocutionary force (see Searle 1969; Lewis 1972). One and the same propositional content may combine with different illocutionary forces and, in this way, take part in different types of speech act, cf.:

Buy yourself a bicycle!
You WILL buy yourself a bicycle.
Will you buy yourself a bicycle?

Consequently, a proposition forms the common content of an utterance, assertion, promise or wish; a question and answer — everything that can be true, possible or probable, see Stalnaker 1972. In other words, a proposition is exactly the object dealt with by speech acts (as well as modal operators and propositional attitude predicates).

From the point of view of classical mathematical logic a proposition is the meaning of a sentence that can be either true or false, i.e. the meaning of an ordinary statement (see Church 1960: 32). Whether a proposition is true or false is of interest to those who study its logical attributes. Recently, however, it has been realized that truth or falsity not a property of the proposition by itself. Indeed, a proposition becomes true or false only when it is asserted; in other words, a proposition is something capable of being asserted (see Lewis 1946). Thus, propositions are not necessarily asserted; they can be used, e.g. as suggestions, conjectures, options, etc. A proposition is made true or false only when the sentence expressing it is used in an utterance (and not in every utterance!): “propositions per se are neither true nor false. Only those held in a certain way (e.g. belief, opinion), issued with a certain force (e.g. statement, verdict) or viewed in a certain context (e.g. as expressing a fact) are true or false”, Vendler 1967: 710. A proposition becomes true only when it is used as an assertion and the speaker takes the responsibility for its correspondence to reality upon him or herself. In general, propositions may be placed in such contexts that do not “generate the parameter of truth”, Vendler 1967: 710.

So, from the point of view of the truth value a proposition in linguistics is opposed to that in classical mathematical logic: in logic a proposition is, by definition, something that is either true or false; in linguistics one cannot apply the notion of truth to a proposition — it can be applied only to a proposition that is asserted, to a proposition formulated as an opinion, and so on. Hence, the main ‘areas of habitation’ of propositions are the following:

1. A proposition is something that is found in a speech act, i.e. something that can be stated, doubted, requested, ordered, wished or promised: all these various illocutionary acts may contain one and the same proposition.
2. A proposition is a natural argument of modal operators and propositional attitude predicates (i.e. of various types of intensional operators), such as possibly; necessary; X thinks that...; X is afraid that... and the like.

3. A non-asserted proposition may become a semantic argument of a performative verb, as in I ask you to close the window; I advise you to go to the doctor. The embedded proposition is not asserted in the context of a non-constative performative; a constative performative, on the other hand, is transparent for an assertion: when a constative performative is used in a speech act of assertion, the assertion shifts from the performative verb to the embedded proposition.

Though, in general, one and the same proposition may be used in different speech acts, there is a kind of correspondence between the type of speech act and the structure of the proposition that may be used in it: every illocutionary act imposes a set of restrictions on either the structure or meaning of the proposition that can be conveyed in this speech act. Indeed, not every sentence may be used with every illocutionary force. For instance, the illocutionary act of compelling (order, request) contains a proposition the content of which is a future action A performed by the hearer H or depending on him in some way or other. In the act of promise (as well as in any other act of obligation) the content of the proposition is the Speaker’s future action A which is in interests of the Hearer. In the act of question the proposition is not closed: it contains variables and is a propositional form (see Church 1956), not a proposition.

5. Sentence and Utterance

A sentence differs from the utterance in the following respects.

1. A sentence has an illocutionary potential expressed by means of mood, sentence illocutionary type and, sometimes, also lexically, e.g., by modal words. In a speech act a sentence with its illocutionary potential is used by a speaker to express his/her communicative intention, i.e. to produce an utterance having a certain illocutionary force.

2. Normally, the meaning of a sentence amounts to a propositional form with so-called pragmatic variables (see below). In an utterance prag-
matic variables take definite values, which results in a transition from a propositional form to a closed proposition.

3. A sentence usually contains concrete-referential object terms, i.e. noun phrases intended to denote individual objects. In an utterance these terms actually acquire reference to individual objects belonging either to the common field of vision or to the background common to the participants in the speech act.

4. In the same way, propositions expressed in a sentence acquire reference to situations and events of the real world.

Sometimes the communicative structure (“Topic-Comment structure”) expressed by word order and intonation is listed among the parameters distinguishing an utterance from a sentence. In our opinion, word order and intonation are fixed already in a sentence, and not only on the level of the utterance.

One of the functions of language is to express propositions. Yet normally a sentence by itself does not express any closed proposition: the values of all the pragmatic variables contained in the meaning of a sentence become fixed only in the context of the speech act in which this sentence is used. Thus, when a sentence is used in a speech act, a proposition not only acquires a certain illocutionary function, but is actually formed — on the basis of the propositional form which, in most cases, constitutes the meaning of the sentence.

Sentences that are true or false by themselves (e.g. *All right angles are equal; The whale is a mammal*), i.e. sentences whose meaning is a closed proposition, are a minority among those we actually use. Normally sentences (such as *It’s raining; I went to the cinema yesterday*) do not express a proposition: their meaning is not a proposition but a propositional form. The meaning of the majority of sentences includes pragmatic variables, such as I = the Speaker, ‘the one who produces the utterance U’; NOW = ‘the moment of time when the Speaker produces the utterance U; HERE = ‘the place where the Speaker produces the utterance U’; YOU = the Addressee, ‘the one to whom the Speaker addresses the utterance U’. Another pragmatic variable, which was introduced in modal logic, takes its values from the set of possible worlds: WORLD = ‘the world that the speaker considers to be the real one’.
In every instance of use of a sentence in a speech act pragmatic variables take certain values and, as a consequence, the propositional form turns into a proposition. Thus, the sentence *I went to the cinema yesterday* does not, by itself, have a truth value but acquires it in every instance of its use in a speech act which fixes the values of its pragmatic variables.

Thus, we have analysed the notion of utterance from the point of view of its illocutionary function and its relationship with the participants of the speech act and with reality. We shall return to reference in Chapter I.2, while the next chapter is devoted to presuppositions.
CHAPTER 1.2
PRESUPPOSITIONS AND OTHER NON-ASSERTIVE COMPONENTS
OF THE UTTERANCE

1. PRESUPPOSITIONS AND FORMALIZATION OF ENTAILMENT

Literary text is structured to convey two levels of meaning — the obvious and the hidden. A reader only understands the hidden meaning as a result of his/her own conclusions. In other words, text may contain information expressed in a non-explicit way and the non-explicitness may become a literary technique. Sometimes it may be quite a puzzle for a literary analyst to understand why the author did not express some idea directly. Why, for example, in Nabokov’s story “Spring in Fialta” does the reader learns about the death of the heroine from a subordinate clause ending the story while Nina had turned out after all to be mortal? There is no direct reference to her death at all. (One probable interpretation of this technique is given in Zholkovsky 1992.) In other cases reasons for being indirect are more understandable.

In Dostoevsky’s novel “The Idiot” the history of the relationships between Totski and Nastasya Filippovna is presented at first in the form of a hint:

Since that time he had been having special feelings about that remote village [Otradnoe village where he placed a sixteen year old orphan Nastya], visited it every summer and stayed there for two or even four weeks, and so it went on for quite a long time, about four years, peacefully and happily, with a lot of taste and grace.

This piece is followed by the description of Nastasya Filippovna’s reaction to the news that Totski intends to get married. It is only several pages later that her “disgrace” is mentioned.

Or take an example from Bunun that can also serve to demonstrate the notion of presupposition:

“Nu-s, zajdem teper’ poskorej k portnomu” <...> I my zašli k kakому-to malen’komu korotkonogomu čelovečku, udivivšemu menja bystrotoj reči s voprositel’nymi i kak budo nemnogo obižennymi otjažkami v konce každoj frazy <...>, potom v “šapočnoe zavedenie”, gde bylo <...> dušno i tesno ot besčislennyč korobok, vsjudu navalennyč v takom besporadke, čto xožjain mučitel’no dolgo rylsja v nič i vse čto-to serdito kričal na nepončatnom Čazyke v druguču komnatu <...>. Ėto byl tože evrej, no sovsem v drugom rode. (Bunin. “The life of Arseniev”)

“Well, then, now let’s go to the tailor’s as quickly as possible”<...> And we went in to see a small short-legged man, who surprised me by the rapidity of his speech which
faded off at the end of each phrase in a questioning and somewhat injured tone. <...>, then to the “hat establishment”, where it was <...> cramped and stuffy from the countless boxes piled up everywhere in such disorder that the owner rummaged around in them for a painfully long time and kept shouting something angrily in a strange language into the other room <....>. He was also a Jew, but of a completely different kind.’ This tože ‘also’ makes us conclude that the tailor was a Jew, though nothing was said about his nationality before. The corresponding semantic component is not asserted, it is just supposed to be known to the reader at this point of the text — indeed, it has the status of a presupposition (extracted from the meaning of tože).

Modern linguistics does not provide a full set of formal rules to explain deductions which the reader has no problem in making for himself. However, some kind of a formal approach to these phenomena has been worked out. The notion of presupposition is of great interest in this connection.

2. The definition of the presupposition

Presuppositions were discovered by G. Frege in 1892 (see Frege 1892/1977). More that half a century after that the attention of linguists was drawn to this notion again, see Strawson 1964 and others.

Proposition P is called a semantic presupposition of statement Q if Q entails the truth of P regardless of whether Q is true or false; in other words, if P is false then Q is neither true nor false.

Usually statement Q with a false presupposition appears to be deviant. For example, the presupposition of the sentence *The man standing by the window is my friend* is that there is only one person standing by the window, and nobody else. The utterance is meaningless if there is nobody by the window (or if there are many people there). Another example: the sentence *Ivan knows that New York is the capital of the USA* should not be regarded as false — it is deviant, and the source of deviance is the falsity of its presupposition ‘New York is the capital of the USA’.

A similar definition of presupposition can be found in the context of modal logic: P is a presupposition of Q if in all possible worlds where Q is true or false, P remains true. It should be emphasized that formalization of the notion of presupposition is possible only on the assumption that Q may
be neither true nor false, see Keenan, Hull 1973: 450), which is the case,
e.g., when Q is deviant. Presupposition is opposed to assertion, see below.

Presupposition is a particular kind of semantic entailment, which is
different from a usual logical entailment. In fact, if P is a logical entailment
of Q, i.e. if Q ⊃ P, then falsity of P automatically means that Q is false (ac-
According to the law of counterposition: if Q ⊃ P then ⊥P ⊃ ⊥Q). Whereas, in
the case of a false presupposition (P) the statement (Q) is not false, it is
simply devoid of truth value, i.e. deviant.

Semantic entailment is defined as follows: P is a semantic entailment
of Q if and only if in any situation (or: in any possible world) where Q is
true P is also true. Semantic entailment, as opposed to logical entailment,
does not obey the law of counterposition.

The following examples illustrate the difference between semantic
and logical entailment. In examples (1) and (2) sentence Q contains a se-
matic component P which is the logical entailment of S:
(1) Ivan is married to Maria (Q) ⊃ Ivan is married (P);
(2) Ivan has stopped working (Q) ⊃ Ivan doesn’t work (P).
Indeed, Q ⊃ P is true (because P is a semantic component of Q) and ⊥P ⊃ ⊥Q,
i.e. the law of counter position holds; e.g., if Ivan is not married (⊥P), then
he is not married to Maria (⊥Q).

Example (3) illustrates the notion of semantic entailment:
(3) Ivan managed to post the letter (Q) ⊃ Ivan posted the letter (P).

In this example, Q necessitates P but ⊥P does not necessarily means
that ⊥Q: from the fact that Ivan did not post the letter it does not follow that
he did not manage to do it: perhaps he did not bother to. Thus, P appears to
be the semantic entailment but not the logical entailment of Q.

3. PRESUPPOSITION
AND OTHER NON-ASSERTIVE SENTENCE COMPONENTS

Presuppositions are included in a large class of implicit (non-asser-
tive) semantic components of words and sentences; however, a number of
peculiarities make them different from all the other members of this class.

1. As has already been mentioned, presuppositions are different from
logical entailments as the latter obey the law of counterposition. In exam-
ple (1) component P is a logical entailment of Q, but it is not a presupposition: provided Ivan is not married, the utterance *Ivan is married to Maria* is simply false, but it is not deviant.

2. Example (3) illustrates the difference between presuppositions and ordinary semantic entailments. P in example (3) is a semantic entailment but not a presupposition of P, because \( \neg Q \) does not entail P: the fact that Ivan did not manage to post the letter \( \neg Q \) does not in any way entail that he posted it (P); in fact, just the opposite appears to be true.

3. The meaning of a sentence is composed not only of presuppositions and entailments but also of many other non-assertive components. For example, the utterance *Close the door!* does not have the presupposition “The door is open”, as some linguists have suggested. In general, presuppositions are defined only for statements. ‘The door is open’ is just a background component in the semantics of the word to *close* (see Paducheva 1993b on background components in lexical decomposition of a lexeme). Thus, it is a non-assertive component of the above utterance, which cannot be regarded as its presupposition.

4. In Keenan, Hull 1973 the term presupposition is also applied to a semantic component that we would call parenthetical or appositive:

(4) This assumption, *Austin thinks*, would lead to a philosophical mistake;

(5) Wittgenstein, *who only used to recognize provable truths*, changed his position finally.

However, a false parenthetical or appositive component does not entail the deviance of the whole utterance, and equating it with a presupposition was later found to be a mistake (see Böer, Lycan 1976).

5. Another variety of non-assertive semantic component, which is different from presuppositions, is the initial supposition (mostly of a question). The notion of initial supposition was studied in Kiefer 1977: question (I) *Who wants to say something?* has an initial supposition ‘Somebody wants to speak’; question (II) *In what countries has the study of water pollution been undertaken?* has an initial supposition ‘The study of water pollution has been undertaken somewhere’. The role of the initial supposition in the process of communication is different from that of the presupposition.
of the question. Initial suppositions may be ignored without any damage to
the communication process — among the variety of answers to questions
(I) and (II) the following are also possible: Nobody wants to speak; There
are no such countries. At the same time, a remark that would destroy the
presupposition of the question would mean a flawed act of communication.
For question (II) the following remark can serve as an example: There is no
such thing as water pollution (or: Which water pollution are you talking
about?; in Russian: Kakoe zagryaznenie vody?).

6. Violating the felicity condition of a speech act might also result in
semantic deviance, cf.:

(6) She is beautiful but I don’t think so;
(7) I don’t know that he has arrived.

In example (6), which is known as Moor’s paradox, deviance appears as
a result of a contradiction between the meaning of the statement and the main
felicity condition of the speech act of asserting, since the speaker is expected to
believe what he asserts. The deviance in example (7) is of the same origin. The
semantic component ‘It is raining’ is a presupposition of (7), and the speaker is
supposed to know the presuppositions of his/her own statements. Obviously,
all the felicity conditions of the speech act can be found in one form or the
other in the meaning of the utterance as its implicit semantic components.

The deviance illustrated by example (7) can be cancelled in the con-
text of unreal modality; you may say, for example: Assume that I don’t
know that he has arrived.

4. CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES

One of the most important notions that should be considered in con-
nection with the notion of presupposition is conversational implicature. In
the following examples (b) is the implicature of (a):

(1) a. I will come on Saturday or on Sunday;
   b. The speaker cannot be more precise than that.
(2) a. If you call me I will come;
   b. If you don’t I will not.
(3) a. She can see fine with her left eye;
   b. Something is wrong with her right eye.
Implicatures, as opposed to presuppositions, are not conventional (i.e. they are not parts of the meaning of words or constructions of a given language) — they come from general conversational maxims regardless of what language it is.

Conversational maxims, or postulates of discourse (see Grice 1975), come from a general principle of co-operation which implies that all participants of the speech act in normal situation have the same goal — mutual understanding.

According to Grice, conversational maxims can be divided into four groups:

1) postulate of informativeness (“Your utterance should be informative”, “It should not contain excess information”);
2) postulate of truth (“Say the truth” or at least “Don’t say what you know is not true”; “Don’t state something you cannot prove”);
3) postulate of relevance (“Be relevant”, i.e. “Speak about things connected with the given subject”);
4) postulate of clarity (“Avoid vague expressions”; “Avoid ambiguity”; “Cut a long story short”; “Be unequivocal”).

Conversational maxims generate implicatures of discourse, or conversational implicatures that can be deduced from the direct meaning of the utterance on the assumption that the speaker obeys the principle of cooperation. Implicatures of discourse are components of the meaning of the utterance but they are not included in the literal meaning of the sentence. Instead they are deduced by the listener from the context of the speech act using conversational maxima.

The speaker (S) may exploit conversational maxima to formulate his utterance in a way which allows the addressee to deduce more information than the utterance actually contains, due to the fact that L assumes that S is observing the co-operation principle. Providing the principle of co-operation is observed by S, these deductions are conversational implicatures. In other words, implicatures are assumptions made by L who not only takes into consideration the literal meaning of the utterance made by Q, but also the fact that Q bothered to make statement Q at all in the given situation, as
well as the fact that it was this particular utterance Q and not another one, Q’, requiring less effort than Q. These deductions imply the notion of “effort” which is intuitively clear but difficult to define: if Q’ is a statement approximately equivalent to Q but requiring less effort than Q, then L has the right to assume that in using Q and not Q’, S is “aiming at something”—i.e., exploiting some conversational postulate.

Conversational implicatures do not stem from any particular aspect of language structure; in other words, they do not form part of the conventional semantics of its lexicon or morphosyntax. Implicatures arise in the context of general conditions of successful communication.

Here are some examples where we have to turn to conversational maxims in order to understand the meaning of an utterance fully:

1) In tautologies like *The law is the law, A woman is a woman* the principle of informativeness is violated: their direct meaning is tautological—which forces the addressee to assume that their true meaning should be sought in the associations connected with the notions of law or women. It is because of these associations that we arrive at an understanding of them as ‘The law should be obeyed’, ‘Women have a lot of weaknesses’, etc. Note, though, that according to Wierzbicka 1987 or Bulygina, Shmelev 1989, the semantics of identity statement underlying this tautological formula contains some conventional components which are specific to one language and absent in another.

2) Irony, metaphor, litote, hyperbole are devices for creating a context, which would make the falsity of a statement obvious; here the principle of truth is violated, which would, in turn, make the addressee look for a hidden, secondary or more complicated meaning.

3) A pun is a technique, the principle of which is that the speaker violates the clarity maxims, “Be unequivocal”, and appears to be deliberately ambiguous. A statement which is purported to imply several readings should be regarded as deviant—especially if they are completely unconnected. Indeed, the function of a pun is not to express one of its meanings but to draw the listener’s attention to a play on those meanings (in Jakobson 1960/1975: 211 it is stated that this technique is actually intended to draw the attention of
the addressee to the message itself not to its meaning; in this work Jakobson offers a series of brilliant examples of deliberate ambiguity in poetry.

The notion of implicature makes it possible to “deload” the semantic description of a word or sentence by eliminating those components that stem from conversational maxims. Not all the information that the listener gets from the utterance in the context of the speech act may be said to be the actual meaning of the sentence, i.e. the meaning of its words and constructions. There are components of meaning that are not conveyed by the lexico-syntactic structure of a sentence. The listener is able to “extract” them unambiguously from the context appealing to the conversational maxims.

An interesting implicature is connected with the conjunction or (see McCawley 1981). Comparing the conjunction or in the natural language with the logical disjunction in propositional logic shows that or, as opposed to the logical disjunction, not only means that one of the alternatives is true, but also that the speaker does not know which one. However, this second meaning component is easy to deduce from the conversational maxims. In fact, if the speaker knew which option is fulfilled in reality, he would simply say so. It would make the utterance more informative with less linguistic effort. Therefore, assuming that the speaker was sincere, we can only deduce that he simply did not know. Thus, the “not-knowing” component can be removed from the actual meaning of the conjunction or. “We use disjunction of propositions only if we assume that one of them is true, although we do not know which one...”; otherwise “we can assert something simpler, but at the same time stronger.” (Tarski 1941/1948: 52). Thus, violating the “not-knowing” condition of the use of or the speaker is violating the postulate of informativeness.

The notion of conversational implicature allows Grice to come up with the following explanation of the difference between the meaning of the word some in the ordinary language and the existential quantifier in logics. It is known that in natural languages ‘some’ usually implies ‘not everybody/everything’, whereas in logic ∃xP(x) does not entail ∀xP(x). According to Grice, the statement (4a) is misleading — the speaker knows that all people are mortal and can use a more informative statement (4b) thus saving himself the effort:
(4) a. Some people are mortal;
b. All people are mortal.

Therefore, if the speaker chooses (4a) and not (4b), the listener has the right to conclude that the speaker considers (4b) to be false.  

Understanding a conditional sentence as one which expresses both a sufficient and a necessary condition (see example (2) above), is also a consequence of the postulate of informativeness. Indeed, if in the implication P ⊃ Q both P and Q are either true or false, then the sufficient condition becomes excessive unless it is necessary at the same time. Cf. the following dialogue:

— If you call me I will come.
— And what if I don’t [call you]?
— I will come anyway.
— Then why should I call you?

The implicature (b) of utterance (a) in example (3) is derived from the same postulate of informativeness (the example is considered from a different angle in Fillmore 1976): the speaker could have made a stronger statement with less linguistic effort if he had made the statement about both of her eyes; but the fact that he did not do it makes us assume that the stronger statement is not true.

In all of these examples the implicit semantic components do not appear to be part of the semantic decomposition of any word or construction of an actual sentence, although they are semantic components of the utterance taken together with its communicative context. Those components are not conventional: the listener deduces this information relying on the principle of cooperation and not on his/her knowledge of the language.

There are several significant points that make implicatures different from presuppositions.

a) The implicature is a less stable semantic component of the utterance than the presupposition. The implicature may be oppressed and cancelled under the influence of the context (namely, if the context contradicts a given implicature). For example, the implicature of the utterance John has

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7 In order to use argumentation that employs the notion of effort it is essential to measure these efforts or, at least, to compare the difficulty of meanings (in the given example the meaning of “all” must be recognised as a simpler meaning than that of “some”).
two children is ‘John has only two children, not more’. However, this implicature may be cancelled in some contexts, such as John has two children if not more; John has two children or maybe even more. In Russian too you can say U Ivana dvoe detej and then add: esli ne bol′še.

Presuppositions cannot be cancelled under the influence of contexts — they are nondefeasable. Using an utterance with the presupposition P in a context which contradicts this presupposition will result in deviance. The presupposition appears to be stronger than the context. Examples drawn from literature to illustrate the opposite (see Levinson 1983: 186) do not appear to be convincing. For example, the utterance John doesn’t regret that he lied with the given context that he didn’t lie is deviant.

b) Another important difference between implicatures and presuppositions is that implicatures are connected with the semantic content of the utterance and not the form. It is impossible to “get rid” of the implicature by replacing a word by its synonym. This property of implicatures is called nondetachability. Presuppositions do not have this property. A presupposition is connected with a given word or expression, and, in principle, another word can often (though not necessarily) be found which would have the same assertive component, but a different presupposition or no presupposition at all. The Russian conjunctions i ‘and’ and a ‘and, but’ can serve as an example in this case: both of them express logical conjunction, but their presuppositions differ (see Krejdlin, Paducheva 1974). Nondetachability of the implicature from the meaning of the utterance is a direct consequence of its being non-conventional.

The most remarkable property of presuppositions, which is sometimes even used as a basis for their definition, is that the presupposition of a sentence does not disappear if the sentence is negated. Two sentences, one of which means Q and the other ¬Q, have the same set of presuppositions. For example, the sentence

(5) No teper′ Afanasij Ivanovič podumal daže, čto on mog by vnov′ ěkspluatirovat′ ětu ženṧčinu.

‘But now it even occurred to Afanasij Ivanovich that he could exploit this woman again.’

(Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”)

has the presupposition ‘X once exploited this woman’ generated by the meaning of again. But the same presupposition is contained in the meaning of (5′):
(5') But now it occurred to Afanasij Ivanovich that he could exploit this woman _again._

This property of the presupposition stems directly from its definition; indeed, if Q entails P regardless of whether it is true or false, then P follows both from Q and \( \neg S \). However, it would be wrong to use this property as a definition of the presupposition. A sentence (especially if it is relatively long) might not contain a natural negation, but this does not mean that it has no presuppositions.

Modal, epistemic and other operators applied to a proposition do not affect its presuppositions. The fact that presuppositions remain valid in both negative and modal contexts makes presuppositions different from entailments. See the following examples (from Levinson 1983):

(6) The teacher gave three bad marks.
(7) a. The teacher exists.
    b. The teacher gave two bad marks.
(8) a. It is possible that the teacher gave three bad marks.
    b. The teacher should have given three bad marks.

The sentence (7a) is a presupposition of (6). The sentence (7b) is an entailment of (6). Accordingly, in sentence (8) where (6) is within the scope of the modal operator, the component (7a) is preserved while the component (7b) disappears.

Speaking more generally, the relationship between presuppositions and embedding operators can be described with the help of rules of inheritance (i.e. rules of projection). The problem of inheritance of presuppositions is the problem of whether the presupposition of a part of a sentence can be regarded as a presupposition of the whole sentence. The problem of projection of presuppositions occurs in connection with the principle of compositionality of meaning (after Frege). This principle implies that the meaning of the whole should appear as a function of the meaning of its constituent parts. One might think that when a compound sentence is composed of several simple ones presuppositions of the initial clauses simply accumulate. However, the rules of projection are more complicated. There are three classes of lexemes which affect presuppositions differently. The classification presented below was introduced in Karttunen 1973b.
a) There is a class of sentential operators, which Karttunen defined as holes, as they “let through” all the presuppositions of the simpler sentence into the more complex one. Negation naturally appears to be one of these holes, as do the above-mentioned epistemic and modal operators. In particular, this class includes all the factive predicates (i.e. predicates with the presupposition of truth of the subordinate clause: glad, upset, knows etc.). In fact, the subordinate clause of a factive verb is the presupposition of the whole sentence. In general, the presupposition of a component, which itself is the presupposition of the whole, appears to be the presupposition of the whole too. For example, in the sentence I don’t try to pretend that I don’t know that he is rich the component ‘he is rich’ is the presupposition of the component ‘I know that he is rich’, which itself is the presupposition of this sentence. Therefore, the component ‘he is rich’ is the presupposition of the whole sentence.

Presuppositions are preserved in the context of compound sentences with the conjunctions and, or, if ...then. For example, the presupposition of the sentence If Ivan fails his exam again he will not give it another try is ‘Ivan has failed at least once already’. The part of this sentence Ivan fails his exam again has the same presupposition.

b) The other class is represented by what is called “plugs”. Here belong propositional attitudes (and verba dicendi), in such contexts where the opinion of the subject of the attitude is not shared by the speaker. In this context the initial presupposition, i.e. the presupposition of the speaker, is cancelled. Instead, a semantic component B_α(P) appears in the semantic representation of the sentence, where B_α is the propositional attitude of the subject α, and P is the presupposition of the initial statement. In the context of “plugs” initial presuppositions of the speaker “change colour” and become presuppositions of the subject α.

Levinson (1983) rightly doubts the existence of “plugs” as a lexical category. Strictly speaking, the speaker’s disregard of the meaning he/she conveys is a pragmatic phenomenon, which should not be classified as lexicology. For example, in the sentence Nixon claimed that he regretted not having information about his employes’ activities the presupposition of the word regret disappears in the context of the word claimed. Whereas in
the sentence *The teacher told his pupils that even for him it was difficult to understand this theorem* the presupposition of the word *even* is preserved regardless of the context of the word *told*.

c) The third class of notions characterising the inheritance of presuppositions can be illustrated by the following examples:

(9) The water either never boiled or stopped boiling;
(10) If he has refused he must be regretting it already.

These examples contain constructions that give rise to a presupposition (stopped boiling presupposes that the water was boiling, regretting it means that he did refuse); but in these contexts the presupposition disappears.

Presuppositions in contexts such as (9) and (10) have two peculiarities: 1) they express a condition which concerns a possible world and not the real world; 2) they are saturated with the meaning of another component of the same sentence, and as a result, they are not valid for the whole sentence.

Clearly, it is words such as *or* and *if* that make it possible for presuppositions to operate like this. Karttunen called these words “filters” because they either let the presupposition through, like holes, or cancell it. The peculiarity of words like *or* and *if* is that, on the one hand, they are world creating operators (*or* = ‘if not’), but on the other hand they can combine two references to the same condition, one of which can saturate the other.

5. **Pragmatic presuppositions**

We shall now address the subject of pragmatic presupposition. Presuppositions can be called pragmatic from the point of view of their contents. The following classification characterizing the contents of presuppositions has been suggested: 1) existential, i.e. presuppositions of existence; 2) factive, i.e. presuppositions of truth — presuppositions stating a fact; 3) categorial presuppositions — e.g., presupposition of animateness characterizing the subject of mental predicates such as *to know, to think*. (This classification is not complete because there are many presuppositions which do not form any natural class.). One such class is represented by pragmatic presuppositions, which deal with the knowledge and beliefs of the speaker, see Keenan, Hull 1973 (cf. also Paducheva 1977). It might be more correct to call them epistemic presuppositions because they deal with the knowledge and opinions of the speaker.
The speaker making a statement Q has the pragmatic presupposition P if while asserting Q he considers that P goes without saying (for example, that P is a well-known fact for a listener). The sentence Q has the pragmatic presupposition P, if it obliges the speaker to have the pragmatic presupposition P whenever Q is used in the utterance. In other words, if this presupposition is not implied by the speaker then Q will appear inappropriate, insincere or provocative.

The semantic presupposition is a relationship between the components of a sentence, while the pragmatic presupposition is a propositional attitude the subject of which is the speaker.

Pragmatic presuppositions are called pragmatic because their contents include a reference to the speaker, who is one of the constituents of the pragmatic context in which the sentence is used as an utterance.

Pragmatic presupposition is the most useful formal device for describing the semantics of Topic-Comment articulation, for example the semantics of particles which contribute to Topic-Comment articulation. Russian èto is among them:

\( (1) \) Èto Vanja razbil okno ‘It was Vanya who broke the window’.

The semantic presupposition P appears to be inappropriate only if the listener knows that P is false. If the listener does not know that P is the case then he simply acknowledges P: the pragmatic presupposition appears to be inappropriate if the listener does not know anything about P. At the same time the inappropriateness of a pragmatic presupposition does not affect communication as much as the failure of a semantic presupposition. For example, the question *Was it you who broke the window?* has the pragmatic presupposition ‘Somebody has broken the window’. If the listener knows nothing about this fact her normal reaction would be something like *What window?* and not *No, it was not me*. However, *No, it was not me* is an adequate answer, too. This answer does not attest to the absence of the pragmatic presupposition from the sentence, it only attests to the fact that inappropriateness of a pragmatic presupposition can be ignored.

A semantic presupposition need not necessarily be accompanied by a corresponding pragmatic one. For example, the sentence
(2) They were only selling apples in the grocery store today has the semantic presupposition

(2′) They were selling apples at the grocery store today, which is not accompanied by the pragmatic presupposition, because the person stating (2) does not assume that (2′) is known to the listener.

The notion of presupposition has a long and rather dramatic history (see “Syntax and Semantics” 1979 for the detailed bibliography). Frege’s discovery was almost completely forgotten. Then presuppositions were rediscovered by Strawson in 1950 and remained on the “back burner” throughout the 1950s up to the late 1960s when the presuppositional boom began. However, the triumphal procession of presuppositions on the pages of both linguistic and logical magazines did not last long. In the mid 1970s it was hit by a wave of unexpected “exposures”. There were attempts to get rid of the notion of presupposition and to reduce it to other supposedly clearer notions (see Kempson 1975; Wilson 1975 and Böer, Lycan 1976). These attempts ended in failure.

In order to eliminate the notion of presupposition it was necessary to prove that presuppositions do not differ from ordinary semantic entailments (of which presupposition are a kind). In particular, it was necessary to prove that presuppositions can be cancelled in the context of negation, i.e., that a sentence having the logical structure \( \neg Q \) (with P as a presupposition of Q) is not necessarily deviant in a context contradicting P. The following examples were used as proof:

(3) Ivan didn’t recover — he wasn’t sick at all;
Ivan does not regret failing his exam because he didn’t fail;
Ivan didn’t stop beating up his wife because he never beat her in first place.

However, these examples cannot prove the thesis that presuppositions are cancelled in the context of negation. The use of negation in these sentences may be not deviant but is still rather specific. The difference in the way presuppositions and entailments behave in negative context, as well as in a number of other contexts, can serve as a sufficient argument in favour of regarding presupposition as a special class of semantic entailments.
6. The Communicative Status of a Proposition

Presuppositions are of interest not only in connection with the task of formalization of entailment, but also in connection with the problem of reference and the notion of the communicative status of a proposition (for the notion of communicative status see Boguslavsky 1985: 30; a cognate notion is that of modality of proposition — Paducheva 1974: 195). We speak of the communicative status of propositions in order to take into account the opposition between the assertive components of the utterance and presuppositions; implicative components (Karttunen 1973a); non-assertive components; unstable components (Zalizniak 1992) background components (Paducheva 1993a) and others.

The assertion of the sentence Q is the proposition that is denied if Q is denied, whereas presuppositions remain untouched under the same condition. For instance, in example (1) the component ‘The classes were cancelled’ has a presuppositional status, and the component ‘Ivan knows it’ has an assertive status. This is why in (1′), which is the negation of (1), the second component is negated while the first is not:

(1) Ivan knows that the classes were cancelled;
(1′) Ivan doesn’t know that the classes were cancelled.

The semantic entailment has implicative status:

(2) He managed to send the letter ⇒ He sent it;
(2′) He didn’t manage to send the letter ⇒ He did not send it.

Certain contexts provide the proposition with non-assertive (neutral) status. Such is the status of the proposition ‘He is ill’ in the conditional context of the sentence If he is really ill, the classes will be cancelled; or in the subjunctive context: I doubt that he is really ill.

Special attention should be attached to what may be called attributive status of the proposition (examples below are from Boguslavsky 1985: 30–32). The semantic decomposition of the verb in sentences (3)–(5) discloses two semantic components, the main one and its attribute. For example, in (3) and (4) the main component is ‘there is a contact between the Subject and the Object’; the second component — ‘the contact is weak’, — is the attribute of the contact. In (5) the main component is ‘The Subject is moving’, and the mode of movement — How it moves? — is the attribute of moving:
(3) The Christmas tree touches the ceiling;
(4) He caught the clock (when he was sweeping the floor);
(5) The water is flowing out of the hose.

Unlike the entailment, the attributive component is not negated in the context of general negation applied to the whole sentence. Unlike presuppositions, the attributive component does not remain untouched in this context. Neither is it negated, as assertive components does. An attributive component simply loses its meaning and disappears, cf:

(6) The Christmas tree does not touch the ceiling.
(7) He didn’t catch the clock;
(8) The water is not flowing.

In example (9) the attributive component “by plane” remains in the negative sentence but it acquires the modus of expectation, cf. examples (9) and (9’) also from Boguslavsky 1985:

(9) Ivan flew to his daughter’s wedding by plane =
‘Ivan arrived at his daughter’s wedding; and ‘he came by plane’;

(9’) Ivan didn’t fly to his daughter’s wedding = ‘Ivan didn’t arrive at his daughter’s wedding’ and ‘It was expected that he would come by plane’.

Given that in sentence (10) the main component is ‘The Subject increased’ and the attributive component is ‘by the given amount’, negation is only possible if the modus of expectation is expressed explicitly, cf. (10’) and (10’”):

(10) For the current year coal extraction has increased by 10 million tons;
(10’) *For the current year coal extraction has not increased by 10 million tons;
(10’”) For the current year coal extraction has not increased by 10 million tons as was planned.

Thus, we have the right to conclude that the notion of presupposition (as well as other communicative types of propositional components) plays an important role in the process of formalization of mechanisms for extracting implicit information from the text. This notion has another facets to it. The presupposition has a carrier. It may be the speaker or the subject of the propositional attitude. This is why presuppositions have a direct bearing on the semantics of egocentric elements of language — including those that serve for reference. In the next chapter we shall return to presuppositions in connection with the problem of reference.
Reference of linguistic expressions to objects and situations in the
world has two aspects to it. Reference as an action is effected by the speaker
and is to be regarded as a separate component of the speech act. Reference
as a result is a relationship established between linguistic expressions in the
context of the speech act, see Strawson 1964, Searle 1969; Linsky 1967.

Linguistic texts are always constructed in a way that implies the exist-
ence of some external world — be it a real or an imaginary one, as in fic-
tion. In the case of an imaginary world, linguistic expressions refer to ob-
jects and situations of the imaginary world of the text. Mechanisms of refer-
ing textual elements to objects of a real and imaginary world are similar in
many ways. They are similar, but not the same. The most important differ-
ence is that the real world exists, generally speaking, irrespective of the text,
while an imaginary world is shaped by the text itself. Besides, in conversa-
tional discourse the speaker belongs to the world to which he/she makes a
reference, while the author of a fictional text does not. This chapter deals
with reference in ordinary conversational discourse, i.e. with reference to the
real world. Reference in fiction is considered in Chapters II.1, II.2, and III.1.

The theory of reference is related to linguistics of narrative primarily due
to the fact that the identity of designated objects (co-reference) is one of the
major conditions of text cohesion (on cohesion as explicit coherence see Ehr-
lisch 1990). In any case, it was this aspect that was the first to be recognized by
linguists as a criterion of text coherence, see, e.g., Paducheva 1965/1974.

Reference in natural language is inseparable from pragmatics (cf.
Givón 1978: 293), namely from such semantic oppositions as known/un-
known for the speaker; the focus of the speaker’s empathy; presupposition
by the speaker that the object is known or unknown to the Addressee, and
so on. Therefore, the means of reference are nearly always deictic and form
the core of egocentric elements of the language.

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8 Cf. Bally 1932/1955: “reality can be not only objective but also fictional, imaginary...
However the difference between the two is not always clear”.

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We should also bear in mind that nominations and, consequently, the concepts of referential expressions, reflect, as a rule, the point of view of a definite subject of consciousness, see Uspenskij 1970: 40 ff. Thus, the theory of reference is intimately related to the linguistics of the narrative in the aspect which is our concern.

Below we are going to consider the following problems of the theory of reference: reference vs. meaning; the inventory of referential status; deictic reference; and reference in non-extensional contexts.

There are two categories of linguistic expressions that acquire reference to the external world in the context of an utterance. These are, in the first place, the noun phrase (NP) and, in the second place, the predicate phrase — a finite verb with all its dependent NPs, in particular, a sentence as a whole, i.e. something that expresses a proposition. In this chapter we shall confine our consideration to referential properties of NPs: those of propositional components were discussed in Chapter I.2 in connection with the communicative status and modality, or modus, of propositions.

1. Reference and meaning

One of the tasks of the logical theory of reference is to determine those features of linguistic expressions that are responsible for their referential use; in particular, it is important to understand the role which the meaning of a linguistic expression plays in the mechanisms of reference. Indeed, the role of semantic and pragmatic factors in reference, as well as the degree to which the meaning predetermines reference, may be different for different types of referential expressions. In this respect three different types of expressions can be distinguished.

1. A proper name has no meaning in the language. Reference of proper names is based not on their meaning, but on the extralinguistic knowledge of the speaker.

Moreover, an essential feature of proper names is that they serve for referring to an object without ascribing any properties to it; the metalinguistic attribute ‘has this name’, which Church (1956) includes in the mean-
ing of proper names, is part of the object’s concept only in a peculiar situation when the object has several names, cf. Uspensky 1970: 40.

Proper names can be used as common nouns, see Vendler 1982. For example, in the sentences Sto dvadcat’ odnu Margaritu obnaružili my v Moskve ‘We have found one hundred and twenty one Margaritas in Moscow’ (Bulgakov); S kakim-to Čackim ja kogda-to byl znakom ‘I used to know a Chacky’ (Griboedov) the name Margarita is used as a common noun with the concept ‘a woman Margarita by name’ and Chacky as ‘a man Chacky by name’. In usual contexts of use the idea of having this or that particular name does not make a part of the concept of the object which is called this proper name. Similarly, the component ‘to be called a horse’ does not make a part of the concept of the word horse the in usual contexts of use of language.

When using a proper name the speaker may not fully express his judgement that he (as a human being rather than the speaker) may have in mind. For example, the utterance Marusya married Zhora may have a situational meaning ‘My daughter married a rascal’, which certainly is not the meaning of this sentence.

2. Deictic, i.e. demonstrative, words and expressions have the same meaning in all their uses and their reference in a given context is predetermined by this meaning. In fact, words ja ‘I’ and ty ‘you’ have unambiguous reference in every speech act. The meaning of deictic elements, however, is of a special character, see below Section 5.

3. The reference of so-called descriptions (noun phrases that have common nouns as their constituents), such as Nero’s mother, Bukovsky’s dog, this book, is determined by both the linguistic meaning of the common noun and the meaning of the deictic element in it, including all its pragmatic components.

2. REFERENTIAL STATUS OF NOUN PHRASES

It is often said that reference characterizes the use of linguistic expression and not a linguistic expressions as such (Linsky 1967). What is meant is that, generally speaking, there is no stable relationship between a referential expression and this or that extralinguistic object. However, the fact that a given NP in the context of a given sentence is meant for specific ref-
ference, i.e. should be somehow related to an individual object, and is different from another NP which is meant for something else, is a relatively permanent feature of some kind of NPs and it is expressed, with a varying degree of unambiguity, by linguistic means. Let us consider an example.

(1) a. Vrač prišel toľko k večeru ‘The doctor came only in the evening’;
   b. Nado najti kakogo-nibud′ vrača ‘We must find a doctor’;
   c. Vrač dolžen vnimatel’novo vyslušat′ bol’nogo
      ‘A doctor should be attentive to the patient’s words;
   d. Ivan vrač ‘Ivan is a doctor’;
   e. Zavtra ja pojdu k vraču ‘Tomorrow I’ll go to see (a/the) doctor’.

In (1a) vrač ‘doctor’ stands for a specific extralinguistic object: one doctor is singled out in the set of all doctors if not in advance then at least by his participation in the situation described by sentence (1a); in other words, the word vrač has a reference. In sentence (1b) the Speaker does not have in mind any specific object and the expression kakogo-nibud′ vrača has no reference. In (1c) the word vrač most likely means “any doctor” and is somehow intricately related to the whole set of doctors of the past, present and future, i.e. to the extension (in Carnap’s sense) of the word doctor. In (1d) the word vrač is not related to any object at all and is used as a predicate. Finally, (1e) is ambiguous: if followed by On rabotaet v našej bolnice, the Np vrač in (1e) will be understood as in (1a); while outside this type of context — as in (1b).

The type of reference a NP is meant for is called here its denotative (or referential) status, cf. the term mode of reference in Geach 1962. The actual relationship between a NP and some extralinguistic object is established only in the speech act, while the denotative status, or the inherent ability to this or that type of reference, characterizes a NP in the sentence.

The referential status may be expressed with a varying degree of unambiguity in structurally different NPs. The referential status of a description depends largely on the syntactic context; cf. the well known examples from Linsky 1967: the description korol′ Francii ‘the king of France’ meant, generally speaking, for reference to a specific individual, can be used non-referentially, as in the sentences Korolja Francii ne suščestvuet ‘The king of France does not exist’ and De Gaulle ne byl korolem Francii ‘De Gaulle never was
the king of France’. For proper names context-dependent status variation is limited, while for NPs containing demonstratives it is actually non-existent.

The referential status is a generalization of different concepts that have been used to denote separate members of this conceptual category, such as substantive/predicate use, definiteness/indefiniteness, specific/non-specific indefiniteness, universal/existential quantification and others.

Below is an inventory of the denotative status of NPs (or rather of a NP uses in sentences). Uses of a NP can be subdivided into substantive and predicate ones. A substantive use of NP introduces, one way or another, a certain extralinguistic object — as in utterences (1a)–(1c); substantive uses of NPs are further subdivided into referential and quantified ones. A NP in a predicative use is not related to any objects at all but denotes attributes, as in (1d). Moreover, there can be autonomous uses, i.e. uses in which a linguistic expression has a confluent reference as it denotes itself, like Nataša does in Muž prosto zval ee Nataša ‘Her husband simply called her Natasha’ (“Pushkin. Conte Nulin”)

Let us consider referential and quantified NPs in greater detail.

2.1. Referential NPs

All referential NPs single out a specific object or a set of objects, regarded as a single object; in other words, referential NPs have a reference. In the Russian language there are three varieties of referential NPs:
— strongly definite, i.e. definite for both the Speaker and the Addressee;
— weakly definite, i.e. definite for the Speaker but not for the Addressee;
— indefinite both for the Speaker and the Addressee.

Definite NPs; examples:
(1) a. Tu knigu, kotoruɉu ty mne dal, ja uɉe proɉel
‘I have already read the book you gave me’;
b. Ja proɉel ėtu knigu
‘I have read this book’;
c. Lučšaja iz moɉx kartin naɉoditɕa v Luvr
‘The best of my paintings is in the Louvre’;
d. Žena Cezarɉa vne podozrenij
(=’the woman who is now Caesar’s wife is above suspicion’);
e. Sobaku on vzɉal s soboj
‘He took the dog with him’;
f. Sokrat — filosof
‘Socrates is a philosopher’.
A definite NP is correlated with the presupposition of the object’s existence and uniqueness in the common field of vision of the Speaker and the Addressee. We speak here of both semantic presupposition (i.e. a proposition the falsity of which makes the sentence meaningless and which is not subject to negation) and pragmatic presupposition (i.e. a proposition which the Speaker believes to be known to the Addressee), see Ch. I.2. It is true, however, that in some contexts the definite NP bears no pragmatic presupposition. For example, the subject NP in the sentence *The book John wrote last year has become a bestseller* is obviously definite — and contains the definite article. The Addressee, however, should not be previously informed that John wrote a book last year to perceive this sentence as a normal one.

Both the first and repeated mentions of an object can be definite. Correspondingly, we differentiate between **textual** and **situation**al definiteness (on textual definiteness see Krylov 1984a). Textual definiteness can be expressed differently from the definiteness of the first mention. Zero substitutes are possible only when the object is mentioned not for the first time; definite reference in the first mention is not normally realized by means of the third-person pronoun, cf. the stylistically marked beginning of Pushkin’s “The Bronze Horseman” where Peter the Great is denoted, by the pronoun *on* ‘he’: *Na beregu pustynnõõ voln stojal on, dum velikiõõ poln.* On the special function of such beginnings in FID see Chapter II.5.

Specific reference, however, cannot be reduced to the presupposition of the object’s existence and uniqueness: when the Speaker uses a description referentially he or she not only believes that there is a single object that satisfies this description, but also that the description satisfies the object it refers to, see Donnellan 1979.

**SEMI-DEFINITE NPs; examples:**

(2) a. On xočet ženit’sja na *odnaj inostranke* ‘He wants to marry *a foreign girl*’;

b. On xočet tebe *koe-čto* skazat’ ‘He wants to tell you *something*’;

c. U menõa est’ k nemu opredelennaja pretenziõa ‘I bear a certain *grudge* against him’;

d. *Malčik* lovil kuznečikov ‘*A boy* was catching grasshoppers’;

e. Na s”ezde prisutstvoval *nekij Dubois*

(= prisutstvoval Dubois, kotorogo vy, ja polagaju, ne znaete)
‘A certain Dubois was present at the Congress’
(= Mr. Dubois whom I believe you do not know, was present).

Examples of plural NPs of the same type:

(3) a. Ja postavil pered nim opredelennye uslovija
‘I put forward definite terms for him’;
   b. \textnumero\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textdegree\textd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When the language of predicate logic is used to represent the meaning of natural language sentences the existential quantifier \( \exists \) is taken to represent indefinite reference. This representation, however, is semantically inadequate, as the quantifier \( \exists \) ‘there exists at least one’ serves the purpose only in case of attributes of non-specified objects, as in the sentence

‘Any point belongs to some straight line’,

where the NP *some straight line* has no reference. Meanwhile in sentence (4b) *kakoj-to učebnik* ‘some text-book’ is related to a specific object.

### 2.2. Quantified NP

Quantified NPs are substantive NPs that do not designate any specific object. Quantified NPs are subdivided into existential, universal and generic.

#### Existential NPs

Existential NPs are used to indicate an object (or a set of objects) that belongs to a class of similar objects but is not specified within this class, i.e. an object that cannot be specified in principle rather than being simply unknown to the Speaker. We differentiate between three types of uses existential NPs.

a) **Distributive** NP designate the participants of a situation who are distributed over a set of similar events, every event having, as a rule, its own participant (though one and the same person can participate in several events):

1. Inogda *kto-nibud′ iz nas ego naveščaet* ‘Occasionally one of us goes to see him’;
   
   Vsjakie dve peresekajuščiesja prjamyje imejut *obščuju točku*;
   
   ‘Any two crossing straight lines have a common point’;

2. K každomu iz vospitannikov priešali ego rodstvenniki;
   
   ‘Each of the inmates was visited by relatives’;

b) **Non-specific** NPs are used in propositional contexts with neutral modality, or, in other words, with a neutral communicative status, see Chapter I.2.6. According to Weinreich (1963/1970), this is a context of cancelled affirmation. Such a context is created by modal words like *možet* ‘can’, *xočet* ‘wants’, *dolžen* ‘should’, *neobhodimo* ‘it is necessary’, the imperative mood and future tense of verbs; interrogation, negation (including intralexemic as in the verbs *ne hvataet* ‘is missing’, *otkazyvaetsja* ‘refuses’, *zapreščaet* ‘prohibits’, *otricaet* ‘denies’), disjunction, conditioning, purpose, diffidence, conjecture, irreality; by numerous propositional attitudes,
such as hočet ‘wants’, stremitsja ‘seeks’, sčitaet ‘believes’, dumaet ‘thinks’ and performative verbs, such as prikazyvaet ‘orders’, prosit ‘asks’:

(2) John xočet ženit‘ja na kakoj-nibud’ inostranke
‘John wants to marry some foreign girl’;
On iščet novuju sekretaršu ‘He is looking for a new secretary;
V komnate net ni odnogo čeloveka ‘There is not a single person in the room’;
Vo izbežanie peregruzki lifta odin iz passażirov dolžen vyjti
‘To avoid overload, one of the passengers should leave the elevator (in the most
natural meaning — just one, it does not matter who’).

c) **General existential** NPs are used to refer to objects with some
definite features without specifying the former. Thus, the NP nekotorye to-
vary ‘some goods’ in example (3a) is different from the referential NP ne-
kotorye iz prisutstvujuščiখ ‘some of those present’ in

Nekotorye iz prisutstvujuščiখ ne pončali ego slov
‘Some of those present failed to understand his words’,
since in (3a) quantification is based on an abstract set which constitutes the
extension of the common noun, while the NP nekotorye iz prisutstvujuščiখ
is definite — on a specified set introduced in the preceding text:

(3) a. Nekotorye tovary portjatsja pri transportirovke
‘Some goods degenerate during transportation’;

b. Inaja pohvala huže brani ‘Some praise can be worse than abuse’;
Mnogie ljudi bojatsja tarakanov ‘Many people are afraid of cockroaches’;

c. V ėtom lesu vodjatsja losi ‘There are elks in this forest’.

A general existential status is the status of the subject in the so-called par-
ticular propositions of traditional logic, i. e. propositions about a part of
some abstract (universal) set. Like universal NPs, general existential NPs
are possible only in the context of predicates that express permanent attrib-
utes not pinpointed in time.

The semantics of existentiality can be adequately rendered by the ex-
istential quantifier $\exists$, which makes it possible to single out an object with-
out it. Additional meanings are specified by the context: for example, a change
in the participants in (1) (i.e. the meaning ‘There exists, generally speaking, its own’) — by the context of distributive plurality; indefiniteness in nearly
all phrases in (2) — by the context of diffidence, conjecture and irreality in
the governing predicate. The meaning of sentence (3c), however, cannot be adequately represented with the help of quantifier $\exists$.

**Universal NPs**

The semantics of a universal NP can be rendered by means of the universality quantifier $\forall$ ‘for any $x$’ binding the variable $x$ that assumes its values in the extension of the NP’s common noun:

(4)  
- a. Konec venčaet delo ‘The end determines the outcome of any business’;
- b. Tot, kto seet veter, požnet burju ‘He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind’;
- c. Mladšij rebenok v sem’ye pol’zuetsja samoj bol’šoj ljubov’ju ‘The youngest child in the family is loved the most’;
- d. Vse deti ljubjat moroženoe ‘All children love ice-cream’;
- e. Ljuboj ee nedostatok možno ustranit’ ‘Any of her flaws can be easily corrected’.

The semantic representation of sentences with the help of the language of logic does not differentiate between the logical forms of such sentences as *Vse sotrudniki otdela vypolnili svoj godovoi plan* ‘All workers of the department have fulfilled their annual plan’ and (4d)

*Vse deti ljubjat moroženoe* ‘All children love ice-cream’.

Meanwhile the referential features of the NPs in these two sentences are different: in (4d) the reference is made to a definite specific set that exists in the common field of vision of the interlocutors; while in the first sentence — to an abstract set constituting the extension of the word *deti* ‘children’. The truth conditions of propositions about specific sets should be checked in a different way than about abstract sets, since specific sets can be checked on the element by element basis, while abstract sets do not allow empirical approach, and their truth conditions can be checked only by inference, inductive or deductive. Hence the importance of causation for universal sentences (on the relationship between universality and causation see Dahl 1975). Kronhauz (1984) speaks of an intentional type of reference in the case of universal NPs as opposed to extensional reference in the case of plural NPs.

**Generic NPs**

Generic NPs are those which make reference to a representative of a class of objects, the one that serves as a model rather than being just ‘any’:
a. Ivan možet ubit' medveda  ‘Ivan can kill a bear’;
b. On postupil kak mužčina  ‘He behaved like a man’;
c. Skorpion poxož na kuznečika  ‘A scorpion looks like a grasshopper’;
d. On igraet na skripke  ‘He plays the violin’;
e. Glaz u ėtoj ryby imeet formu gruši  ‘This fish has pear-shaped eyes’;
f. Kul't materi široko rasprostranen v Indii  ‘The cult of mother is widespread in India’.

The generic use is non-referential as it does not require that the speaker should recognize the existence of a specified object in the universum of speech⁹: reference is made to a genus of objects via one representative of that genus. Thus in The day will come when man will land on the planet of Mars preference should be given to a generic rather than existential interpretation of the word man, as it is clear that not just a man but a representative of the genus Homo is meant in this sentence.

The generic and universal interpretations of a sentence may also differ as to their truth conditions, see Wierzbicka 1980, Paducheva 1989.

3. Deixis

Deixis has long been studied in logic (see Peirce 1940:104; Bar-Hillel 1954) as an element of pragmatics which, according to Ch. Morris (1938), investigates how the sign is related to the context in which it is used, in the first place — to the Speaker. For discussion of deixis see Krylov 1984b, Krylov, Paducheva 1992 with bibliography appended.

In language, deictic words and elements are a rule rather than an exception to it. Besides words like ja, ty, zdes', sejčas, ēto ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘this’, another important source of deixis is to be found in the grammatical category of tense that ascribes deictic coordinates to all sentences used in speech with the exception of those that Quine (1960) called eternal, i.e. sentences in the gnomic present tense, the only use of tense that is not deictic.

An element is called deictic if it identifies an object — be it a physical object or a place, a point in time, an attribute or a situation — through its relationship to the speech act, its participants or its context.

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⁹ Bally (1932/1955: 92) wrote: “in our imagination we visualize a genus as the embodiment of the very essence”. However, “such personification can only be imaginary because as a result of actualization the content of a noun becomes unlimited while <...> generic nouns are determined by a limited number of characteristic features”. 80
Such categories as mood, modality and the illocutionary function markers (affirmative and interrogative) are not deictic. These elements are egocentric, i.e. their semantics implies the existence of the Speaker (for example, a sentence in the subjunctive mood such as *Bylo by sejčas leto* ‘It would be nice if it were summer now’ contains a semantic component ‘the Speaker wishes’), but deictic. The essential feature of deixis, which differentiates it from other egocentric elements, is the fact that for deictic words reference to the speech act context serves the purpose of identification (of objects, points in time and space and so on).

Deictic elements include: 1) the first- and second-person pronouns and verb forms; 2) demonstrative pronouns and adverbs as well as a deictic definite article; 3) tense; 4) some meanings of verbs (cf., for example, Fillmore 1971 on the English verb *come*) and adverbs; cf, for example, the English adverb *ago* (analysed by Fillmore), which, unlike the adverb *earlier*, implies reference to the time of the Speaker, i.e., to the time of the speech act. Therefore it is possible to say (a) and (b), but one cannot say (c):

(a) He lived there many years ago;
(b) He had lived there many years earlier;
(c) *He had lived there many years ago,* since the Past Perfect means that the action is referred to some moment in the past preceding the moment of speech while *ago*, being deictical, implies direct reference to the moment of speech.

Besides numerous words and categories that may have deictic meanings, nearly all referential expressions can be deictic in some of their uses. Thus, reference of proper nouns of persons is for the most part deictic in character (or, at least, egocentric), i.e. dependent on the speech act. In this case, however, pragmatically determined reference characterizes the speech acts of a definite community in their totality rather than a single speech act. For example, *Ivanov* can designate one person in one community and a different person in a different one. Quantifiers are also deictic; for instance, *vse* ‘all’ in the sentence *Vse ostalis' dovol'ny* ‘All were pleased’ designates
not the universal set of all people but a specific group singled out by the speech act context (or somewhere in the text).³

Though deictic pronouns form a certain semantic group (being all related to the speech situation), there is a significant difference between first- and second-person pronouns (including the “first-person adverbs” — here, now) and demonstrative pronouns: the personal pronouns are determined directly by the speech act parameters, while the demonstrative ones are to be determined by these parameters via additional and yet rather vague concepts — such as the common field of vision of the interlocutors, salience of the object in the field of vision, the Speaker’s pointing gestures, etc. Formalization of demonstrative elements through the introduction of an additional coordinate axis, ‘objects pointed at’ and ‘previously mentioned objects’ that would be similar to the coordinates ‘the Speaker, ‘the Addressee’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ (as proposed in Lewis 1972) would give an unjustifiably rough approximation of the real picture.

After deictic uses of pronouns had attracted the attention of linguists, it was soon found that the anaphoric use of pronouns was based on their deictical use and was very similar to it in many significant ways. Consequently, the anaphoric use, which has always been looked upon as a simpler “young brother” is also characterized by numerous pragmatic constraints that were not considered in the first attempts at a description of pronominalization made in the framework of the transformational approach to language, see Paducheva 1974. For example, the use of the third-person pronouns is governed by such conditions as the object’s location in the common field of vision of the interlocutors or in the focus of their attention or else in the focus of their empathy among other things (Lyons, 1978).

Strictly speaking, the distinction between deixis and anaphora is not always clear. For example, in sentence The sound of footsteps was heard —

³ Stalnaker (1972) speaks of deictical modal words; for example, when saying it is possible or it is necessary one usually has in mind not the whole set of possible worlds but a set somehow singled out by the speech act context — by the Speaker’s knowledge, his presuppositions, his ideas of law, morality, standards and physical possibilities. In the light of our terminology, however, we have here an egocentric orientation of the meaning rather than deixis.
it was Yura the pronoun it seems to be anaphoric, though it has no antecedent (Paducheva 1982a).

Similarly, the distinction between the deictic use of the definite article (definiteness in the speech act context) and the use of the same article in the context of encyclopaedic uniqueness is not clear-cut either; in other words, there is no distinct boundary between the uniqueness of an object in the common field of vision of the interlocutors (the table in a situation with only one table) or in their common pool of knowledge (the king for the citizens of the same state).

One of the difficult problems with deixis is deferred ostension (the term was proposed by Quine (1971), when the singled out object does not coincide with the deictic expression reference the Speaker has in mind. The following is an example of deferred ostension from Miller 1982: a waitress in the restaurant asks: “Where did he go?” pointing not to the man but to the steak on the table he has ordered. Deferred ostension is a particular instance of deferred (i.e. metonymic) reference, cf. pairs like Proust — works by Proust, a canoe — people in it and so on, analysed in Lakoff 1975. Lakoff proposes a solution prompted by the tradition of generative grammar: for sentences with deferred ostension, deep structures with an explicit name of the object are to be generated and then reduced in the course of transformational derivation. This solution is not quite satisfactory since, at least in certain contexts, one and the same NP may have, besides a deferred ostension, a direct reference as well. Let us suppose that the sentence Proust’a očen’ trudno čitat’ ‘It is very difficult to read Proust’ is understood as ‘it is difficult to read works by Proust’. If it were all true, then the sentence ‘Mr. NN made the public read himself’ (Dostoevsky “Writer’s diary”) where Mr. NN denotes some writer and himself should mean ‘his works’, would be impossible, which it is not.

The egocentricity of deictic word semantics, i.e. its orientation towards the Speaker, becomes obvious from their semantic interpretations (one of the first attempts at such an interpretation was made by Reichenbach 1947):

I (when the token of this word is used in utterance U)

= ‘the one who is the Speaker in U’;

You = ‘the one who is the Addressee of the Speaker in U’;
this \( X \) = ‘that \( X \) which the Speaker in U points at (at least mentally); or that \( X \)
which is close to the Speaker; or \( X \) salient in the common field of vision of
the participants in the speech act U’.

Available interpretations do not cover all subtleties in the use of deictic
pronouns, cf. such problems as the inclusive and exclusive meaning of
the Russian pronoun \( my \) ‘we’, the indefiniteness of the pronouns \( here, now \),
i.e. the breadth of the temporal or spatial zone that is regarded as adjacent
to the Speaker (the same goes true for the pronoun \( we \)). The obligatoriness
of use of 1\(^{st}\) or 2\(^{nd}\) person deixis when naming the participants in the speech
act may also vary, cf. the possibility of using the pronouns \( han \) ‘he’, and
\( hon \) ‘she’ in Swedish with respect to the Addressee of the utterance, which
is not to be found in Russian).

Some important aspects of the semantics of deixis have been identi-
fied in the framework of so-called formal semantics — by R. Montague,
D. Scott, D. Lewis and particularly by D. Kaplan, who found that the role
of lexical decomposition in the semantics of the deictic pronouns is limited
compared to the importance of similar decompositions for predicate words
and referential expressions having a descriptive meaning.

Kaplan (1978) provides a series of examples throwing light on contex-
tual factors that contribute to disambiguation of the NP’s reference but are
not the components of the ultimate meaning of the utterance. Thus, writes
Kaplan, the question “Do you know anything new about Lybia?” addressed
to me by my wife, can be related either to the state of Lybia or to our
daughter Lybia, and you guess what was meant relying upon its context,
i.e. some pragmatic factors, and not upon the meaning of the phrase as
such; how I do it is not relevant for the message perceived by me. Similar-
ly, the meaning of the deictic pronoun, i.e. the way the reference is made,
can be irrelevant for the meaning of the utterance. Kaplan proposed to
make use of Russell’s conception, which postulates that for certain types of
designating expressions, it is the designated object that is to be regarded as
their meaning. Consequently, the designated person itself is the proposi-
tional component that corresponds to the deictic pronoun. As to various lin-
guistic forms the reference of one and the same object may have, they are
not reflected in the ultimate meaning of the utterance, i.e. in the proposition expressed in it. In fact, every reference singles out an individual object; but the way it does so is not relevant for the utterance meaning, just as it was irrelevant for the identification of the object (the state of Lyibia or the daughter Lybia) in the above example.

In logic, it is accepted to believe that the meaning of a referential expression is the way it makes it possible to identify the object. Cf. the well known definition by Frege according to which the meaning of a noun is the way this noun indicates its possible reference — the way of presenting the reference. This approach, however, proves to be unacceptable for deictic pronouns: the way of indicating the object may be irrelevant for the overall meaning of the utterance.

A convincing example confirming this conclusion is given in Stalnaker 1972. The sentence *I might as well not be here now* said by John at a party has the meaning ‘It is not necessary that John should be at this party’ (John could have said: “It is not necessary that I should be here now”) and is true. Indeed, this very situation would not take place in some other possible world. Meanwhile, the sentence *I am here now* is true every time it is uttered, i.e. it is necessarily true. Sentences like *I am not here* or *I am not here but there* can be used only metaphorically, for in their literal meaning they would be absurd. Consequently, it is not the proposition *I am here now* that is necessarily true, but some other proposition in which the deictic expressions are replaced by more direct denotations.

In principle, the sentence *I am here now* can be ascribed two meanings: 1) ‘I am now in a place where I am now’ (in this meaning the word *here* is replaced by its semantic decomposition) and 2) ‘I am now in the place A’ (where the word *here* is represented not by its meaning but by its denotatum A). The first meaning, however, is tautological and bears no information, therefore this sentence will be normally understood in the second meaning, which has no connection with the semantic decomposition of the word *here*.

Consequently, the role of semantic decompositions of deictic pronouns is temporally constrained: semantic decompositions of deicticals are not included in the ultimate meaning of the sentence (which in other cases
is obtained through the integration of the meanings of its constituent elements. The role of deictic words is to indicate their references, and once this role is played, they take a curtain call.

4. NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS IN NON-EXTENSIONAL CONTEXTS

Logicians, beginning with Frege, studied the specific behaviour of the referential names and descriptions in the so-called non-extensional contexts. The following “anomalies” have been noted.

Generally speaking, a referential NP can be substituted for another NP with the same reference salva veritate (though the meaning might change):

(1) a. Oedipus married Jocasta.
    b. Oedipus married his mother.

Since Jocasta is the mother of Oedipus (i.e., the corresponding identity statement is true) one cannot imagine a situation when (1a) is true while (1b) is false. In that way the expressions Jocasta and the mother of Oedipus are interchangeable in (1) without a change in the truth value. Yet in the examples (2a) — (4a) such a substitution results in a change of the truth value (the examples are borrowed from Quine 1953)\(^\text{10}\)

(2) a. Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta.
    b. Oedipus wanted to marry his mother.
(3) a. Oedipus knew that he was married to Jocasta.
    b. Oedipus knew that he was married to his mother.
(4) a. Philip believes that Tegucigalpa is in Nicaragua.
    b. Philip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua.

Quine has defined contexts in which the principle of interchangeability of identicals does not hold as “referentially opaque”, or “non-extensional”. Here is another definition of a non-extensional context: the context where the concrete referential term \(a\) is used is non-extensional if \(P(a)\) does not entail \(\exists x P(x)\); on non-extensional contexts see Heny 1981.

Referential opacity itself is not a satisfactory semantic notion and requires an additional analysis as such. Suffice it to mention the fact that in Quine 1953 modal contexts (in particular, the context of a predicate of pro-

\(^{10}\) This follows from Leibnitz’s principle of indiscernibility of identicals, cf. the formulation of the principle in Quine 1953: “if an identity statement is true then in any true sentence one of its members may be replaced by the other one, and the result will also be a true sentence”.

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positional attitude) on the one hand and the contexts with autonymous use of terms on the other are discussed side by side. Indeed, both contexts have the impact of non-interchangeability of identicals. Yet it is clear that semantically they have little in common.

Another “anomaly” consists in the fact that a sentence, contradictory by itself, in a non-extensional context may allow quite natural and sensible interpretation; for example, (5a) is contradictory, while (5b) is not:

(5) a. The books that have been burnt haven’t been burnt;
    b. Ivan believes that the books that have been burnt haven’t been burnt.

In the same way, the contradictory sentence (6a) allows consistent interpretation in the context of modality, see (6b), the example is from Russell 1920:

(6) a. The author of “Hamlet” is not the author of “Hamlet”;
    b. The author of “Hamlet” might not have been the author of “Hamlet”.

One more aspect of the problem can be illustrated by the following example from Quine 1971. Let us take a man in a yellow hat, who has been seen in suspicious circumstances by our acquaintance Ralph, and whom Ralph considers to be a spy. There is also a respectable member of society, B. Ortcutt, who is actually the same person, but Ralph does not know that. The problem is whether in these circumstances one can consider the utterance (7) to be true:

(7) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

The utterance (7) allows of an interpretation under which it is true in the given situation, and of another one under which it is false because

(8) Ralph doesn’t believe that Ortcutt is a spy is true.

While the examples (1)–(6) illustrated the existence of transparent and opaque contexts of use of names and descriptions, (7) is an example of a sentence that simultaneously allows of a transparent (de re) and an opaque (de dicto) interpretation of the same name. An interpretation of a name is called transparent if this name is used by the speaker, whereas the subject of the propositional attitude, having the same object in mind, might give it another name. Under this interpretation, (7a), the utterance (7) is true: Ralph may believe that Ortcutt is a spy and call him “the man in the yellow hat” in his thoughts. The
interpretation is opaque if the given name belongs to the subject of the propositional attitude. Under this interpretation, (7b), the utterance (7) is false.

The following treatments of the opposition *de re* / *de dicto* have been offered:

I. One way of representing the semantic difference between transparent and opaque interpretations of a noun phrase (NP) in the context of a propositional attitude verb was suggested in Keenan 1972 (it may be regarded as a direct development of Russell’s idea (Russell 1920) of differentiating the scope of a description, cf. also Peterson 1979 and McCawley 1971. The sentence (9) is assigned two structures, which differ in the scope of the description. The structure (9a), where the description is outside the scope of the predicate, expresses the transparent interpretation, *de re*, while the structure (9b), where the description comes within the scope of the predicate of propositional attitude, expresses the opaque interpretation, *de dicto* (in formulas below ι denotes iota-operator, see, e.g. Reichenbach 1947):

\[
(9) \quad \text{It was a surprise for John that the champion was drunk —} \\
\text{a. } (\iota x)(x \text{ champion}) \text{ it was a surprise for John } (x \text{ is drunk}); \\
\text{b. It was a surprise for John } (\iota x)(x \text{ champion}) (x \text{ is drunk}).
\]

Yet these formulae leave a number of vague points. Firstly, the operator of description is not quite adequate for representation of concrete reference, see section 3.1. above. Secondly, when the operator of description is within the scope of the propositional attitude verb, it is not clear what it means. For example, it is not clear whether the speaker in this case believes in the existence of the person who constitutes the object of John’s statement or assumes that his statement as a whole is sheer fantasy.

Roughly speaking, the difference between (9a) and (9b) consists in the following: under the interpretation (9a) John’s surprise concerns the person as such, irrespective of the description, and in (9b) John is surprised by the drunkenness of the champion in his aspect of the champion. Yet this difference is hardly clarified with the help of the given formulae.

II. Quine (1971) suggests describing the opposition *de re* / *de dicto* in terms of two different meanings of propositional attitude verbs: the first — when a verb denotes the relation (in the logical, i.e. extensional sense of the
word), the second — conceptual, i.e. intensional. In particular, the verb *to believe* has the intensional meaning *believeis* that expresses the relationship between the possessor of the opinion and the statement, conveyed by the subordinate clause (i.e. by the intensional of the subordinate), and the extensional meaning *believes* which is a three-term relation between the possessor of the opinion, the object with the property expressed in the opinion, and the property itself. With such an approach the sentence (7) in the reading (7b), when it is interpreted as containing *believeis*, is false; when (7) is understood in the reading (7a), as containing *believes*, i.e. as synonymous to the sentence

(10) Ralph believes of Orctutt that he is a spy, it is true

According to this analysis, in one and the same situation two contradictory statements with the verb *believeis* are true:

(I) Ralph believes of Orctutt that he is a spy,
and

(II) Ralph doesn’t believe of Orctutt that he is a spy.

But this reflects a real contradiction in Ralph’s picture of the world. On the other hand, when we understand *believe* in the meaning *believeis* only one of the two contradictory statements is true, namely, the (II): (I) is (7) in the reading (7b), which is, as we have seen, false.

Quine’s solution gives a satisfactory explanation of non-interchangeability of identicals in (2a)–(4a): these sentences are interpreted *de dicto*, so one of the arguments of the propositional attitude verb is a statement; if in a statement we substitute one component for another with a different meaning, the statement will necessarily change, and it is not surprising that its truth value also changes. Now the examples (5) and (6) get an explanation: their consistent interpretations (5b) and (6b) are interpretations *de re*.

Still the referential status of a NP in its opaque interpretation remains unclear: Quine maintains that under the opaque interpretation individual terms have no reference. But this obviously contradicts the intuition: while asserting (7) in the meaning (7b) the speaker, as well as Ralph assumes the existence of Orctutt.

Quine believes that the implication (II) ⇒ (12) holds:

(11) Ralph believes that the man in the yellow hat is a spy.
(12) Ralph believes of the man in the yellow hat that he is a spy.

Yet actually the implication (11) \( \Rightarrow \) (12) is only true under the condition that the object of the statement has reference (i.e. that it exists in the real world, namely, in the world of the speaker). Thus, the problem of reference of terms under the opaque interpretation cannot be eliminated by pointing at the opacity of the interpretation.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Performers</th>
<th>Possibility of combination of performers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject of attitude</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de dicto</td>
<td>Subject of reference</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>de re</td>
<td>Subject of reference</td>
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<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject of nomination</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Impossible because under a de dicto interpretation the subject of attitude must be the subject of reference and nomination.

** Impossible because somebody has to be the subject of reference and nomination.

*** Impossible because with a de re interpretation the speaker must be the subject of reference.

**** Impossible by virtue of the structure of the NP.

Indeed, referential properties of terms under the opaque interpretation may differ. Thus, in the utterance (11), although it is interpreted de dicto, i.e. the nomination belongs to the subject of attitude, the speaker nevertheless does not deny himself responsibility for the existence and uniqueness of the man in the yellow hat. In other cases this is not so clear. For example, the
utterance (13) easily allows an interpretation where the speaker refers to nothing, so that the crocodile exists only in Maria’s fantasy world:

   (13) Maria thinks that her neighbour’s crocodile frightens her cat at nights.

So, it may be fittingly concluded that the opposition *de re*/*de dicto* fails to represent all the necessary distinctions, for in the examples under consideration not one, but at least two distinctions should be made:

1) Whether the speaker subscribes to the reference of the subject of the propositional attitude while reporting his/her opinion, or not (cf. Searle 1979: 158). In the first case the term has a reference also in the speaker’s world; in the second case the term has a limited reference, namely, a reference confined to the world of the subject of attitude.

2) When the speaker does refer, he either subscribes to the nomination (and consequently to the concept) that has been given to the object by the subject of the propositional attitude or he replaces the initial name by his own (cf. Reinhart 1975; cf. also Goffmann 1981 on the speaker as the author of the idea and as the author of the formulation).

The first opposition makes it possible to draw a distinction between the utterance (11) and the non-referential interpretation of (13), while the second differentiates (11) from (7a).

It follows from what has been said that the semantic interpretation of an utterance that reports the propositional attitude of the OTHER (with the help of a compound sentence that contains a name or a description in the subordinate clause) requires knowledge of the performers of two roles. The first is the role of the subject of reference, the second being the role of the subject of nomination. In an utterance with a *de dicto* interpretation the subject of the propositional attitude has to perform both roles, while the speaker may not perform either. In an utterance *de re* the speaker must to perform both roles, while the subject of attitude may fail to be the author of the nomination (yet he cannot avoid being the subject of reference, due to the referentiality of the NP. The correlations are given in the Table 1.

Table 2 shows all the possible combinations of performers of both roles in one and the same utterance.
### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Subject of reference</th>
<th>Author of nomination</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject of attitude</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Subject of attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>de dicto</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>de re</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In connection with the opposition *de re/de dicto* the following question arises: why does a name or a description in the context of a predicate of propositional attitude sometimes allow of both interpretations, as in (7), and sometimes of only one, as in (2a) or (3a)? If both interpretations were then it would be impossible to construct examples of a true utterance turning into a false one, as in the examples (2)–(4). Indeed, the utterance (11) *Ralph believes that the man in the yellow hat is a spy*, after the substitution on the basis of identity (unknown to Ralph), *the man in the yellow hat = Ortcutt*, does not become false, because the resulting utterance (7) allows a *de re* interpretation, and under this interpretation it is true.

In fact, the utterance (4a) that, according to Quine, illustrates the impossibility of substitution on the basis of identity, *Tegucigalpa = the capital of Honduras*, plays this role only insofar as we have no doubt that (4b) excludes a *de re* interpretation. Meanwhile, generally speaking, a *de re* interpretation
of (4b) is not altogether excluded: it is quite natural, for example, on the part of a person who would like to stress Philip’s absurdly poor knowledge of geography. In other words, it is quite possible as a specific demagogical device or a figure of speech. However the utterance (5b), for which a de re interpretation is considered acceptable, allows for the interpretation mentioned only insofar as we accept the given figure of speech as legitimate. As for the utterance (5b), its demagogic interpretation sounds natural because its de dicto interpretation is contradictory, so that a de re interpretation is derived from Grice’s (1975) principle of cooperation: it forces the speaker to seek a sensible interpretation of the utterance up to the last chance.

It is natural that in evaluating the acceptability of a de re interpretation some doubts are possible. But eventually they all boil down to the extent of our acceptance of the speaker’s intention to misrepresent the opinion or desire of the subject of attitude. This misrepresentation always has a certain purpose (for example, to show the absurdity of the opinion or the stupidity of the desire) and forms part of the contents of the utterance. So, for the sentence One of Mark Twain’s characters wanted to marry his granny a de re interpretation is quite natural (taking into account the fact that the man did not know that the lady he wanted to marry was his own granny). The same case as with Oedipus, who knew nothing about his blood relationship with Jocasta: a de re interpretation arises naturally because we are ready to accept the demagogical device as part of the speaker’s communicative intention. Putting the question this way we realize that for the utterance (2b) as well one can imagine a context in which its demagogical de re usage becomes possible.

The difficulty of a de re interpretation of (3b) might be one of principle: in (3b) the verb of propositional attitude is to believe, and the subordinate clause is, in essence, an identity statement:

(3a) = ‘Oedipus knew that his wife was Jocasta’;
(3b) = ‘Oedipus knew that his wife was his mother’.

Meanwhile, the misrepresentation that would take place in a demagogical de re usage would be a deliberate disregard of the subject of attitude’s ignorance of the given identity: correspondingly, the false implication that the
subject of attitude knows the named identity contradicts the whole assertive content of his attitude and not only its presuppositional part, as, e.g., in (5b).

Let us now return to Table 2. Line 6 corresponds, as we can see now, to the demagogical de re interpretation. Lines 2 and 4 correspond to the situation when the speaker dissociates herself from the authorship of the nomination. This situation requires quotation marks in a written text (see on quoting Chapter II.6). The situation represented by line 3 is not frequent in the case of a definite NP in the thematic (i.e. topical) position; yet for an indefinite NP, as well as for a NP included in the rhematic part of the sentence, it is quite natural, cf. Maria believes that a crocodile frightens her cat or Maria believes that the neighbour’s crocodile frightens her cat. The identity of all the features in lines 1 and 5 means that the opposition de re/de dicto is defined in such a way that if there is no discrepancy between the speaker and the subject of attitude the interpretation may be identified as de re and de dicto.

Table 2 gives the answer to the question about the referential status of terms and descriptions in the structure of sentences under a de dicto interpretation. Namely, we are forced to admit that besides an ordinary referential use (when the term has a reference in the world of the speaker) a term may have a limited reference — namely, a reference in the world of the subject of the propositional attitude, see examples 3 and 4 in Table 2.

The possibility of ascribing the authorship of the name to the speaker or to the subject of the attitude depends, to a certain extent, on the structure of the NP.

1. If the NP is a description, i.e. if it provides the object with a concept (more precisely, with a characterizing and not an evaluative concept) then in a pragmatically neutral situation the subject of attitude will necessarily count as the author of the nomination — or at least as one of the authors, probably together with the speaker, as in example (11). If the subject of attitude is deprived of the authorship of nomination we recognize it as a demagogical device or some other figure of speech.

2. If a NP is a proper name, and thus, not provide the object with any explicitly expressed concept, then the subject of the attitude and the speaker have an equal right for the authorship of nomination. Indeed, sentence
(7) easily acquires a *de re* interpretation in a situation when the subject of attitude is not the subject of nomination.

3. If a NP has a deictic semantics then, as a rule, the speaker will be the subject of nomination. Thus, for the sentence

(14) Ralph believes that the man over there is a spy

*de re* interpretation is the only one possible. The same is true for the sentence (15) with the deictic NP *your sister*:

(15) It seems to me that John wants to marry *your sister*.

The sentence is perfectly legitimate, non-distorted statement of John’s desire, even in a situation, when John himself happens not to know that the lady he wants to marry is the sister of the speaker’s interlocutor.

4. If a NP contains an appositional clause (which, in terms of behavior, resembles a parenthetical clause, see Chapter I.2.3), then the speaker, and not the subject of the propositional attitude is the author of the proposition contained in the subordinate clause. For example, the utterance *Ivan says that his neighbour, whom you’ve seen once at Egorov’s place, has gone to Spitsbergen* is appropriate even in a situation when Ivan himself cannot give such a characteristics to the person who has gone to Spitsbergen, cf. McCawley 1971.

5. A separate rule concerns the evaluative components of the meaning of a NP — they can be ascribed both to the subject of attitude and to the speaker; see the sentence (16), which is ambiguous in this respect:

(16) Maria fears that her dolt has got a bad mark again.

It should be emphasized that in reporting the attitude of others by means of a description in which the subject of attitude is not the author of nomination, pragmatical by-effects arise only when the description is embedded in the subordinate clause. In a construction where, as in example (12), the object of the proposition is raised from the subordinate into the main clause, the subject of attitude loses his priority for the authorship of nomination. Note that raising of the object of proposition from the subordinate into the main clause is widespread, both in conversation and in narrative, cf. numerous examples of this construction taken from Dostoevsky’s novels and cited in Ivanchikova 1979: 275.
The boy knew of his mother that she loved him very much, but he hardly loved her much himself.
They told of Virginsky that his wife, not having been married him for even a year, had suddenly told him that he got the sack.
Vasin said of his lady-neighbours that they had been living here for about three weeks.
Speaking of such persons as Dergatchev, I once wrung from him a note that they were beneath criticism.

The reference confined to the world of the subject of attitude is possible not only for definite NPs but also for indefinite ones. For example, in the sentence

(17) Masha says that some man visited her yesterday taken in its basic interpretation, the subject of the propositional attitude is the subject of indefiniteness, and in this case the indefinite reference takes place in the world of the subject of attitude, cf. Peterson 1972, Langendonck 1979.

On the other hand, semi-definiteness (see Section 3) confined to the world of the subject of attitude is impossible. In translating from direct into indirect speech pronouns that express semi-definiteness either undergo replacement or change their meaning:

(18) a. Vasja skazal: “U menja koe-čto dlja tebja est’”
‘Vasja said: “I have something for you”’.
b. *Vasja skazal, čto u nego koe-čto dlja menja est’.
‘Vasja said that he had [koe-čto] for me’.

(19) a. Vasja skazal: “Ja kupil tebe odnu knigu.”
‘Vasja said: “I’ve bought a book for you”
[I know what the book it is and you don’t]’.
b. *Vasja skazal čto on kupil mne odnu knigu.
‘Vasja said that he bought [one] book for me’.

It follows from what was said that an adequate solution of the problem of non-transparent contexts requires an extention of the conceptual apparatus of the theory of reference: to describe concrete reference adequately, it is necessary to distinguish reference in the world of the speaker and in the world of the subject of attitude. Besides, it is necessary to distinguish the speaker as the subject of reference from the speaker as the author of nomination.
PART II
SEMANTICS OF NARRATIVE

CHAPTER II.1
EGOCENTRICAL ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE

1. THE CANONICAL COMMUNICATIVE SITUATION

In different literary texts the presence of the author may be noticeable to a varying degree. However, in principle, it is impossible to create a literary text that would display no trace of its author at all. According to V. V. Vinogradov, N. Chernyshevsky once had the idea of writing a novel in which the author’s voice would be totally inaudible to the reader. This plan was never implemented however.

The presence of the author (and the author’s point of view) in a literary text is a consequence of the fact that the presence of the Speaker and, accordingly, of the Speaker’s point of view in any text is predetermined by the semantics of the most ordinary words and grammatical categories of the natural language. One well-known class of such words consists of deictic words, which play a direct part in reference, i.e. in identifying persons, objects, temporal intervals and spatial segments (such as the pronouns I, you, now, here, there, this and that; note also the Russian particles von ‘there is’ and vot ‘here is’ which possess idiosyncratic combinations of meanings and, therefore, cannot be easily translated into other languages). Bertrand Russell called words of this type egocentric, since they are oriented towards the EGO, i.e. the Speaker. It seems reasonable, however, to adopt a wider interpretation of this term in linguistics and regard as egocentric not only deictic words and elements but also markers of so-called subjective modality, namely: parentheticals; expressivity markers; specific constructions which express different types of speech acts, etc. The credit for bringing together the deictic and modal elements into a single category belongs to Roman Jakobson (1957/1972), who called them shifters.

Initially, we shall confine ourselves to deictic elements. Language is primarily a means of communication, and it must, among other things, make it possible for the Speakers to refer. The main instrument of reference in the natural language is deixis, construed here as an array of linguistic
means for identification of objects, places, events, time intervals, etc. through their relation to the communicative situation.

Language is normally used in a canonical communicative situation. The definition of a canonical communicative situation (i.e., speech situation) includes at least the following conditions:

I. The Speaker and the Addressee are present in the context of the utterance (i.e., they are not alienated from the utterance produced).

II (identity of time). The moment of the message production by the Speaker coincides with the moment of its perception by the Addressee; in other words, the Addressee is the Listener.

III (identity of place). The Speaker and the Addressee are in the same place; thus, they can usually see each other and possess a common field of vision.

Naturally, one can speak about conditions II and III only if condition I is fulfilled, but II and III are otherwise independent of each other.

As John Lyons puts it, “there is much in the structure of languages that can only be explained on the assumption that they have developed for communication in face-to-face interaction” (Lyons 1978:637). Indeed, the natural language abounds in deictic elements, i.e. words and grammatical categories which have to rely for their meaning on some component of the communicative situation constituting the point of orientation, Origo. These elements must be anchored in the communicative situation, and it is this anchoring that provides for an exact reference.

The following components of the communicative situation may be relevant: the Speaker and the Addressee, their respective parameters (such as the space and time location), and their activities (such as pointing gestures, real or imaginary).

Under normal communication conditions, deictic elements are geared to the Speaker as their point of orientation: now = ‘the moment of speech’; here = ‘the place where the Speaker is at the moment of speech’. However, it should be borne in mind that the use of deictic elements usually relies on the assumption that the communicative situation is a canonical one, so that other elements of the communicative situation may also contribute to the interpretation, though
in a less obvious way. Thus, an analysis of the use of deictic elements in a non-canonical communicative situation may serve to clarify their meaning. The interpretation of these elements may change in a non-canonical communicative situation, or it may be impossible to use them at all. A full-fledged Speaker is the Speaker in a canonical communicative situation, i.e. one who has a Listener, the latter being synchronous with the Speaker and in the same place.

Some examples of deictic words and categories are given below (whatever possible, the Russian examples have been translated into English).

(1) The pronouns I and you denote persons on the basis of their roles in the speech act. The assumption of canonicity is obviously at play here; thus, if condition I is not fulfilled, the first person pronoun in the utterance cannot be said to denote the Speaker. Moreover, the concept of the Speaker degenerates somewhat even if only condition II is violated.

(2) Grammatical Tense characterizes the time of an event through its relation to the moment of speech. The moment of speech is the moment of production of the utterance coinciding with the moment of its perception. This last point is something that usually goes unnoticed. We can say that the moment of speech is the moment when the Speaker produces the utterance, but this will only be true given the assumption that the communicative situation is a canonical one (condition II). In other words, the moment of speech can only be defined as the present moment of the Speaker that coincides with the present moment of the Addressee.

(3) The Russian particles vot ‘here is’, and von ‘there is’ used by themselves or in combinations, such as vot ėtot ‘the one here’, von tot ‘the one over there’, vot takoj ‘one like this’ (e.g., vot takoj veličiny ‘of the size that I am showing’), include direct reference to the Speaker’s gestures, and, hence, also imply a canonical speech situation, when the Speaker and the Addressee can see each other (condition III).

(4) Russian tam, tuda ‘there’ = ‘at/to a place different from that of the Speaker’ are definitely based on the assumption that the speech situation is a canonical one (condition III).

Thus, although it is true that the Speaker is the main point of orientation for the interpretation of deictic elements, it is not the whole truth: in
many cases the assumption that the communicative situation is a canonical one is an important part of the meaning of a deictic element and, consequently, a prerequisite for its appropriate use.

Let us look at some examples of non-canonical speech situations, as these may serve to clarify the meaning of deictic elements.

Example 1. A telephone conversation: the place of the Speaker at the moment of the utterance does not coincide with the place of the Addressee; condition III is not fulfilled.

In a telephone conversation, the adverb \textit{zdes’} ‘here’ will only denote the place of the Speaker; thus, in the lexical decomposition of \textit{zdes’} no assumption of canonicity need be mentioned. But \textit{tam} ‘there’ does not mean simply ‘the place which is not occupied by the Speaker <now>’: in fact, the place which is now occupied by the Addressee cannot be referred to with the Russian \textit{tam}. For instance, if I, being in Moscow, speak on the telephone with someone who is in London, I cannot say \textit{Ja skoro budu tam} ‘I’ll soon be there’, meaning ‘in London’; I must say \textit{u vas} ‘at your place’ (one can, however, also say \textit{tam u vas}). Thus, the meaning of \textit{tam} takes into account the Addressee as well (English \textit{there}, on the other hand, disregards the location of the Addressee, cf. Lyons 1978: 579). In other words, the meaning of \textit{tam} relies on the assumption of canonicity of the speech situation. Thus, the situation of the telephone conversation clarifies the meaning of deictic place markers exactly because condition III — identity of place — does not obtain here.

Example 2. Writing a letter: the moment of production of the message by the Speaker does not coincide with the moment of its perception by the Addressee (although the place may be the same for both of them — as, for example, when a message is left on a dining table or on a door). This situation may help clarify the meaning of deictic time markers, because here it is condition II — identity of the time positions of the Speaker and the Addressee — that is violated. The adverb \textit{now} may denote the present moment of the Speaker without bringing the Addressee into the picture (though, in order to describe a concrete situation which occupies a short period of time, it is preferable to say not \textit{now} but, e.g., \textit{now that I am writing this letter}). Thus, the assumption of canonicity is not crucial for the meaning of \textit{now}. 
What is affected here is the unambiguity of reference, i.e. if the dispatching and receipt of the message are not synchronous, the reference to the present moment may become uninformative, which is very often the case with messages left on doors, like “Back in an hour”. Cf. also Christopher Robin’s

\textbf{GONE OUT}
\textbf{BACK SOON} C.R.

There is an interpretation strategy for deictic elements that John Lyons calls deictic projection (Lyons 1978: 579), when a deictic word or category, instead of being geared to the Speaker as its point of orientation, becomes Addressee-oriented. Lyons borrows his example from Classical Latin, where it was possible to use the so-called epistolary Past Tense for reference to situations taking place at the moment of writing. This practice was motivated by the consideration that when the Addressee received the letter, that moment would already belong to the past.

Deictic projection is a strategy often utilized for understanding posters and notices in public places. Cf., for instance, a notice like \textit{Zdes' ne kurjet} ‘No smoking here’, where \textit{zdes'} means ‘here; where the Addressee is situated now’, the place of the Speaker being irrelevant. In fact, the Speaker is not present at all in the context of this utterance. In this situation, the messages are alienated from the Speaker’s place and time. Instead, it is the Addressee’s place and time that become relevant for their interpretation. Another example (now, fortunately, outdated) comes from Comrie 1985: 15 — \textit{You are now leaving West Berlin}. In this case, the word \textit{now} is also Addressee-oriented; it denotes the time at which the Addressee perceives this message (it does not mean ‘at the present moment of the Speaker’). Cf. also an example from Fillmore 1976, a message left on a door: \textit{I may be in room 2114}. What is meant here by the Present Tense is not the time when the message was written but rather when it was expected to be interpreted. Conditions under which deictic projection is permitted vary from one language to another and are different for different egocentricals. For example, Lyons observes that in English such a projection is possible with the word \textit{come} but not with \textit{here}.

Non-canonical speech situations are of interest for our discussion here because they constitute an intermediate case between normal discourse and narrative.
We shall consider narrative text as an utterance intended to function in a non-canonical situation. Below we discuss egocentricals, i.e. those elements of language whose meaning is to some extent dependent on the communicative situation. The general principal here is that the strategy of interpreting an egocentrical in narrative depends upon its meaning in ordinary discourse. Namely, the more it relies on the assumption of canonicity of the communicative situation, the more it modifies its interpretation when the situation is a non-canonical one.

2. EGOCENTRICAL ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE. EXAMPLES

There are many linguistic elements that in a canonical communicative situation semantically imply the Speaker. We shall mention but a few of them.

1) Parentheticals express the opinion or emotional state of the Speaker: *Ivan, kažetsja, čem-to rasstroen* ‘John seems distressed’ = ‘it seems to me’.

2) So-called weakly-definite pronouns (see Chapters I.3.3 and I.3.6) express indefiniteness of identification of the object, which is intentional on the part of the Speaker. This explains the anomaly of the example (2):

(1) a. *On ženat na odnoj poljačke.* ‘He is married to a certain Polish girl’
   b. *Mne skazali, čto on ženat na odnoj poljačke.* ‘*I was told that he is married to a certain Polish girl’.

Sentence (1a) means that the Speaker knows the girl, i.e. he is able to identify her — by perception or description (cf. knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description in Russell’s sense); but he does not intend to transfer his ability (of identification) to the Addressee. This is why sentence (1b) is deviant: the Speaker is quoting somebody else’s words, so that the intricate semantics of the semi-definite pronoun (see Paducheva 1985: 90) is out of place.

3) The presuppositions contained in the semantics of a sentence are — in the context of a canonical speech situation — presuppositions of the Speaker. For example, the sentence *Èto sobytie ošelomilo daže otca* ‘Even the father was stunned by the event’ carries the presupposition that the father would be the last to be stunned (which is conveyed by the particle *even*). Another example. In the sentence *He has retired, but he likes music* the Speaker and no one else is the carrier of the sentiment of contradiction — expressed by the conjunction ‘but’ — between the two facts, which, generally speaking,
are quite compatible. On egocentrical components in the semantics of the
Russian conjunctions no ‘but’, a ‘and, but’ see Paducheva (in print).

4) Nominations of objects may also imply the Speaker; e.g., in the sen-
tence *The sister is anxious* the preferable anchor for the referentially inad-
quate noun *sister* is the Speaker: *the sister* = ‘the Speaker’s sister’. Though
here the Speaker appears only by default: in a corresponding context it could
be the listener’s sister or the sister of someone else salient in the context.

5) Evaluations normally belong to the Speaker. Cf. the following ex-
ample from Uspensky 1970: 24 —

(2) *Tut sobaka Kalin-car’ govoril Il’e da takovy slova: Aj ty staryja kazak da Il’ja
Muromeec! Da služi-tko ty sobake carju Kalinu!* (‘Onega byliny’)
‘Then the *pagan dog Tsar Kalin* spoke to Il’ja these words: “Hey, you old cos-
sack — you, Il’ja Muromeec! Now serve me, *pagan dog Tsar Kalin!*”

The deviance of the last sentence in this text is explained by the fact that
Tsar Kalin’s own direct speech contains the pejorative nomination of him-
self, i.e. the nomination is ascribed to the tsar himself. Outside this context,
in the first sentence, the negative evaluation of the tsar is interpreted as the
evaluation of the Speaker and does not sound deviant.

3. THE SPEAKER AND HIS ROLES

Semantics of words and grammatical categories of natural language
presupposes the Speaker in several different roles, and in a canonical com-
municative situation the real Speaker plays all these roles. We can dis-
tinguish the following roles of the Speaker (Paducheva 1991a):

1) The Speaker as the subject of deixis,
2) The Speaker as the subject of speech,
3) The Speaker as the subject of consciousness,
4) The Speaker as an observer (the subject of perception).

In the cases 1) and 4) it is essential that the Speaker, apart from any-
thing else, is a physical body occupying a definite position in space (see
Wierzbicka 1980: 107 on the principal connection between perception and
place). On the other hand, the physical coordinates and parameters of the
Speaker are irrelevant for cases 2) and 3) — acts of consciousness and will
are not, as a rule, localized in space. This compels us to distinguish percep-
tion from other acts of consciousness. Some examples.
1. The Speaker as the subject of deixis is the most traditional object of study in linguistics. This aspect of the Speaker has been described best of all. It is evident that here = ‘the place where the Speaker is at the moment of his utterance’, there = ‘a place at a distance from the Speaker’, and so on, see section 1. The Speaker is the Origo of the “system of coordinates” which serves as the main instrument of reference for the participants in the speech situation.

2. The Speaker as the subject of speech reveals himself in the semantics of speech acts. Example (1) is known as Moor’s paradox:

   (1) a. She is beautiful, but John does not think so.
   b. *She is beautiful, but I do not think so.

   Why is sentence (b) deviant, though sentence (a) sounds natural? Because the Speaker must believe that what he says is true. When something is asserted, the Speaker makes an epistemic commitment, i.e. he/she assumes a certain responsibility for the truth of the asserted proposition.

   The role of the Speaker is revealed most forcefully in the semantics of indirect speech acts, as is demonstrated by example (2)

   (2) Začem ty otkryl fortočku? ‘Why did you open the window?’

   The purpose of the utterance (2) is the expression of the Speaker’s reproach: it is the Speaker who happens to be the subject of the negative evaluation of the action, included in the semantics of this speech act. Similarly, the Speaker is “lurking in the background” of an utterance expressing any other speech act — especially if it is not just an assertion (although the semantics of the assertion also includes a reference to the Speaker as the subject of the epistemic commitment).

   Only the Speaker has the right to use the address and call the Addressee from his own viewpoint, i.e. to call him/her ty ‘thou’ or vy ‘you’. In a series of interesting examples from Russian petitions (čelobitnye) of the 17th century, given in Uspensky 1970: 34, anomaly occurs because the author refers to himself in the third person, thus denying himself as a Speaker and refusing himself the right to call the Addressee from his own viewpoint, i.e. the right to use pronoun your:

   (3) Gosudarju Borisu Ivanoviču b′et čelom <...> tvoi krest’janin Tereško Osipov. ‘My Lord Boris Ivanovich, thy peasant Tereshko Osipov <...> humbly beseeches <thee>.’
However the rule “No I, no You” may be broken in introductory utterances of self introduction, such as: Svami govorit učennyj secretar’ Instituta mekaniki ‘This is the secretary of the Institute of Mechanics speaking’. In example (3), then, the deviance is due to the inconsistency of the viewpoint: the Addressee is first called in the third person as not participating in the communicative situation and then in the second person as its Addressee.

3. The Speaker as the subject of consciousness reveals him/herself in a context where the semantics of a predicate implies a subject of mental, emotional or volitional state which is not and cannot be expressed in the utterance. Such a state is usually interpreted as a state of the Speaker:

(4) a. Ivan seems to be upset by something
b. It is a pity he has not come.
c. He suddenly stopped.
d. Unfortunately he is not at home.
e. Probably he will come.
f. It looks as though he’ll win.
g. God grant that everything will turn out all right.
h. This building reminds [me] of an ancient temple.

This is why these words are sometimes deviant in the context of a first-person subject, cf.

*I have suddenly stopped.


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like’, neoxta ‘I don’t feel like’, xočetsja ‘I want to’, pridetsja ‘I’ll have to’, ostaetsja ‘There is no other way out’. E.g., *It is a pity you didn’t come = I am sorry, that you didn’t come* (cf. Zolotova, 1973).

Even *you* in impersonal use may be understood as ‘I’ (see Bylugina, 1990): *Nu čto ty budeš' delat’!* = ‘What could you <= I> do about it?’.* You has the same meaning in a poem by Joseph Brodsky (where he speaks about the distance of one thousand lees):

\begin{align*}
\text{Tysjača označaet,} & \quad \text{‘One thousand means} \\
\text{Čto ty sejčas vdali} & \quad \text{That you are now far} \\
\text{Ot rodimogo krova} & \quad \text{From your home’}
\end{align*}

At the same time, stydno usually means ‘you should be ashamed’ and not ‘I should be ashamed’. It is wrong to say: *Stydno, čto ja ego ne navestil* ‘It is a shame, I have not visited him’. The right variant is: *Mne stydno* ‘I am ashamed <that I have not visited him>’. Most probably, the type of speech act in which the word is used plays a certain role. For example, in questions the implied subject of these words would be *you*; cf. *It is tasty* (‘for me’) and *Is it tasty* (‘for you’)?

The Speaker is the subject of the will expressed by the Subjunctive Mood, in Russian — by particle *by* (as in *liš' by, tol'ko by* ‘if only’) and by all kinds of wishful formulas (cf.: *Daj Bog, čtoby*...). The implied subject of modal predicates in impersonal use is also the Speaker:

- The scope of the work was to be extended.
- It may be necessary to change the meeting place.

The Speaker is the implied subject of definiteness; of evaluation; of a feeling of similarity; the implied subject of expectation/unexpectedness, if they are components of the meaning of a word. (For example, the component expectation is present in the meaning of the words *suddenly, soon* and *finally*.

4. The Speaker in the role of the subject of perception:

\begin{align*}
(5) \quad \text{V lesu razdavalsja topor drovoseka.} \quad \text{(N. A. Nekrasov.)} \\
& \quad ‘The axe of the wood-cutter sounded in the forest.’
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Na lestnici poslyšalsja strannyj šum ‘A strange noise was heard on the stairs’.
\end{align*}

Thus, different words and constructions presuppose the Speaker in different roles (as the subject of deixis, the subject of speech, consciousness and perception), and this provides a useful classification of egocentricial ele-
ments. This classification is relevant, in particular, for the theory of narrative, see Chapter II.5.5. Below we present another classification of egocentric elements, namely, their division into primary and secondary egocentrics. We shall begin with deicticals; the same opposition will be applied to modal egocentrics in Chapter II.3.

4. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DEIXIS

Let us now return to egocentric elements in a non-canonical communicative situation and introduce the notion of regime of interpretation.

In Paducheva 1986 it was proposed to distinguish between the dialogical and narrative registers of interpretation of deictic elements, i.e. deictic words and grammatical forms. This opposition of interpretation regimes (they will also be called keys, or modes of interpretation) will be extended in the future to other types of egocentrics.

When an utterance or part of it is interpreted in the dialogical register, i.e. in the framework of a canonical communicative situation, the role of the Speaker envisaged by the semantics of a deictic element is fulfilled by the real Speaker. In the communicative situation of narrative there is no Speaker: a real Speaker is possible only in a canonical communicative situation, whereas a narrative text should be interpreted outside such a framework. In this case, the question arises as to who replaces the Speaker when an utterance containing an egocentric element is interpreted in the narrative regime? There are two possibilities: the Speaker may be replaced either by the narrator, who exists in a narrative text specially for this purpose, or by one of the characters.

Thus, there are two registers of interpretation of egocentric elements: the dialogical regime — when the role of the Speaker is played by a real Speaker; and the narrative regime — when the text is interpreted in a non-
canonical communicative situation and the real Speaker is absent. In the
framework of the narrative regime, there are two strategies for choosing the
Speaker’s deputy: in some contexts it will be the narrator; in others it will
be a character.

There is the third register of interpretation of egocentrical elements,
which can be called syntactic: if an egocentrical element occupies a special
syntactic position, for example, if it is a part of a subordinate clause, the
Speaker is replaced by the subject of the main clause. Thus, in examples (a)
and (b) below the role of the subject of consciousness required by the ego-
centrical element in the subordinate clause is played not by a Speaker but
by a person denoted by the subject of the subordinate clause: in (a) the sub-
ject of certainty is Zina, in (b) the subject of perception is Ivan.

(a) Zina thinks that Ivan will *undoubtedly* return;
  (b) Ivan says that at that moment I *appeared* on the road
(example from Apresyan 1986).

Syntactic interpretation is not independent on the type of contextuali-
zation of the main clause: it may happen that for one and the same egocen-
trical a syntactic interpretation is possible when the main clause is contex-
tualized in the narrative and impossible when the main clause is contextual-
ized in the speech discourse, see Section 5.

Now let us turn to the opposition of primary vs. secondary deixis,
which we shall reduce to the opposition of Speaker vs. Observer.

The notion of the observer was introduced by Apresyan (1986) and
demonstrated by a series of remarkable examples. Cf. example (6):

(6)  a. Na doroge pokazalsja vsadnik. ‘A horseman appeared on the road.’;
    b. *Na doroge pokazalsja ja ‘*I appeared on the road.’

Sentence (6b) is deviant. Indeed, in (6a) the Speaker is an implied
subject of the predicate of perception taking part in the semantic decompo-
sition of the verb: pokazat’sja = ‘to appear’, namely, ‘to enter the field of
vision of some person’, and in (6a) this person is the Speaker. But the
Speaker cannot enter his own field of vision. Moreover, pokazat’sja sug-
gests that there is some distance between the observer and the observed ob-
ject. This explains the anomaly of sentence (6b) with the 1-st person pro-
noun, where the object observed is the Speaker himself.

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The role of the observer in an utterance with the verb *pokazat'sja* can however be played not only by the Speaker but also by the subject of the embedding predicate of propositional attitude:

(6) c. On govorić, čto v ētot moment na doroge pokazalsja ja.

“He says that (at this moment) I appeared on the road.

Example (6c) serves as conclusive proof of the fact that the Observer is different from the Speaker (in Fillmore 1982 similar tests were used to describe the English verb *to lurk* with analogous properties).

Another group of examples from Apresyan 1986. Sentences (7), (8) sound strange — for the same reason: the fact is that the words *vdali, vdal' ‘in the distance’, ‘far away’ — when it is not specified from what — presuppose an observer. This observer (in the dialogical regime) should be the Speaker; yet the Speaker here plays the role of the object of observation:

(7) *Ja byl vDALI* ‘*I was in the distance’;
(8) *VDali vidnelis' my s Volodej* ‘*Volodya and I were standing in the distance’.

Or take such verbs as *belet’, černet’ ‘to be white’, ‘to be black*: X *beleet* means ‘X is white, and a person Y is observing it at this particular moment’ (see Bulygina 1982: on these verbs). They also presuppose an observer. Hence the anomaly:

(9) *Moe telo belelo v temnote* ‘*My body showed up white in the darkness’

Below we shall offer further evidence substantiating the relevance of the concept of the observer: namely, we shall answer the following questions.

**Question 1.** Where does the observer stem from? The Speaker is legitimately present in every sentence that is contextualized in a speech situation, because a canonical verbal interaction presupposes the Speaker. The observer has no such justification. Consequently, the participation of the observer in the semantic interpretation of an utterance must be demonstrated by different kind of arguments.

It can be assumed that the figure of the observer is implied by the semantics of some words and categories of the language. In particular, such words as *pokazat'sja ‘to seem’, belet’, ‘to show up white’ or *vdali, vdaleke, vdal' ‘in the distance, far off, far away* presuppose the observer as one of the participants of the situation described in the utterance. Indeed, the verb
*pokazat’sja* has a semantic argument “Observer”, because *X pokazalsja* means that *X* has appeared in the field of vision of *Y*; *belet’* ‘to be white’ — because *X is white* = ‘*X* is white and somebody *Y* perceives it at that moment’. Words like *vdali* ‘far off’ have a semantic argument “Reference point” (*far off* necessarily means far from something), and this Reference point is the place where the observer is situated. So the figure of the observer stems from the semantics of (certain) words and categories of the sentence and not from the context of the speech act as the Speaker does.

**Question 2.** Should those words which presuppose an observer be considered deictic? An affirmative answer to this question is by no means obvious. According to the standard definitions, “by deixis is meant the location of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance” (Lyons 1978:637). In the spoken language, the role of the observer is, of course, most often played by the Speaker himself. Apresyan’s *insight*, however, is that the Speaker emerges here only by default — the role of the observer may be played by other subjects as well. Thus, the essential thing here is not this but the fact that the Speaker and the observer, even if they do not coincide referentially, have very much in common. In effect, they both generate a certain orientation of the situation in space (if we are speaking about spatial deixis) with respect to a certain subject.

The difference between the role (observer, Speaker) and its “referential performer” (the Speaker, the Addressee, the subject of the attitude, etc.) is described below with the help of the concept of projection: projection is a modification of the contextualization of a sentence, as a result of which an egocentrical acquires a new referent. Most often projections are brought about by non-canonicity of the communicative situation, but not only. In section 2 above we have mentioned the term of deictic projection, coined by Lyons to describe how the Speaker may be replaced by the Addressee in non-canonical communicative situations, when the Speaker is alienated from his utterance. Example (6c) above displays what may be called syntactic projection: in the context of an embedding predicate of propositional attitude, the observer’s role is performed by the subject of this predicate,
and not by the Speaker as in conversational discourse and in a syntactically independent position. Syntactic projection may take place in a canonical communicative situation as well. It results in removing the constraints in (7), (8) and (9) which were imposed by the identity of the observed object and the Speaker, cf. (8) with (8') and (9) with (9'):

(8') On sčitaet, čto vdaleke vidnelis' my s Volodej

‘He believes that Volodya and I were visible in the distance’;

(9') Ivan potom govoril, čto toľko moe telo belelo v temnote.

‘Ivan said afterwards that only my body looked white in the darkness’.

A kind of projection takes place also in the context of an interrogative speech act:

Nu čto, on tak i ne pokazalsja?

‘So, he hasn’t appeared, has he?’ (= ‘in your field of vision’).

The Speaker is replaced here, in his role of observer, by the Listener.

**Question 3.** What is the relationship between deixis geared towards the observer and narrative deixis, i.e. deixis in narrative text? Apresyan (1986) employs, with reference to Ehlich 1982 and Ehrich 1982, a concept of secondary deixis, which he identifies with narrative deixis. We shall use these terms in a different way: *secondary deixis* is geared towards the observer (and is actually not considered deixis at all under the standard definitions). This should be distinguished from *primary deixis*, or deixis proper, which is geared towards the Speaker.

Having made these distinctions, however, we find that there is an inherent connection between secondary and narrative deixis. Namely, secondary deicticals admit of what one might call *narrative projection*: they are used in narrative text and interpreted in the narrative communicative situation in such a way that the implied subject is changed only at the referential level — the role of the observer in the narrative mode is usually performed by one of the characters (more rarely — by the narrator): a secondary deictical is always at place in the narrative mode and its semantic interpretation remains the same as in the speech mode.

The situation with primary deicticals is totally different. Normally they do not admit of narrative projection: if used at all in narrative, they would have a different meaning; cf., for example, the meaning of *vot* in *Vot*...
ètot dom, pro kotoryj ja govoril, with speech mode interpretation, and Vot pošel on v les, where vot has another meaning.

The same distinction is found between secondary and primary deicticals with respect to syntactic projection — the latter is most often impossible for primary deicticals in conversational discourse. For example, syntactic projection is impossible for the deictic tam: if Ivan says, while being in Australia: Mne tam [v Moskve] plo xo ‘I feel bad there (in Moscow)’, then someone in Moscow cannot convey his words as Ivan skazal, čto emu tam plo xo ‘Ivan said that he felt bad there’.

Thus, we can specify the observer referentially: in conversational discourse the observer is either the Speaker himself (as in (8)) or the subject of the embedding propositional attitude (as in (8’)), whereas in the narrative mode it is either the character or, less frequently, the narrator.

**Question 4.** Apresyan 1986 considers the observer exclusively in the context of spatial deixis, and Reichenbach’s concept of the temporal point of reference is deemed irrelevant for this issue. Is this really the case? There is evidence to suggest that temporal secondary deixis also exists and the observer plays the same role in temporal as in spatial secondary deixis. Reichenbach’s temporal point of reference, which is important for the semantics of Russian aspect (Paducheva 1986), is pragmatically interpreted in Paducheva 1989 as the temporal position of the observer. Moreover, the figure of an observer with a certain temporal position emerges from the semantics of aspect (i.e. the specific meanings of aspect, including the progressive one) with the same regularity as observer with a fixed spatial position emerges from the semantics of spatial adverbs. Whereas spatial secondary deixis localizes the observer in the space of a situation, and, furthermore, orients the situation with respect to this observer, temporal secondary deixis does the same with the situation’s temporal orientation (the so-called “time distribution” of the situation conveyed by aspect).

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14 The concept of a spatial point of reference (used in Lyons 1978: 700 for describing the semantics of expressions such as ‘three miles away’, ‘on the other side of the town hall’, etc. and in Ehlich 1982 for describing da and dort in German) can also be considered equivalent to the spatial position of the observer as opposed to the Speaker; cf. the term “deictic observation point” in Leech 1969.
What the primary and secondary deixis have in common is that in both cases, in order to understand the meaning of an utterance correctly, one needs to know the localization of a certain subject (Speaker / Observer), this localization being spatial when spatial deixis is involved, or temporal in the case of temporal deixis. With primary deixis, the situation may even feature an absolute localization of the object for the benefit of the speakers, but with secondary deixis the localization tends to be relative: the meaning of an utterance localizes the observer himself through reference to an object in the situation described, rather than vice versa. This also relates secondary deixis to narrative deixis (one should not assume, however, that deixis in narrative is necessarily secondary; primary deictic elements are also used in narrative, see section 5).

The distinction between primary and secondary elements applies to all deicticals: secondary deicticals are those which admit of syntactic (and, usually, also narrative) projection; whereas primary ones exclude simple projections. In fact, secondary egocentricals are geared to the subject alone, so that the communicative situation of the narrative, where there is a narrator, is not too restrictive for them; whereas, primary egocentricals are, as a rule, not only EGOcentrical but require, as a condition for their interpretation, other components of a canonical communicative situation, and hence exclude any projections. As far as terminology is concerned, it should be pointed out that the subject of a secondary egocentrical may be rightly called the observer in one contexts and not in the other, where it is merely the subject of consciousness.

**Question 5.** What is the difference between secondary deixis and anaphora? Apresyan (1986) excludes the word *vperedi* ‘in front, ahead’ from the list of secondary deicticals, because the spatial point of reference for *vperedi*, as opposed to *vdali* ‘in the distance’, may be not only the “deictic” subject (observer), but any prominent subject or object. Cf. *Ona šla za Petej, a Vanja byl vperedi [Peti]*. ‘She was walking behind Peter, while John was ahead [of Peter].’

The word *mimo* ‘by, past’, which under this definition is also not deictic, is significant in this respect. Thus, in (10a) *mimo* = ‘past the place occupied by the Speaker’, and it is the Speaker who constitutes the point of reference; whereas in (10b) *mimo* = ‘past the place occupied by the Addressee’; and in (10c) the valency is filled anaphorically:
(10) a. Padu li ja, streloj pronzennyj,   
    Il’ mimo proletit ona  
    ‘Whether I fall, pierced by the arrow, Or whether it flies past’.  

    ‘[I] was walking past. Sensed the smell of smoke. And decided to drop in on 
    the way’  
    (D. Samojlov. “Slonenok”).  

c. Počemu ty k nej ne zašel? Ty že proxođil mimo!  
    ‘Why didn’t you drop in at her place? You were going past anyway’.  

Thus, deixis differs from anaphora in that it defines the reference point 
through the mediation of a subject, whereas anaphor refers to the antecedent 
without implying any person as a participant in the communicative situation. 

However, one should not exaggerate the difference between deictic 
words, such as vdalij and non-deictic ones, such as vperedi ‘ahead’ or 
spava ‘on the right’. As far as narrative is concerned, the reference points 
for words of the latter type, in non-embedded position, are nevertheless de-
ctic. Thus, in the sentence  
<...> po ravnine sprava nalevo katilsja čisten’kij želto-sinij poezd   
‘a clean yellow-blue train was rolling across the plain from right to left’  
(Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”)  
the adverbial sprava nalevo ‘from right to left’ has a deictic reference point; 
hence the situation is oriented with respect to a literary character in the same 
way as it might be oriented by a word like vdalij, which is said to be a secondary deictical.  

Deictic pronouns with demonstrative meaning (like tot ‘that’, tam, 
tuda ‘there’) can normally also be used anaphorically. It should be stressed, 
however, that the anaphoric use of a deictic word is not the same as a pro-
jection. A projection — deictic, syntactic or narrative — is responsible only 
for a shift of reference. Whereas, the anaphoric use of a deictic word in-
variably leads to a modification of its meaning. Thus, the words tam and 
tuda have a dual orientation in conversational discourse — to the Speaker 
and to the Addressee. The Russian sentence Ja idu tuda ‘I am going there’ 
cannot be interpreted as ‘I am going towards your location’. Even the sen-
tence Ja idu tuda k tebe ‘I am going there to you’ may mean ‘I am going to 
your place’ only if you are not there now, because it conveys the meaning ‘away from the Speaker and the Listener’. The involvement of the Ad-
dressee disappears with anaphoric usage, and *tam, tuda* would refer to a place which is singled out in the text’s denotative space. For example, *tam* in (11) is interpreted in the narrative key and functions as a pure anaphor:

(11) Ja prožil v *nem* [Peterburge] nedelju i, nesmotra na to, čto ne bylo *tam* u menja ni odnogo znakomogo čeloveka, provel vremja črezvyčajno veselo.

‘I stayed for a week [in St. Petersbourg] and, in spite of the fact that I knew no one *there* at all, passed the time most enjoyably’

(Pushkin. “A History of Goryukhino Village”)

The semantic addition which accompanies the replacing of *tam* with *zdes’* ‘here’ is the presence of a person in the context of the situation; this person may be called the observer; in fact, it is a subject of consciousness with a definite spatial localization. And this would be narrative deixis but not anaphora. This is why *zdes’* looks somewhat out of place in (12), where no such person can be suspected:

(12) Goda čerez dva perešel on v učiliṧče živopisi, probyl *zdes’* čut’ li ne pjatnad-cat’ let i končil po arẋitekturnomu odtdeleniju, s greẋom popolam.

‘After a couple of years he moved to the art school, stayed *here* almost to fifteen years and graduated from the architectural department, by the skin of his teeth’.

(Chekhov. “The Bride”)

If a sentence as a whole is interpreted in the conversational key, this rules out anaphora with *tam*. Cf. sentence (13), which is deviant if the Speaker is in Moscow:

(13) Ivan priedet v Moskvu i budet nekotoroe vremja žit’ *tam*

‘Ivan is coming to Moscow and will live *there* for some time’.

Thus, *tam* can be used as an anaphor only in the narrative mode, while it can be deictic in both narrative and conversational discourse.

The ability to have both deictic and non-deictic antecedents is a unique property of the zero anaphor. No other anaphoric pronouns have such referential ambiguity, since the first- and second-person subjects, as well as “their” spatial-temporal segments, cannot be referred to subsequently otherwise than with the same deictic means, cf. the law of the Permanent point-of-view mentioned in the Introduction (which follows from the linguistic rule that first- and second-person deixis is obligatory, see Paducheva 1992). In other words, a demonstrative word cannot refer to a participant of the communicative situation.
5. Example: Time Adverb Interpretation Modes

The following is an analysis of the adverb sejčas ‘now’ with regard to possible interpretations in different registers.

A. The Conversational Mode of Interpretation

Russian dictionaries (e.g., The Dictionary of Pushkin’s Language, cf. also Mel’chuk 1985) distinguish three meanings of the word sejčas:

sejčas-1 = ‘at the present moment’ (used with verbs in the present tense)\(^\text{15}\)
sejčas-2 = ‘just now’ (with verbs in the past tense);
sejčas-3 = ‘in the nearest future’ (with verbs in the future tense).

In a canonical communicative situation, i.e. when interpreted deictically, the word sejčas can be used in all its three meanings:

1) Ja sejčas pišu pis’mo [sejčas-1] ‘I am writing a letter now’;
2) Ja sejčas pisal pis’mo [sejčas-2] ‘I was writing a letter just now’;
3) Ja sejčas budu pisat’ pis’mo [sejčas-3] ‘I shall write a letter now’.

In conversational discourse, sejčas-1 indicates that the situation is simultaneous with the moment of speech, i.e. with the present moment of the Speaker. This explains the anomaly of (4) (example borrowed from Mel’chuk 1985):

4) K Miše nas ne pustili. *On byl sejčas s damoj. ‘We were not let in to Misha. He was now with a lady’

In effect, there is a contradiction arising in the deictic interpretation: sejčas expresses simultaneity of the situation with the moment of speech, while the past tense represents the situation as preceding this very moment. Instead, one ought to say v tot moment ‘at that moment’.

B. The Narrative Mode of Interpretation

In the narrative mode, sejčas-1 may denote either the present moment of a character, as in (5), or the present moment of the narrator, as in example (6) from Paducheva 1990.


\(^{15}\) The combinatorial constraint formulated for sejčas-1, namely, its inability to occur in the context of the past (or future) tenses, applies only to verbs in the imperfective aspect; verbs in the perfective aspect can combine with sejčas-1 even in the past tense (which is noted in Mel’chuk 1985). Thus, in the sentence My sejčas izmenili porjadok oformlenija dokumentov ‘We have now changed the procedure for processing documents’ the word sejčas occurs in the meaning sejčas-1. The fact is that the referential interval of a perfective verb in the past tense (in its basic, i.e. perfective, meaning), in contrast to the past tense of the imperfective aspect, includes the present moment; the state which results immediately after the action is completed lasts at the present moment, see Paducheva 1986.
‘He [Tiverzin] went out, slamming the door, and strode off, without turning round. He was surrounded by the autumnal damp, the night, the darkness. <...> He now hated this world more than ever before’ (Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”) (6) Požiloj passažir, sidevšij u okna neumolimo mčavšegosɉa železnodorožnogo vagona <...>, byl ne kto inoj, kak Professor Timofej Pnin. Ideal′no lysyj, zagorelyj i gladko vybrityj, on načinalsɉa dovol′no vnušitel′no ogromnymi čerepaẋovymi očkami <...>, no zakančivalsɉa neskol′ko razočarovyvajuṧče, paroj žuravlínỳx nog (sejčas oni vo flanelevyẋ štanaẋ, odna na drugoj i šrup-kimi, počti ženskimi stupnjami. (Nabokov. “Pnin”) ‘The elderly passenger sitting on the north window-side of that inexorably moving railway coach <...> was none other than professor Timofey Pnin. Ideally bald, sun-tanned, and clean-shaven, he began rather impressively with that great brown dome of his tortoise-shell glasses <...> but ended somewhat disappointingly, in pair of spindly legs (now flanneled and crossed) and frail looking, almost female feet.

In passage (6) (it is essential that this is the first paragraph of the novel) the narrator does not at first reveal himself in his capacity of ob- server; only when the reader reaches the word sejčas — in the present tense of a parenthetical clause — does he realize that, in addition to all the pas- sengers, there is also an invisible narrator in this railway coach, who is di- rectly observing the events taking place there. Thus, sejčas-1 in (6) indicates that the situation is simultaneous with the present moment of the narrator.

The fact that the predicate of the parenthetical clause in (6) is in the present tense is irrelevant for interpreting sejčas; the tense could just as well be the past (cf. the past tense in (5)): in the narrative mode, sejčas-1 does not contradict the past tense of the verb as neither sejčas-1, nor the past tense relates the situation to the moment of speech. The present tense in (6) is, of course, an exquisite mannerism of Nabokov’s: the narrator pos- ing as a kind of sports commentator.

In (5) sejčas-1 can be interpreted as an anaphor referring to the mo- ment of time indicated in the preceding text. In (6) we have a case of narra- tive deixis.

The lexemes sejčas-2 and sejčas-3 do not allow interpretation in the nar- rative mode (within the standard narrative framework) and, therefore, must be classified as primary deicticals; see discussion of sejčas-2 in Chapter III.1.
Secondary deicticals are freely interpreted in the syntactical register — irrespective of the type of discourse; in fact, for secondary deicticals syntactical interpretation is always possible both in conversational and in narrative discourse, which is not the case with primary egocentricals. Let us start with narrative discourse.

If a sentence as a whole is interpreted in the narrative mode, then щас-і in a subordinate clause functions as an anaphor, i.e. it refers to the moment of time designated by the verb in the main clause:

(7) On jasno ponimal, čto щас ot nego trebovalos' / trebuetsja
    'He understood clearly what was required of him now';
    On videl, čto ona щас ne raspoložena k razgovoru
    'He saw that she was not inclined to talk now'.

Щас-і can be freely employed in the context of an imperfective verb in the past tense (trebovalos' ‘was required’): the past tense in (7) is the narrative past, so (7) does not mean that the situation precedes the moment of speech (trebovalos' = trebuetsja).

If, however, the entire sentence is interpreted in the conversational mode, then щас-і in the subordinate clause would permit only deictic interpretation (that is to say, щас would not co-occur with the relative meaning of the present tense, see Chapter II.2). Therefore, щас in (7') means ‘at the moment of speech’, and not ‘at the moment when he was talking’, which makes it deviant:

(7') On togda govoril, čto ona щас bez raboty
    lit. ‘He said then that she is now unemployed’.

Thus, a syntactic projection is excluded for щас-і in the conversational mode, the lexeme щас-і may have both primary and secondary deictic, secondary dexis being close to anaphora. In conversational discourse — both, in an independent position, see (l), and in a syntactically embedded one, see

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16 Note that togda ‘then’, as opposed to щас, functions practically exclusively as an anaphor in any mode (cf. Krylov 1984b). For instance, when Pushkin’s Tatyana says Onegin, ja togda molože Ja lučše, kažetsja, byla ‘Onegin, I was younger then and better, too, it seems’ the word togda refers to a moment which is precisely designated in the pre-text: Onegin, pomnite l’ tot čas <...> ‘Onegin, do you remember that time <...>’. Indeed, a place which does not coincide with the Speaker’s location in space can be indicated with a gesture, while it is impossible to do the same for time localization, and thus the deictic togda would be doomed to referential ambiguity. Cf., however, Pomniš’, kak my togda rasslabljalis’? ‘Do you remember how we relaxed then?’.
(7'), — *sejčas*-1 has a deictic meaning. In the narrative mode it can function either as a deictical, see (6), or as an anaphor, see (5), (7). However, in all its usages *sejčas*-1 means ‘at the present moment’: in the deictic mode it is the present moment of the Speaker (the moment of speech); in the narrative mode it is the present moment of a character or of the narrator, and in the syntactic mode it is the present moment of the subject in the embedding clause (i.e. the moment when that subject was talking, perceiving, thinking or feeling).\(^{17}\)

The lexeme *sejčas*-2 cannot be used in the embedded position either in the spoken language or in the narrative. Thus, in the context

*On rasskazyval, čto on *sejčas* videl korolevu

On was saying that he had *now* seen the queen

one ought to say not *sejčas* ‘now’ but *tol’ko čto* ‘just’. However, such usage is possible for *sejčas*-3; cf. examples from “Doktor Zhivago”:

Ej kazalos’, čto ona *sejčas* upadet bez čuvstv posredi ulicy

‘She felt that she would *now* faint in the middle of the street’;

Esli by ėto byl volčonok, bylo by jasno, čto on *sejčas* zavoet

‘If it were a wolf cub, it would be clear that he it was *now* going to howl’.

There are similar possibilities of interpretation in all the three modes for other adverbs of time as well. Cf., for instance, the adverb *nedavno* (‘recently’ = ‘not long before the present moment’). Sentence (8) below sounds anomalous; the fact is that the preferable interpretation for *nedavno* is the one in the conversational mode, in which case (8) should be interpreted as ‘not long before the moment of speech’, i.e. in 1990. Whereas, the author meant the early 1960s, of course:

(8) V načale 60-ólica godov mne pozvonil Simon Čikovani, <...> blizkij drug nedavno umeršego Pasternaka


Evtushenko meant ‘then recently deceased’. If one inserts *togda* ‘then’ (*togda nedavno umeršego*), it would be possible to interpret the word *nedavno* in the narrative mode with respect to the moment of time indicated in the text: the adverb *togda* refers to the time modifier *v načale 60-ólica godov* ‘in the early

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\(^{17}\) In Meľchuk 1985, *sejčas*-1, when interpreted in the narrative mode, is treated as a separate lexeme *sejčas*-4. One may think that the description proposed here represents the interaction between the lexical meaning of a word and the contexts of its usage in a more general way.
1960s’, and nedavno receives a correct reference point indicated inside the utterance itself, and not imposed from the outside by the moment of speech.

On the other hand, in example (9a) nedavno is rightly interpreted in the narrative mode (as was intended by the author): the present moment is indicated by the first sentence of the text — this is the time when metropolitan Illarion wrote his “Sermon on Law and Grace”, and nedavno in the second sentence conveys a kind of anaphora because it means ‘not long before that moment’. Outside the context which fixes the present moment for this excerpt, nedavno would be interpreted in conversational mode, cf. (9b), which is meaningless because this is the first sentence of a text and no temporal anaphora is possible here:

(9) a. “Slovo o zakone i blagodati” mitropolita Illariona otdeleno ot kresčenija Rusi primerno polstoletiem. Sovsem nedavno praktikovalis’ obyčai čelovečeskih žertvoprinosenij; sovsem nedavno knjaz’ Vladimir predprinimal poslednjuyu popytkuyu podnjat’ jazyčesto v rang gosudarstvennoj religii, stavja kumirov u terennogo dvorca, — i užu soznanie stalo inym.

‘The “Sermon on Law and Grace” by Metropolitan Illarion is separated from the christening of Russia by approximately half a century. The rites of human sacrifices were practiced not long ago; also not long ago Prince Vladimir made the last attempt to elevate paganism to the status of a state religion and placed idols beside the tower-chamber palace, — and yet the consciousness was already different’ (S. Averincev)

b. Sovsem nedavno knjaz’ Vladimir sdelal poslednuyu popytkuyu.

‘Not long ago prince Vladimir made the last attempt’.

In (10), which is the last sentence of M. Gorky’s “Story of the First Love”, nedavno is interpreted in the conversational mode — through reference to the extra-textual present moment of the narrator. This also creates a special effect — an illusion that the narrator belongs to the real world, i.e. that his existence is not confined to this text:

(10) Nedavno ona umerla ‘She died recently’.

The word davno (‘a long time ago’), though different from nedavno in many respects, also admits of a narrative-key interpretation in a specific context. Thus, in (11) the phrase ešče davno, v ijuńe 1937-go ‘a long time ago, in June 1937’ means that June 1937 is separated by a short period of
time from the moment which is indicated in the first sentence, and not from
1992, which encompasses the present moment of the Speaker:

(11) Osip Emil’evič i sam ponimal nebespredel’nost’ pisat’l’skoj vlasti i ničego re-
šitel’nogo ne ždal. Ešče davno, v ijune 1937-go, on písal ...
‘Osip Emil’evich himself also realized that a writer’s power is not unlimited. A
long time ago, in June 1937, he wrote ...’ (È. Poljanovskij, “Izvestia”, 1992)

Adverbials like dva goda (tri dni, dve minuty) tomu nazad ‘two years
(three days, two minutes) ago’ are normally interpreted deictically, i.e. their
reference point is construed as the moment of speech (the present moment
of the Speaker), cf. discussion of the English ago in Fillmore 1976.

Adverbials with the word spustja ‘later’, on the contrary, have a pre-
dominantly narrative interpretation. Thus, in Dovlatov’s story “I am Look-
ing for a Man” the first sentence of the text plays on the anomaly arising
from the fact that the adverbial četvře goda spustja ‘four years later’ occurs
in a context where the moment which can provide a reference point for it is
has not yet been indicated:

(12) Četvře goda spustja na lice žurnalistki Agapovy pojavitsja glubokij sled ot udara
metalličeskoi rejsšinoj
‘Four years later a deep trace from a blow with a metal T-square would ap-
pear on the face of journalist Agapova’.

Adverbials with the preposition čerez ‘in’ (čerez dva dni, tri goda,
etc. ‘in two days, in three years’) allow both a deictic and a narrative inter-
pretations. The phrase do siš por ‘until now, still’ is also of interest. Cf.:

(13) a. Babuška do siš por ljubit ego bez pamjati
‘The grandmother still adores him’ (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”);

b. Do siš por babuška ljubila ego bez pamjati.
‘The grandmother has until now adored him’.

In sentence (13a), where the verb is in the present tense, do siš por has
only a deictic interpretation (the present moment = the moment of speech),
and the sentence has only one interpretation: ‘has loved him until the pre-
sent moment, i.e. until the moment of speech, and continues to love him at
the present moment’. Whereas, (13b), where the verb is in the past tense, al-
allows both interpretations (depending on the intonation), and the difference
between these is enhanced by the ambiguity of the perfective aspect:
— in the deictic register, i.e., in a deictic interpretation of the adverbial and the past tense, (13b) = ‘loved until the present moment; her feelings at the present moment are unknown’; existential Ipv;
— in the narrative register, (13b) = ‘loved until the moment indicated in the previous text as the present moment of a character and continues to love at this moment’; progressive Ipv.

Example (13b) suggest that the narrative interpretation of an adverbial can be regarded as anaphora to the moment of time indicated in the text. Still a subject of consciousness lurks behind the surface, and this is why time shifts in narrative are better interpreted as secondary deixis: the time point in itself but a present moment of some subject of consciousness (= observer).

6. Other Types of Egocentricals

So far, we have discussed egocentricals which imply the Speaker as the subject of deixis. Let us turn now to those egocentricals which presuppose the Speaker in the role of the subject of speech and consciousness, including perception.

There are numerous words and phrases which, owing to their semantics, presuppose a subject of speech or a subject of consciousness, yet this subject is not (or even cannot be) expressed syntactically, i.e., as a syntactic argument of this word or phrase. When these words are used in conversational discourse, i.e. in a canonical speech situation, it is normally the speaker who plays the role of such subject. What happens if these words are used in a narrative text, which lacks a full-fledged speaker? The situation here is exactly the same as in the sphere of deixis. It is either the narrator or a character who acts as a substitute for the Speaker in the narrative text. We can formulate the following general observations.

Thesis 1. If the semantics of an egocentrical presupposes only a subject of consciousness, then, in the narrative, the Speaker may be replaced by a character (the narrator is not excluded either, of course).

Thesis 2. If the semantics of a word or a phrase presupposes the speaker in his capacity of the subject of speech, then the interpretation of a text with this word in traditional narrative involves the figure of a narrator: no character can normally replace the Speaker in this capacity.
Thesis 3. If the semantics of a language element presupposes a subject of speech, and the content of the text suggests a character for this role, then the narrative form of such text is identified as free indirect discourse.

We shall now examine several groups of egocentricals (excluding deicticals, which has been discussed above) observing their behaviour in the narrative text.

‘what is even worse’, čto važnee ‘what is more important’, čto suščestvenno ‘what is essential’, koroče govorja ‘in short’, odnako ‘however’, tem ne menee ‘none the less’, vse-taki ‘all the same’, čestnoe slovo ‘word of honour’, etc.

As their semantic decompositions contain the verb ‘to speak’, metatextual expressions semantically presuppose a speaking subject. For example, skoree ‘rather’ = ‘one can rather say that’, prežde vsego ‘first of all’ = ‘first of all, I shall say’. In the traditional narrative, the implied subject of such phrases can only be the narrator. In the following excerpt it is the metatextual element naprimer ‘for example’ that discloses the presence of a narrator:

<...> tverdost’ spasala ego ot obyknovenñyž zabluždenij molodosti. Tak, naprimer, buduči v duše igrok, nikogda ne bral on karty v ruki. ‘Firmness saved him from the usual blunders of youth. Thus, for example, being a gambler at heart, he never touched the cards.’ (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)

Cf. also examples from M. Bulgakov’s novel “The Master and Margarita” (the egocentricals are highlighted by italics):

(1) Vposledstvii, kogda, otkrovenno govorja, bylo uže pozdno, raznye učreždeniɉa predstavili svoi svodki s opisaniem ėtogo čeloveka. ‘Afterwards, when, frankly speaking, it was already too late, different institutions presented their accounts describing this person.’
— Sam čelovek i upravlɉaet, — pospešil serdito otvetit′ Bezdomnyj na ėtot, priznat′sɉa, ne očen′ ɉasny vopros. ‘— It is the man himself who controls, — Bezdomnyj hastened to give a sul-
len answer to this, honestly speaking, not very clear question.’

The same is true for metatextual verbs such as priznat’ ‘to admit’, zametit’ ‘to mention’, dobavit’ ‘to add’, povtorit’ ‘to repeat’, napomnit’ ‘to remind’, obratit’ vnimanie ‘to pay attention’, podčerknut’ ‘to underline’, etc. when they occur in the context of impersonal modal phrases of the type priẋoditsɉa ‘one has to’, nado ‘it is necessary’, etc. For instance:

(2) Da, sleduet otmetit′ pervuju strannost′ ētogo strašnogo majskogo večera ‘Yes, one must point out the first oddity of that dreadful May evening’;
Trudno skazat’, čto imenno podvelo Ivana Nikolaeviča ‘It’s difficult to say what was it that let down Ivan Nikolaevich’;
Nado zametit’, čto redaktor byl čelovekom načitannym ‘It must be observed that the editor was a well-read person’;
Priẋoditsɉa priznat’, čto ni odna iz svodok nikuda ne goditsɉa; ‘It has to be admitted that none of the accounts is of any use at all’;
It should be added that the foreigner made a disgusting impression on the poet from his very first words.

The novel “The Master and Margarita” is a traditional narrative with an exegetic narrator. The first-person pronoun occurs only once or twice in the entire text of the novel (it should be also noted that the title of Chapter 1 is an exhortative speech act and the narrator is its subject: Nikogda ne razgovarivajte s inostrancami ‘Never talk to foreigners’; note also the narrator’s direct address to a character: Deševka ěto, Ambrosij! ‘That’s cheap, Ambrosij!’). However, the narrator is invisibly present all through the novel as the implied subject of parenthetical phrases and impersonally used metatextual predicates.

Sometimes the author does not give us a chance to restore the implied subject of a metatextual predicate in an unambiguous and uncontroversial way:

(3) <...> na poeta inostraneč s pervyě že slov proizvel otravitel’noe vpečatlenie, a Berliozu, skoree, ponravilsča, to est’ ne to čtoby ponravilsča, a, kak by vyrazit’sča, <...> zainteresoval, čto li.

‘<...> from his very first words the foreigner made a disgusting impression on the poet, but Berlioz rather liked him, that is not exactly liked, but, how should one put it, <...> was sort of interested in him, shall we say.’

The discursive words should be interpreted here to the effect that it is Berlioz who is trying to formulate for himself, as precisely as possible, his attitude to the “foreigner”: otherwise, how could the narrator, who has hitherto observed his characters from the outside, be aware of such an intimate internal state of their consciousness? However, judging by the formal structure of the sentence, this cannot be “the voice of Berlioz”: it is only the narrator who can be the legitimate subject of the metatextual phrases in non-embedded position.

2. Inner-state predicates. When used impersonally (but not parenthetically!), words denoting emotional or mental states, including perception, normally have a character as their implied subject. Cf. the following passages from “Doctor Zhivago”:

(4) Dom byl odnoētažnyj, nedaleko ot ugla Tverskoj. Čuvstvovalas’ blizost’ Brestskoj železnoj dorogi.

‘It was a one-storeyed house, not far from the Tverskaya-street corner. You could sense the proximity of the Brest railway line’
Daže solnce, tože kazavšeesja mestnoj prinadležnostju, po-večernemu zastenčivosti osveščalo scenu in rel'sov "..."

'Even the sun, which also seemed to be a local attribute, was illuminating the scene by the rails in an evening-shy manner'.

The subject of čuvstvovalas' 'you could sense' here would be the inhabitants of the house; while kazavšeesja 'which seemed' means that it seemed to the passengers (of the train in which the suicide took place).

In (5), the phrase moglo pokazat'sja 'might seem' means that it might seem so only to someone attending the funeral, and the narrator realizes that this was not the case:

(5) "..." vyros xolmik. Na nego vzošel desjatiletnij mal'čik. Tol'ko v sotočanii otupenija i besčuvstvennosti, obyklenno nastupajuščij k koncu poxoron, moglo pokazat'sja, čto mal'čik xočet skazat' slovo na materinskoj mogile.

'..." a small mound grew up. A ten year-old boy climbed onto it. Only in the state of benumbed torpor which usually comes at the end of a funeral, could it seem that the boy wished to say something from his mother's grave'.

However, in Pasternak's text it is often not clear who is the subject of perception. Cf.:

(6) On ne zametil, kak vstala s posteli i podošla k stolu Lara. Ona kazalas' tonkoj i xušen'koj i vyše, čem na samom dele, v svoej dlinnoj nočnoj rubaške do pžat. Jurij Andreevič vzdrognul ot neožidannosti, kogda ona vyrošla rjadom.

'He didn't notice Lara get up from the bed and come up to the table. She seemed thin and slight and taller than she actually was, in her long night-gown which reached down to her heels. Jurij Andreevich started up in surprise when she appeared at his side.'

To whom could Lara seem thin, etc. if Yuri Andreevich first saw her when she was already close to him?

The subject of perception may be both the narrator and a character at the same time:

(7) Malen'kaja figura samoj gospoži Dorn v konce stola kazalas' očen' neumestnoj, žalkoj i poterannoj.

'The small figure of Mrs. Dorn herself at the end of the table seemed very much out of place, pathetic and lost' (Nabokov. "Mašen'ka").

However, if an internal state or perception is conveyed by means of a parenthetical (cf. such words and expressions as k sčast'ju 'luckily uvy 'alas', k so-žaleniju 'unfortunately', strannoj dela 'strangely enough', navernoj 'most

(8) Nevedomaja sila, kazalos’, privlekal ego k nemu [domu grafīnī]
‘An unknown force, it seemed, drew him to it [the house of the countess]’
(Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”);

(9) Važnoe svedenie, po-vidimomu, dejstvitel’no proizvelo na putešestvennika
sil’noe vpečatlenie
‘The important information, apparently, actually produced a strong impression on
the traveller’
(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”).

Cf. examples from L. Tolstoy’s story “Two Hussars”; the implied subject of the perception predicate in (10) may be a character; but if the word is used parenthetically, as in (II), this immediately brings the narrator into the picture:

(10) Morščiny <...>, spina sognulas’, a vse-taki v slabyx krivyx nogaх vidny byli
priemy starogo kavalerista.
‘Wrinkles <...>, the back was bent, and yet in the weak crooked legs you
could see the ways of an old cavalryman’
V sadu i v komnate bylo tak ti xo, čto slyšalos’, kak za oknom bystro prošumij
kryl’ami lastočka.
‘It was so quiet in the garden and in the room that you could hear
how a swallow rapidly swish with its wings outside the window’
Na prudu, kotorogo povērstn’s vidnelas’ skvoz’ allei, zalivalis’ ljašski.
‘In the pond, the surface of which was visible through the alleys, the frogs
were croaking loudly’

(II) <...> do podrobnostej razbiral krasotu Lizy, kotoraja, kak vidno, neožidanno
porazila ego.
‘<...> was discussing in detail Liza’s beauty, which, evidently, had unexpected-
edly amazed him’
answered the count, evidently distressed by this recollection’

Kornet, vidimo nažodivšijsja pod vlijaniem grafa 啁...

‘The cornet, who was evidently under the count’s influence 啁...

This supports the initial hypothesis that the semantics of a parenthetical construction includes the speaker as the subject of speech.

Sometimes the narrator enters into a dialogue with the reader, as it were:

(12) V tot čas, kogda užе, kažetsja, i sil ne bylo dyšat’, 啁...

(13) Jure bylo prijatno, čto on opijat’ vstretitsja s Nikoj Dudorovym, gymnazistom, živšim u Voskobojnikova, kotoryj, naverhoe preziral ego, potomu čto byl goda na dva starše ego.

‘Yura was pleased that he would again meet Nika Dudorov, a grammar-school boy who lived at Voskobojnikov’s place and who, most likely, despised him because he was two years older’ (Pasternak. “Doktor Zhivago”)
A more detailed discussion of parenthetics in subordinate clauses is provided in Chapter II.3.

In Bulgakov’s novel “The White Guard” it is almost invariably the Turbins who are the implied subject of the parentheticals, which makes one identify the text as FID (see Chapter III.1):

(15) Vernulsja staryj Turbin v rodnoj gorod posle pervogo udara <...>. Nu, du-
maetsja, vot perestanet, načnetsja žizn’, o kotoroj pišetsja v šokoladnyx knigaх
‘And so, the old Turbin returned to his native city after the first blow <...>. Now, one might think, it will cease, and the kind of life described in chocolate books will start’.

No časy, po sčast’ju, soveršенно bessmertny, bessmerten i “Saardamskij plot-
ik”, i gollandskij izrazec <...>, v samoe tjažkoe vrem′e živitel’nyj i žarkij
‘But the clock, fortunately, is absolutely immortal, as is the “Saardam Carpenter” and the Dutch tile <...>, which is hot and life-giving at the most difficult time’.

3. Predicates expressing similarity also require a subject of consciousness (the one who perceives the similarity), who need not be explicitly expressed. The implied subject of such predicates is usually a character, see (16); while (17) involves both a character and the narrator:

(16) Zdes’ byla udivitel’naja prelest’! <...> Kak ěto napominalo Antiby i Bordigeru!
‘It was so unusually charming there! <...> It reminded one very much of An-
tibes and Bordighera!’ (Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”)

It reminded Yura; namely, it had been said before that Yura had lived with his mother in the south of France.

(17) V ětom položenii udivitel’no napominal on portret Napoleona. Ėto sxoḍstvo porazilo daže Lizavetu Ivanovnu
‘In this position he looked amazingly like Napoleon’ portrait. This resem-
blance struck even Lizaveta Ivanovna’ (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)

Note daže ‘even’ in (17) which implies the presence more than one thinking subject.

4. Identification markers are also egocentrical (cf. Shmelev A. 1990); and indeed, identification of an object amounts to substituting a known entity for one which is unknown (to the subject). Thus, an attentive reader will discover behind ne kto inoj ‘none other than’ in (18) the presence of a narrator who pretends that the reader, as well as he himself, knows the character and simply failed to recognize him at the beginning:
Požiloj passażir, sidevšij u okna <...> železnodorožnogo vagona <...> byl ne kto inoj, kak professor Timofej Pnin

‘The elderly passenger sitting at the window <...> of the railway coach <...> was none other than Professor Timofej Pnin’

(Nabokov. “Pnin”)

Pervyj byl ne kto inoj, kak Miĕhal Aleksandrovič Berlioz, predsedatel’ pravlenija odnoj iz krupnejši境外 moskovski境外 literaturny境外 associacij

‘The first was none other than Mikhail Aleksandrovich Berlioz, chairman of the board in one of Moscow’s largest literary associations’

(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”)

Let us now compare (19a) and (19b). In (19a), which may be taken from conversational discourse, there is a first-person pronoun, so that tot samyj ‘the same’ expresses an act of identification performed by the speaker: the speaker “realizes” that he has seen before the person he encounters. In (19b) the subject of identification may be both the narrator and a character:

(19) a. Ja segodnja videl togo samogo graždanina ‘I have seen this very man today’;
    b. Tut u samogo vxoḍa na Bronnuju so skam’i navstreču redaktoru podnialis tot samyj graždanin, čto togda pri svete solnca vylupilsa iz mirnogo znoja.

‘And then, at the very entrance to Bronnaya street, there rose from a bench to meet the editor the same man who had emerged from the peaceful heat then, in the sunlight.’

(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”)

5. There is an interesting semantic group of words with a meaning of unexpectedness — vdrug ‘suddenly’, vnezapno ‘all of a sudden’, neožidanno ‘unexpectedly’ (when used without a subject), udivitel’nym obrazom ‘surprisingly’, udivitel’noe delo ‘strangely enough’. As a rule, vdrug means ‘unexpectedly for the participants in this situation’. When vdrug is used in the context of a perception verb, which is paradigmatic for this word, it is the subject of the verb that constitutes the subject of the unexpectedness:

(20) Marfa Gavrilovna brosala vzvolnovannye vzglady po obe storony mostovoj.

Vdrug ona, po sčast’ju, uvidala mal’čika na protivopoloznom trotuare.

‘Marfa Gavrilovna was casting worried glances at both sides of the road. Suddenly, she, fortunately, saw a boy on the opposite pavement’

(Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”);

Vdali po ravnine sprava nalevo katilsa čisten’kij želto-sinij poezd, sil’no umen’šennij rasstojaniem. Vdrug oni zametili, čto on ostanovilsa.

‘In the distance, a clean yellow-blue train, greatly reduced by the distance, was rolling across the plain from right to left. Suddenly they noticed that it had stopped’

(Pasternak. “Doktor Zhivago”)
Outside such a context, the subject of perception is more indefinite. In (21) it is obviously a character; in (22) it may also be the narrator, which distinguishes *neožidanno* ‘unexpectedly’ from *vdrug* ‘suddenly’:

(21) Samovar, molčavšij do siţ por, *neožidanno* zapel.

‘The samovar, which had kept silent up till now, *unexpectedly* started singing’

(22) Vojna s Јапоније ёшče ne končilas′. *Neožidanno* ee zaslonili drugie sobytija.

‘The war with Japan was not yet over. *Unexpectedly*, it had been overshadowed by other events’

(23) Niki *ne okazalos′* ni v sadu, ni v dome

‘It turned out that Nika was not in the garden or in the house’

Sentence (23) means approximately the following: Nika was not in the garden or in the house, and, at a certain moment, this information became available to a certain subject of consciousness, who was probably interested in clarifying this question. It follows from the context that the information was received at the same time by several persons, but it was of interest primarily for Yura (because the next sentence is: *Jura dogadyvalsɉa, čto on prɉačetsɉa ot niɉ* ‘Yura guessed that he was hiding from them’). In other contexts, the subject of consciousness for the verb *okazat'sja* may be the narrator.

6. A source of the semantic need for a subject of consciousness is provided by *indefinite pronouns and adverbs*. Thus, in example (24) (from Tolstoj’s “Two Hussars”) there arises the question as to whom it is not clear why Anna Fedorovna went to change her clothes (most probably to herself). In (25) it is, most probably, Polozov who does not see the reason, while the narrator knows it, and the reader also may guess what it is. In (26) the subject of uncertainty is also a character. But in (27), which features an appositive construction, one can detect the narrator:

(24) Anna Fedorovna pošla nadet′ dlja čego-to plat'e gro-gro
‘Anna Fedorovna went, for some reason, to put on her gros-gros dress’

(25) No počemu-to on <Polozov> ne soobščal etiž mečtanij svoemu drugu.
‘But, for some reason, he <Polozov> did not communicate these dreams to his friend’

(26) On proigral čto-to mnogo, no skol′ko imenno, on ne znal.
‘He had gambled away quite a lot, but exactly how much he did not know’

(27) ... on ispuganno obvel glazami doma, kak by opasajas’ v každom okne uvidet’ po ateistu
‘he looked around at the houses with alarm, as if fearing to see an atheist in each window’;
Pravyj glaz černyj, levyj, počemu-to, zelenyj.
‘The right eye is black, the left one, for some reason, is green.’
(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”)

7. The generalizing “insertions” in the narration usually light up the narrator’s figure — a text with generalizations cannot “retell itself”:

(28) ... uže tak nemoloda, čto sama ne sčitala sebɉa molodoɉu, čto mnogo značit dlɉa ženṧčiny
‘already not young to such an extent that she no longer considered herself young, whič means a lot for a woman’ (Tolstoj. “Two Hussars”).
Poslednie luči zaẋodɉaṧčego solnca, kak i vsegda v ėtu poru, brosali ...
‘The last rays of the setting sun, as is usual at this time, were casting ...’
(Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”)

The generalizing parentheticals — po obyknoveniju ‘as usual’, kak často byvaet ‘as often happens’, voobšče ‘in general’ (e.g. Voobšče, s priezdom grafa kutež oživilsɉa ‘In general, with the count’s arrival, the drinking party became much livelier’) belong, even more predictably, to the narrator. The idea that it is the narrator who stands behind generalizations can be found in Chudakov 1971, Mann 1991, Kozhevnikova 1994.

8. Words with an evaluative meaning presuppose a subject of the evaluation. Author’s evaluations are considered bad style in modern literature, hence it is usually a character who is the subject of evaluation:

(29) ... vežlivo i zaiskivajuɉe ulybasɉe sidel Tal′berg protiv germanskogo lejt-
‘smiling politely and ingratiatingly, Talberg was sitting opposite the German lieutenant and talking German’
(inžener i trus, buržuj i nesimpatičnyj, Vasilij Ivanovič Lisovič.)
‘...> an engineer and a coward, bourgeois and unattractive Vasily Ivanovich Lisovich’  (“The White Guard”)

Golos Alferova na neskolk’ko mnogovenij propal, i kogda snova voznik, byl neprijatno pevč.

‘Alferov’s voice disappeared for a few moments, and when it emerged again, it sounded unpleasantly singsong’  (Nabokov. “Mašen’ka”)

On ostal’sja očen’ dovolen svoej neudačnoj ostrotoj.

‘He remained very pleased with his unfortunate joke’  (Viktor Erofeev. “The Russian Beauty”)

The elementary considerations of text coherence require that the implied subject of consciousness should be materially identical within the certain segment of narration. Moving from one character’s viewpoint to another, i.e. changing the subject of consciousness, when this is not motivated by an explicit indication of the propositional attitude, can be employed in order to produce a parody effect, as in V. Tokareva’s story “Happy End”. The following is a somewhat abridged excerpt from this story (the subject of consciousness is indicated in the square brackets; and the most explicit exponents of his viewpoint are highlighted by italics):

[Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya s užasom’...> smotreła na starikov — roditelей muža. Oni vtjagivali edu kak pylesosy’...> I byli okončat’el’no sčastlivy. Osobennye staruža’...> [Roditeli muža] Vremja dlja žizni vypalo krutoe’...> I vot oni prišli, čti samye svetlye dni’...> Vnučok Kiruža — krasavčik i umnik’...> Pravda, na nevestku poxož, toščen’kij.’...> [Ėlya] Ėlya with horror’...> watched the old people — the parents of her husband. They were sucking in food like vacuum cleaners’...> And they were ultimately happy. Especially the old woman’...> [Her husband’s parents] They had lived through tough times. ’...> And now they had come, the happiest days of all. ’...> Their little grandson Kiruža was handsome and clever’...> Actually, like their daughter-in-law, too skinny’...> [Ėlya] And then in addition, Kiryusha was born. Mother invited them to her place, risking her own happiness. [Ėlya’s mother] But Kiryusha was so skinny and blue that you didn’t care about happiness, only that he should survive. ’...> [Mišatkin, Ėlya’s husband] Well, it’s no use talking, the time
is passing, and mother wants to have grandchildren. <...> [Mishatkin’s mother] She was tired <...> of living through the same fear over and over again, that they would take him drunk to the police station and beat him up there. It had happened once, they were bending him at the police station, they call it “making a sledge”, and nearly broke his back. Not that it was for nothing, he’d been wagging his tongue too much, <...> but breaking a man’s back is definitely too much’

At the same time, the presence of a narrator in a text with a predominantly personal interpretation of egocentricals does not contradict the norms of a traditional narrative:

(30) Jure xorošo bylo s djadej. On byl poxož na mamu. Podobno ej on byl čelovekom svobodnym, lišennym predubeždenija protiv čego by to ni bylo neprivyčnogo. Kak u nee, u nego bylo dvorjanckoe čuvstvo ravenstva so vsem živuṧčim <...> ‘Yura felt good with his uncle. He was like his mother. Like her, he was a free person, devoid of prejudice against anything unusual. Like she, he had a nobleman’s feeling of equality with any living creature <...>’

(Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”)

The first sentence conveys an inner state the subject of which is Yura; the second statement, the one about similarity, may also belong to him. The rest of the passage, however, is difficult to construe as the opinion of a ten year-old boy.

The opposition “subject of speech / subject of consciousness” is related to the distinction of primary vs. secondary egocentricals which was discussed in section 4, namely, the subject of speech is, as a rule, a primary egocentrical, while the subject of consciousness is a secondary one.

In Chapter II.3 we extend the opposition primary / secondary to embrace not only deixis but also other types of egocentricals. In the meantime, Chapter II.2 continues on the topic of deixis. We shall examine two grammatical categories — tense, which obviously belongs to the area of primary deixis, and aspect, whose relationship to the sphere of deixis has so far remained unclarified.
CHAPTER II.2

THE GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES OF TENSE AND ASPECT

The grammatical categories of Tense and Aspect, like all other grammatical categories of any language, have a meaning which is not easily defined. According to the most widespread formula, the category of Aspect characterizes the distribution of a situation in time ("Aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation", see Comrie 1976: 3), while the category of Tense determines the place of the situation upon the axis of time. The essential difference between Tense and Aspect is that Tense is deictic in its basic meaning (i.e. it localizes a situation upon the axis of time marking the present moment as the moment of speech), while Aspect is not deictic — at least not in its basic meaning. To be more precise, Aspect does not belong to the primary deictic categories, i.e. it does not map a situation with respect to the moment of speech.

Dahl (1985) rightly insists that semantic delimitations between Tense and Aspect are possible only in their basic meanings since their secondary meanings may overlap. Thus, the Perfective Aspect usually implies past time reference, and both Aspects often serve as a means to express precedence and synchronicity, i.e., essentially temporal meanings; moreover, in a text Aspect is more effectively used to express temporal correlations, than Tense. On the other hand, Tense is deictic in its basic meaning only; for secondary meanings this may not be the case. So it is of radical importance to reveal the basic grammatical meaning of a word form if we are to define its categorical attribution.

1. POINT OF REFERENCE

The contemporary approach to the semantics of Tense is based on the notion of the point of reference introduced in Reichenbach 1947. According to Reichenbach, there are three points that are relevant to the choice of Tense (and sometimes of Aspect too, we must add):

— the point of speech (= the moment of speech);
— the point of event;
— the point of reference.

We can illustrate these notions on the example of the English Past Perfect. In the sentence
(1) I had mailed the letter when he came

the Tense of the temporal clause expresses the precedence of the situation “he came” to the moment of speech and transfers the point of reference to the past; in the main clause the Past Perfect must be used instead of the Past Indefinite in this case. In other words, a necessary condition for the use of the Past Perfect is the presence of a reference point which is transferred to the past. The Present Perfect presupposes a point of reference in the Present: unlike the Simple Past, it does not generate a point of reference which refers to the past. Hence the anomaly of sentence

(2) *I had mailed the letter when he has come;

the Present Perfect has come presupposes a point of reference in the present (which mostly coincides with the moment of speech) and the Past Perfect requires a point of reference in the past, this contradiction producing anomaly.

The notion of a point of reference is necessary to describe the semantics of Aspects in Russian. Russian aspectology knows a great number of particular (and, as a rule, contextually conditioned) aspecual meanings of the Imperfective Aspect (Ipfv): the progressive meaning, the qualitative meaning, several iterative meanings (simple iterative, habitual, potential) and several existential (in other terms — general-factual) meanings — resultative and non-resultative, namely, stative. In connection with the opposition of progressive and existential stative meaning, Yu. D. Apresyan (1980: 33) examines an example

(3) Na stene sprava visela kartina ‘A painting was hanging on the wall to the right’, in which the Past Ipfv visela admits two interpretations: the progressive and the existential one. The difference between these two meanings can be presented as the difference in the point of reference (see Paducheva 1986): with the progressive interpretation, the point of reference is synchronous (the painting was hanging in front of the observer at a certain moment in the past); with the latter existential interpretation, it is retrospective (the speaker knows that some time ago a painting was hanging on that wall, but now it is probably not).

The connection of these two meanings of the Ipfv with the reference point is also proved by the fact that this opposition appears only in the Past Tense. Indeed, the Present Tense, with its reference to the moment of speech, cannot provide a base for two different perspectives: the synchronous per-
spective remains the only one possible; so of the two meanings of the Ipfv the only one possible in the Present Tense is the progressive one.

The most interesting point here is that the main difference between the two interpretations of sentence (3) is not generated by the semantics of Aspect at all: it follows from the semantics of Tense. The progressive interpretation of sentence (3) may appear only on condition that the Past Tense acquires a certain secondary function: in its primary function, the form of the Past Tense denotes a situation that precedes the moment of speech, as in the case of existential interpretation. Thus the progressive interpretation of Aspect is conditioned by the fact that the Past Tense does not express any precedence, and the two interpretations of sentence (3) demonstrate two different meanings of the Past Tense in the first place. We have to go back to modes of interpretation in order to describe this difference.

2. Registers of Interpretation of Tense and Aspect

The Present Tense is always the basic form among all other temporal forms: the Past always precedes the point of the Present; the Future always follows this point. Thus regime (key, mode) of interpretation depends on interpretation of the point of the Present: the point of the Present does not just determine the meaning of the Present Tense form, it also provides the point of reference for the interpretation of all other Tense forms.

As mentioned in Chapter II.1, we differentiate between the speech mode of interpreting egocentric elements (it is also called the dialogical, or deictic mode) and the narrative mode. The speech mode corresponds to the situation when a sentence is interpreted in the context of a canonical, i.e. full-fledged communicative situation. It is only for the canonical situation that the notion of the moment of speech makes sense: the moment of speech is defined as the point of the present of the speaker which coincides with the point of the present of the addressee, which in this case is the listener. So in the speech register of interpretation all the tenses are interpreted according to their relation to the moment of speech.

The narrative text is the result of detaching the utterance from the subject of speech, or the speaker: the narrative text is interpreted in the context of an incomplete communicative situation — in the narrative regime. The narrative
regime provides no correlation between the sentence and the moment of speech (cf. Forsyth 1970: 182; Benveniste 1959/1974: 271) — due to the simple fact that the speaker is absent. When reading a novel, of course, we have a general idea that the narrator is telling us about something that happened in the past; yet, as Yu. S. Maslov (1984: 182) observes, the same Past Tense will be used in science fiction where the action refers to the Future. In the narrative mode Tense-Aspect forms of verbs are not interpreted as referring to the moment of speech, they are interpreted as oriented to some other point of reference. The point of reference is usually fixed in the preceding text.

There is a separate problem concerning the interpretation of the initial sentence of the text (initial — in a conventional sense), which is to be interpreted within a context where no temporal point of reference has been established yet (Mayenowa 1974). This “first” sentence differs from all other sentences since “it has to provide temporal anchoring for the rest of the discourse by, e.g., an explicit time adverbial” (Dahl 1985: 113). In fiction a conventional point may function as the starting point for the textual time; compare the famous “beginnings” of well-known texts: Guests were arriving to the dacha’ (Pushkin); I was travelling by post-chaise from Tiflis’ (Lermontov). As a matter of fact, the initial point of textual time may be established in some non-initial sentence, see Chapter III. 3.

In the narrative mode the form of the Ipfv loses its primary meaning: the Past Tense denotes synchronicity with the point of reference here (as with the progressive interpretation of the Past Ipfv in example (3)), instead of denoting precedence, as happens in the speech mode, see the existential reading of example (3). As a result, in the narrative mode the Past and Present Tenses do not differ much from one another. As for the semantics of the Present Narrative as opposed to the Past Narrative, we shall go back to this issue in the next section.

The opposition between the narrative and the speech registers of interpretation corresponds roughly to the opposition between the narrative plane and the plane of speech introduced by Benveniste (1959). Benveniste has demonstrated that in French the narrative regime is characterized by a special set of Tense-Aspect forms of the verb. In Russian the narrative regime does not
have any special grammatical forms; yet it is manifested in many other ways, including special temporal and aspectual meanings of verb forms.

The delimitation suggested by Benveniste does not coincide exactly with the one that would look natural from our point of view, if the delimitation of regimes is meant to provide us with more precise definitions in Tense and Aspect semantics. For example, despite Benveniste, we believe that first person pronouns do not necessarily imply that the text is to be interpreted in the speech regime. In Banfield 1982 it is claimed that the criterion for defining the speech regime is the combined use of first and second person pronouns. We believe that a more definite criterion of the speech regime is the presence of the speaking subject with his/her present moment. For example, in Pushkin’s “The Shot” the speaking subject has no present moment (the narrator retells some past events), and that keeps the narration within the limits of the narrative regime, unlike, e.g., the first part of Yu. Olesha’s “Envy”, which is quite consistently kept in the speech regime: in this novel the speaking subject has the present moment, which shifts, discretely, to the Past, usually at the beginning of a new Chapter.

Sometimes the structural peculiarities of a sentence clearly express in which regime its Tense-Aspect forms are to be interpreted. For example, unambiguously deictic words make it possible to identify a sentence as included in the speech regime, and, consequently, the Tense form of this sentence retains its primary meaning of denoting precedence to the moment of speech. Take, for instance, the following sentence:

(3′) Vot na ėtoj stene visela kartina ‘On this very wall the painting was hanging’.

Unlike sentence (3), the form of the Past Pfv is unambiguously interpreted in (3′) as having the existential meaning. The verb ležala in Akhmatova’s verses is interpreted in this way:

Zdes′ ležala ego treugolka ‘Here his cocked hat was lying
I rastrepannyj tom Parni. And a disheveled volume of Parnis.’

the Past Ipfv is understood as having existential meaning due to zdes′ lacking antecedent and, thus, unambiguously deictic.

The speech mode of interpretation may be imposed upon a sentence by its communicative objective. For example, the Past in sentence (4a) is am-
biguous: *pokazyval* may have two meanings depending on the intonation it is pronounced with; in the corresponding interrogative sentence (4b) the Past Tense *pokazyval* is unambiguously interpreted as expressing precedence:

(4)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. On <em>pokazyval</em> ej tvoi pis′ma</th>
<th>‘He was showing her your letters’;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. On <em>pokazyval</em> ej tvoi pis′ma?</td>
<td>‘Did he show her your letters’?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, a question is naturally interpreted in the speech registers. So the retrospective point of reference is clearly established in (4b).

### 3. Present vs. Past Narrative

Let us now discuss the narrative use of tenses — namely, the Present Narrative as opposed to the Past Narrative. Since tense is an essentially deictic category (primary deictic in terms of Chapter II.1), its use in the narrative registers cannot be presented simply as a narrative projection, i.e. as a shift on the referential level, as in case of secondary deictic categories. So we must not be surprised by the fact that the opposition of Past vs. Present in the narrative mode has a different meaning from that of the speech mode, although we shall attempt to reveal an invariant to integrate different registers.

The narrative use of the Present Tense is frequently called the present historical since it is the Present Tense used, as a rule, in narration about the past. Yet this feature is not the most essential one; a better term — the Present Narrative — is found in Grammatika 1952/1960: 484–485, and we shall use it here. In fact, a verb in the present historical may denote an action in the past because reference to the past is explicitly expressed by an adverbial:

(5) *Daveća* edu v tramvae. I stoju konečno na ploščadke <...> I vot stoju na ploščadke, i duša u menja očen′ vostorţeno vosprinimaet... každyj šoroţ... Raznye vozvyšennye mysli priĥodjat. Raznye gumannye frazy tesnjašja v golove. <...> I vdrug konduktorša razbivaet moe vozvyšennoe nastroenie.  

‘The other day I take a tram. I’m standing on the platform, of course. So I’m standing on the platform, and my soul thrills at every sound. Various exalted thoughts come to my mind. Various humanitarian phrases crowd my brain. And then the ticket girl dashes my exalted mood.’ (Zoshchenko. “On a Tram”)

Descriptions of the semantics of the Present Narrative usually emphasize the idea that the action denoted by the verb in this form seems to develop “in front of the speaker”, cf. Glovinskaja 1989: 106. Yet this is characteristic for the semantics of the Imperfective Aspect (in the progressive meaning),
and not for the semantics of Tense. The idea of the eye-witness perspective is actually characteristic for the semantics of the Ipfv, and when the lexical semantics of the verb allows it, it is equally present in the meaning of the Present and Past Narrative, see (6); but if the lexical semantics of a verb does not allow it, the eye-witness component is absent even from the semantic of the Present Tense form, see example (7) taken from Glovinskaja 1989:

(6) Po bazarnoj plóščadi idet policejskij nadziratel′ Očumelov.
   ‘Police Inspector Ochumelov is walking across the market square.’
   (Chekhov. “A Chameleon”).

(7) V konce XIX veka pojavljajutsja pervye mežaničeskie časy.
   ‘By the end of the XIX century the first mechanical watches appear.’

If we replace the Present Tense by the Past Tense in example (6), we could still feel the narrator who observes the situation with his own eyes. So this semantic analysis of the Present Narrative cannot answer the question as to what is the difference between the Present and the Past Narrative.

The most striking difference between the Past and the Present Ipfv is, obviously that the Past has the grammatical opposition of Aspects, while in the Present this opposition is not formally expressed: the Ipfv form is used both in the Imperfective and in the Perfective meaning, cf. (6) and (7)\(^{18}\). Evidently, to clearly understand the function of Tense in the semantics of the Present Narrative we should start our analysis with the uses where the Present Narrative is interpreted as having the imperfective meaning, so that only the temporal meaning component makes it different from the Past Narrative.

In a context where the Present Narrative has an imperfective meaning the difference between the forms of the Present and the Past Tense does not concern the relationship between the narrator and the situation he describes (this relationship is determined by the Aspect which is the same in both Tense forms); it concerns the relationship between the narrator and the reader: the Present Tense includes the reader in a dialog — it places the reader within the space where the narrator is; while the Past Tense establishes a distance between the narrator and the situation he observes and de-

\(^{18}\) The claim that the Present Ipfv can actually be interpreted in the meaning of the Pfv is confirmed by the fact that a series of Ipfv verbs in the Present Narrative can be interpreted as denoting a sequence of events, in the same way as a series of Pfv verbs can, see Apresyan 1988.
scribes for the reader, see Paducheva 1989. This solution is confirmed by the difference in combinability of the forms of Past and Present with deictic elements. For example, in (8) the form of the Present Tense, which imitates a canonical communicative situation, with the Speaker and the synchronous Addressee-listener, can be combined with deictical *vot*, while the Past Tense (*stojava = ‘was standing’*) is excluded in this context:

(8) *Vot stoju ja na ploščadke*

‘[Vot] I stand by the black door’ (Zoshchenko. “On a Tram”).

In other words, the Present Narrative generates a pseudo-canonical communicative situation placing the Addressee within the range of immediate contact with the narrator. The involvement of the Addressee is also responsible for the expressivity which makes the Present Narrative different from the cool Past Narrative.

Thus we can reveal the invariant in the opposition of the Tense forms: the Past Tense always expresses a detachment; but in the speech mode (conversational discourse) the Past Tense expresses the detachment of the situation from the speaker and the addressee taken together, while the Past Narrative detaches the narrator and the situation from the reader.

In examples such as (7) the form of the Present Tense functions in a different way: it has the meaning of unmarked time — in sentence (7) time is expressed by the adverbial modifier and the Tense form adds nothing to the semantics of the sentence. Thus, in sentence (7) the meaning of the Present Tense form is atemporal.

Apart from the above-mentioned difference between the Present and the Past Narrative, note some particular effects which may accompany the replacement of the neutral Past Perfective by the expressive Present Narrative.

1) The Present Narrative cannot be used “instead of” the Past PfV if the form of the PfV does not constitute the rheme of the sentence (cf. in Bondarko 1971: 164 examples confirming thesis that the opposition Past — Present is associated with the Topic-Comment structure of a text). Take, for instance, sentence (9), where the Past PfV cannot be replaced by the Present IpfV due to the word order:

(9) *A v bol'nicu menja privezli s brjušnym tifom.*
‘And to the hospital they brought me with typhoid fever.

(Zoshchenko. “On a Tram”)

Replacement could have been possible if the sentence had a different word order:

(9’) Privozhat menja v bol’nicu s brjušnym tifom.

2) The Present Narrative may be used instead of the Past Pfv only on condition that the description of the situation constitutes the background for further development of events. Therefore, in sentence (10) the Present Narrative cannot be used within the context of the same short story since it would mean that the narrator is following the passenger in order to tell something new about him, whereas in the real story the passenger dissappears out of sight at that point:

(10) Črez dve ostanovki zlopolučnyj passažir sošel s tramvaja.

‘Two stops later the unlucky passenger got off the tram.’

Hence the fact that the use of the Present Narrative creates a certain suspense (Fleischman, 1992) — a sense of something to come, cf. the sentence from the same story: Porylsja v karmane i dostaet dvukhrivennym ‘fumbled in his pocket and gets out a twenty kopek coin’ — after this we are expecting something to happen. This is the second source of the perceptible expressiveness of the Present Narrative.

The function of the Present Narrative under discussion deserves attention because this function turns out to be associated with the general disposition of the Ipfvs to express background information (Hopper, Tompson 1980, Chvany 1984). In other words, this textual function of the Present Narrative may be explained by the purely formal reason that the Present Narrative denotes the event by means of the grammatical form of the Ipfv Aspect.

One observation is called for concerning the narrative use of tenses in general. Philosophers have observed the opposition between the two ways of establishing temporal reference. Within the first type of reference (it could be called objective) a simple relationship of ‘before’, or ‘later than’ is established between the events; with the second (subjective, or deictic) there is the point of the Present that interrupts the time axis and provides the starting point which divides all events into past and future. In the for-
mer case relationships between the events are rigid, while in the latter the situation is constantly changing: a moment ago this point belonged to the Future, and now it is already in the Past. This makes the deictic mode inconvenient for making an account of a sequence of events which are localized in time. For example, a sports report on TV where one would expect the utterance to be construed within the framework of the canonical speech situation (since the speaker has a synchronous addressee who shares his area of vision), often resorts to the narrative mode instead of the deictic one because the moment of speech orientation is inconvenient for describing sequences of events. The point of the Present tends to be motionless for some time, shifting forward discretely at suitable moments; cf.:

(11) Kuznecov... *upustil mjač za bokovuču. Mjač pokidaet predely polja. Sejčas spar-
takovcy *vvodjat ego v igru.

‘Kuznecov... *let the ball go across the touch line [Past Deictical]. The ball *leaves the field [Present Historical]. Now the Spartak players *throw it in [Pre-
sent Prophetical].’

In conversational discourse the grammatical Tense relies upon of the speaker; in other words, it implies the time axis where the point of the Present is fixed by the moment of speech inevitably dividing all events between the present and the future. In the narrative discourse Tense relies upon the present moment of the narrator-observer, who provides an objective time count. The present moment of the observer differs from the moment of speech at least in two respects: 1) it can move not only forward (as the moment of speech) but also backward; 2) it easily changes, following the narrated events. On the other hand, the moment of speech is inert: there is no general mechanism that would move it ahead. Thus, it is clear that the objective time axis provides a much more convenient account of sequences of events.

As a matter of fact, the deictic meaning of the Tense form is confined to a single utterance or utterances related to a single situation, cf. — *Gde ty byl? — *Gulčal. ‘Where have you been? I went for a walk’. This is why Tense forms change their interpretation from the deictic to the narrative mode as soon as the speaker starts “telling a story”, see Peshkovsky 1938: 208.
4. Example. Registers of Interpretation of the Past and Future IPFV

Examples of interpreting Past and the Future Tense forms (mainly in the Ipfv) in the deictic and narrative modes are given below.

A. The Deictic Mode of Interpretation.

In conversational discourse the Past Tense expresses precedence to the moment of speech, or to the Present moment of the speaker:

(1) — Čto ty delal? — Igral v karty. “What were you doing?” “I was playing cards.”

B. The Narrative Mode of Interpretation

In narrative discourse the moment of speech does not take part in the interpretation of the sentence: it is replaced by the so called current point of the textual time — the present moment of the narrator (or the character; normally these time points coincide, see Chapter III.1.5 for interesting exceptions). In its special narrative meaning the Past Ipfv does not express precedence to any time point important for the interpretation of the text; the situation is presented as synchronous to the Present moment of the narrator-observer. Thus, the Past Narrative is equal to the Present from the referential point of view:

(2) Odnaždy igrali v karty u konnogvardejca Narumova.
   ‘Once they were playing cards at horse guards Narumov’s.

   (Puskin. “The Queen of Spades”)

The flow of time in the text is determined either by actions of the characters (see example (5) in Chapter II.1.4, where the current point of the textual time is the moment when On [Tiverzin] vyšel ... i zašagal vpered, ne oboračivajas ‘He [Tiverzin] got out ... and strode forward’, or by a change in the temporal position of the observer-narrator. In example (3) the reference point (of the verb in the Future Tense) is registered as the Present Tense of the narrator; so the Future Tense in sentence (3) is the Future Narrative:

(3) Manilov uvel prijatela v komnatu. Ĭotja vremja v prodolženje kotorogo oni budut proxođit’ seni, perednjuju i stolovuju, neskol’ko korotkovatoe, no proprobuem <...> im vospolzovat’šja i skazat’ koe-čto o xoźjaine doma.
   ‘Manilov took his friend to his room. Although the time that will pass while they will be walking through the porch, the front room and the dining room is rather short, we shall try to make use of it and to tell something about the master of the house.’

   (Gogol. “Dead Souls”)

The Future Narrative is also represented by examples (4)–(6), see Bondarko 1990:
Belinskij ešče ne raz vernelsja k četoj teme
‘Belinsky would return to this theme many times’.

(5) Vskore on uedet iz Moskvy
‘Soon he will leave Moscow’.

(6) Ėtot svoj postupok on budet pomniv potom vsju žizn’
‘Later he will remember this act of his all his life’.

In each particular case unambiguous interpretation of the Future Tense form in the meaning of the Future Narrative is promoted by various factors. In example (5) it is supported by the adverbial vskore ‘soon’ for which the interpretation in the narrative mode is preferable: the corresponding deictic adverb is skoro, see Krylov 1984b: 144. In example (6) the adverbial potom ‘later’ is the clue: it contains retrospection by referring to a certain time point in the past which is evidently fixed in the previous text — thus the moment of speech is “compromised” as the point of reference. The only fact that prevents the interpretation of example (4) as a prediction — i.e. in the meaning of the Future Deictic — is that Belinsky is no longer alive; from the linguistic point of view, the deictic interpretation of the Future Tense form in (4) cannot be excluded.

Let us return to the case when the character is the bearer of the Present Tense of the text. The question arises as to what happens when there are several characters in the text, acting independently. Which one is the bearer of the textual time with the shifting present moment? V. V. Vinogradov revealed and analysed the dependence of the textual time on the character using as an example Pushkin’s “The Queen of Spades”. As Vinogradov (1980) observes, this dependence results in the fact that various characters often have his/her own (unsynchronized) chronology, so the narrator may have to intervene in order to provide synchronization:

(7) Odnaždy — četo slučilos’ dva dnja posle večera, opisannogo v načale četoj povesti, i za nedelju pered toj scenoj, na kotoroj my ostanovilis’, — odnaždy Lizaveta Ivanovna ...
‘Once — it happened two days after the night which was described at the beginning of this story and a week before the scene we stopped at — once Lizaveta Ivanovna...’ (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”).

Note that the sentence Na doroge pokazalsja ja ‘I appeared on the road’, an example from Apresyan 1986, discussed in Chapter II.1.3) is anomalous only when the Past Pfv is interpreted in the deictic key, i.e. when it means ‘I have just appeared’, — because only in this case ja ‘I’ denotes both the
speaker and the observer. This identity is not compulsory when the Past Pfv is interpreted in the narrative key. The combination of pokazat’sja ‘appear’ with ja ‘I’ as the subject is admissible, for example, in (8), where the speaker is presenting the situation through the eyes of his contractor, pushing him forward to take the role of the observer and putting it away from himself:

(8) Tut na doroge pokazalsja ja, i on sprjatalsja v kusty.
‘Then I appeared on the road, and he hid himself in the bushes’.

C. The Syntactical Mode of Interpretation: Relative Tense

In the diagrams below s denotes the moment of speech (the Present Tense of the speaker), e$_1$ the time of the situation designated by the verb in the main clause, and e$_2$ the time of the situation designated by the verb in the subordinate clause. The syntactic interpretation of the Tense form of the verb in the subordinate clause is represented by diagrams (9a) — (12a). They are compared to the parallel diagrams (9b) — (12b) which demonstrate the potential interpretation of the same form in the deictic mode$^{19}$.

(9) Ja ne znal$_1$, čto menja vstretjat$_2$ ‘I did not know$_1$ that I would be met$_2$’:

a. 

\[ e_1 \quad e_2 \quad s \]

b. 

\[ e_1 \quad s \quad e_2 \]

(10) On obeščal$_1$, čto budet pisat’$_2$ ‘He promised$_1$ that he would write$_2$ to me’:

a. 

\[ e_1 \quad e_2 \quad s \]

b. 

\[ e_1 \quad s \quad e_2 \]

(11) Ivan nadejalsja$_1$, čto ja vermus’$_2$ ‘Ivan hoped$_1$ that I would return$_2$’:

a. 

\[ e_1 \quad e_2 \quad s \]

b. 

\[ e_1 \quad s \quad e_2 \]

(12) Ivan skazet$_1$, čto ty zastavil$_2$ ego ždat’ ‘Ivan will say$_1$ that you have made$_2$ him wait for you’:

a. 

\[ s \quad e_2 \quad e_1 \]

b. 

\[ e_2 \quad s \quad e_1 \]

In example (9) the situation designated by the verb in the Future Tense refers to the Past when interpreted in the syntactical mode: menja vstretjat here means ‘I have been met’. The deictic interpretation of the Future Tense in (9) is difficult although it is not impossible: menja vstretjat may be interpreted as ‘I must be met’. In example (10), on the contrary, the deictic interpretation of

$^{19}$ On relative use of tenses in Russian see Shmelev D. 1960.
the Future Tense seems more natural. In example (11) both interpretations are equally possible: in the deictic interpretation (11) means that I have not returned yet, while in the syntactical interpretation it means that Ivan has just learned that I do not intend to return. In example (12) the deictic interpretation says what Ivan will say about an event that has already taken place, while in the syntactical reading (12) would denote an event that is to happen in the Future; take, for instance, the following context: “[You must go, or] Ivan will say that you have made him wait for you”. Thus, when interpreted syntactically Tense forms localize situation in time relative to the present moment of the observer wholly ignoring the moment of speech.

It must be emphasized that according to general laws of interpreting egocentric elements the syntactic interpretation of Tense should have been impossible: as a primary deictic category Tense has no rights for narrative projection; so, basically speaking, Tense should not admit syntactical interpretation (and Tense does not in the majority languages, including English). Indeed, the admissibility of syntactical projection is a prerequisite for the narrative one, see Chapter II. 1, while, as we saw, the narrative use of Tenses is anything but projection.

Thus, the relative use of Tenses in Russian should be represented as the language specific secondary meaning of Russian Tense, not as a syntactical projection of its deictical meaning.

5. DOES THE RUSSIAN ASPECT HAVE PURELY DEICTIC MEANING?

The notion of the point of reference, though demonstrated by Reichenbach on varied examples taken from several languages, is neither sufficiently definite nor pragmatically clear. The notion we have in mind (cf. a different interpretation of the Reichenbach conceptions in Timberlake 1985) might be pragmatically explicated if we make use of the notion of the observer introduced in Apresyan 1986 in connection with the problems of spatial deixis. We propose a pragmatic motivation according to which the Reichenbachian point of reference can be regarded as the temporal localization of the observer, his present moment (cf. the term “point of observation” which is introduced with a different purport in Glovinskaja, 1982: 125). Thus, the se-
mantics of Aspect relies on the notion of the observer, hence Aspect belongs to secondary egocentricals in the sense of Chapter II.1.

We can now consider whether the semantics of the Russian Aspect contains primary deictic components. Let us examine two phenomena in this connection. The first one is the Perfective meaning of the Russian Past Pfv.

As for the English Present Perfect, there is no doubt that it is primary deictic: it denotes an action the result of which is retained at the moment of speech. At first glance the Russian Pfv functions in the same way: you cannot say in a conversational discourse,

(13) Ja slomala ruku

‘I have broken my arm’,

if it happened to you in childhood, or even several years ago so that your hand is all right now: asserting (13) I not only assert some event in the Past, but also imply that its resulting state lasts up to the moment of speech. If the resulting state does not last any longer, it would be better to say Ja lo-
mala ruku ‘I broke my arm’ using the Ipfv in its existential meaning. So the interpretation of the Pfv form (in a fairly large class of verbs, see Paducheva, 1993b) may contain the Perfective component, thus referring the event to the moment of speech, which at first glance seems to make the semantics of the Russian Pfv similar to the English Present Perfect.

Yet, unlike the English Present Perfect, the Perfective component of the Russian Pfv form is non-stable (in the sense of Zalizniak 2006: 134ff.): it is suppressed in contradicting contexts. To be more precise, it refers to the moment of speech only when the adverbial modifier of time is absent. If there is an adverbial modifier of time21 the Perfective component is lost. V. V. Vinogradov states: “Even in sentences like Puškin rodilsja v 1799 godu ‘Pushkin was born in 1799’ the result of the past event is grammatically interpreted as still existent” (Vinogradov 1947: 563). We would rather say that in this context the form of the Pfv does not have the Perfective component. The

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20 The same is true for the English Past Perfect. In fact, the meaning of this form presupposes an observer with a definite temporal localization, and it does not depend on who plays this part, be it the speaker (in conversational mode), or the narrator (in the narrative one). Thus, when sentence (2) is interpreted in the speech regime, the speaker plays the part of the speaker (when time is interpreted), and the part of the observer (when the Perfective form is interpreted).

21 When its interval of reference does not cover the point of speech; as for the modifiers of the “now” type, see Paducheva 1992.
general definition of the meaning of the Russian Pfv form should be that the resulting state is retained at the point of reference. In conversational discourse the moment of speech is but the most natural point of reference which appears by default when the context does not contain any other reference point, and this explains example (13). But the time point may be fixed by a time adverbial. So in the following sentence

(14) V mae 1962 goda ja uže priėxal v Voronež
‘In May 1962 I already came to Voronezh’

the moment of speech takes part only in the interpretation of the Past Tense: the point of reference for the Pfv Aspect is fixed by the adverbial modifier. This is why example (14) does not imply that the speaker is still in Voronezh.

In English, as opposed to Russian, Present Perfect does not co-occur with time modifiers — exactly because reference to the moment of speech is a stable component of its semantic decomposition.

The Perfective component of the Russian Pfv can also dissapear in the context of a special Topic-Comment structure. Compare the following sentences:

(15) a. V Moskvu priėxal s sem′ej Solženicyn
   ‘Solzhenicyn came to Moscow with his family’;

b. *V London priėxal s sem′ej Hercen ‘Herzen came to London with his family’;

c. V London Hercen priėxal s sem′ej
   ‘In London Herzen arrived with his family’.

Unlike (15a), (15b) is perceived as anomalous since the Perfective meaning component in (15b) clashes with our knowledge of the world: the state of affairs with respect to Herzen cannot be relevant at present. In (15c) the Perfective component is absent, and this cancels the anomaly. Surely, the anomaly of (15b) may be cancelled if the point of reference is fixed by the textual time, instead of the moment of speech, cf. the following example: Avgust 1852 goda byl burnym. V London priëxal s sem′ej Hercen ‘The August of 1852 was turbulent. Herzen came to London with his family’.

Thus the Perfective meaning of the Pfv in Russian is not primary deictical: it is not connected with the moment of speech in any radical way — it is the point of reference, and not the moment of speech, that participates in the interpretation of the Pfv, and the point of reference, i.e. the temporal
position of the observer, coincides with the moment of speech in certain contexts only. Generally speaking, the point of reference can be established in many other ways, including anaphorical one. So the Pfv form, which is oriented at the observer, not at the speaker, is used both in the conversational and in narrative discourse with the same meaning: its invariant implies that the retrospective position of the observer is established, and the observer views the event bearing in mind its resulting state.

The second point where the Russian Aspect can be suspected of being primary deictical is the existential meaning of Ipfv. As mentioned in section 2, the existential meaning of the Past Ipfv requires the retrospective position of the observer for its realization: the situation described by the verb should be viewed from a certain point in time which follows the time point of the event itself. Yet the point of observation, which is detached from the time of the situation itself, should to be fixed in some way. In speech discourse it is fixed by the moment of speech: the point of observation coincides with the present moment of the subject of speech since the observer is the speaker himself. So the existential meaning of the Past Ipfv naturally fits the speech register of language usage. It would seem, on the face of it, that in the narrative register the moment of speech could be replaced by the current moment of textual time. Yet the Past Ipfv is practically absent in the narrative discourse in its existential meaning — all the clear examples of it are taken from colloquial usage, cf. Rassudova 1968; Bondarko 1971: 86. Of course, examples can be found where the Past Ipfv denotes an action which precedes the current point of textual time. Yet one always feels that the meaning of precedence is expressed by the context, and not by the form of the verb. In the following examples the latter of the two verbs in italics refers to a time which preceded the action of the former:

‘And into hospital I was brought with typhoid fever. My family hoped to ease my suffering’

I vot imenno togda, kogda Kseniɉa Fedorovna vernulas′ iz bol′nicy, žena Dmitrieva zatejala obmen ... Razgovory o tom, čtoby soedinit′sɉa s mater′ɉu, Dmitriev načinal i sam. No to bylo davno. (Trifonov. “The Exchange”).
‘And exactly when Ksenia Fedorovna came back from the hospital, Dmitriev’s wife started the exchange... Conversations about living together with his mother. Dmitriev had started himself. But that was long ago.

Ksjuša vyšla za zubnogo vrača, smejas’, čto zuby bolet’ ne budut. Ėtot Rene priežžal v Moskvu na učenyj kongress, a ona ego snimala dlja televidenija.

‘Ksyusha married a dentist laughing and saying that her teeth would never ache. This Rene had come to Moscow for some scientific congress, and she had filmed him for Television.’ (Viktor Erofeev. “The Russian Beauty”).

The current point of the textual time easily serves as a synchronous point of reference, but the retrospective usage is unnatural for it; in Chapter II.1 a similar phenomenon is discussed: the retrospective meaning of sejčas ‘now’ is not realized in the narrative mode. The general tendency to reduce the set of grammatical forms and their meanings in the narrative discourse as compared to the conversational one was observed in Dahl 1985. If that is true, we could say that the existential meaning of the Ipfv is linked to the speech discourse, so that this meaning of the Ipfv is primary deicticalal.
CHAPTER II.3
SUBJECTIVE MODALITY AND OTHER MAIN CLAUSE PHENOMENA

1. SUBJECTIVE MODALITY AND SYNTACTIC NON-EMBEDDABILITY

In the 1970s a series of works appeared (see Hooper and Thompson 1973, Green 1976 and Bolinger 1977) on the phenomenon of syntactic non-embeddability (known in generative grammar as “main clause phenomena”; it should be borne in mind that these phenomena are characteristic of the main clause exclusively). We have seen that a large number of linguistic units (namely, words; lexemes — lexeme being a word in one of its meanings; phraseological set expressions; grammatical units; intonation contours; syntactic constructions etc.) are possible only in a syntactically independent position, i.e., in a main clause; and that the placing of a clause with such a word or construction in a subordinate position results in an anomaly.

A simple example of syntactic non-embeddability is a sentence with a parenthetical:

(1) Ivan, kažetsļa, v otpuske. ‘Ivan is, apparently, on leave’.

(2) *To, čto Ivan, kažetsļa, v otpuske, putaet vse moi plany
   ‘*The fact that Ivan is, apparently, on leave upsets all my plans’.

Theoretically the absence of precise information can upset your plans, but this idea cannot be expressed with the help of sentence (2) because it is deviant.

A phenomenon close to syntactical non-embeddability is non-reportability22. Let us assume that opinion (1) belongs to a certain Zina, and we want to tell someone about it; we then find that it cannot be conveyed in indirect speech by reporting sentence (1):

(3) *Zina sčitaet, čto Ivan, kažetsļa, v otpuske.
   ‘*Zina thinks that Ivan is, apparently, on leave.’

The parenthetical apparently makes sentence (3) deviant; and, consequently, (1) is non-reportable. The sentence (an example from Green 1976) *Bobby realised that, honestly, he could expect nothing owes its deviance to the parenthetical honestly.

22 What is meant here is non-reportability by means of indirect speech and on the assumption that the lexico-sintactic structure of the sentence is preserved.
The attention to the phenomenon of non-reportability was first attracted to in the article Wierzbicka 1970. A revealing example of non-reportability is examined by Yu. D. Apresyan (Apresyan 1988). The phrase *očen’ nužno* ‘[he] badly needs’ may also have the meaning *ne nužno* ‘just what he doesn’t need’; and the sentence containing this *očen’ nužno* in the sense of “covert negation” is non-reportable — it cannot be used to convey a third-person’s opinion in indirect speech; e.g., in (4’) *očen’ nužno* cannot be used; at least not in the meaning of “covert negation”:

(4) Očen’ nužno emu raskaivat’sja! — skazala Zina
‘What he doesn’t need is to repent! — said Zina’
[lit. ‘What he needs very much is to repent! — said Zina’]

(4’) *Zina sčitaet, čto očen’ nužno emu raskaivat’sja
**Zina thinks that what he doesn’t need is to repent’
[lit. ‘Zina thinks that what he needs very much is to repent’].

To simplify the point, one can say that non-reportability is a particular case of syntactical non-embeddability, namely, non-subordinability to a verb of opinion: non-embeddability of a sentence means that it cannot occupy a subordinate position at all. As a matter of fact, Apresyan’s example can also be used to illustrate non-embeddability:

(4″) *Poskol’ku očen’ nužno emu raskaivat’sja, ty ničego ne dob’eš’sja.
‘*Since what he doesn’t need is to repent, you won’t get anywhere’
[lit. ‘*Since what he needs very much is to to repent, you won’t get anywhere’].

Common to sentences (1) and (4) is the so-called subjective modality (according to V. V. Vinogradov, see Vinogradov 1947; cf. also the detailed analysis of subjective modality in Grammatika 1980: 215). And it does indeed seem probable a priori that subjective modality should give rise to non-embeddability or at least some obstacles to the use of the sentence as a subordinate clause. We shall show that this is true, i.e., that for a clause with a subjective modality marker there is always a context in which this clause cannot be placed precisely because of the presence of the modal marker.

The reverse is not true, however; syntactical non-embeddability can be conditioned not only by subjective modality, but by other phenomena also.

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23 For non-reportability to be a particular case of non-embeddability, account must also be taken of *semantic* subordination; thus, in the sentence According to Ivanov, just the opposite was true the component ‘just the opposite was true’ is semantically subordinate to the verb of speech implicit in the parenthetical expression according to.
The main one is deixis (the non-embeddability of deictic words was discussed in Chapter II.1 and II.2 in connection with the concept of syntactical projection). We shall assume that this common property of subjective modality and deixis, non-embeddability, stems from the fact that both subjective modality markers and dieicticals are primary egocentricals. Thus, non-embeddability may be regarded as a test for establishing primary egocentricity in general.

It must be stressed that main clause phenomena are limited, strictly speaking, not by the main clause, but by the clause to which the individual speech act corresponds. In fact, there are subordinate clauses in which many types of syntactically non-embeddable clauses are possible: for example, subordinate clauses with the postpositionally used conjunctions poskol'ku ‘since’, potomu čto ‘because’ and ětoja ‘although’ and the appositive kotoryj ‘which/who’. Indeed, a clause with the appositive kotoryj may contain any parenthetical words and clauses:

\[(5) \text{ Avtor memuarov — Kissinger, kotoryi, kak soobščajut, polučit za nič dva mil-}
\text{liona dollarov} \quad \text{‘The author of the memoirs is Kissinger, who, they say, is to get two million dollars for them’}.
\]

A subordinate clause with potomu čto ‘because’ may contain a verb with a modally coloured use of the past tense reffering the future:

\[\text{Vymoj posudu sama, potomu čto ja pošel} \quad \text{‘Wash the dishes yourself, because I’m off’ [lit. ‘I’ve gone’].} \]

It is natural to assume that such a clause has a particular speech act corresponding to it.

In Green 1976 a syntactical approach to the description of non-embeddability phenomena was advanced. Today it is clear that this phenomenon is not of a syntactic, but a semantic nature (as shown already in Bolinger 1977).

2. Subjective modality

The term “subjective modality” embraces extremely diverse linguistic phenomena (roughly speaking, subjective modality is egocentricity minus deixis), which, for the sake of simplicity of exposition, will be divided into two groups:

1. On the one hand, the sphere of subjective modality includes linguistic devices with the help of which the speaker characterizes his/her attitude to that
very utterance of his — to any aspect or part of it: to its content, form, degree of authenticity and correspondence to other utterances, etc. The only condition is that this attitude of the speaker must be expressed non-explicitly — it cannot be expressed in the particular utterance with the help of a separate clause where the first person subject denotes the speaker. This group of subjective modality markers consists mainly of parenthetical words. For example, bezuslovno ‘certainly’ is a subjective modality marker in the sentence

(6) On, bezuslovno, vernetsja. ‘He will certainly come back’.

This condition — concerning the non-explicitness of expression — is not included in traditional definitions of subjective modality, although it is obviously taken into account in delimiting the phenomenon in question. For example, it is non-explicitness that makes us exclude from the sphere of subjective modality, as it is studied in grammar, sentences with propositional attitude predicates, i.e., with an explicit modus as defined by Bally 1932/1955. For example, Grammatika 1980 recognizes subjective modality in sentence (6), but not in sentence (7) — although (6) and (7) are practically synonymous:

(7) Ja uveren, čto on vernetsja ‘I am sure he will come back’

And rightly so. The fact is that in (6) the attitude of the speaker to the content of the utterance is expressed with the help of the modal adverb bezuslovno ‘certainly’, for which the speaker is the implied subject, and there is no direct denoting of the speaker (namely, the first-person pronoun), in (6). Whereas in (7) the attitude of the speaker to the content of his utterance is not expressed idiomatically and therefore is not a grammatical problem. Thus, our definition reveals the opposition, by virtue of which predicates of propositional attitude do not relate to subjective modality as it is presented in the grammatical tradition: the attitudes of the speaker or other persons expressed in assertive form belong to the sphere of modality in the broad sense, but are not part of the phenomenon which is studied in grammar.

The proposed definition also justifies fully the position of Grammatika 1980 with relation to modal words of the type možno ‘may’, nužno ‘must’, možet ‘can’, dolžen ‘should’, vozmožno ‘could’ etc., which are not included in the sphere of subjective modality. In most of their uses modal words have as their subject not the speaker, but the person designated as the subject (as
in the example Ivan možet ubit' medvedja ‘Ivan could kill a bear’, cf. the analysis of modal words in Grzegoreczykowa 1973). On the other hand in the statement Ivan možet opozdat’ ‘Ivan might be late’ nobody else but the subject is responsible for the assessment of the situation of being late as a possibility, and the so-called epistemical modality is subjective modality.

With regard to the optative, its exclusion from the sphere of subjective modality in Grammatika 1980 would appear to be unfounded. To take an example, the sentence Bylo by sejčas leto ‘If only it were summer now!’ expresses a wish; the subject of the wishing is the speaker; and there is no reference to the speaker with the help of the first-person pronoun in the sentence. Consequently the optative mood has all the features of a subjective modality marker.

2. The second group of subjective modality markers consists of means of expressing — usually emphatic — the communicative intent of the speaker in the given speech act, cf. the utterance Kakoj on tam učenyj!, lit ‘What sort of a specialist is he there!’, which expresses emphatic disagreement with a previous remark by the interlocuter. Grammatika 1980 identifies a group of subjective-modal meanings, which are called, rather generally, “specifically evaluatory”. These are mostly meanings of the type agreement/disagreement, acceptance/non-acceptance <of the interlocuter’s utterance> — categorical or weak; approval, negation, censure, exhortation, encouragement, warning, threat, misunderstanding, emphasis etc. In other words, these are means of expressing the speaker’s communicative intent, i.e., markers of the type of speech act, for which the given clause is intended (in other words, markers of the illocutionary force of the clause, see Chapter I.1). Again, this concerns not all means of expressing communicative intent, but only non-explicit ones. The sentence Ja trebuju, čtoby ty nemedlenno ostavil pomeščenie! ‘I demand that you leave the room at once’, in which the communicative intent of the speaker is expressed by a performative verb with the subject I, does not belong to the sphere of subjective modality, unlike, for example, the almost synonymous Pošel von! ‘Get out!’.

Both types of subjective modality may be present in the same sentence. Thus, the non-explicit expression of this or that attitude of the speaker — for example, of a positive or negative assessment, negation, or a high degree of some value — is usually expressive (emphatic), because non-ex-
plicitness itself is one of the devices of expressiveness, i.e., emphasis, cf. Stanu ja ego slušat′! ‘As if I would listen to him!’; Vot golos tak golos! ‘This voice is really a voice!’. And emphasis is always a special aspect of the communicative intent of the speaker.

Both groups of subjective-modal markers have in common: 1) non-explicitness in the expression of the modal subject; and 2) the participation of the speaker in the explicit formulation of their meaning.

In the second group the speaker appears, first and foremost, as the subject of speech, but in the first he has a broader role as the subject of consciousness — thought, feeling and other propositional attitudes. In section 3 below we shall discuss markers of communicative intent, while section 5 deals with parenthetical words, i.e., with the first group of modal markers.

3. Modal markers of communicative intent

3.1. Grammatical markers of communicative intent.

Subjective-modal markers of the communicative intent of the speaker function within the framework of illocutionary classes of sentences marked by grammatical devices, i.e., what is called in grammars of Russian “sentence types according to aim of utterance”.

There are four grammatical illocutionary classes — indicative, interrogative, imperative (exhortative) and exclamatory sentences.

An indicative sentence, which is intended for the speech act of assertion, is marked by the indicative mood of the verb, but is not unambiguous. If the clause with the verb in the indicative mood is a subordinate one, it does not usually express an assertion or any other particular illocutionary force, cf.:

(8) a. Ivan zabolel ‘Ivan has fallen ill’;
   b. Esli Ivan zabolel, on pojdet k vraču. ‘If Ivan has fallen ill, he will go to the doctor.’

In (8b) there is no corresponding speech act for the component Ivan has fallen ill, and the indicative mood loses its “affirmative power”; correspondingly, the proposition loses its assertive status, see Chapter I.2.6.

Interrogative sentences, intended for the speech act of a question, are marked by interrogative words and particles. The illocutionary force of an interrogative sentence is expressed more definitely than that of an affirmative one, but also not completely unambiguously. An interrogative sentence
may fulfil the role of an indirect question, in which case it does not express any separate speech act:

(9) a. Kuda on pošel? ‘Where has he gone?’
   b. Ja ne znaju, kuda on pošel ‘I don’t know, where he has gone’.

Designation for an **exhortative** is expressed with the help of the imper-erative mood, and here the mood expresses the illocutionary function of the sentence, as far as grammatical distinctions are concerned, unambiguously: the individual speech act always corresponds to the imperative (we leave aside subject uses of the imperative in the sense of the conditional mood, as in the example *Pridi on čas ranše, ničego by ne slučilos’* ‘Had he come an hour earlier, nothing would have happened’).

Finally, the **exclamatory** sentence, intended for participation in a speech act of the self-expression, also has several standard grammatical models; cf., *e.g.*, *Kakaja ona okazalas’ xitralja!* ‘How cunning she proved to be!’; *Čto on za merzavec!* ‘What a scoundrel he is!’; *Kak ona udivilas’!* ‘How surprised she was!’; *On takoj dobryj!* ‘He’s so kind!’. Although in fact exclamatoriness may not be expressed by anything but intonation — both in the affirmative case (*Ja ne želača tebja slušat’!* ‘I don’t want to listen to you!’) and in question: *Ivan pridet?!* ‘Ivan is coming?!’ (with a rising tone on *Ivan*).

In an exclamatory sentence based on the standard model the illocu- tionary function is expressed unambiguously, so this sentence always has an individual speech act corresponding to it. For a small group of verbs, however, the exclamatory clause in a subordinate position may be interpreted as an “indirect exclamation” (Paducheva 1987): *Ja byl poražen, kakaja ona okazalas’ xitralja* ‘I was amazed how cunning she proved to be’; *Voobražaju, kak ona udivilas’!* ‘I can imagine how surprised she was’; *Te-per’ ja ponimaju, kak ej tjaželo* ‘Now I realise how hard it is for her’.

The markers of communicative intent discussed here belong to the class of primary egocentricals. They are intended to function in a canonical speech situation; for example, they presuppose not only a speaker, but also an addressee. The special role played by markers of communicative intent in narrative is discussed in section 5.4.
3.2. Modal markers of communicative intent.

Below we consider a series of examples which show that in each illocutionary class the modal marker may translate a sentence which does not have a well defined illocutionary function and is therefore embeddable into a sentence which is intended strictly for carrying out a certain type of speech act and is therefore non-embeddable.

The question as to whether a sentence can be used in a subordinate context is not always easy to answer. It is a known fact that when an independent clause is put in a subordinate position certain intonational changes take place in it (and intonation may be a subjective-modal marker); the loss of assertive modus is possible, as in example (8) of Section 3.1. Other shifts are also possible. For example, for sentence (a) I love you the most natural context is the speech act of confession, in the interpretation of which, according to Wierzbicka’s analysis (Wierzbicka 1984), there is the semantic component ‘It is hard for the speaker to perform the given speech act’ or ‘The speaker did not want to perform the given speech act and is performing it against his will, as it were’, cf., confession of guilt, admission of one’s shortcomings, etc. It is clear that in a subordinate context, for example, in sentence (b) I have told your father that I love you, no such component corresponds to clause (a) I love you. This does not mean, however, that sentence (a) is syntactically non-embeddable, because the said specific illocutionary force is not the only one for sentence (a), which may be used also as a mere assertion.

a) Affirmative sentences

In the sentences of examples 1–6 the non-reportability results from the fact that unambiguously expressed illocutionary force forms part of the meaning of a sentence. They are sentences with a definite communicative function which is not amenable to simple communicating information. For example, this may be a dialogical reaction, as in examples 1 and 2, or a speech act of irony, example 4, censure or threat, example 5. The non-reportability in example 3 is explained by the fact that the sentence includes a designation of the participants in the speech act.

Example 1. The modal particle pravda ‘isn’t it’ marks a special speech act expressing the desire to receive confirmation of one’s opinion.
Cf. sentence (1) which, according to Wierzbicka’s analysis (Wierzbicka 1984) has the following interpretation:

(1) V komnate šолодно, pravda? ‘It’s cold in the room, isn’t it?’ =
   a) ‘I think that X’ (where X = ‘It’s cold in the room’; i.e., X is the point of
      sentence (1) without the illocutionary intention markers);
   b) ‘I assume that you think so too’;
   c) ‘I want you to confirm that you think so too’.

The particle pravda prescribes exactly the type of speech act which
may be performed with the help of the sentence in question. Thus, sentence
(1) is intended by its very structure for the role of a separate utterance.
Therefore it cannot be a subordinate clause, i.e. syntactical component in a
compound sentence. In the sentence

(1’) Ivan govorit, čto v komnate šолодно, pravda?
   ‘Ivan says that it’s cold in the room, isn’t it?’

sentence (1) is not a syntactical component, because (1’) can be understood
only in such a way that pravda relates to govorit ‘says’.

The explication of the meaning of the particle pravda contains a reference
not only to the speaker, but also to the addressee. Thus, pravda belongs
to the group of dialogical particles, which also includes razve ‘surely [not]’
and neuželi ‘surely [not]’ (see Bulygina, Shmelev 1987), ved’ ‘you know, isn’t
it’ (see Paducheva 1987) and konečno ‘of course’. The word konečno is em-
beddable, but in a slightly different meaning: Esli, konečno, ty otkazyvaeš'sja
‘If, of course, you refuse...’, see Kiseleva, Palliard, Razlogova 1994.

In this connection the particle -to is of interest, which is close in
meaning to daže ‘even’ (being a kind of antonym to it, see Apresyan 1978),
but daže is embeddable, whereas -to is not:

(2) a. Ivan-to spravitsja! <Vot kak ostal’nye — neizvestno>
   ‘Ivan will manage alright! <But we’re not too sure about the others>’.
   b. *Esli Ivan-to spravitsja, ja pervyi budu udivlen
      ‘*If Ivan[-to] manages, I’ll be the first to be surprised.’
   c. *Zina uverena, čto Ivan-to spravitsja
      ‘*Zina is sure that Ivan[-to] will manage.’

24 In her article A. Wierzbicka analyses not the Russian word pravda, but the English tag-
question construction. However, the explanation offered for this construction is suitable for prav-
da as well, with practically no changes.
Dialogical reactions include such retorts as Ni za čto! ‘Not on my life’; Ničego udivitel’nogo ‘I’m not surprised’; Ne možet byt’! ‘You must be joking’; V muzej tak v muzej! ‘The museum it is then’ — (a formula of resigned acceptance). On dialogical particles see Shvedova 1960.

**Example 2.** Utterance (3) has the illocutionary force of denying false information:\(^{25}\)

(3) Nikogda \(\vdash\) ja na Kamčatke ne byl! ‘I’ve never \(\vdash\) been to Kamchatka’.

Such an utterance would be appropriate, for example, in the context: Vot ty-to byl na Kamčatke! ‘But you’ve been to Kamchatka’. The lineal-intonational construction serves here as a modal marker. This sentence is syntactically non-embeddable if the lineal-intonational construction with its meaning is to be preserved:

(3’) *Ja žaleju, čto nikogda \(\vdash\) ja na Kamčatke ne byl.

*I’m sorry that never have I been to Kamchatka’.

The only admissible context for a sentence with an unambiguously expressed illocutionary force is that of a performative prefix expressing the same communicative intent as that expressed in the sentence by the modal marker (or a weaker one). Thus, (3″) is possible:

(3″) A ja / tebe govorju |, čto nikogda \(\vdash\) ja na Kamčatke ne byl. ‘But never I have been to Kamchatka, I tell you’.

**Example 3.** The illocutionary force of utterance (4) may be defined as “disillusioning the listener’s false assumptions”:

(4) Ja tebe ne Žanna d’Ark!

‘I’m not Joan of Arc, \(\text{you know}\) [lit. — “for you”]’

(example from Arutyunova 1983).

Here tebe = ‘as you wrongly think’ (or ‘as you wrongly say’). N. D. Arutyunova regards this tebe as a “fragment” of the speech act (designating a participant in it) which turns up inside the utterance against the rules.

The third-person pronoun may also perform the same function of designating a participant in the speech act, perhaps, an imaginary one, cf. Stanu ja

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\(^{25}\) We shall use the following conventional signs for phrasal accents: the signs \(\backslash\) and \(\vdash\) mark the main phrasal stress, ordinary and contrasting (intensified); the signs / and // mark the anticadence, i.e., secondary stress in an affirmative sentence or final stress in an interrogative one; ∪ indicates lack of stress. The sign | denotes the boundary of tone groups.
emy molčat!’ ‘Why should I be quiet for him!’ (= ‘I won’t be quiet inspite of the fact that he thinks I will’) or Tak ja emu i pošel!, lit. ‘That’s how I shall go just for him’ = ‘I won’t go in spite of the fact that he thinks I will’.

Sentences of type (4) are syntactically non-embeddable and can only be substituted into the context of a performative verb:

(4') Ja skazala Ivanu, čto ja emu ne Žanna d’Ark
‘I told Ivan that I wasn’t Joan of Arc, you know’ [lit. “for him”].

**Example 4.** Various linguistic devices exist for expressing the idea that a given statement should be understood in an ironic sense, so to say, i.e., in the opposite sense from the one expressed literally. Since this opposite meaning is expressed non-explicitly, the utterance acquires an expressive shade and the sentence becomes syntactically non-embeddable The various devices of such conventionally ironical utterances are examined in Shmelev 1958:

(5) a. Est’ iz-za čego rasstraivat’sja! ‘That really is something to get upset about!’
   b. Našel čemu radovat’sja (o čem govorit’, kogo priglašat’)! ‘You’ve certainly found something to be pleased about (talk about, someone to invite)!’
   c. Stoilo iz-za nego bož’ɉu pticu gubit′! ‘It was worth killing God’s bird for him!’ (Chekhov)
   d. Oξota byla emu ženit′sja! ‘He couldn’t wait to get married!’
   e. Nužny mne vaši den’gi! ‘I need your money!’
   f. Mnogo ty ponimaes’ ‘You are so understanding!’
   g. Tol’ko ētogo nedostavalo! ‘That was all we needed!’
   Tebɉa tut tol’ko neẋvatalo! ‘You were all that was’ missing!
   h. Ĺoroš drug! ‘What a good friend!’
   Velika važnost’! ‘That’s most important!’
   i. Stanu ɉa psa kormit′! ‘I’ll feed the dog alright!’
   Stala by ja starat’sa, esli by znala!
   ‘I would have really tried if I’d known!’ [= ‘I wouldn’t’]
   Budet on molčat’! ‘He will be quiet!’ [= ‘he won’t’]
   j. Ot vas doždeš’ɉa! ‘I’d wait for you to do it!’ [= ‘I know you’ll never do]
   Takiɉ pojmaes’! ‘Try catching people like that!’

Usage in the negative sense is connected with words which denote distinctly positive mark on the scale quality. Such words as est’ ‘there is’, stoilo ‘it was worth’, očen’ nužno ‘it’s very necessary’, oξota ‘I want’, mnogo ‘a lot’, Ĺoroš ‘good’, velik ‘great’, etc. easily acquire the opposite meaning.
The words *stanu* ‘I will’ and *budu* ‘I shall’, which express firm intention, mean, in ironical usage, ‘I have not the faintest intention’. The form of the future tense in the context of verbs *doždat'sja* ‘to wait for and succeed’, *pojmat’* ‘to catch’ and *dognat’* ‘to catch up’, literally expresses possibility, but denotes total impossibility in a conventionally-ironical utterance.

One of the structural schemes of the conventionally-ironical utterance uses a combination of the particles *tak* and *i*:

(6) a. Tak on tebe i skazal (skažet)! ‘And that’s how he told (will tell) you!’
   b. Tak ja emu i poveril (poverɉu)! ‘And that’s how I believed (will believe) him!’
   c. Tak oni i dali (dadut) tebe ėту premiju!
      ‘And that’s how they gave (will give) you the prize!’
   d. Tak ja i pošel (pjoðdu)! ‘And that’s how I went (will go)’!
   e. Tak ja vas i poboɉalas′ (poboɉus′)!
      ‘And that’s how afraid I was (will be) of you!’

Sometimes the ironic usage is not predetermined by the structure of the sentence (if one discounts the intonation), but derives from the context only. Such words and expressions as *kak že, kak by ne tak, čerta s dva, derži karman* [<śire>] [lit. “prepare your pocket”], *nečego skazat’* ‘nothing to say’, *ždi* and *dožidajsɉa* ‘wait [in wain]’ reinforce our understanding of the preceding utterance as an ironical one: *Poeʃala (poedet) ona s toboj, dožidajsɉa!* ‘Did she (will she) go with you, just wait!’ It is natural, therefore, that the words which are used in the speech act with conventional irony, such as *oʃota (byla)*, *stoilo* and *ʃoroʃ*, should be specially marked as such in a dictionary, cf. *očen′ nuţno*, which is analysed from the lexicographical point of view in Apresyan 1988b the predisposition for use in speech acts of a certain type may be one of the components of the lexicographical description of a word.

**Example 5.** There are also words intended for the speech act of censure. For example, the meaning of the utterance

(7) *Oʃota že vam bylo ženit’sja!* ‘You were dying to get married!’
    (example from Shmelev 1958)

is not simply the opposite of the literal meaning of the words, as in (5d) *Oʃota byla emy ženit'sja* = ‘He did not want to get married’; (7) censures the addressee’s action; it means ‘There was no point in you getting married’.
Another interesting example is the word *dat'sja* (to be obsessed with), which is analysed in Shmelev 1958:

(8) 
| Dalsja tebe étot motocikl! | ‘You’re obsessed with this motor-cycle!’ |

Ushakov’s dictionary gives as one of the meanings for *dat'sja* in the past tense, ‘to become an object of constant attention, interest, obsession’. It does not, however, mention the important fact that the word *dat'sja* has this meaning only in an utterance with the illocutionary force of expressing censure of the person who has this obsession, or at least distancing from the subject of the obsession.

The unambiguously expressed illocutionary function of sentences (7) and (8) naturally makes them syntactically non-embeddable. Sentences expressing the speech act of a threat are also non-embeddable: *On mne za étoto poplatitsja!* ‘He’ll pay for this!; *Ty u menja poplaçëš’* ‘You’ll cry; *Ty mne poplajašëš’!* [lit. “You will dance to me!”] *Ty mne povorčiš’!* ‘You’ll speak!’; or to use another model: *Sejčas kak dunu!* ‘I’ll make a blow!’; *Kak stuknu!* ‘I’ll beat you’.

All these words and constructions are at place only in a dialogical context and, consequently, are non-embeddable.

b) Interrogative sentences

**Example 6.** An interrogative sentence expressing a rhetorical question is syntactically non-embeddable. A rhetorical question is roughly equivalent to affirmation of the sentence which results from the substitution of the interrogative pronoun by a negative one:

(9) 
| Who can embrace the unembraceable? = | ‘No one can embrace the unembraceable’ |
| ‘I kakoj že russkij ne ljubit bystroj ezdy! | ‘And what Russian does not love riding fast!’ = ‘All Russians love it’ |

A rhetorical question expresses a negative judgement only in the context of a separate speech act, so it cannot be used to express the same negative judgement in a subordinate context, for example, in the context of a verb of opinion or speech.

In a more complex context, however, a rhetorical question can be embedded subordinate:
On pribavil v pojasnenie <....> i čto, nakonec, počemu že ne dopustit′ i ne izvinit′ v nem čelovečeskogo želaniɉa šot′ čem-nibud′ oblegčit′ svoju sovest′

‘He added by way of explanation <....> and that, when all was said and done, why not permit and excuse in him the human desire to ease his conscience in some way at least’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”).

**Example 7.** An interrogative sentence, as has already been said, is actually possible in a subordinate context — in the function of an indirect question. However, if the interrogative sentence contains a modal particle which elucidates the illocutionary force of the utterance or inserts it into a dialogical context it becomes unembeddable; tol′ko ‘only’ in (10a) is one of such particles:

(10) a. Začem tol′ko on tuda šodil! ‘Why on earth had he gone there!’
   b. *On skazal \ mne, začem tol′ko on tuda šodil.
      ‘He told \ me, why only had he gone there’.
   c. *Ja sprosil \ u nego, začem tol′ko on tuda šodil.
      ‘I asked \ him, why only had he gone there’.

We can assume that the scope of tol′ko in (10) consists of some component of the semantic decomposition of the illoqutionary purport of question: the meaning of (10a) is, roughly, ‘Only tell me one thing: why had he gone there!’.

In the same way the meaning of the particle že in the context of the interrogative word: Kto že ‘But who’... Kakoj že ‘But what’..., etc. means ‘But tell me who...’, ‘But tell me what...’, etc. On the particle -taki, which also has an illocutionary component of an utterance as its scope, see Shirokova 1982.

**Example 8.** A whole series of conventional means of expressing emphatic rejection of the interlocuter’s utterance are based on the model of the interrogative sentence:

(11) a. Da komu on nužen? ‘But who needs him anyway?’
   b. Nu čto emu sdelajtša? ‘But what will happen to him anyway?’
   c. Da kto ego preziraet! ‘But who despises him anyway!’

(example from Shmelev 1959).

Utterances of this type express a negative reaction to the preceding utterance, and this distinguishes them from rhetorical questions which do not require a dialogical context. Sentences of type (11), like rhetorical questions also, are syntactically non-embeddable.

Retorts with kakoj, kakoe may also express rejection, see the examples from Shmelev 1959 and Grammatika 1980:
(12) Kakoj on tam učenyj! ‘Who says he’s a specialist!’
    Kakie my druz’ja! ‘Who says we’re friends!’
    Kakoj že ja postoronnjij! ‘Who says I’m a stranger!’
    Kakaja už tam ironija! ‘What sort of irony is that!’
    Kakoj tut otdyx, kogda del stol’ko! ‘What sort of rest is that when there is so much to do?’
    Kakie tam šči, esli rakov budem varit’! ‘What sort of cabbage soup will it be if we boil rayfish!’

These sentences cannot be used in the function of an indirect question — partly because of the particles že, uže, tam, tut; e.g., sentence *Ja navel spravki, kakoj on tam učenyj is ungrammatical.

**Example 9.** A large number of idiomatic utterances with an unambiguous illocutionary force are constructed on the basis of an interrogative question. For example, the sentence

(13) Otkuda ža znaju? ‘How do I know?’

serves as a perfectly conventional means of expressing lack of knowledge as a reply; naturally (13) is non-embeddable, cf. *I said that how do I know.

In the sentence

(14) Kogo on tol’ko ne sprašival! ‘Who hasn’t he asked!’

the idea of a large number is conveyed most expressively: (14) implies that he asked many people. This sentence is not dialogical sensu stricto. The source of its non-embeddability is emphasis alone. In the sentence

Ljudi tak // nevnimatel’ny! ‘People are so inconsiderate!’ (E. Schwartz. “The Dragon”) the source of the non-embeddability is the expressive intonational contour induced by the word tak ‘so’ in the sense of ‘very strongly’.

c) Exhortative sentences

A sentence with a verb in the exhortative mood is intended strictly for the role of an independent utterance. Such a sentence is, therefore, always syntactically non-embeddable.

The model of an exhortative sentence is used as a basis for utterances with the illocutionary force of a threat: Ty mne pogovori! ‘You just tell me!’, Ty pokriči u menja! ‘Just you shout!’; mitigated exhortation is also non-reportabile:

(15) a. Idite, čto li! ‘Go away, will you!’
    b. *Ja skazal ĭm, čtoby oni šli, čto li ‘*I told them to go away, will you.’
The fact of the syntactical non-embeddability of the imperative was noted by Roman Jakobson (in his address at the 1966 Conference on Semiotics in Poland, see Paducheva 1967). Jakobson disagreed with the analysis of the imperative put forward in transformational grammar, according to which, say, the sentence *Go home at once* is interpreted as ‘You must go home at once’: from this explanation it does not follow that one cannot say *I tell you that go home at once*, whereas *I tell you that you must go home at once* is perfectly correct.

d) Exclamatory sentences

Sentences with unambiguous exclamatory model are syntactically non-embeddable. The only exception is a construction with an “indirect exclamation”. For example, the sentence *Kakoj on ostorožnyj!* ‘How careful he is!’ = ‘He is very careful’ is embeddable: *Ėto udivitel’no, kakoj on ostorožnyj!* ‘It’s amazing how careful he is’. However, most models of exclamatory sentences do not permit indirect use:

(16) Čto on za merzavec! ‘What a scoundrel he is!’
(17) Nu i pugliv že ty! ‘How timid you are!’

 Tol’ko vospitatelei svoíx nu i ne ljubjat že!
‘Only people [nu i] don’t like [že] their tutors!’ (examples from Shvedova 1960).

A sentence may be non-embeddable because of the empathetic preposition or postposition of the noun phrase (accompanied or not accompanied by its duplication):

(18) Dikoe suščestvo byla ėta Bela.
‘She was a wild creature, this Bela.’ (Lermontov. “A Hero of Our Time”)
Ošibaetsja on, tvoj prijatel’ ‘He’s wrong, your friend’;
Neizvestno, gde ego iskat’, ėtot bank ‘Who knows where to look for it, this bank’;
Oni ej otkazali, duraki ! ‘They refused her, the fools!’;
Govorjat, ona ne naxodit sebe mesta, bednjažka
‘They say she’s beside herself, poor thing’.

Expressivity may also be conveyed by repetition (cf. *Nado bylo bežat’, bežat’ otsjuda ‘They had to run away, run away from here’; On byl legkij-lekgij ‘He was as light as could be’), which also precludes embedding.

Expressive vocabulary may be an obstacle to the syntactical embeddability of a sentence:

(19) a. Čert ego znaet, pridet on ili net. ‘The devil only knows if he will come or not’
b. *Zina sčitaet, čto čert ego znayet, pridet on ili net.
   "Zina thinks that the devil only knows if he will come or not’.

(20) a. Čerta s dva, on pridet!
   ‘Like hell, he’ll come!’

b. *Zine kažetsɉa, čto čerta s dva on pridet
   ‘Zina thinks, like hell, he’ll come’.

In Banfield 1982 the construction illustrated by examples like Eṧče odin glotok, i ɉa pojdu ‘One more drink, and I’ll go’; Eṧče odin takoj vykrik, i ego vygonjat ‘One more shout like that, and they’ll throw him out’ is treated as expressive. There are no grounds for regarding it as expressive, and its non-embeddability is doubtful; for example, you can say Mat’ sčitaet, čto eṧče odin takoi vykrik, i ego vygonjat.

Thus, we have examined the means of expression of the illocutionary force of a sentence — the words and constructions in which syntactic non-embeddability is caused by expressive or dialogical components of the meaning. Sentences with an indefinite illocutionary force may be used both as independent utterances and as “building material” for more complex sentences. A sentence which contains unambiguous markers or expressivity of the speaker can serve only as an independent utterance, being incapable of embedding. The main difference between dialogicity and expressivity is that expressivity is not necessarily addressed to an outside addressee — it may be addressed by the speaker to himself — while dialogue is.

4. NON-MODAL CONSTRUCTIONS AS MAIN CLAUSE PHENOMENA

Some words and constructions, while not being markers of subjective modality, resemble them in the sense that they invariably require the context of a speech act, i.e., are syntactically non-embeddable.

1. The address. Direct speech which contains an address cannot be turned into indirect speech26:

(21) “Babuška, ja prinesla tebe pirožok”, — skazala Krasnaja Šapočka
    “Grandma, I’ve brought you a pie”, said Red Riding Hood’.

26 This applies, of course, to translation with the help of standard synonymic transformations, see Chapter II.5; a dative addressive is an approximate functional analogue of the address. However, if say Krasnaja Šapočka skazala babuške, čto prinesla ej pirožok ‘Red Riding Hood told her grandmother that she had brought her a pie’, the information about the kind of appellation that Red Riding Hood used is completely lost. On the specifics of nominations used in addresses, see Wierzbicka 1970.
In (22) the address is possible only because it is appositive to the second-person pronoun:

(22) Ėti fakty svidetel'ствуют о том, čto ty, Boris, ne sdelal pravil'nyx vyvodov

‘These facts show that you, Boris, have not drawn the right conclusions’.

2. The **general affirmative and general negative words** “yes” and “no” and interjections such as *ax* ((oh) and *nu* (well):

*Da*, kvartira № 50 pošalivala  ‘Yes, flat № 50 was getting up mischief’
(Bulgakov.“The Master and Margarita”);

*Ax*, čto byl tol'ko son!  ‘Ax, it was only a dream!’

3. **Meta-linguistic expressions** with the help of which the speaker refers to his own (usually previous) statement:

(23) Drugoj utverždal, čto on [Čičikov] činovnik gosudarstvennoj kanceljarii, i tut že prisovokupljal: a vpročem, čert ego znaet, na lбу ved’ ne pročteš'.

‘Another one maintained that he [Chichikov] was a state chancellery official, adding straightaway: *but still*, the devil only knows, you can’t read it on a man’s forehead, can you?’ (Gogol. “Dead Souls”)

4. Constructions with the so-called Nominative of the theme:

(24) a. Ee muž/| — on bol’soj načal’nik. ‘Her husband/| — he’s a bigwig.’


*It’s such a pity that her husband — he’s a bigwig.

5. Self-corrections (see Banfield 1982):

(25) Ja videla ego včera — net, pozavčera

‘I saw him yesterday — no, the day before yesterday’.

The phenomenon of self-correction, typical of spontaneous conversational speech, provides a basis for interesting literary devices, see Chapter III.2.

Thus we see that syntactical non-embeddability may result from various causes — such as subjective modality, deixis, or simply the presence in the sentence of constructions with an address or Nominative of the theme, which require the context of a speech act. All these linguistic phenomena have something in common, however, that characterizes the sentence as a finished utterance intended for functioning in a speech act. Consequently syntactical non-embeddability acts as a test of primary egocentricity, i.e., a test of the speaker’s unremovable participation in the semantic interpretation, namely, in the contextualization of the sentence.
In one aspect at least the test on embeddability produces an unambiguous result: if the sentence is syntactically embeddable, there are no grounds for looking for a subjective modality marker in it. Thus, it would seem that sentences of the example (26) type, all syntactically embeddable, are wrongly assigned to the sphere of subjective modality in Grammatika 1980:

(26) Emu teper′ prazdnik ne v prazdnik ‘No day is a holiday for him now’;
    Emu ne do razgovorov ‘He has no time for conversation’;
    U nee tol′ko i radost′, čto v detjač ‘Her only pleasure is in her children’;
    Ej est′ o čem podumat’ ‘She’s got plenty to think about’;
    On čut′ li ne geniem sebja sčitaet ‘He regards himself practically as a genius’.

Another example is when the embeddability test helps to establish the limits of the sphere of subjective modality. Bally writes categorically that “negation expresses a modal concept — it is a refusal to affirm” (Bally 1950/1955: 238). However, negation is a modal concept only when it really is a refusal to affirm as, say, in example (12). Otherwise negation is an ordinary semantic operator which constructs a proposition capable of being a scope for many other operators, i.e., syntactically embeddable. Consequently ordinary negation does not belong to sphere of subjective modality.

5. ON EMBEDDABILITY OF PARENTHETICALS

5.0. GENERAL

We shall now consider subjective modality of the first group, namely, parentheticals, such as naverno ‘probably’ or možet byt’ ‘perhaps’ with an implicit subject of consciousness. Example (3) from section 1 (*Zina sčitaet, čto Ivan, kažetsja, v otpuske ‘*Zina thinks that Ivan is, apparently, on leave’) demonstrated the syntactical non-embeddability of parentheticals. In fact, however, not all parentheticals are non-embeddable. For example, sentence (1) below, where the parenthetical is inside a complement clause, is not an anomaly:

(1) Kolja sčitaet, čto zaščita sostoitsja, skoree vsego, v oktjabre
    ‘Kolya thinks that the wedding will, most likely, be in October.’

The parenthetical skoree vsego ‘most likely’ is embeddable, i.e., it is possible in an embedded position, and reportable: (1) conveys the uncertainty expressed, possibly with the same parenthetical, by Kolya. So there are par-

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27 Parentheticals are of interest to us so far only from the point of view of the implied subject; on other aspects of the semantics of parentheticals, see Chapter II.4.
entheticals for which not only a speech-act interpretation oriented on the speaker is possible, but also a syntactical interpretation, which is oriented on the subject of the embedding clause. It would seem that some parentheticals behave in the same way as other secondary egocentricals discussed in Chapter II.1 and II.2. In that case in order to characterize the behaviour of a parenthetical inside an embedding clause, it is sufficient to establish whether it is a primary or secondary egocentrical.

The impossibility of using a parenthetical in an embedded clause may be linked, not with the fact that the parenthetical in question belongs to the class of primary egocentricals and does not permit syntactical projection, but simply with the fact that the predicate and the parenthetical do not agree semantically (there are quips that play on this type of contradiction, for example: *Kak žal', čto vy, nakonec, ušodite! ‘What a pity you are going away at last!'). That such rules of agreement exist and, moreover, may be formulated in fairly general terms, can be seen from the following examples:

(2) a. Ķotja Napoleon, kak izvestno, bežal iz Moskvy...
   ‘Although Napoleon, as is known, fled from Moscow...’;
   b. *Kogda Napoleon, kak izvestno, bežal iz Moskvy...
   ‘When Napoleon, as is known, fled from Moscow...’;

(3) a. Ķotja v kvartire, konečno, pobyvali, nikakogo maga tam ne okazalos'
   ‘Although people did come to the flat, of course, there was no magician there’;
   b. *Kogda v kvartire, konečno, pobyvali, nikakogo maga tam ne okazalos'
   ‘*When people came to the flat, of course, there was no magician there.’

Examples (2b) and (3b) are incorrect because the conjunction *kogda* ‘when’ implies understanding the subordinate clause as a process; whereas the scope of the parentheticals *kak izvestno* and *konečno* must be fact (on the opposition fact / process see Vendler 1967; Arutyunova 1980, 1988; Paducheva 1986).

Constructions with a parenthetical in a complement clause are clumsy and, probably because of this, are not used very often. Cf., however, the following examples from journalese, officialese and modern fiction:

(4) Soobščajut, čto Kissinger, kažetsja, polučit za svoi memuary dva milliona
   ‘They say that Kissinger, it seems, is to get two million for his memoirs;
   Prosim učest’, čto Orgkomitet, k sožaleniju, ne smožet obespečit' gostinicej
   vseh inogorodniх učestnikov konferencii.
‘Please note that the Organising Committee, unfortunately, cannot provide a hotel for all visiting conference members’;

(5) Mne bylo priatno za djadju Šuru, i ja dumal, čto on, navernoe, ne xuže togo heroja graždanskoj vojny, kotorogo nikak ne možet zabyt’ tetja Sonja.
‘I was pleased for Uncle Shura, and I thought that he was probably no worse than the hero of the civil war that aunt Sonya cannot forget.’

Dostoevsky’s novels are full of such constructions; several examples from “The Idiot”:

(6) Ia toľ'ko nasčet togo xoṭel, čto oni isportɉat kovry i, požaluj, razob'jut čto-nibud’
‘I only mean to say that they’ll ruin the carpets and break something, perhaps’;

Ja daveča uže podumal, čto, možet byt’, ja i vprjam’ iz sčastlivyx
‘I thought only recently that perhaps I really am a lucky person’;

I nakonec, mne kažetsɉa, my takie roznye lɉudi na vid... po mnogim obstoʃtel'stvam, čto u nas, požaluj, ne možet byt’ mnogo toček obščihashed...’
‘And, finally, it seems to me, we are such different people on the face of it, that we cannot perhaps have many points in common...’;

...no mne kažetsɉa, čto vy, možet byt’, neskol’ ko pravy...
‘...but I think you are perhaps right to some extent...’;

<...> i tak kak ja prežde vsego ubežden, čto vy čelovek vse-taki prevosxoɗnıyj, to ved’ my, požaluj, končim tem, čto družeski sojdemsɉa
‘<...> and as I’m perfectly sure that you are, notwithstanding, a splendid chap, we shall perhaps end up being good friends’.

From the syntactical point of view, the matter is complicated by the fact that in conversational speech some parentheticals move around fairly freely in the sentence and may “stray” into the subordinate clause, while remaining in the main clause as far as meaning is concerned, as in (7), or, the reverse, move from the subordinate clause into the main one, as in (8).

(7) I soblaznit′ ee pytalsɉa, / Čtob ej, konečno, ugodit’ (Bulat Okudzhava)
‘And tried to seduce her so as to make her happy, of course’ [lit. “so as, of course, to make her happy”];

(8) My, k soʃaleniju, znaem, čto Natal′ja Nikolaevna spravilas′ so svoim zadaniem
‘We, unfortunately, know that Natalia Nikolaevna carried out her task (Akhmatova) = ‘we know that unfortunately she carried it out’.

In different languages the rules of permissible straying of this kind are not absolutely identical (on analogous shifts of other sentential operators, in particular, negation see Paducheva 1969, Boguslavsky 1985). For example, the sentence Note, in contrast, that existential generalization with respect to
the purely referential occurrence yields a sound conclusion should be understood not as ‘note, in contrast, that’, but ‘note that existential generalization, in contrast, yields’. We shall confine ourselves to normative word order.

Thus, non-embeddability may be caused not only by a parenthetical being a primary egocentrical (which excludes syntactical interpretation), but also by a simple violation of the rules of semantic agreement. We shall, therefore, first examine, in sections 5.1 and 5.2, the embedding of a parenthetical to a predicate with a first-person subject. In this context the subject of the embedded parenthetical (and also of the embedding predicate) is the speaker, so the interpretation of the parenthetical, basically, is not syntactical, but speech-act oriented. Consequently the prohibition for the parentheticals to enter the subordinate clause may in this case be explained only by its lack of semantic agreement with the embedding predicate. Later, in section 5.3, we shall confine ourselves to contexts with guaranteed agreement and examine the possibility of substituting the third person for the first person of the embedding predicate: such a substitution should be possible for secondary, but for not for primary egocentricals. This will enable us to distinguish a class of primary egocentricals among parentheticals.

We shall confine ourselves below primarily to the context of the embedding verb of propositional attitude (PA) — speech, thought, feeling and sensation. In this context two subjects of consciousness arise — the speaker and the subject of the propositional attitude. And they are the two claimants to the role of the implied subject of the parenthetical.

5.1. **Semantic classes of parentheticals**

From the semantic point of view the situation which arises in a context where a parenthetical is embedded to the verb of the propositional attitude is such that one proposition — that expressed in the embedded clause — is included in the scope of the two predicates, embedding and parenthetical. One might think that this is not so and that the two propositional attitudes form the scope of one another. This is true in other cases. For instance, in example (1) below the word order (a) is possible, but (b) is not, because the word order expresses here a difference in scope — in (1a) the subject of “obviously” is the speaker, whereas in (1b) it should be the editors:
(1) a. Očeviđno po mneniju redactorov, različija meždu zablužđeniem i lož′ju ne suščestvuet
   ‘Obviously, in the opinion of editors, there is no difference between a mis-
   apprehension and a lie’;

b. Po mneniju redactorov, različija meždu zablužđeniem i lož′ju, ocevidno, ne suščestvuet
   ‘In the opinion of editors, there is obviously no difference between a mis-
   apprehension and a lie’.

However, in our case, when the parenthetical has the same implied
subject as the PA, the problem of scope does not arise: the parenthetical
and the PA are characterized by the same attitude, distributed between the
two linguistic expressions. For example, in (2) the probability expressed in
možet byt′ ‘perhaps’ duplicates one of the components included in the se-
monic decomposition of the verb bojat'sja ‘to be afraid’ (this analysis ac-

(2) On boitsa, čto ona, možet byt', ego zabyla.
   ‘He is afraid that perhaps she has forgotten him.’

Thus, we must establish the rules of semantic agreement which make
possible the unambiguous combination of semantic components from these
two sources the parenthetical and the PA-predicate. In order to describe this
agreement a semantic classification of parentheticals is required. The divi-
sion will be made on the following basis:

Firstly, on a purely semantic basis one can distinguish meta-textual
parentheticals (such as meždu pročim ‘incidentally’, skoree ‘rather; most
likely’, tem ne menee ‘nevertheless’) and evaluatory ones. The latter in-
clude parentheticals which express:

a) evaluation of a fact — k ščast'ju ‘fortunately’, na bedu ‘unfortunately’;

b) evaluation of authenticity of information — bezuslovno ‘undoubt-
edly’, ‘apparently’ (this class of modal markers is established in Vinogra-
dov 1947: 739);

  c) evaluation of correspondence to expectation — konečno ‘of
course’, estestvenno ‘naturally’, razumeetsja ‘it goes without saying’, v sa-
mom dele ‘indeed’ (this group of modal words is rightly treated as a sepa-
rate class not included as markers of authenticity in Yakovleva 1988).
From the point of view of the communicative status of the associated proposition one can distinguish three groups of parentheticals:

A. Parentheticals which combine only with the assertive modality of the associated proposition (i.e., in speech regime the speaker uses the given parenthetical to assert or assume that the situation in the associated proposition is taking place). Thus, in (3)–(5) the associated proposition is asserted by the speaker:

(3) Ivan, k sožaleniju, v otpuske ‘Ivan is, unfortunately, on leave.’
(4) Čestno govorja, Bobby zavralsja ‘To be quite honest, Bobby has gone a bit too far.’
(5) Tem ne menee, on preuspevaet. ‘Nevertheless, he is flourishing.’

In the context of a non asserted proposition is a group A parenthetical cannot be used. For example, these parentheticals are impossible in the interrogative sentence (6) and in the conditional subordinate clause (7):

(6) *Ivan, k sožaleniju, v otpuske? ‘Is Ivan unfortunately on leave?’
(7) Esli Ivan, k sožaleniju, v otpuske, vam pridetsja ždat’ do sentjabra. *If Ivan is unfortunately on leave, you will have to wait until September.

B. Parentheticals that assume neutral modality in the associated position. If a parenthetical belongs to this group, the proposition is included in the scope of the corresponding operator, but is not itself asserted by the speaker; for instance, in (8), unlike (3), the associated position of the parenthetical does not have assertive status; the speaker here is not asserting a fact, but merely stating a surmise:

(8) Ivan, naovernoe, v otpuske ‘Ivan is probably on leave.

All parenthetical markers of authenticity belong to this type.

This property of authenticity markers explains certain co-occurrence restrictions characteristic of them. For example, in (9), due to the presence of the -nibud' pronoun, the proposition has non-assertive status; and consequently there is nothing about which the speaker could say ‘fortunately’; hence the anomaly (9b). Whereas in the scope of naovernoe ‘probably’, which requires neutral modality of the associated proposition, this proposition is correct, see (9a):

(9) a. Naovernoe, k nemu kto-nibud' prišel ‘Someone has probably come to see him’;
   b. *K sčast’ju, k nemu kto-nibud' prišel ‘*Fortunately, someone has probably come to see him’.
The deviance of examples (10b) and (11b) is explained, conversely, by the fact that *bezuslovno* ‘undoubtedly’ requires neutral modality of the associated proposition, and in these sentences, by virtue of their communicative structure, the modality is unambiguously assertive (cf. the somewhat different explanation of this kind of examples in Yakovleva 1988):

(10) a. Byl u nas na kurse odin student ‘There was a certain student in our year’;
    b. *Bezuslovno, byl u nas na kurse odin student
       ‘*There was undoubtedly a certain student in our year.’

(11) a. Vnezapno poezd ostanovilsə. ‘Suddenly the train stopped.’
    b. *Bezuslovno vnezapno poezd ostanovilsə.
       ‘*Undoubtedly, suddenly the train stopped.’

In sentence (12), which differs from (11) in communicative structure, the associated proposition has no inherent predestination for assertive use, and therefore a group B parenthetical is acceptable:

(12) Poezd *bezuslovno* ostanovilsə vnezapno.
    ‘The train *undoubtedly* stopped unexpectedly.’

Group B parentheticals may be used in a question and even in a conditional sentence:

(13) Ty, vidimo (veroɉatno, kažetsɉa, vrode), zanɉat?
    ‘You are obviously (probably, apparently, seem to be) busy, aren’t you?’

(14) Esli ty, *možet byt′*, zanɉat ...
    ‘If you are busy, *perhaps* ...’

which is not possible for group A parentheticals, examples (6) and (7).

C. Parentheticals which are indifferent to modality of the associated proposition. This group includes all parentheticals which express correspondence to expectation. They are possible with both assertive, (15a), and neutral modality (15b):

(15) a. On, *konečno*, opjat′ zanɉat ‘He’s busy again, *of course*.’
    b. Esli, *konečno*, on opjat′ zanɉat, ...
       ‘If he’s busy again, *of course* ...’

Another important semantic opposition concerns authenticity markers alone. They can be divided into two classes — parentheticals which express modus of opinion (*navernoe* ‘probably’, *bessporno* ‘indisputably’, *bezuslovno* ‘undoubtedly’, *nesomnenno*, ‘indubitably’, *dumaetsɉa* ‘[I] think’, *bez somneniɉa* ‘without a doubt’, *po vsei veroɉatnosti* ‘in all probability’, *očevidno* ‘obviously’, *dolžno byt′* ‘probably’, *nado polagat′* ‘presumably’, *vozmožno* ‘possibly’, *skoree vsego* ‘most likely’, *možet byt′* ‘perhaps’), ‘i.e.,
correspond semantically to the verbs sčitat′ ‘to consider’, dumat′ ‘to think’ and dopuskat′ ‘to admit as possible’, and parentheticals which express modus of knowledge — first and foremost, perception (kažetsja ‘it seems’, jasno ‘it is clear’, opredelenno ‘it is definite’, kak budto ‘it would seem’ and vrode ‘it looks as if’), i.e., correspond to the verbs videt′ ‘to see’, čuvstovat′ ‘to feel’, znat′ ‘to know’. This division was introduced in Yakovleva 1988, where, it is true, a non-standard terminology is used: parentheticals of the kažetsja type are said to express “characteristic” information and those of the naverno type — “non-characteristic” information. Ioanesyan (1993) suggests a third class in the same series; this class includes vidimo ‘apparently’ and po-vidimomu ‘it would appear that: if kažetsja ‘it seems’ is possible in the context of the personal contact of the subject of consciousness with the situation, and naverno, conversely, in the absence of such contact, vidimo, po-vidimomu express a conclusion based on mediated contact. A characteristic context for the use of the word po-vidimomu can be seen in example (16): the conjunction potomu čto ‘because’ in the context of this word expresses its obligatory semantic actant — it inserts the information which gave the speaker grounds for his conclusion:

(16) Važnoe svedenie, po-vidimomu, dejstvitel′no proizvelo na putešestvennika sil′noe vpečatlenie, potomu čto on obvel glazami doma, kak by opasajš v každom okne uvidet′ po aistu. (Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita’)
‘The important information had evidently indeed produced a strong impression on the traveller, for his eyes made a frightened round of the buildings, as though expecting to see an atheist in every window’

5.2. SEMANTIC AGREEMENT

Thus, an associated proposition of a parenthetical which is embedded in another PA-predicate, is at one and the same time in the scope of two operators, which must naturally agree with each other (below only parentheticals with evaluational meaning are examined; meta-linguistic ones, such as vpročem ‘but, rather’, odnako ‘however’ type, function mostly not as one-argument operators, but as links that join the proposition in question with another one. Example:

Drugoj utverždal, čto on [Čičikov] činovnik gosudarstvenoj kancelarji i tut že prisovokupil: a vpročem, čert ego znaet, na lbu ved′ ne pročteš’
Another one insisted that he [Chichikov] was a state chancellery official and added straightaway: but actually [vpročem] the devil only knows, it’s not written on a man’s forehead after all.’ (Gogol. “Dead Souls’)

This agreement is governed by the following rules:

Rule 1. A parenthetical that induces neutral modality of an associated proposition does not agree with the embedding predicate, which requires assertive status for the proposition in question, see (1); and, conversely, (2).

1. *Ja rad, čto on, naverno, vernul'sja. ‘I am glad that he has, probably, returned.’
   *Ja ogorčen, čto ona, bessporno, uexala ‘I am sorry that she has, indisputably, gone away.’
   *Okazalos’, čto ona javno uexala. ‘It turned out that she had obviously gone away.’
   *Izvestno, čto on opredelenno mošennik. ‘It’s generally known that he is definitely a rogue.’

2. *Ja uveren, čto on, k sožalenju, opozdaet ‘I am sure that he will, unfortunately, be late’;
   *A ja dumal, čto on, k sčastju, ešče zdes’ ‘But I thought that he was, fortunately, still here’.

In (3a) modalities are in agreement with one another; in (3b) they are not:

3. a. Ja dumaju, čto on nesomnenno prav ‘I think that he is undoubtedly right’;
   b. *Ja znaju, čto on nesomnenno prav ‘I know that he is undoubtedly right’.

In real texts one may find exceptions to Rule 1, but this does not give us grounds for doubting its basic significance:

4. Udивительнее всего то, čto, očевидно, s nim vneste ixčez i milicijer
   ‘The most amazing thing was that, evidently, the policeman had disappeared together with him’ (Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”);
   S kakoj že vj stati skazali ej prijma v glaza, čto ona “ne takaja”. I, konečno, ugas-dali. Okazaloš’, čto i, dejstvitel’no, možet byt’, ne takaja. Vpročem, ja ee ne razberu. ‘Then why on earth did you tell her to her face that she wasn’t “like that”. And you were right, of course. It turns out that perhaps she really isn’t like that. But actually I cannot make her out.’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”).

In sentence (5) the violation lies in the fact that dumat’ in the past tense non-narrative assumes contra-factual modality — ‘we now know that this is not so’, which does not combine with the neutral modality required by the word naverno ‘probably:

5. A, kstati, ja vèd’ dumal, čto otec naverno s Rogožinym uedet
   ‘By the way, I thought Father would [probably] go off with Rogozhin’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”)
Rule 2. A parenthetical which expresses the modus of knowledge or perception is possible only in the context of an embedding predicate of knowledge or perception; similarly, a parenthetical which expresses the modus of opinion combines only with an embedding predicate of opinion. This rule was formulated, in different terms, in Yakovleva 1988. In (6a), (7a) the agreement holds, in (6b), (7b) it does not:

(6) a. Ja čuvstvuju, čto za mnoi opredelenno sledat 'I feel that I am definitely being followed';
   Ja čuvstvuju, mne, kažetsja, pridetsja ustupit' 'I feel I shall have, it seems to me, to give way.
   b. *Ja čuvstvuju, on, naavorne, gde-to poblizosti
   *Ja feel that he is probably somewhere nearby';
   *Ja počuvstvoval, čto on nesomnenno ustal
   *I felt that he was undoubtedly tired'.

(7) a. Ja sčitaɉu, čto ty, nesomnenno, spraviš'sja
   'I consider that you will undoubtedly manage it';
   Ja dumaju, čto ty bezuslovno prav 'I think that you are undoubtedly right';
   Ja dumaju, čto ona, vozmožno, otkažetsja
   'I think that she will probably refuse'.
   b. *Ja dumaju, čto Ivan, kažetsja, v otpuske
   *I think that Ivan seems to be on leave'.

Rule 3 is connected with the gradation of parentheticals in terms of quantity, introduced in Yakovleva 1988. Each of the two classes of authenticity markers can be divided into two sub-classes: in the first the subject of the parenthetical indicates the sufficiency of available information to confirm the associated proposition, and in the second its insufficiency. In the class of parentheticals with the modus of knowledge sufficiency is expressed by javno 'clearly' and opredelenno 'definitely', and in the class with the modus of opinion by bessporno 'indubitably', bezuslovno 'certainly', nesomnenno 'undoubtedly', dumaetsja '[I] think', bez somnenija 'without a doubt' (the others express insufficiency respectively). The rule of agreement says that a parenthetical cannot express insufficiency of information, if the embedding predicate expresses the opposite; thus, parentheticals expressing insufficiency of information are embeddable only to such verbs as dumat' 'to think', podozrevat' 'to suspect' and govorit' 'to say', but not to verbs such as čuvstvovat' 'to feel' and videt' 'to see':
On почувстовал, что его определенно (*кажется*) кто-то догоняет
‘He felt that someone was definitely (*seemed to be*) chasing him’;
Ja видел, что он явно (*кажется*) расторон
‘I saw that he clearly was (seemed to be) upset’.

In accordance with Rule 3 the following are possible:
Ja думаю, что ты, наверное, устал ‘I think (say) that you are probably tired’;
Ja считаю, что он, несомненно, прав ‘I believe that he is undoubtedly right’;
Ja подозреваю, что она, может быть, забыла ‘I suspect that she has perhaps forgotten;
Ja надеюсь, что она, может быть, еще придет
‘I hoped that she would perhaps still come’;
Добавлю, что он, возможно, вообще откажется
‘I would add that he may possibly refuse outright.’

There are also other rules which are of a particular nature and connected, in fact, with individual words. Thus, *Ja опасус’, что он, может быть, забудет ‘*I am afraid that he will, perhaps, forget’ is not quite correct: the reason is that может быть ‘perhaps’ has a general positive connotation (i.e., to some extent it is similar to ас ‘let’s hope’), so it would be better to say Ja опасус’, что он может забыть ‘I hope that he will, perhaps, not forget’.

Tautologies produce a sense of anomaly, of course:
(9) *Я рад, что он, к счастью, уехал ‘*I am glad that he has, fortunately, gone’;
*Я не сомневаюсь, что он, несомненно, уехал
‘*I do not doubt that he has undoubtedly gone’.

Rules 1–3 concern evaluational parentheticals. As for meta-textuals, they are hardly subject to semantic co-occurrence restrictions at all.

One point concerning meta-textual parentheticals. Two parentheticals, однако ‘however’ and тем не менее ‘nevertheless’, are almost synonymous at first glance, but differ in embeddability: the first is non-embeddable which is but natural for metatextuals, but the second is not. This feature of тем не менее is evidently explained by its pronominal character — тем не менее is capable of refering to the context because it is anaphoric, while однако is not:
(10) Я не сомневаюсь, что операция тем не менее (однако) увенчается успехом
‘I did not doubt that the operation would nevertheless (*however) be successful’.

5.3. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES WITH A THIRD-PERSON SUBJECT:
THE CASE OF CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE

Thus, we have formulated a number of general rules for the semantic agreement of the propositional attitude with an embedded parenthetical.

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They were most easily tested on PAs with a first-person subject: in this context the impossibility of using this or that parenthetical in the complement clause arises only when there is no semantic agreement between the two attitudes: there is no need to appeal to the egocentrical semantic of the parenthetical. In fact, with a first-person subject of an embedding attitude, the division of the parentheticals into primary and secondary egocentricals does not work: in both interpretations — syntactical and speech-act oriented — the speaker remains the implied subject of the parenthetical. The difference between primary and secondary parentheticals comes to the surface only in the context of an embedding PA-predicate with a third-person subject.

We shall now focus on contexts where, in accordance with Rules 1-3, the use of a parenthetical with a first-person subject of the PA is possible (so the impossibility of embedding cannot be accounted for the semantic disagreement of two attitudes, one of which is expressed in the parenthetical and the other in the PA) and examine what happens when the first person of the embedding PA-predicate is replaced by the third. We shall demonstrate that parentheticals are divided into the two groups already known to us from deixis: secondary egocentricals, which are acceptable in this context and, therefore, permit not only a speech-act oriented but also a syntactical interpretation; and primary egocentricals, which can have the speaker alone as their implied subject; the latter do not allow of a syntactical interpretation and, as a rule, cannot occupy an embedded position.

I. The group of secondary egocentrical parentheticals includes, for example, skoree vsego ‘most likely’ and možet byť, vozmožno ‘perhaps’. They can be embedded by a PA with a third-person subject and receive a syntactical interpretation in this context; in other words, they may be contextualized through the subject of the embedding PA:

1. Ivan govorit, čto on, vozmožno, priedet vo vtornik
   ‘Ivan says, that he will come on Tuesday perhaps’.

2. Kolja sčitaet, čto svad′ba budet, skoree vsego, v oktjambre
   ‘Kolya thinks that the wedding will, most likely, be in October’.

Parentheticals of this group are secondary egocentricals in the sense that they permit, alongside a speech-act oriented interpretation with the speaker as the implied subject, a syntactical one oriented on the subject of the embed-
ding PA. In Apresyan 1986 the verb *pokazat'sja* ‘to appear’ was identified as a secondary deictical — and therefore as a secondary egocentrical — using the same type of reasoning, namely, the possibility of syntactical projection.28

Secondary parentheticals may also be used in an embedded position with speaker-oriented interpretation:

(3) Ėto on potomu ubežal, čto emu, verno, trudno stalo vam otečat’ ‘He ran off because he probably found it hard to answer you’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”);

A togo ne znaet, čto, *možet byt’, ja, p’janica i potaskun, grabitel’ i lixodej, za odno tol’ko i stóju čto vot ětogo zuboskala, ešče mladenca, v svivalv’niki obertyval...

‘But what he doesn’t know is that perhaps the only thing I, drunkard, lecher, thief and evildoer, have to my credit is that when this scoffer was a baby I wrapped him in swaddling clothes...’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”).

(4) Skaži ej, čto Ivan, *možet byt’, pridet ‘Tell her that perhaps Ivan will come’.

This use of secondary egocentricals is not a deviation from the proposed generalizations: a secondary parenthetical is identified by the fact that it can be used in an embedded position; it need not necessarily have but a syntactic interpretation in that position, cf. *sejčas*-1 in chapter II.2 (though for paradigmatic secondary deicticals — such as *pokazat'sja* ‘appear’ deictic interpretation in an embedded position is out of the question).

II. Primary egocentrical parentheticals include, for example, *kažetsja* ‘apparently’, which is non-embeddable to a PA-verb with a third-person subject:

(5) Ja čuvstvuɉu, čto ja, *kažetsja*, dolžen ujti ‘I feel that apparently I must go away’;

*On čuvstvuey, čto on, *kažetsja*, dolžen ujti

‘*He feels that apparently he must go away’.

Sentence (6) with the primary egocentrical *vse-taki* ‘after all becomes utterly impossible (or becomes a clear case of quotation, see chapter II.6) if we substitute the third person subject:

28 In Section 1 we claimed that non-embeddability and non-reportability are closely related concepts: the latter is a particular case of the former. Still the link between embeddability and reportability requires additional comments. In fact, an opinion expressed with the help of the sentence (2′) *Svad’ba budet, skoree vsego, v oktɉabre* ‘The wedding will, most likely, be in October’, is obviously reportable: it can be adequately conveyed, moreover in the same expressions in which it was formulated by the author cf. (2′) and (2), while embeddability is a more complicated concept. Indeed, embedding changes interpretation of a proposition; for example, the implied subject of the parenthetical *skoree vsego* ‘most likely’ in (2′) is the speaker, whereas in the embedded context in (2) it is the subject of the PA. However, the particle *pravda* was identified in section 3.2 as non-embeddable on the grounds that it does not change its interpretation. So it is natural to accept a change in interpretation as proof of embeddability.
(6) Ja budu vynuždena skazat′ emu, čto vse-taki vy prišli s cvetami.
‘I shall be forced to tell him that you did come with flowers after all.’

In certain conditions primary parentheticals are possible in an embedded position. These exceptions, however, always have an explanation. For example, in (7) the speaker-oriented interpretation of the embedded unfortunately is explained by a kind of deictic projection: Mne soobščili = ‘I learned’; so basically the speaker remains the priority subject of consciousness. The speaker oriented interpretation of vpročem in (8) it is explained by the fact that the parenthetical forms part of a separate phrase, i.e., a phrase not embedded by the PA.

(7) Tol′ko čto mne soobṧčili, čto orgkomitet, k sožalenɉu, otklonil moj doklad.
‘I have just been informed that the organising committee has, unfortunately, rejected my paper.’

(8) Belokuryj neskol′ko udivilsɉa, čto emu udalos′ sozdat′, dovol′no, vpročem, ploẋoj kalambur
‘The fair-haired young man looked somewhat surprised at having produced a pun, if only a poor one’    (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”).

Thus, the division of egocentricals into primary and secondary ones prove valid not only for deixis but also for parenthesis.

5.4. EMBEDDED PARENTHETICALS IN NARRATIVE

We shall now examine the two established groups of parentheticals — primary and secondary egocentricals — from the viewpoint of what we know about narrative.

With regard to secondary egocentricals, narrative does not differ from conversational language: a parenthetical may have syntactic interpretation — the implied subject of the parenthetical is the subject of the embedding PA. Cf. the following examples (from Dostoevsky’s novel “The Idiot”):

...i sam izvestil, čto daču, možet byt', i zajmet. Lebedev že znal utverditel′no, čto ne “možet byt’”, a naverno zajmet ...
‘...and announced himself that perhaps he would take the dacha. Lebedev knew for sure that it was not “perhaps”, but “certainly” ...’;

Knɉazɉu prišlo na um, čto Lebedev i dejstvitel’no, možet byt', žmetsɉa i krivlɉaetsɉa potomu tol’ko, čto <...> vygadyvaet vremja
‘It occurred to the prince that Lebedev was perhaps really only hesitating and putting on an act <...> to gain time’;

<...> menja naverno sočtut za učenika nizšego klassa ... ili skažut, čto ja, možet byt', i šotel čto-to vyskazat′, no <...> ne sumel “razvit’sja”
‘I shall probably be taken for a pupil from the lower classes ... or they’ll say that perhaps I really did want to express something, but <...> could not “develop” it’;

Kniaz’u kazaloš’ inogda, čto Ganja, možet byt’, i želal s svojej storony samojo polnoj i družeskoj iskragnosti

‘At times, the prince had the impression that, for his part, Ganya would perhaps have liked the fullest and most friendly sincerity’;

Emu podumalos’, čto general, požaluj, ešče voz’met ego i totčas že otvezet v Pavlovsk

‘He thought that the general would perhaps still take him and carry him off to Pavlovsk’;

Kniaz’ znal, čto u Epančinyx v gorode on možet zastat’ teper’ odnogo toľko generala, po službe, da i to navrjad

‘The prince knew that at the Epanchins in town he could now find one general only, on business, and even that was unlikely’;

Naprnasno devicy uverali, čto čelovek, ne pisavšij polgoda, možet byt’, daleko ne bydet tak toropliv i teper’, i čto, možet byt’, u nego i bez niň mnogo šlopot v Peterburge

‘In vain the girls assured her that a man who had not written for six months would perhaps not be in such a hurry now and that he had perhaps a great deal to attend to in St Petersburg without them’.

Some doubts arise as to the identity of subjects in the following example:

(1) I nakonec edinoglasno vse rešili, čto vidno takova byla sud’ba Mar’i Gavrilovny <...

‘And eventually everyone decided unanimously, that this was evidently Maria Gavrilovna’s fate <...>’  


As for primary egocentricals we have the right to expect embedded primary egocentrical PEs, which are impossible in conversational language in the context of a third-person PA subject, to be possible in narrative due to assimilation of the third person to the first — in FID and, more generally, in personal form narrative. The following fabricated examples may serve to support this hypothesis:

(2) a. *On čuvstvet, čto emu javno ne žvataet Maši

‘He feels that he is obviously missing Maša’;

b. On čuvstvoval, čto emu javno ne žvatalo Maši.

‘He felt that he was obviously missing Masha.’

(3) a. Ja čuvstvuji, čto kto-to opredelenno idet za mnoj.

‘I feel that someone is definitely following me’;

b. *On čuvstvet, čto kto-to opredelenno idet za nim.

‘He feels that someone is definitely following him.’;

c. On čuvstvoval, čto kto-to opredelenno šel za nim.
‘He felt that someone was definitely following him.’

(4) a. Ja dumaju, čto slušateli, naverno, ustali
‘I think that the audience is probably tired.’

b. *On dumaet, čto slušateli, naverno, ustali
‘*He thinks that the audience is probably tired.’

c. On dumal, čto slušateli, naverno, ustali i on dolžen skoree končat’
‘He thought that the audience was probably tired and he should finish as quickly as possible.’

Thus, we may hope that the opposition of primary and secondary egocentricals will prove valid. On the other hand, we have reasons to believe that the analogy between deixis and modality proves fruitful for the analysis of both areas of language.

5.5. Subjective Modality and Narrative

The syntactical non-embeddability of a linguistic element means that it cannot be interpreted in a syntactical regime. On the other hand, if syntactical interpretation is impossible, personal interpretation in traditional narrative is also excluded, since they are both text oriented. A special property of markers of illocutionary intent is that for them — in the main body of traditional narrative — narrative interpretation is also impossible. The reason is that the exegetic narrator has the right to make utterances with the sole illocutionary function of imparting information, i.e., the very function which the elements in question are intended to exclude. Hence the fact that, unlike ordinary egocentrical elements, markers of illocutionary intent cannot have the narrator as their master. The only place which they can find for themselves in narrative is FID, where they receive a personal interpretation. All the minor types of illocutionary acts which are expressed by markers of subject modality are, as a rule, dialogical in their semantics; they cannot belong to the narrator, but are naturally understood as the quasi-direct speech of the character.

Thus, the foregoing shows that in order to analyse narrative we must distinguish three classes of egocentrical elements: 1) secondary, i.e., those which permit both narrative and personal interpretation; 2) primary, which permit only narrative interpretation in traditional narrative; and 3) ones that cannot be used in traditional narrative (in auctorial form), thereby making it possible to diagnosticate FID unambiguously.
In order to indicate the sphere of linguistics to which the semantics of this class of egocentricals belongs we call them dialogical. Emphases and expression may be classed as dialogical elements, if one considers that they presuppose an addressee, even if this addressee is the speaker himself. In general a semantic characterization of primary egocentricals which would define the possibility of their use in traditional narrative is a task which we can pose, but not solve.

It is precisely in parentheticals that authorial modal orientation is manifested most of all in the auctorial form of narrative.

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29. Traditional narrative is sometimes called monological (see, for example, Vinogradov 1980, Fillmore 1981). This term would be correct, if a monologue really did not have an addressee. In fact, however, this is not the case: a monologue is defined (see Kwiatkowski 1966) as speech directed to oneself or to a listener. It is not surprising that a monologue may include expressive elements or emphases, which are not permitted for the narrator in In section 1 we said that non-reportability and non-embeddability are closely related concepts: the latter is a particular case of the former. The link between embeddability and reportability requires separate proof. In fact, an opinion expressed with the help of the sentencetraditional narrative.
CHAPTER II.4.
COMMUNICATIVE STATUS OF PARENTHETICAL CLAUSES

Several reasons make parentheticals interesting for the analysis of narrative. As we mentioned earlier, the implied subject of parentheticals (such as na-vernnoe ‘probably’, v samom dele ‘actually’) is the speaker and, therefore, they belong to egocentric elements of the language. It was shown in Chapter II.3 that some parentheticals admit syntactical-oriented interpretation in addition to more basic speech-act oriented interpretation, while others do not. Thus, we have right to make a distinction between primary and secondary subjective modality, parallel to the distinction between primary and secondary deixis.

In quite a different perspective, we should also consider the parenthetical usage of finite verbs (On, ja dumaju, soglasitsja ‘He, I believe, will agree’; Liza, oni mne skazali, vyšla zamuž ‘Liza, they say, has got married’). In such parenthetical clauses (PC) the subject is overtly expressed and does not necessarily coincide with the speaker. We will demonstrate precisely the opposite: within the PC context, with the non-first-person subject, the speaker loses his/her positions considerably. Therefore, this type of parenthetical constructions is of principal importance for the analysis of FID with its disappearing narrator.

1. FINITE VERBS IN PARENTHETICAL USE

Many verbs and predicatives with a sentential complement — propositional attitude verbs (dumat’ ‘to think’, znat’ ‘to know’, verit’ ‘to believe’, bojat’sja ‘to fear’, nadejat’sja ‘to hope’, etc.), verbs of intellectual influence (dokazyvat’ ‘to prove’, objasnit’ ‘to explain’, uverjet’ ‘to assure’, ubeždat’ ‘to convince’, etc.), verbs of speech and, in a broader sense, verbs of communication (govorit’ ‘to speak’, soběščat’ ‘to inform’, utverždat’ ‘to assert’, otricat’ ‘to deny’, pisat’ ‘to write’, etc.), and also some verbs of perception (videt’ ‘to see’, čuvstvovat’ ‘to feel’, zamečat’ ‘to notice’, etc.) — allow parenthetical use which, in a certain way, changes their meaning (on parenthetical use of verbs of consciousness and communication, see Urmson 1970). We shall be dealing here with finite verbs, i.e., to use linguistic terminology, with parenthetical clauses.
First of all, we shall try to find formal parameters of the parenthetical clause.30

If the conjunction čto ‘that’ is omitted in the subordinate clause it usually means that the preceding clause has a parenthetical use:

(1) \textit{Ja dumaju, on soglasitsja} ‘I think, he will agree’;
\textit{On čitae, pogoda izmenitsja} ‘He believes, the weather will change’.

It is normal for parenthetical clauses to change their location freely in the sentence:
\textit{Ja dumaju, on soglasitsja} ‘I think, he will agree’;
\textit{On, ja dumaju, soglasitsja} ‘He, I think, will agree’;
\textit{On soglasitsja, ja dumaju} ‘He will agree, I think’.

Moreover, this feature can be the basis for the definition of a parenthetical clause.

According to Grammatika 1952/1960: 165, a parenthetical clause may be located in the middle and at the end of the sentence, but not at its beginning. However this cannot be accepted as a general rule, since, for instance, sentences like (1) would not then be considered to contain a parenthetical construction, which contradicts our intuition. On the other hand, it is true that there are compound sentences with preposition of the main clause and omitted conjunction which would not be readily identified as containing parenthesis. Consider the following example:

(2) \textit{On dumaet, ja ego ispugalsja} ‘He thinks I am afraid of him’

First, in (2), as opposed to (1), it is impossible to change the location of the main clause; secondly, the meaning of (2) contains a semantic component which, as we shall show below, contradicts the general semantics of parenthesis:

(2) = ‘He thinks that I am afraid of him, which is not true’.

Thus, in general, the possibility of hypotaxis clause with an omitted conjunction čto ‘that’ where the main clause is not parenthetical should not be excluded31.

Among parameters of parenthesis an important role is also played by intonation; cf. stressed \textit{ja znaju} ‘I know’ in (3a) and unstressed in (3b):

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30 We do not differentiate between verbs and predicatives, cf. parenthetical phrases such as \textit{kak izvestno} ‘as is generally known’, \textit{mne očeviđno} ‘it is evident to me’, and similar.

31 In English omission of the conjunction \textit{that} is commonplace and not necessarily equal to parenthesis.
(3) a. On sobiralsja pridti \,’ja znaju\,’ ‘He was going to come\,’ I know\,’;
b. On sobiralsja pridti \,’ja znaju\,’ ‘He was going to come\,’ I know’.

In (3b) the verb znat’ ‘know’ is used parenthetically; and indeed, the word order in (3b) is free: we may say On, ja znaju, sobiralsja pridti; ‘He was, I know, going to come’, Ja znaju, on sobiralsja pridti ‘I know, he was going to come’. But sentence (3a) should rather be treated as elliptical — as if the anaphoric ěto ‘this’ were omitted: (3a) ≈ On sobiralsja pridti, ja ěto znaju. In (3a) the word order is fixed: the component ja znaju ‘I know’ can be located only at the end — in accordance with the general rule of location of a zero anaphoric sign with respect to its antecedent (indeed, the zero anaphor must follow its antecedent). Therefore, the absence of the phrasal stress on the verb is an intonational marker of parenthetical usage.

The construction in sentences (1), (2) may be called purely parenthetical. Besides, there is another kind of parenthesis which may be termed conjunctional parenthesis, or C-parenthesis (C-paranthetical construction is formed with the help of the conjunction kak ‘as’):

Ja meščanin, kak vam izvestno, i v ětom smysle demokrat. (Pushkin. “Ezerskij”)
‘I am a city dweller, as you know, and in this sense I am a democrat’.

2. Co-occurrence restrictions in parenthetical clauses

Some of the combinability restrictions to be explained by the semantics of parenthetical clauses are presented below (if the opposite is not stated, we are dealing with purely parenthetical constructions).

1. Parenthetical use is impossible for the most part of factive predicates (cf. Krejdlin 1983), in particular, with factive predicates of emotional state; cf., for instance:

(4) Ja rad, čto zanjatij ne budet — *Zanjatij, ja rad, ne budet.
‘I am glad that there will be no classes — *There will be, I am glad, no classes’.

2. Verbs of opinion with negation do not allow parenthetical use (this phenomenon was described in Apresyan 1978):

(5) Ja dumaju, pogoda izmenitsja ‘I think the weather will change’;
Ja ne dumaju, čto pogoda izmenitsja ‘I do not think that the weather will change’;
*Ja ne dumaju, pogoda izmenitsja ‘I do not think the weather will change’.
3. Characteristically for parenthetically used verbs, their combinability with first and third person is different\(^ {32} \) — parenthetical construction is more common for first-person verbs, example (6a). Third-person usage produces anomaly (this difference was noted by Urmson, with no explanation, however), see examples (6b) and (7):

(6) a. U sosedej, ja vižu, gorit svet.  ‘The light is on, *I see*, at the neighbors’;


(7) *Tam, on jasno vidit, stoit čelovek.

‘There, *he sees it clearly*, is a person standing’;

*Izmenenija, on ěvstvuęt, neobxodimy. *The changes, *he feels*, are necessary’;

*Deti, on boitsją, ne spjat.  ‘The children, *he fears*, are not asleep’.

With conjunctural parenthesis, the situation is the opposite; the conjunction *kak* ‘as’ in (8b) should rather be omitted; for example, sentence sited in Apresyan 1978 becomes ungrammatical if *I* is substituted for *conoissers*:


‘Sturgeon, *as connoisseurs believe*, has lost its former taste.’

b. *Osetrovye ryby, kak ja sčitaju, utratili svoj byloj vkus.

‘Sturgeon, *as I believe*, has lost its former taste.’

Poslednij ukaz, *kak ja utverždaɉu, skoro otmenɉat.

‘The last decree, *as I assert*, will be soon repealed.’

4. There is a correlation between the grammatical person of the subject in a parenthetical construction and the temporal reference of the sentence: most restrictions concerning the grammatical person of the subject which are characteristic of the present tense, do not exist in the past tense. For example, in (9) — (12) the third person subject does not co-occur with the present tense verb though it does co-occur with the past tense:

(9) a. *Pogoda, ej kažetsɉa, ploẋaɉa. *The weather, *it seems to her*, is bad’;

b. Pogoda, *ej kazalos′, byla ploẋaɉa. *The weather, *it seemed to her*, was bad’.

(10) a. *Maša, on vidit, bledna. *Masha, *he sees*, is pale’;

b. Maša, *on videl, byla bledna. *Masha, *he saw*, was pale’.

(11) a. *Na kuẋne, on jasno slyšit, kto-to est′.  ‘There is somebody, *he hears clearly*, in the kitchen’.

b. Na kuẋne, *on jasno slyšal, kto-to byl

\(^{32}\) There are considerable differences between the third and the second persons, also, cf. *kak vy znaeɉe* ‘as you know’, but *kak on znaeɉ *as he knows’; *kak vy dogadyvaesɉe* ‘as you may guess’, but *kak on dogadyvaesɉja *as he may guess’. We do not, however, specifically consider second person.
‘There was somebody, *he heard clearly*, in the kitchen’.

(12) a. *Liza, on čuvstvuot, naźoditsja gde-to poblizosti
   ‘Liza, *he feels*, is somewhere nearby’;
   b. Liza, on čuvstvoval, naźodilas’ gde-to poblizosti
   ‘Liza, *he felt*, was somewhere nearby’.

With conjunctive parenthetical construction just the opposite is the case, first person subject is impossible in the present tense though possible in the past:

(13) a. *Deti, kak ja bojus’, ne spjat. ‘The children, as I fear, are not asleep’.
   b. Deti, kak ja i bojalsja, ne spali. ‘The children, as I feared, were not asleep’.

Interpretation of combinability restrictions presented by examples (4)—(13) will be dealt with again in Section 4.

3. The semantics of parenthesis

To describe the semantics of parenthesis it is useful to divide the verbs that allow parenthetical usage into two groups. Group 1 consists of the verbs of opinion: dumat’ ‘to think’, sčitat’ ‘to believe’, polagat’ ‘to suppose’, predpolagat’ ‘to assume’, rassčityvat’ ‘to rely on’, etc. Predicates that combine an opinion with evaluation or emotional attitude (bojat'sja ‘to fear’, nadejat'sja ‘to hope’, verit’ ‘to believe’, byt’ uverennym ‘to be sure’) the same group belong to. Group 2 comprises factive verbs — znat’ ‘to know’, ponimat’ ‘to understand’, pomnit’ ‘to remember’, and also verbs which, when used parenthetically, express deduction made on the basis of sensual perception (videt’ ‘to see’, slyšat’ ‘to hear’, čuvstvovat’ ‘to feel’, predstav-ljat' sebe ‘to imagine’, zamečat’ ‘to seem’, etc.).

Speech act verbs, used parenthetically, often express or convey an opinion (Kak govorit Aristotel’, čelovek obladaet svobodoj voli, potomu čto on v odinakovoj mere vlasten v vybore dobra i zla ‘As Aristotle says, a person possesses freedom of will, because he or she has the power to choose, in equal measure, between good and evil’; Karfagen, ja nastaivaju, dolžen byt' razrušen ‘Carthage, I insist, must be destroyed’) and, in this meaning, belong to Group 1. Besides, speech act verbs in parenthetical constructions may have a performative use (evidently, in first person): ja skažu ‘I tell you’, napominaju ‘I remind you’ = (let me remind you) and napomnju ‘I [lit. “will”] remind you’ = (let me remind you), zameču ‘I [lit. “will”] tell’ = (let me tell

Two types of parenthetical constructions, purely parenthetical and conjunctional-parenthetical, will be discussed separately.

**I. PURELY PARENTHEtical CONSTRUCTIONS**

It was this type of parenthetical construction that was analyzed in Urmson 1970, where the following was found. When a statement is made, the speaker usually implies that the entire utterance is true. However, in a sentence that comprises a parenthetical verb and an indicative component P (former subordinate clause; associated proposition of the parenthetical verb), the speaker implies, above all, the truth of P. As to the parenthetical verb, it conveys only the emotional aspect of the utterance; or the basis for the speaker’s statement; or the extent of its validity; or the logical path of deduction that brought the speaker to the statement, etc. For instance, it is said about the parenthetical ‘I guess’ that “it is put in to show that one is making one’s statement without any specific evidence, that it is, in fact, a guess” Urmson 1970, p. 232. Similarly, the function of the parenthetical *I regret* in *He is, I regret, unwell*, is only to convey an emotional evaluation of the fact reported.

We shall now describe the semantics of the parenthetical construction trying to reveal the semantic difference between a parenthetical use of a PA-verb and its “regular”, subordinating (embedding) use.

To begin with, the semantics of parenthesis depends largely on the person of the subject of the propositional attitude. In case of the first person subject, the difference between parenthetical and subordinating use is minimal and may be reduced to the difference in communicative significance: in regular use, the entire sentence is communicatively significant; in parenthetical use, only its non-parenthetical part. Communicative significance — the term is coined by G. Krejdlin (1983) — is not a clearly defined concept. There are, however, a number of properties that it definitely possesses:
1) the communicatively significant part of the sentence constitute the scope of assertion in an affirmative sentence and of question in an interrogative sentence;
2) it carries new information;
3) it may contain a logical accent.

Cf. *Ja vižu, čto tam kto-to est’* 'I see that there is somebody there’ and *Ja vižu, tam kto-to est’* 'I see, there is somebody there: in the presence of a conjunction, the verb can be a carrier of the accent (*Ja vižu \, čto tam kto-to est’*); when used parenthetically, it can not.

However, even that, purely communicative, difference between parenthetical and hypotactical use is often lost: verbs of opinion in the first person can be devoid of communicative significance in their hypotactical, non-parenthetical use; below, in (14) and (15) parenthetical and embedding use are practically synonymous:

(14) a. *Ja dumaju, čto my možem k nemu zajti* ‘*I think* that we can visit him’;
    b. *Ja dumaju, my možem k nemu zajti.* ‘*I think* we can visit him’.

(15) a. *Bojius’, čto mne ne xvatit na ěto vremen. ‘*I am afraid* that I will not have enough time for that’;
    b. *Bojius’, mne ne xvatit na ěto vremen.* ‘*I am afraid* I will not have enough time for that’.

In fact, a normal answer to a question with a parenthetical verb is a response to the communicatively significant rather than to the parenthetical component. Therefore, in example (16) the reply is not a direct response to the question (a direct response would be *Da, imemno ěto* ‘*Yes, that’s right*’; or *Net, ne ěto* ‘*No, that’s wrong*’):

(16) — *Vy dumae, imenno ěto slomilo ego uporstvo? ‘Do you think* that was what made him give up?*
    — *Ja ne dumaju, ja znaju.* ‘*I do not think, I know.*’

However, even if a verb of opinion has an embedding use the answer is usually a response to the embedded rather than to the main component. For example, *Ja dumaju, čto my možem k nemu zajti, pravda? ‘*I think* that we can visit him, don’t you?’ means ‘*Is it true* that we can visit him?’ but not ‘*Is it true* that I think so?’ Compare also (17), where the response is directed to the embedded component, and embedding one (*on utverždaet, čto*...
‘he asserts that’) is devoid of communicative significance, i.e. does not fall within the scope of the question:

(17) Korol’: *On utverždaet, čto ty vse ravno ženiš’sja na princesse*
    Henrič: *Da, ja vse ravno ženus’ na princesse.*
    ‘The King: *He asserts* that you will marry the princess anyway?*
    Henrich: *Yes, I will marry the princess anyway.*’


There is, nevertheless, a difference: for a verb in parenthetical use, communicative significance is impossible in principale, while embedding use leaves such a possibility for every verb, including verbs of opinion. Cf. the following dialogue:

(18) — *Ja sčitaju, čto Maša simpatičnaja devočka.*
    — *A ja / sčitaju, čto ona naẋalka \.*
    ‘— *I believe*, that Masha is a nice girl.
    — *And I / believe* that she is impudent \.*’

In the first sentence *ja sčitaju* ‘I believe’ can be transformed into a parenthetical clause without any change of meaning (*Maša, ja sčitaju, simpatičnaja devočka* ‘Masha, I believe, is a nice girl’); in the second sentence this is impossible since *ja sčitaju* ‘I believe’ carries an accent.

Thus, the main aspect of the semantics of parenthesis consists in the following. In a hypotactical construction the entire sentence is, generally speaking, communicatively significant; if, in some usages, the main clause may be devoid of communicative significance, this is not fixed by its syntactic form. The transformation of the main clause by parenthesis deprives the “former principal clause” of communicative significance forever.

In case of the third person subject, semantical decomposition of the parenthetical construction contains another component: ‘the speaker agrees with the opinion of the subject referred to (or, at least, does not have a contradictory opinion)’. Cf. (19a) and (19b):

(19) a. *Poezda, sčitaet John, uže ţodɉat*
    ‘The trains, *John believes*, are already running’;

b. *John sčitaet, čto poezda uže ţodɉat*
    ‘*John believes*, that the trains are already running’.

Utterance (b) can be made in a situation when the speaker sees John hurrying to the train; yet the speaker knows that the trains are not running
yet and that John does not need to hurry. However, the utterance (a) is impossible in this situation: it requires that the speaker should not have any knowledge or opinions contradictory to the opinions that the speaker conveys (see Urmson 1970: 230). In other words, an hypotactical construction allows a “non-sympathetic” interpretation (the speaker’s disagreement with the subject’s opinion or modus), but a parenthetical construction makes such an interpretation impossible, since this would contradict one of the semantic components of the parenthetical construction: ‘the speaker agrees with the opinion of the subject referred to’.

A non-sympathetic interpretation of an hypotactical construction does not have any consistent formal expression; this interpretation is due to a specific pragmatic shift (a similar pragmatic shift is represented by irony, as described by Grice 1975: 41–58). There may be overt exponents of the speaker’s distancing from the opinion reported: On dumaet, čto ja ego ispugalsja. Kak by ne tak! ‘He thinks he has frightened me. Far from it!’; On nadeetsja, čto ego primut. Da kuda emu! ‘He hopes he will be accepted. No way!’; On boitsja, čto ona otkazetsja. Da ona rada-radešen’ka! ‘He is afraid that she will refuse. But she is only too glad!’; On rassčityval, čto emu zaplatit. Ne tut-to bylo! ‘He believed he would be paid. No such luck!’ Sometimes such interpretation is emphasized by particles: A on ešče somnevaetsja! ‘And he still doubts about it!’ I on ešče nadeetsja! ‘And he’s still hoping [after all that had happened]!’ A non-sympathetic report of someone’s opinion can make use of a special lexeme: On voobražaet čto ego primut ‘He imagines that he will be accepted’. It goes without saying that a non-sympathetic interpretation is possible only for non-factual verbs, cf. the impossibility of a similar interpretation for the following sentences: A on-to znaet, čto ego primut ‘As for him, he knows that he will be accepted’; On-to dogadyvaetsja, čto ona zdes’ ‘As for him, he seems to know that she is here’ — despite the presence of the same particles.

A non-sympathetic interpretation is also possible for conjunctionless sentential complements if only it is not parenthesis, cf. the above example (3) On dumaet, čto ja ego ispugalsja ‘He thinks he has frightened me’.

33 Interestingly, there is no complete analogy here between a parenthetical sentence and a parenthetical phrase. Thus, after saying According to the opinion of other scientists, the Earth continues to cool off (example from Apresyan 1978), the speaker may proceed to challenge this assumption.
It may seem doubtful that the interpretation of the parenthetical construction should always be sympathetic, cf. example (20a) below, where the speaker in his/her capacity as speaker, i.e. at the present moment, may be inclined to change his/her former opinion; in (b) Pushkin cites someone else’s opinion with the possible purpose of refuting it later:

(20) a. Teper′, podumal ja, puti k primirenju otrezany
‘Now, I thought, the ways of reconciliation are cut off’.

b. Marija <...> uvlečena byla, govorili mne, tščeslaviem, a ne ljubov′ju
‘Maria, I was told, was carried away by vanity, but not love’ (Pushkin. “Reply to the Critics of «Poltava»”, cited by Grammatika 1954, vol. II, part 2, p. 164).

However, these examples are interpreted in a narrative context, where, as will be shown in Section 5, the component ‘the speaker agrees with...’, in fact, disappears.

II. CONJUNCTIONAL-PARENTHETICAL CONSTRUCTION

Like the purely parenthetical, the conjunctional-parenthetical construction is used in the context of verbs of opinion in the third person, present tense. In this context, it conveys someone else’s opinion which serves a basis for the speaker to form his/her own judgment: *Kak on rassčityvaet, Maša vernetsja zavtra*. ‘As he believes, Masha will return tomorrow’. Usually, this third person has some “authority”, cf. *kak sčitaют specialisty* ‘As specialists believe’, *kak utverždaet Aristotel* ‘as Aristotle asserts’, *kak polagaju气象ologists* ‘as meteorologists believe’, *kak ukazyvaet akademik Vinogradov* ‘as academician Vinogradov indicates’.

Conjunctional-parenthetical construction with a verb of opinion generates in the utterance the semantic component ‘the speaker agrees with the opinion as well as a purely parenthetical construction with a subject in the third person (of the paranthetical clause) or, at least, does not have a contradictory opinion’34, cf. *Ženščiny iþ prekrasny i, kak slyšno, očen′ blagosklonny k putešestvennikam* ‘Their women are beautiful and, as they say, very favorably disposed towards travelers’ (Pushkin. “A trip to...

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34 A separate case is represented by the expression of someone else’s opinion: *Kak vyražajut mjorjak, veter krepčal* ‘As sailors say, the wind was growing stronger’ (Chekhov); *U šorošej devki ni glaz, ni ušej, kak govorjat v narode* ‘A good girl does not have eyes or ears, as the folk saying goes’. Here the speaker steps aside from the mode of expression but shares the view, on quoting see Chapter II.6.
The presence of this component in the semantics of a conjunctional-parenthetical construction is confirmed by the following facts.

1) The verb *voobrazit’* “to imagine”, whose semantics includes the disagreement of the speaker with the opinion relayed, is impossible in this context: *kak voobražaet Bebel’* “as Bebel imagines”; the same is true for *zabluždat’sja* “to be mistaken’, *ošibočno polagat* ‘to erroneously believe’; cf. also verbs like *allege, pretend*.

2) If the speaker conveys an opinion which he is going to dispute, he cannot use a conjunctional-parenthetical construction; for example, sentence

\[ \text{Takie igry, kak utverždaet avtor, detɉam vredny.} \]

‘These games, as the author asserts, are harmful for the children.’

cannot have a textual continuation *Ja dumaɉu, čto ėto ne tak* ‘I don’t think so’. What should be said is: *Avtor utverždaet, čto takie igry detjam vredny. Ja dumaɉu, čto ėto ne tak.* ‘The author asserts that these games are harmful for the children I don’t think so.’ Similarly, it is impossible to say: *Kak utverždajut odni učenye, P; kak utverždajut drugie, ne-P* ‘As some scientists assert, P; as others assert, non-P’, where P and non-P are any judgments which contradict each other. Meanwhile, the phrase *Odni učenye utverždajut, čto P; drugie utverždajut, čto ne-P* ‘Some scientists assert, that P; others assert, that non-P’ is quite legitimate.

The main difference between purely parenthetical and the conjunctional-parenthetical construction is that main the former is used mainly in the context verbs of opinion, while the latter prefers verbs with factual presupposition. In this context the parenthetical indicates the source from which the speaker learned the information in question (*kak dokazal Goedel* ‘as Goedel has proved’; *kak obnaružil, pokazal, vyjasnil, dogadalsja, zaključil takoj-to* ‘as somebody found, showed, discovered, guessed, concluded’), or simply expresses some concomitant judgment, usually of a meta-linguistic character (*kak uže bylo skazano* ‘as was already stated’; *kak priznaet moj načal’nik* ‘as my boss admits’). Thus, in sentence (21a), where the verb *to feel* is used factive, a conjunctional-parenthetical construction is possible, but (21b), where the associated proposition does not assered by speaker, sounds strange:

\[ (21) \text{a. Sosed, kak on sam čuvstvuet, zavralsja} \]
‘The neighbor, as he himself feels, has gone too far’;
b. *Kak on čuvstvuеt, izmenenija neobхodimy
‘As he feels it, the changes are essential’.

Evaluative and subjective-modal components of the verbal meaning contradict the semantics of the conjunctional-parenthetical construction:

*Kak boitsja (ne somnevaetsja, verit, uveren, ne isključaet, oхotno dopuskaet, gotov dopustit′, gotov poključit′sja) Ivan, izmenenija neobхodimy
‘As Ivan fears (does not doubt, believes, is sure, does not exclude, readily admits, is prepared to admit, is ready to swear), changes are essential’.

The same restriction is valid for the first-person subject: *kak ɉa boɉus′, ne somnevaɉus′, uveren ‘as I fear, do not doubt, am sure’, etc., although purely parenthetical use is quite normal for those verbs: On, ja bojuз′, устanet ‘He, I fear, will get tired’.

Unlike the purely parenthetical construction, the conjunctional-parenthetical one does not work as a performative formula: *Kak ja van soobščaju, Ivan prixežal ‘As I am informing you, Ivan has come’; cf. On, ja s vami soglasen, sil′no izmenilsja ‘He, I agree with you, has changed a lot’. Related to this is the fact that the conjunctional-parenthetical construction is not normally used in utterances with non-affirmative illocutionary function, in particular, in interrogatory sentences: *Kak ja nadeɉus′, ty sobralɉus′? ‘*As I hope, you are ready?’, while a purely parenthetical construction easily allows such a use: Ja nadeɉus′, ty sobralɉus′? ‘I hope, you are ready?’

4. SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION OF CO-OCCURRENCE RESTRICTIONS

Let us now return to the combinability restrictions mentioned in Section 2.

1. The impossibility of using factive predicates in purely parenthetical constructions, see example (4), is related, apparently, not so much to their factivity, i.e. the semantic presupposition that the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is true, but rather to the ability of those predicates to predict, in a certain way, the communicative structure of this proposition: it is more natural for a sentence with a factive predicate to be understood in such a way that the subordinate clause is bears the pragmatic presupposition also: the speaker presupposes that the fact relayed is already known to the
listener. In other words, the subordinate clause, in case of a factive verb, does not carry any new information. However, upon replacement of a hypothetical construction by a parenthetical one, the former subordinate clause acquires maximal communicative significance, i.e. its content is presented as new, unknown. It is natural therefore, that the transformation of the main clause into a parenthetical clause is impossible if the former subordinate clause bears the presupposition of being known. This assumption explains why verbs of opinion/supposition so easily acquire parenthetical use: in sentences with those verbs the subordinate clause does not usually have the presupposition of being known. For example, sentence (22) has the main phrasal stress on bolen ‘sick’ — pragmatic presupposition is absent:

(22) Ivan sčitaet, čto on bolen ‘Ivan believes that he is sick’.

A different reading and intonation contour of (22) — *Ivan sčitaet čto on bolen* — would require a “strong” context.

Apparent contradiction is the verb znat’ ‘to know’ — it is a factive verb but it allows a parenthetical use: Vy, ja znaju, byli letom v Krymu ‘You, I know, were in the Crimea in summer’. But it is essential that znat’ ‘to know’ can be used without pragmatic presupposition that the fact is known to the speakers:

(23) a. On ne znal čto tam est’ stolovača ‘He did not know that there was a canteen there’;

b. On ne znal / čto tam est’ stolovača ‘He did not know / that there was a canteen there’.

Here, sentence (23a) bears the presupposition that the fact contained in the subordinate clause is supposed to be known, while sentence (23b) does not. Therefore, the verb znat’ ‘to know’ does not impose any strict restriction on the communicative structure of the sentence. We may assume that this is what facilitates its parenthetical use.

The following example may confirm that the ban on parenthetical use is caused by presupposition of being known rather than by the factive presupposition. Predicative expressions žal’ ‘it is a pity’ and k sožaleniju ‘unfortunately’ are both factive. Žal’ does not allow parenthetical use while k sožaleniju can be parenthetical. Evidently the reason is that žal’ induces the pragmatic presuppo-
sition linked with the embedded predication while *k sožaleniju* does not; moreover, *k sožaleniju* ‘unfortunately’ always introduces new information:

(24) Zavtra zanjatij, *k sožaleniju*, ne budet

‘Unfortunately, there will be no classes to-morrow’;

*K sožaleniju*, ja ničem ne mogu vam pomoč’

‘Unfortunately, I cannot do anything for you’.

The verb *sožalet* ‘to regret’, in Russian does not allow parenthetical usage: *Ja ne smogu, sožaleju, segodnja s vami vstretit’sja* ‘I, I regret, will not be able to meet you today’. And this is caused not by the factive presupposition of the verb *sožalet* ‘to regret’ but by the presupposition, also contained in its meaning, that the fact described by the embedded predication is known. Thus, the English verb *to regret*, which does not carry the pragmatic presupposition (the English sentence *Madam, I regret that your son is dead* is possible from a man who has come from the front to tell the mother about the death of her son, see Urmson 1970) allows a parenthetical use: *He is, I regret, unwell*.

Therefore, the purely parenthetical use of a factive verb is prevented not by the factive presupposition contained in the initial subordinate but by the pragmatic presupposition that the associated proposition belong to the common background of the speaker and the listener.

2. The impossibility of the negation within parenthetical construction also has a semantics explanation: the communicatively significant part of the sentence (the former associated proposition of the parenthetical clause) must be someone’s opinion; if the parenthetical verb is used with negation no opinion is expressed.

A verb with negation may have parenthetical usage only when its own meaning amount to refusal of expressing a judgment, of communicating information, etc.; in the case the addition of negation yields the required meaning which is equivalent to the meaning of a predicate of expressing opinion or communicating information. Naturally, such a verb cannot be used parenthetically without negation, see Urmson 1970 and Apresyan 1978:

(25) a. *Ja ne somnevaɉus’, pogoda izmenitsɉa* ‘I do not doubt, the weather will change’;

b. *Ja somnevaɉus’, pogoda izmenitsɉa* ‘*I doubt, the weather will change’.

(26) a. *Ne skroɉu, on mne ponravilsɉa* ‘I don’t conceal, I liked him’;

b. *Skroɉu, on mne ponravilsɉa* ‘*I conceal, I liked him’.

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Other examples of this type of construction: *ja ne otricaju* ‘I do not deny’, *on ne ošibsja* ‘he was not mistaken’, *nel’zja ne soglasit’sja* ‘one cannot help agreeing’, *k čemu skryvat’* ‘Why prevaricate?’

3. The fact that in the sentence (6b) the verb cannot have a third person subject has the following explanation. Verbs of inner state and perception (and all verbs in the purely parenthetical construction belong to this very class) have two different usages in the context of a third-person subject: one is based on the subject’s own judgment about his/her state, while the second is descriptive and is based on external manifestations of his/her behavior (see Urmson 1970, Vendler 1972, Pitcher 1965). Deviance of sentence (6b), as well as of (7) and (9a), is explained by the fact that they do not allow either of the two meanings: the subject’s own judgement is excluded by the terms of the context, since the “reporting” of the state is simultaneous to the state itself; descriptive use is also improbable because states usually have very poor external manifestations.

In a conjunctival parenthetical construction, however, the third person subject is always possible while the first-person subject demands reservations. A first person subject is undesirable in the context of a verb of opinion, see example (8b), in this context the purely parenthetical construction is more appropriate. At the same time, factive verbs (*znaju* ‘I know’, *pomnju* ‘I remember’, *ponimaju* ‘I understand’, *predstavlju sebe* ‘I imagine’, *mne pomnitsja* ‘I recall’) and the verbs that allow factive use (*dogadyvaš’* ‘I guess’, *podozrevaš* ‘I suspect’) do not exclude a first-person subject: *Ona, kak mne pomnitsja, blondinka* ‘She, as I recall, is blond’.

Besides, the first person subject is possible in the context where the speaker is somehow “split” between two temporal levels, which makes it possible to refer to him/herself as if to a stranger. For example, it is possible to say *Kak ja vsegda govorju v takiš slučajah* ‘As I always say in such cases’: the person kind of quotes him/herself as if it were a different person. In example (13) the particle -taki generates a factive presupposition, and the restriction on the first-person subject, as we have seen, emerges in a conjunctival parenthetical construction only with verbs of opinion, i.e. in the absence of a factive presupposition (the difference in grammatical
Tense plays no role). Therefore, the first-person subject in a C-parenthetical construction is prohibited only for verbs lacking a factive presupposition.

4. Let us now turn to the restriction on the tense of a parenthetical verb, examples (9)–(12). We can ask the following question: why in (9a)–(12a), where the parenthetical verb is in the present tense, the third-person subject is impermissible, whereas with the past tense, examples (9b) — (12b), the parenthetical use of a third-person verb becomes possible? The answer is as follows. The past tense in (9) — (12b) is interpreted in the narrative mode, namely, in FID, where the rules of semantic interpretation make no recourse to the figure of the speaker, see chapter II.5. The third-person subject of the parenthetical verb is the only subject of consciousness that takes part in the interpretation of these sentences. Therefore, the third person in these sentences is equivalent to the first person. We shall return to these examples in the next section.

Inside the speech mode transition to the past tense may remove the restriction on the 3rd-person subject too. In fact, videl ‘saw’ in example (28b) denotes an event in the past, whence a possibility to convey information from the subject to the speaker:

(28) a. *U sosedej, Ivan vidit, gorit svet
    ‘In the neighbors’ house, Ivan sees, the light is on’
    b. U sosedej, Ivan videl, gorel svet
    ‘In the neighbors’ house, Ivan saw, the light was on’.

So, what conclusions about the semantics of a parenthetical verb emerge from this analysis?

1. In the purely parenthetical construction, the verb usually expresses an opinion and therefore the associated proposition has a neutral status.

2. In the conjunctional-parenthetical construction, however, the associated proposition may have the status of a fact, in which case the responsibility for its truth is assumed by the speaker.

3. A third-person subject in a purely parenthetical construction is only possible on the condition that there is a way of transmitting information

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35 Conjunction kak ‘as’, though, can have a meaning of ‘as far as’, which somewhat weakens the factivity of the verb; for example, in (27b) the extent of certitude is less than in (27a):

(27) a. Ja ponimaju, čto mne pora uđodit’ ‘I understand that it’s time for me to go’
    b. Kak ja ponimaju, mne pora uđodit’ ‘As I understand, it’s time for me to go’.
from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person to the speaker. However, this condition is essential only in the conversational mode. In the narrative mode, there is only one subject of consciousness: the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person is the speaker himself; so that no problem of information transfer from one subject to another arises.

4. The dependence on the grammatical tense is either reduced to the same dependence on the mode of interpretation, or it is explained by the fact that temporal gap makes it possible to transfer information from one subject to another.

5. **Parenthetical clauses in narrative**

Thus, we can distinguish between two types of parenthesis which are identified by the basic meanings of our two types of parenthetical constructions: the neutral type, which corresponds to the neutral status of the associated proposition, and the presuppositional type. Let us now discuss the use of parenthetical clauses in narrative.

We shall begin with the semantically simple, presuppositional type of parenthesis, the one that occurs in a C-parenthetical construction, i.e. in the context of a verb carrying a factive presupposition:

(1) *Kak vyjasnilos’ vposledstvii, podlodku zametili c hidroplana* ‘As it turned out later, the submarine had been detected by a hydroplane’

(2) *Kak ja i bojalsja, deti ne spali* ‘As I feared, the children were not asleep’.

This construction can be interpreted as follows (below: Q = the associated proposition; P = the predicate of the parenthetical clause; a = its subject):

as P(a), Q = ‘The speaker asserts

1) that the situation Q expressed in the associated proposition takes place;

2) that this fact is the content of the communicative mode P of the subject a’.

According to this definition, the proposition expressed by the associated clause of the PC (parenthetical clause) has the status of an assertion made by the speaker. In narrative, according to the general rule, the speaker is replaced by the narrator. So, in (3) the narrator informs us 1) that the first toast was to Chichikov’s health and 2) that the readers may have guessed it.

(3) *Pervyi tost byl vypit, kak čitateli, možet byt’, sami dogadalis’, za zdorov’e novo go xersonskogo pomeščika* ‘The first toast was, as readers may have guessed, to the health of new Kherson’s landowner’ (Gogol. “Dead Souls”).
The neutral type of parenthesis, presupposition-free, occurs in the context of verbs of belief, i.e. within a purely parenthetical construction, cf. examples:

(4)  
a. Emu, *ja dumaju, ēto nadoelo* ‘He, I think, is sick and tired of it’;

b. Emu, *govorjat, ēto nadoelo* ‘He, they say, is sick and tired of it’.

Here, due to the semantic agreement with the predicate of the parenthetical clause, the associated proposition does not have the status of a fact: it denotes the opinion of the PC subject — and the speaker must convey it as an opinion. The following should be taken into account, however. As the reader will remember, when the mode of the subject is transformed into parenthesis its associated clause becomes the main clause, syntactically, so it cannot be expressed by the speaker in discourse without the appropriate communicative mode of the speaker himself. If the subject of the PC is the speaker himself, as in (4a), the necessary mode is provided by the PC; if not, as in (4b), the proposition is without any modus, as it were, and in this “difficult” situation it acquires a minimal modus which can be called “sympathetic quoting”. It is this component, which appears in the speech-act mode as if by default, that imposes on a parenthetical construction with a non-first-person subject the sympathetic interpretation considered in Section 3.1.

Let us now consider a presupposition-free parenthetic construction with a non-first-person subject in narrative. In speech, the participation of the speaker in this construction is compulsory, as it were. This is due to the fact that in the speech mode an utterance cannot exist without any illocutionary force: in conversational discourse it is, normally, not the case that the speaker simply utters a sentence — he must perform a speech act. In narrative there is no such necessity: the construction in which two different consciousnesses — the speaker and the PC subject — interacting in a complicated way in the speech mode, may be reduced to one namely, that of the PC subject, “the character”, the narrator is out of the game. Thus, in (5), the only voice we hear is that of Pierre; the narrator keeps silent:

(5) *Nekrasivogo, dobrogo čeloveka, kakim on sebja sčital, možno, polagal on [Pierre], ljubit’ kak prijatelja*

‘The plain, kind person, which he thought he was, could, he [Pierre], believed, be loved as a friend’

(Tolstoy. “War and Peace”).
It is clear from the above that parenthetical verbs play a major role in the semantics of FID. And indeed, in conversational discourse, when the communicative attitude of the OTHER is expressed by the hypotactical construction, this attitude is the responsibility of the speaker (the speaker is responsible, at least, for the fact that a speech act or an inner state took place); correspondingly, in narrative text, there is always a narrator, see (6a). However, by changing to parenthetical usage and losing its communicative significance, a propositional attitude verb in conversational discourse escapes from the jurisdiction of the narrator; and the narrator disappears from the narrative, see (6b):

(6) a. *Duke rešil, čto nado nakazat′ Angelo za ego žestokost’*
   ‘Duke decided that Angelo should be punished for his cruelty’;

b. *Nado — rešil Duke — nakazat′ Angelo za ego žestokost’*
   ‘Angelo — Duke decided — should be punished for his cruelty’.

In (6a) the narrator tells us about Duke’s mental act; in (6b) the same mental act is presented to the reader directly, without the mediation of the speaker. For more detail see Chapter II.5.

A presupposition-free parenthetical clause with a non-first-person subject does not belong to productive constructions in conversational discourse. In narrative, due to a change of interpretation, it becomes useful and widespread: the status of parenthesis is the main status for propositional attitude verbs in FID.
CHAPTER II.5
FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE (FID)

1. THE PLACE OF FID AMONG OTHER NARRATIVE FORMS

Free indirect speech as a linguistic phenomenon and free indirect discourse as a narrative form have been an object of attention in Russian specialist literature beginning with Voloshinov 1930, which already contains a large number of references to authoritative authors. The striking lack of coordination in terminology reflects the complex nature of the phenomenon itself (cf. the existence of terms meaning the direct opposite). McHale 1978 cites: in the French version — ‘style indirecte libre’ (Bally, Lips) and ‘discours direct impropre’ (Kalik-Teljatnicova; cf. the analogical Russian terms *nesobstvennaja prjamaja reč*’ in Voloshinov 1930 and *nesobstvenno-prjamaja reč*’ in Jakobson 1957/1972); in German: ‘verschleierte Rede’, ‘erlebte Rede’, ‘uneigentliche direkte Rede’ and others; in English: ‘semi-indirect style’ (Kruisinga), ‘represented speech’ (Jespersen), ‘independent form of indirect discourse’ (Curme), ‘quasidirect speech’, ‘represented speech and thought’ and ‘represented consciousness’ (Banfield). The terms ‘interior monologue’ (Uspensky 1970) and ‘narrated monologue’ are used in a closely related sense. McHale himself uses the term free indirect discourse’ (FID), which seems to predominate (cf., for example, Oltean 1993; the term *svobodnaja kosvennaja reč*’ ‘free indirect speech’ is also found in Bulakhovsky 1954). It is this term that we propose to use.

A significant step forward in understanding phenomenon of FID was made in connection with the development of the theory of speech acts. The essence of FID as opposed to other narrative forms is revealed in its entirety only in the context of the communicative situation: the ‘voices’ and ‘dialogues’, about which Bakhtin and Voloshinov speak, are now turned from metaphors into strictly defined terms.

In Chapters II.1–3 we made an analysis of egocentrical elements in conversational speech from the point of view of their orientation on different aspects of the communicative situation. We can now give a definition of FID based on this classification. In we shall contrast FID this chapter unless otherwise stated, with traditional narrative primarily in the narrow sense, i.e. with the auctorial form.
We examined above three properties of natural language which are directly connected with its function or use in a canonical speech situation. These properties are: deixis, when the designation of objects and also intervals of time and space is oriented towards the communicative situation and its participants; expressivity (as self-expression of the speaker); and dialogue, or communicative orientation (when the utterance presupposes not only a speaker, but also an addressee, sometimes a synchronic addressee, i.e., listener). In conversational discourse all these language properties are fully realized. In narrative they are reduced or modified to some extent or other. It is from these different ways of reduction that we are able to construct a valid typology of narrative forms, and, in particular, provide a definition of FID as opposed to traditional narrative.

Traditional narrative (meaning the main body of the text, the narrative as such — the fictional portions of the text) differs from conversational discourse in all three above-mentioned aspects — it does not presuppose a canonical speech situation with an actual speaker and synchronic addressee and, consequently, is obliged to renounce both the deictic elements of language and elements with an expressive-communicative orientation. In traditional narrative an exegetic narrator, who does not belong to the world of the text, is an analogue of the speaker, a manager of the expressive elements of language (an image of the manager taken from Benveniste 1958a/1974). The exegetic narrator of traditional narrative conceals his presence. Consequently he does not have the right to primary egocentric elements of language.

Firstly, he does not have the right to use the 1ˢᵗ-person pronoun (except in the context of meta-textual predicates) and is, indeed, not present in the world of the text. In particular he does not have the right to those egocentric elements which are oriented on the 2ⁿᵈ person by virtue of their semantics, because the 2ⁿᵈ person presupposes the 1ˢᵗ person. Therefore the 2ⁿᵈ-person pronoun, the imperative, the address and other 2ⁿᵈ-person oriented constructions are excluded in traditional narrative. Further, the narrator of traditional narrative, again in the narrative body of the text, does not have the right to any speech acts apart from the communication: the communication is a speech act which requires a minimal degree of activity on the part of the addressee.
Primary egocentric elements are possible in traditional narrative only in ‘lyrical digressions’ — which, as the name itself indicates, involve moving beyond the confines of the narrative into the lyrical realm, i.e., a sphere of literature which presupposes a different communicative situation and where, consequently, different rules of interpretation apply. Similar to lyrical digressions are rhetorical ones, for example, when the narrator addresses himself or his hero, or expresses his attitude towards what is taking place. All these are non-fictional portions of a literary text.

FID, like traditional narrative, does not presuppose genuine communication in the sense of the cooperative interaction of I and YOU, cf. Toolan 1992: 130. FID, however, unlike traditional narrative, does not demand a reduction of the conversational elements of natural language. Expressive and dialogical elements are kept through a change of interpretation — in FID the owner and manager of egocentricals is not the narrator, but a character: the character ‘usurps’ the egocentrical layer of language, the expressive and also the dialogical sphere. In FID special figure arises, namely, a speaker in the 3rd person, which is impossible in conversational discourse.

Both narrative forms — traditional narrative and FID — give what A. Banfield calls ‘unspeakable sentences’, i.e., sentences which cannot be used in conversational language, such as Nakanune šel sneg ‘It had snowed the day before’.

2. INDIRECT SPEECH: TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH

For linguistic analysis it is essential to distinguish narrative forms and the language constructions typical of them, namely, the following three narrative forms and their corresponding language structures will be considered:

1st-person narrative — direct speech (DS);
traditional narrative — indirect speech (IS);
FID — quasi-direct speech (QDS).

The correspondence is a free one. Not every sentence of traditional narrative is an IS sentence; and QDS can be used as a means of conveying the words or thoughts of a character in a text which is not actually identified as
FID, cf. example (2) from section 3. On the other hand, by no means every individual sentence in FID should be identified as QDS.

A sentence of indirect speech is one of the ways of conveying another person’s speech, a kind of reported speech. In fact it is not only speech, but also thoughts, feelings and perceptions — attitude in general. We shall confine ourselves to reported speech that is being conveyed, so as to be able to use the traditional terms of ‘direct speech’ (DS) and ‘indirect speech’ (ID).

There are two usual ways of conveying another person’s utterances — by direct speech, as in (1), or by indirect speech (2) (QDS not being a usual way):

(1) He said: “I am ill.”
(2) He said that he was ill.

In the simple case both ways are possible:

(3) He said: “Ivan is ill.” ⇔ He said that Ivan was ill.

But in a slightly more complex case this may not be so. The structural differences between DS and IS stand out clearly when one examines the transformations that take place in the hypothetical operation of turning direct speech into indirect. These transformations are listed below. It must be stressed that there is no psychological reality at all behind these transformations: no real derivation of one structure from another. In general, DS can by no means always be turned into IS nor, conversely, can every IS sentence be shown to have been obtained from DS as a result of these transformations.

The diagrams below show the semantic-pragmatic structure (i.e., the structure of a sentence in the context of the speech act, see Paducheva 1985: 30) of IS and DS sentences.

The abbreviation s.a. stands for speech act; s.a. is characterized by an indication of the speaker (S), listener (L) and illocutionary function (it may be a statement, an admonition, a reproach etc.). The propositional attitude is abbreviated as P-attitude; it is set by the subject (Sb), addressee (Adr) and the propositional verb (P-verb); in particular, this may be a performative prefix, if the propositional verb is a verb of speech. The speech act is understood as defined by Bakhtin, that is, as a ‘setting’ (oprava) in which the text (sentence) is inserted. The introductory sentence of DS (cf. *He said* in example (1) com-
prises such a setting with regard to direct speech. The ovals represent the settings and the boxes symbolize texts inserted in each of the settings.

(DS) Ivan said [attitude]: “I am ill.” [direct speech] =

(IS) Ivan said [attitude], that he was ill [reported speech] =

An IS sentence is a single statement, and the speaker is in charge of all its egocentrical elements. In a DS sentence there are two texts, two statements, each with its own speaker and listener: the subject of the propositional attitude plays the same role of ego in his sphere as the speaker in his. The sphere of the speaker is restricted by the P-attitude: the egocentrical elements of 2 text are taken charge of by the subject of the attitude, not the speaker.

The transition from DS to IS takes place in accordance with the following rules (cf. Jespersen 1924, Chapter XXI).
Rule I. A subordinating conjunction is inserted and the dividing line (inverted commas) between the two texts is removed; i.e., the two texts are joined into one.

Rule II. In languages with agreement of tenses the tense of the main and subordinate clauses are made to agree. In Russian all that takes place is a change of interpretation in the tense form; that is to say, the deictic interpretation (oriented to the present moment of the Speaker) is replaced by a syntactical one (oriented to the present moment of the Subject of the propositional verb). For example, in Ivan boleet ‘Ivan is ill’ we have the interpretation of the present tense is deictic whereas in On skazal, čto Ivan boleet ‘He said that Ivan was [lit. “is”] ill’ it is the syntactical.

Rule III. A restructuring of the deictic references.

1) If direct speech contains deictic pronouns of the 1ˢᵗ or 2ⁿᵈ persons, denoting, respectively, the Sb or Adr of the propositional attitude, in reported speech they must be replaced by anaphoric pronouns of the 3ʳᵈ person:

Ivan said: ‘I am ill.’ ⇒ Ivan said, that he is ill;
The queen told the tailor: ‘You’re a blockhead!’ ⇒
The queen told the tailor, that he is a blockhead.

A classic example of the misuse of pronouns in rendering the DS with the help of IS is the following sentence spoken by Osip in Gogol’s “Government Inspector” (cited in Peshkovsky 1938: 431):

(4) Traktirṧčik skazal, čto ne dam vam edy, poka ne zaplatite za prežnee
‘The innkeeper said that [I] won’t give you anything to eat until [you] pay for what you’ve had’.

Here the 1ˢᵗ and 2ⁿᵈ person have been carried over from the innkeeper’s direct speech to Osip’s indirect rendering of it, thus breaking rule III.

In the subordinate clause 1ˢᵗ- and 2ⁿᵈ-person pronouns are possible in IS; the nomination of the participants of the s.a. in an IS sentence — including a subordinate clause, i.e., in the reported speech — is only deictic (due to the rule on compulsory deixis, see Paducheva 1992): I told him that I was ill. Similarly, if in the IS context S = Peter, then Ivan told Peter: “You’re a charlatan!” ⇒ Ivan told me that I’m a charlatan. If L = Peter, then Ivan said: “Peter owes me money and won’t give it back.” ⇒ Ivan said that you owe
him money and won’t give it back. However, deictic nominations are possible only in conversational discourse, and not in traditional narrative.

2) If in the DS some objects (in particular, intervals of time and stretches of space) referred to are named deictically (by reference to the Subject of the direct speech or to the Addressee), they should be renamed in IS — either by replacing deixis with anaphora, case A, or by a deictic reference to the Speaker of the given speech act, case B.

(5) a Masha said on the platform: ‘I shall wait for you here!’ ⇒
   A. Masha said on the platform that she would wait for me there;
   B. (S is now on the platform) Masha said that she would wait for me here;
   b. Masha said yesterday: ‘I shall come tomorrow.’
   A. Masha said yesterday that she would come the next day;
   B. Masha said yesterday that she would come today.

Substitutions of the B type are substitutions on the basis of denotative identity and not synonymic transformations; for example, such substitutions are not fair in a propositional context, if the identity is not known to the subject of the propositional verb (see on de re / de dicto nominations in Chapter I.3.6). Thus the IS sentence (6c), unlike (6b), is not a correct rendering of the DS in (6a):

(6) a. Oedipus said: “Jocasta is beautiful.”
   b. Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful.
   c. Oedipus said that his wife was beautiful.

The possibility B arises only in conversational discourse and if limited by narrative the rule is formulated more easily: deictic words, such as now, today, yesterday and tomorrow are replaced by anaphoric ones, e.g., at that moment, that day, the day before and the following day. For example, Masha said: “I went to a concert yesterday” ⇒ Masha said, that she had been to a concert the day before.

Rule IV. If the text in DS contains expressive or dialogical elements, it cannot usually be turned into IS:

(7) a. Ivan exclaimed: “What a voice she has!”
   Masha said: “What about something to eat!”
   He said: “No!” (*He said that he no ⇒ He said that he wouldn’t).

The fact is that the speaker who has now become master of the whole text cannot transfer to himself the expressivity which is contained in the state-
ments of the subject of direct speech: expressivity can only be expressed 
(by a 1st-person subject), it cannot be conveyed. (On expression as a special 
function of language see Bühler 1993; cf. Wierzbicka 1969: 33). Thus it fol-
lows that the transition from DS to IS impoverishes the polyphony of the 
text: in DS the voices of the speaker and subject of speech were separate, 
whereas in IS normally only the voice of the speaker remains.

Incidentally, there are correspondences in the sphere of modality, 
alogical to correspondences between deictic and anaphoric elements, 
which operate in the transfer of direct speech into indirect. For example, a 
categorical refusal may be expressed in DS by the words Ni za čto! ‘Not 
likely!’, and rendered in IS as Ni v kakuɉu ‘not having any’, cf.

a. Ona ego ugovarivaet, a on tverdit: “Ni za čto!”
‘She tried to persuade him, but he kept saying: “Not likely”!’;

b. Ona ego ugovarivaet, a on ni v kakuɉu
‘She tried to persuade him, but he wasn’t having any’.

There is a group of pronouns specially designed for the abbreviated ren-
dering of someone else’s speech, namely, takoj-to, tak-to i tak-to, to-to i to-to; 
 cf. English this and that, this, that and the other, so-and-so, such and such:

Doktor govoril: to-to i to-to ukazyvaet, čto u vas vnutri to-to i to-to; no esli čto ne 
podtverditsja po issledovaniju togo-to i togo-to, to u vas nado predpoložit′ to-to i to-to. 
‘The doctor said: this and that indicates that you’ve got this and that inside; but if 
this is not confirmed by an examination of this and that, we’ll have to assume that 
what you have is this, that and the other.’ (Tolstoy. “The Death of Ivan Ilyich”)

There is a general device which makes it possible to compensate for the 
breaking of rules III and IV: the speaker can place the alien element from the 
reported speech in parenthesis, either literally or figuratively, so that it 
sounds obviously like a quotation, see Chapter II.6 on quotation. The role of 
this type of parenthesis designating another person’s speech in the embed-
ded position can be played by particles. The sentenca from example (4), 
which is incorrect from the point of view of modern usage, could be made 
acceptable by adding one of the untranslatable Russian particles mol, deskat′ 
or de (in a different context jakoby would also do), see Uspensky 1970: 51.

In example (9) deskat′ is no help, because here none of the viewpoints 
are expressed consistently. It would have to be either it’s not right for me,
deskat' and *it’s not right for him* and *in my*, but then the allocu-
tion (*kiddo*) would not be possible.

(8) *<...> on že dal’še razvival svoju mysł’: ne emu, deskat’, vmešivat’sja v vašu,
detočka, burnuju i interesnuju žizn’*

‘<...> he went on in the same vein: it’s not right for *him, deskat’, to interfere
in *your* wild and fascinating life, kiddo.’ (Viktor Erofeev. “A Russian Beauty”)  

Words, but not constructions, may be put in parenthesis. Thus, (9) is
ungrammatical, and in (10) the self-correction cannot be understood as be-
longing to the subject Masha, i.e., the syntactical subject — a correction
can belong only to the speaker:

(9) *Ivan exclaimed, that what a voice she has!*

(10) Masha confessed that he had finished work only yesterday, no the day before.

Sentences with repetition characteristic of direct speech cannot be trans-
ferred from DS to IS, cf. *Emu mnogoe nužno uznat’ ot francuženki, očen’ mnog-
oge* ‘There is a great deal he needs to know from the Frenchwoman, a very

A statement may be untransformable to IS because its illoctionary
function, i.e., the speech act expressed by it, is unclear:

(11) “*I shall come at two*” = ‘*X promised <or threatened, or whatever> to come at two’

“Come at two!” = ‘*X asked <or demanded, or whatever> that Y come at two’.

Either because the verb of attitude, which is required by the meaning, is not ca-
pable of subordinating the proposition: *He laughed that she had left long ago.*
Or because the sentence expresses an indirect s.a. and there is no verb which
could convey the content of this exactly; cf. this example from Krylov’s fable
“The Donkey and the Nightingale”, which is quoted by A. M. Peshkovsky:

*A žal’, čto ne znakom*

*Ty c našim petuňom:*

*Ešče b ty bole navostrilsja*

*Kogda by u nego nemnožko poučilsja*

‘What a pity that you aren’t acquainted with our cock! You would have sung
better if you learned a bit from him.’

The Donkey’s statement *What a pity that you are not acquainted with our cock!* would have been inadequately rendered by the words *It’s a pity that the Nightingale does not know.* The point is that sentence *What a pity that you aren’t acquainted ...* expresses not regret, but reproach (cf. the English
Shame on you!), moreover in the form of indirect speech act, and herein lies the source of its untransformability to IS: the indirect speech act (such as whimperatives and queclaratives, see Wierzbicka 1991) is always untransformable into IS, because the specific interpretation of the words and constructions of a sentence takes place in the context of the utterance, and in order to be transferred into IS this sentence must be taken out of this context.

For all its restrictiveness the transformational description of IS through DS reveals some important aspects of the structure of IS, namely the transition of egocentrical elements from one subordination to another. Whereas a similar description of FID (see McHale 1978) is quite pointless: the transformation of IS into QDS would result in the elimination of the effects of the transformations that took place in the transfer from DS to IS. They do not reveal the main thing specific for FID, namely, the mechanism of replacing the narrator by a character — which is the subject of the following section.

3. FID: the narrator leaves the stage

In the following examples the QDS sentences are italicized:

(1) Petja užē ne dumal teper′ o podače prošenijā. Užē tol′ko emu uvidat′ by Ego, i to on sčital by sebɉa sčastlivym.

‘Petya no longer thought about submitting a petition. If only he could see Him now, he would think himself a happy man.’

(Tolstoy. “War and Peace”; example from Uspensky 1970: 58);

(2) — I've frightened her. I should have been quieter. — He stopped and listened: the watchman went through the second cell into the garden ... It would have been better to hide.

(Tolstoy. “Two Hussars”);

(3) Kogda on [Ɉura] ležal pod krovat′ ɉu, vozmuṧčaɉas′ ẋodom veṧčej na svete, on sredi pročego dumal i ob ėtom. Kto takoj Voskobojnikov, čtoby tak daleko zavodit′ svoe vmešatel′stvo? Ėoroša takže i mama.

‘While he [Yura] was lying under the bed, angry with the way things were going in the world, he thought about this as well. What on earth gave Voskobojnikov the right to interfere on such a scale as this? And the same went for Mama too.’

In all these examples the narrative text turns imperceptibly into an interior monologue of the character. Thus, in (2) It would have been better refers to the character, not the narrator. In (3) the expressiveness also belongs to the character.
An QDS sentence possesses characteristic formal features of both direct and indirect speech. There are two markers which bring QDS close to IS.

1) The subject of speech and thought is designated in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person\textsuperscript{36}.
2) The grammatical Tense designating the present moment in the text is usually the narrative Past (in Russian, however, it may also be the Present, see ex. in Chapter III.1).

All the other formal characteristics bring QDS close to DS:

1) proximal deixis;
2) addresses, imperatives, questions, interjections and other expressive-dialogical markers are possible;
3) abundance of modal and evaluational words (\textit{wretched, poor} and \textit{the like}).

There is one more marker which brings QDS close to DS, namely, the absence of propositional attitude verb not for the speech subject of this passage. It is important, however, that the attitude verb may be present in an QDS context in some way or another, usually in introductory use as a commentary:

But, Shukhov remembered, there’s no having a few days’ rest in hospital anymore.

(Solzhenicyn. “A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”)

FID figures in outline histories of narrative first and foremost in connection with the tendency towards a reduction in the role of the narrator. Thus, the main task concerning FID is to understand the mechanism of the removal of the narrative and transfer of expressivity and other egocentrical elements to the character. We propose the following ‘transformation history’ for the QDS sentence, example (D). Structure (A) is taken as the point of departure for (D); structure (B) results from the transfer from DS to IS; in (C) the propositional prefix changes to parenthetic use, and (D) results from (C) when this introductory phrase is omitted, i.e., becomes implicit:

\textsuperscript{36}The 1\textsuperscript{st} person is not excluded in FID, but it cannot designate the speech subject. Cf. the following passage from Dombrovsky’s “The Keeper of Antiquities”, written in the first person, which reports a driver’s account, in FID, and the I stands for the narrator:

On skazal: esli ja xoču dostat’ jabloček, to lučše vsego mne govorit’ so storozhjoj, tetej Dašej.

Von-von ee dom na otšibe! Tol’ko ne rano li ja edu? Aport-to ved’ eṧče ne snimali.

‘He said: if I want some apples, I’d better have a word with the watch-woman, Aunty Dasha. That’s her house over there, set apart! only perhaps I’ve come too early? They haven’t picked the Oportos yet’.
(A) He said: ‘I am ill.”
(B) He said that he was ill.
(C) He was ill, he said.
(D) He was ill ‘he said’.

The postulation of structure (C), with the parenthetic use of the propositional verb, as an intermediary between the IS sentence, where a propositional verb is essential, and FID, where it is not, is extremely fruitful and revealing for a semantic analysis of FID (the role of the parenthetic construction in the interpretation of QDS was noticed by Charles Bally, see Voloshinov 1930: 141). In fact, in structure (B) the voice of the character is localized inside the propositional prefix, and the voice of the narrator figures as the speaker of the s.a., in which (B) is inserted, see the IS diagram in section 2. There is no assertive propositional prefix in structure (C); but this means a loss of position for the speaker / narrator as well.

This effect of parenthesis — the removal of the speaker — was examined in detail in Chapter II.4; the transfer of the propositional verb to parenthetical use results in the loss of the syntactical position in the sentence, which served as a refuge for the speaker in conversational language and for the narrator in narrative.

The essence of the restructuring which takes place in the transition from (A) to (C) is as follows. The explicit relationship between the Subject of the attitude and his speech (opinion, perception), which is expressed by the verb of the propositional attitude, is turned into an implicit one, the same relationship as existed earlier between the Speaker and his statement. Subject of attitude moves to a position like that of the speaker: he becomes the implied subject of this attitude. But then there can no longer be an implied speaker — language does not permit so many implied stages. Consequently, there is no implicite narrator in the narrative.

As was shown in Chapter II.4., in the semantic structure of a sentence with a parenthetical phrase the speaker appears, in speech discourse, by default — only because there must be a speaker in the speech register: he stands behind each utterance. Whereas in the narrative register there need not be a narrator. A new type of discourse arises with no narrator: the narrator is ousted by a character who, in so doing, becomes a speaker in the 3rd person.
This ousting of the narrator does not usually take place in FID-mode throughout the whole text, but only in portions of it. The narrator may disappear and return again. Examples of complex interaction of the voices of the narrator and character in FID are given below.

The parenthetical use of the verb of attitude is only one of the possibilities. A commentary that makes the attitude explicit may be found in the neighbouring sentence, cf. the following characteristic example:

Pripomnilos′ daže, kak nanimali ětot taksomotor u “Metropolja”, byl ešče pri ětom kakoj-to akter ne akter ... s patefonom v čemodančike. Da, da, da, ěto bylo na dače!
‘He even remembered how they had hired the taxi cab by the “Metropol”, there was some actor fellow or other, around ... with a gramophone in a little case. Yes, yes, yes, it was at the dacha!’ (Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”),

where the construction characteristic of remembering (*some actor fellow or other*) is syntactically not subordinate to the verb *pripomnilos‘ ‘remembered’.*

Thus we have traced, as it were, the genesis of FID: we have shown the syntactical device, on the basis of which the egocentrical elements of language are contextualized in free indirect discourse differently from speech discourse (where they are oriented to the speaker) and differently from traditional narrative (where they are oriented towards the narrator, whom we can quite easily put in place of the speaker): an FID sentence is the content of the propositional attitude of a character — not of the speaker, as in speech discourse, nor of the narrator, as in traditional narrative.

4. Syntactic FID markers

In order to identify a text as FID it is enough to show that, with the substitution of the 3rd person for the 1st person, it can without stretching a semantic point be seen as the direct speech of that 1st person. So, reducing QDS to IS does not yield any interesting insights, but reducing it to DD, on the contrary, is revealing. E.g., for sentence (1) from section 3 we would get the following:

(1′) <Petya thought:> ‘If I could only see Him, I would think myself a happy man!’

Analysis by reducing QDS to DD provides a test which can be used to identify FID (Uspensky 1970), cf. the use of this test in Chapter III.3. We now list some constructions and language elements which are usually regarded as formal FID markers.
1) A non-constative speech act, for example, a question. In traditional narrative a question is possible only in non-fictional portions of the text. For example, it may be a meta-textual question by the narrator, to which he replies himself, cf. the following example of a meta-textual question:

(a) Kto pri zvezdaḍ i pri lune
    Tak pozdno edet na kone? Who rides along so late at night
    Under the stars in bright moonlight?

(Pushkin. “Poltava”)

In FID, however, the question may belong to the main body of the narrative (and is a question put by a character):

(b) Elena razdvinula port’eru, i v černom prosvete pokazalas’ ee ryževataɉa
golova. Brat’ɉam poslala vzglɉad mɉagkij, a na časy očen’ i očen’ trevožnyj.
    ‘Elena pulled the curtain, and her auburn head appeared in the black aperture. She glanced tenderly at her brothers and most anxiously at the clock. And no wonder. Where, indeed, could Talberg be at hour?’

(Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)

The subject of the question is the brothers; the parenthetical indeed has the same subject. In (c) interrogative sentences express a reproach (also from the character):

(c) Nikolkiny golubye glaza <...> smotreli rasterɉanno, ubito. <...> Za čto takaja
obida? <...> Začem ponadobilos’ otnjaɉ mat’, kogda vse s”exalis’, kogda na-
stupilo oblegčenie?       (Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)
    ‘Nikolaj’s blue eyes <...> had a bewildered, dead look <...> that wretched and enigmatic old man god <...> Why such an insult? Such injustice? Why take away mother, just when they had all been reunited, when things had got easier?’

2) Another formal FID marker is the address. In traditional narrative the address is possible, again, only in the non-fictional portions of the text; the address proceeds from the narrator and is addressed to the reader. Whereas in FID both the authors and the addressees of addresses are characters:

(d) Staršij načinaet podpev′at’. Glaza mračny, no v niḷ zažigaetsja ogonek, v žilaɉ
    žar. No tiξon’ko, gospoda, tiξonečko!       (Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)
    ‘The elder brother joins in the singing quietly. His eyes are sombre, but then they light up and his blood warms. But not so loud, gentlemen, not so loud!’

(Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)

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‘<...> and the young Turbins did not notice the arrival of white, shaggy December in a hard frost. *O fir-tree grandfather of ours, shining with snow and happiness! Mama, our radiant queen, where are you?*

In the final analysis, however, the deciding factor in each case is semantics: in order to identify a text as FID, it must be understood that its egocentrical elements are at the disposal of the character, and not of the narrator. All these elements are possible in traditional narrative as well, but only in its non-fictional portions.

If we are asked how the reader understands that in a certain text a certain egocentrical element has a character oriented interpretation, the answer is a simple one: by using our common sense, in other words, by trying to construct the most coherent interpretation of the text as a whole.

Let us take, for example, a sentence with a verb in the subjunctive mood, example (1) from section 3. Is it syntactically marked as a sentence of FID? The subjunctive mood in the sense of the optative in (1) presupposes a subject of desire, and this can be either the narrator or the character: mood is an egocentrical element, so these two possibilities always exist. In the given context the reader automatically chooses the second, because he understands the utterance as an expression of desire, as a speech act of the character; and also because this ensures a greater degree of coherence of the text, cf. the fact that behind the capital letter in the word *Him* stands a character (this capital letter belongs to Petya, not to Tolstoy, see Uspensky 1970: 58), and, consequently, the subject of the optative is the self-same character. In fact, an optative construction may belong to the narrator also, cf.:

*Ах, если бы здесь был Иван Николаевич! Он узнал бы этого субъекта сразу!*  
‘Ah, if only Ivan Nikolayevich were here! He would recognize this fellow at once!’  
(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”).

There is no strict dividing line between traditional narrative and FID, and one and the same text may have markers of both forms. In Mann 1992 the concept of the *personal narrative form* is introduced which is characterized mainly by a negative marker — through the reduction of the author’s role in the narrative (in other words, a reduction of the role of the narrator in the interpretation of egocentrical elements). An example of the personal form in Mann 1992 is Chekhov’s short story “Kashtanka”, which is written in the person of a
dog. It has the formal FID markers, but in a very small degree. For example, the ‘personal’ method of naming objects should be regarded rather as quotation; cf., some rascal in (4); customers (in the sense of ‘people’) in (5); or the stranger used for Kashtanka’s second owner, the circus artiste, in (6):

(4) Kaštanka stala obnjuživat’ trotuar, nadejas’ najti šoxjaina po zapaku ego sledov, no ran’še kakoj-to negodaj prošel v novyţ rézinyvýx kalošaţ i teper’ vse tonkie zapaţi mešalis’ s ostroj kaučukovoj von’jú.

‘Kashtanka began sniffing the pavement in the hope of finding her master by picking up his scent, but some rascal had walked past in new rubber galoshes and now all the fine scents were mixed with the pungent stench of rubber.’

(5) Bezostanovočno vzad i vpered proxođili neznakomye zakazčiki.

‘Constant streams of customers she did not know were walking backwards and forwards.’

(6) Prodelav ešče neskol’ko podobnyţ nevaţnyţ fóskov, neznakomec sëvát il sebça za golovu

‘After performing a few more similarly uninspired tricks, the stranger clasped his head in his hands.’

The subject of the evaluation (rascal, uninspired trics) is Kashtanka in all cases; but predicates of the evaluation are secondary egocentricals, and they may have a personal interpretation within the framework of traditional narrative as well. In the nomination the pungent stench of rubber in (4) the character and narrator have merged into one.

The story begins with an FID-mode mishmash of time sequence: first we are introduced to a young ginger-haired dog, who was trotting up and down the pavement, then follows a flashback, motivated by her remembering how she spent the day. The ambivalent contextualization of a parenthetical (as, e.g., in: He was obviously a very clever goose) is characteristic of FID. On the whole, however, the external point of view dominates in the story. (Incidentally, Tolstoy’s “Kholstomer”, in content also narrated by the person of a horse, contains even fewer formal markers of FID.) A sure indicator of FID would be a personal interpretation of those egocentrical elements which presuppose the speaker in the role of the speech subject (see Chapter II.1), of which there are hardly any in “Kashtanka”.

An example of FID in Chekhov is his story “The Bishop”, cf. the following characteristic extracts:
How hot and stuffy it was! And how long the night service <...> Nearby another person began to cry, then someone else further off <...> The bishop remembered her from early childhood — and how he had loved her! Dear, precious unforgettable childhood! Why is it that this time, now irrevocably gone forever, why does it seem brighter, gayer and richer than it really was? When he was ill as a child and a young man, how gentle and understanding his mother had been! <...> the summer mornings, gypsies under the window — oh, how sweet it was to think about all that! <...> even his old mother seemed to be a different person, quite different! And why, he asked himself, did she chatter endlessly with Sisoy and laugh a lot, yet was so grave with him, her son <...>? And perhaps in the next world, the next life, we will remember the distant past, our life here, with the same emotion. Who knows? <...> But how tired he feels, how his back aches with a dull, cold pain, and that ringing in his ears! <...> And his father? If he had been alive, he would probably not have been able to utter a single word in his presence ...

In traditional narrative all that we know about the characters is what the narrator tells us; FID contains elements of mimesis, the direct reproduction of a character’s voice (McHale 1978, Toolan 1992).

5. The narrator returns: Past narrative in FID

An analysis of FID that excludes narratorial mediation of any kind was proposed by Charles Bally (1930). In recent years the absence of the narrator in FID was stated in sharply polemical form in Banfield 1973 and 1982, and since then this question has been widely discussed; cf., McHale 1978, Toolan 1992). The debate is of an abstract nature, however. In order to defend the narrator from purely linguistic positions, it is enough to show that a text written in FID-mode invariably contains language elements that cannot be interpreted in any other way except by admitting the presence of a narrator.

Let us now return to the aspects of free indirect discourse that characterize it as indirect, namely, the 3rd-person subject and past tense of the verb. It is these two aspects, first and foremost, which should testify to the presence of a narrator. The 3rd person does indeed presuppose the presence of a 1st-person subject, for which this 3rd person is a 3rd person, and it may be assumed that this 1st person is the narrator Toolan (1992: 69) says on Henry James’ novel “The Ambassadors”: ‘the source of the third-person pronoun used to denote Strether is a distinct narrator’). However, the 3rd-person subject in
FID has very little in common with the ordinary 3\textsuperscript{rd} person. In fact, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person in FID behaves in all important respects as a 1\textsuperscript{st} and not a 3\textsuperscript{rd} person (see Zalizniak, Paducheva 1987): what sort of 3\textsuperscript{rd} person is it if it deals with egocentricals as if it were denoting a speaker? There are also other differences between the 3\textsuperscript{rd}-person subject in FID and the ordinary 3\textsuperscript{rd} person. For example, the subject of FID is more like a pronoun than a proper name\textsuperscript{37}. Cf. the characteristic construction from Chekhov’s “The Bride”: \textit{She, Nadya, was already twenty three years old.}

It may, of course, be said that the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person of the character is such from the narrator’s point of view. However, the 3\textsuperscript{rd}-person subject of FID cannot serve as the only argument for postulating a narrator in FID: how could the narrator provide us with the indirect denotation of the subject (a 3\textsuperscript{rd}-person pronoun) and then retire himself, leaving all his prerogatives to the selfsame subject! Such an explanation would explain nothing.

From the linguistic point of view, if we want to obtain useful generalizations concerning the semantics of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person in general, the 3\textsuperscript{rd}-person subject in FID must be seen as a convention of style; otherwise the functions of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person contradict the semantic invariant of the opposition of the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} persons which is formulated on other types of discourse.

The past tense of the verb is quite a different matter. The semantics of tense-aspect forms in FID are undoubtedly comparable with the semantics of the same forms in traditional narrative and conversational language. It should be possible to describe the use of tenses in FID in such a way that this could serve solely as confirmation of the invariant of the meaning of the tense, which has been detected on other types of discourse. And this description rests on admitting the presence of a narrator. In fact, the semantics of the Past Ipfv narrative presupposes a synchronous observer (Paducheva

\textsuperscript{37} In the following extract from “The White Guard” the proper name actively prevents the reader from understanding the passage beginning with \textit{Yes, perhaps} as an interior monologue of the character:

Little Shervinsky’s cunning eyes lit up with bouncing balls of joy at the news of Talberg’s disappearance. The little Ulan felt that he was in better voice than ever \textit{<...> Yes, perhaps} everything else was rubbish, except this voice of Shervinsky’s. There was headquarters now, of course, this stupid war, the Bolsheviks, Petlura and duty, but later, when everything went back to normal again, he would leave the army, in spite of his Petersburg connections, and connections he certainly did have, you know ... and go on the stage.
1986, 1989), and the role of such an observer cannot be played by a character in FID, because from the point of view of the character it is the present moment (denoted by the adverb sejčas ‘now’, see Chapter II.1, and sometimes the form of the present tense). One can only assume that the form of the Past Ipfv narrative in FID owes its existence to the narrator. The example below is taken from R. Kireev’s short story “An unsuccessful attempt to go to a café on a public holiday” (for more detail see Chapter III.3):

\[(1)\] The wet pavement reflected the illuminations, coloured lights danced and flickered, and just try to avoid the puddles!

This sentence expresses the content of the character’s perception and belongs to FID-mode; the act of perception belongs to the present moment for the character, and the form of the Past Tense cannot be explained otherwise than by the presence of a narrator: the past tense here expresses distancing. Of whom and from what? The narrator is supposed to be a witness of what is taking place, i.e., he is present ‘on the battlefield’. One can only assume that it is the reader who is distanced: he sees what the narrator sees, but either not synchronically or from a distance. And if this analysis is true then the meaning of the Past Tense in FID is the same as in traditional narrative, see Chapter II.2.

Thus, in a text in FID-mode, where the base Tense is the Past, the narrator is present in each sentence: the narrator and the character co-exist as rival consciousnesses.

The above-mentioned facts testify to the need to make the theoretical apparatus of narrativistics more sophisticated. Benveniste 1946 advances the simple, and revolutionary, idea of two types of texts: texts belonging to the realm of history (plan de récit) and those belonging to the realm of discourse (plan de discours). Later on the concept of the key or register of interpretation was advanced (Paducheva 1986): it is possible to change the register of interpretation many times in one and the same text (cf. changes of the key in the notation of a piece of music). Examples like the one cited above show that this concept is not sufficiently flexible as well, because it can happen that in the same sentence some egocentrical elements are interpreted as if it were FID and others as in the traditional narrative. More satisfactory is the concept of contextualization of egocentrical elements, see Fillmore 1981,
Lyons 1978: various egocentrical elements in one and the same sentence may have different contextualizations; cf., example (2) — from the same story:

(2) Odno celoe oni — kak ostro oščuščala ěto Lidija Alekseevna, stoja rjadom s nim pered zapertoj dveřju

‘They were one — how keenly Lidia Alexeevna sensed, standing next to him in front of the locked door’.

Here they were one is the content of the character’s mental attitude; but the narrator is also present and shows himself at least three times: in the description of the character’s perceptive state (sensed), in the past tense of the description and in calling the character by her actual name. The expressive how keenly belongs to the character, however.

6. LITERARY MOTIVATIONS OF FID

It remains to say a word about the artistic functions of FID, i.e., about its motivation (or, in the terminology of the Russian formalists, naturalization). In McHale 1978 FID is examined as a vehicle of irony, empathy, stream of consciousness effect and polyvocality.

Irony and empathy are different sides of one and the same function (‘it is indicative of the complexity of FID that it is routinely naturalized both as a mode of ironic distancing from characters and as a mode of emphatic identification with characters’, McHale 1978: 275). An example of the use of FID to express an ironical attitude to a character is Chekhov’s story “Rotshild’s Violin”:

...> he kept having to suffer terrible losses. For instance, it was a sin to work on Sunday and church festivals, Monday was a hard day, and because of all this there were about two hundred days in the year, when he had to twiddle his thumbs. And what a loss that was! ... but the overseer who had gone to the provincial centre for medical treatment went and died there. And there was another loss for you, in the region of ten roubles at least.

Or another passage:

There weren’t many patients there <at the hospital>, so he didn’t have to wait long, about three hours.

It must be emphasized that the author’s ironical attitude towards a character cannot serve as a proof of the narrator’s presence: the irony may be represented as a divergence of viewpoints between the character and the reader. Essentially, we detect irony when the direct meaning of the utter-
ance contradicts common sense. And the author may transfer the function of a bearer of common sense to the reader.

An example of narrative empathy with the hero is Chekhov’s story “The Bride”: the title character is the initial position from which the reader is introduced to all the other characters and events. The beginning of the text abounds in impersonal predicates:

Slyšno bylo, kak gde-to dałečo... kričali ljaguški. Čuvstvala maj, milyj maj!
Dyšalos' gluboko i šotelos' dumat'<

[You] could hear frogs croaking somewhere far off. There was a sense of May, sweet May! [You] felt like taking deep breaths and thinking, And for some reason [you] wanted to cry,’

and these are all contextualized through Nadya, who is the priority subject of perception. In one case this is made explicit in the text: at first it says and now for some reason mother looked very young through the window in the evening lamplight and a little further down Nadya herself says: And I sit here gazing at mother She looks so young from here!

We find the same empathy to the character in the story “The Bishop”, but here the implied subject is clear right from the start:

To Bishop Peter, who had not been well for the last three days, all the faces looked the same; the crowd kept moving, and there seemed to be no end to it, now or ever. How hot and stuffy it was! And he couldn’t help feeling disturbed when a ‘fool-in-Christ’ kept crying out in the gallery Now his mind was at rest. And soon the service was over.

Soon — from the viewpoint of the bishop. The narrator is also present, however, for example, it is he who tells us that Bishop Peter has not been well for the last three days.

An excellent example of depicting events ‘through a prism’ of a limited consciousness is Solzhenicyn’s “A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”. Here are a few extracts with constructions most characteristic of FID:

At five in the morning, as usual, the reveille was sounded And still no one came to open the barracks He (the team-leader) was wrong about the tell-tales, of course. Shukhov always got up at reveille, but today he didn’t. In his sleep he had sometimes felt really ill and sometimes a bit better. He kept hoping that morning would not come. Shukhov went on lying there, on the compressed sawdust of his mattress. If only it was something definite — either he got a real fever, or the aches and pains stopped. But this was neither one thing nor the
other. <...> The Lett’s home-grown baccy was okay, pretty strong and smelt good. A sort of brownish colour. [in Russian: Burovaten’kij takoj.]

Here the narrator is consistently removed, and the author (Solzhenicyn) sometimes has to resort to special tricks to give the reader certain information which is too well known to Shukhov himself to attract his attention on this particular one day. The narrator’s voice may be put in parenthesis:

Meanwhile Shukhov pulled on his wadded trousers (a scrap of worn, dirty material with the number S-854 in faded black ink had been sewn on them above the left knee).

The maximal degree of removing the narrator is in cases when FID is used to depict the 'stream of consciousness', as in Joyce’s short story “Eveline”.

One of FID’s most interesting functions is that of systematic equivocation: ‘the complication of the issue of who is speaking’ (McHale 1978: 278), in other words, deliberate ambivalence in attributing the attitude of its subject. FID is often used in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish the character whose utterance is being reported from the narrator’s voice. Ambivalence in attributing the voice is obviously intended by the author, i.e., it constitutes the motivation of preferring FID to other narrative forms. Playing with polyvocality is typical, in particular, of Bulgakov. Cf. the following passages from “Master and Margarita”, Chapter 7, on Woland’s visit to Stepa Likhodeev: Stepa was most impressed by the fact that the jug had misted over with the cold. Which was perfectly understandable — it had been standing in a slop-basin full of ice. In short, covered up very neatly and nicely. The parenthetical in short should formally belong to the narrator: Stepa may think it, but not say it. Further on, however, it transpires that Stepa himself also regularly makes use of parentheticals: with metatextual meaning:

Now this stranger in the beret here, if you please, Stepa had never seen him in his study; he couldn’t for the life of him remember anything about a contract and, cross his heart, hadn’t set eyes on this Woland yesterday; he saw the sea murmuring <...> and, in short, himself sitting right on the end of the pier.

Stepa even uses addresses, i.e., as it were, sums up his impressions in the form of a report to a kind of audience:

It would have been the easiest thing in the world, ladies and gents, not to get involved in it [the conversation with Berlioz].

So the final decision is in favour of Stepa, although some uncertainty remains as to the attribution of the voice — here and in many other passages.
Pascal 1977: 54–55 describes a phenomenon of complex FID — when the utterance of one character is represented as filtered through the consciousness of another. An example of this is Woland’s account, in the same chapter, of his contract with Stepa, which is conveyed in FID-mode, but through Stepa’s perception:

‘<...> and described everything in order. Yesterday afternoon he had arrived in Moscow from abroad, gone straight to Stepa and suggested that he do a variety guest tour. Stepa had phoned <...> and arranged it all (Stepa went white as a sheet and blinked), signed a contract with Professor Woland for seven performances (Stepa gaped at him) and agreed that Woland would come and see him at ten a.m. this morning to work out the details ... So here Woland was.’

Thus, with respect to the repertoire of means of expression used FID is a return to the 1st person narrative. It differs from 1st-person narrative and from traditional narrative, in the absence of clear divisions between the spheres of consciousness of the different subjects — the narrator and the character, one character and another, and this feature forms the basis of all its artistic functions. Therefore FID provides a far more powerful instrument of polyphony (Voloshinov 1930/1973/1986) than DD, where quotation marks serve as boundaries separating the voices.

7. EGOCENTRICALS REVISITED

Now let us return to egocentricals. In conversational discourse egocentricals normally contextualize through the speaker. In narrative there is a split: two subjects of consciousness compete with each other for the right to possess egocentrical elements — the narrator and the character. The problem of voice identification arises.

General properties of egocentricals have been delineated which are relevant for their use and interpretation in the narrative.

I. Egocentricals fall into four classes corresponding to the role of the Speaker: the speaker may be the subject of speech; the subject of consciousness; the subject of deixis; and the subject of perception, see Chapter II.1. In conversational discourse all these roles are played by the real speaker. Whereas in traditional narrative (in its narrational portions) the role of the subject of speech is excluded for the narrator, because he conceals his existence; the role of the subject of deixis is also excluded, because the narrator
is not present in the world of the text. What is left is the role of the subject of consciousness. As for egocentricals that presuppose the subject of perception, they serve as a source of constant violation of verisimilitude in narrative. Gukovsky (1959: 217, 218) mentions descriptions like:

his face seemed to light up (Gogol. “Old-World Landowners”),

which presuppose the presence of an observer, while the narrator cannot fulfill this role because the character was definitely alone at the moment when the ‘event’ took place. Another example, the following sentence from “The Queen of Spades”: People ran up, voices rang out and lights went on in the house puzzles the reader: Hermann is the subject of perception in this extract, but he cannot perform this role in the sentence, because he is hiding in the old countess’s room and has only a chink through which to peer.

2. Egocentricals are divided into primary and secondary ones. In conversational discourse primary egocentricals contextualize through the speaker only. Whereas secondary ones place the speaker in this role by default, in the absence of a stronger contender. Correspondingly, in narrative secondary egocentricals contextualize not only through the narrator, but also through the character: the observer may be found in the text and not in the communicative situation. What follows are examples of personal and narrator-oriented interpretation of egocentricals in traditional narrative and in FID.

7.1. SECONDARY EGOCENTRICALS AND TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE

Secondary egocentricals presuppose a subject of consciousness (it may be a subject of evaluation, emotional or mental state, expectation or unexpectedness), but not a subject of speech. They allow, in traditional narrative, both character- and narrator-oriented interpretation.

In the examples below, text (a) demonstrates a character-oriented interpretation of an egocentrical, and text (b) a narrator-oriented interpretation (the egocentricals are italicized),

(1)  a. The samovar, silent until then (lit. ‘up to now’), suddenly started whistling (Bulgakov. “The White Guard”);
   b. The war with neighbouring Japan was not yet over, when it was unexpectedly overshadowed by other events. (Pasternak. “Doctor Zhivago”)

(2)  a. The boy gazed at the familiar places, but the hateful carriage drove on leaving everything
b. It was what he [Hermann] had expected and he went home deeply absorbed in his *intrigue*. (...>) He too felt anguish, but it was not the poor girl’s tears or the delightful charm of her grief that stirred his *hard heart*.  
(Pushkin. "The Queen of Spades")

As for deictic elements, we have the right to expect them to exclude personal interpretation in traditional narrative. Indeed, one can sense something ‘Nabokovian’ in example (3b). And (4b), in which *here* is understood as ‘where the narrator is localized’ (i.e., presumably in St Petersburg) is non-deviant only because it is *Ich*-Erzählung. The uniqueness of (4b), however, has been commented upon by Guvovsky (1959: 215) and Lotman (1988).

(3) a. He [Tiverzin] went out, slamming the door, and marched off without turning round. The damp autumn closed on him (<...>) This world of ignominy and fraud (<...>) this world was *now* more hateful to him than ever.  
(Pasternak. “Doktor Zhivago”)

b. The elderly passenger sitting on the north window-side of that inexorably moving railway coach (<...>) was none other than Professor Timofey Pnin. Ideally bald, sun-tanned, and clean shaven, he began rather impressively with that great brown dome of his tortoise-shell glasses ... but ended somewhat disappointingly in a pair of spindly legs (*now* flannelled and crossed and frail looking, almost female feet.  
(Nabokov. “Pnin”)

(4) a. And if I sometimes happen to hear the sound of squeaking doors *here*, I have a sudden sense of being in the country  
(Gogol. “Old-World Landowners”)

The subject of perception is usually the character. In (5b) both the characters and the narrator may be the subjects of perception together, for the narrator is standing ‘behind the characters all along:

(5) a. The long winter night passed *imperceptibly*  
(Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)

b. (<...>) and *now it became obvious* that he was seeing the place for the first time.  
(Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”)

Some secondary egocentricals never contextualize through the narrator. For example, the subject of longing implied by ‘at last’ is definitely a character. The same is true of the subject of anticipation in ‘already’:

(6) Hermann stood there in his frock-coat, oblivious to the wind and snow. *At last* they brought the countess’s carriage.  
(Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)

It was *already* ten o’clock, and a full moon was shining over the garden.  
(Chekhov. “The Bride”)

The subject of non-definiteness expressed by an indefinite pronoun is usually a character, cf. the Nabokian device in (6b):
a. In the evening the master usually went *somewhere* and took the goose and the cat with him (Chekhov. “Kashtanka”)
b. `<...>` the degree that Pnin had received at Prague University in 1925, *was it*, was no use at all by the middle of the century. (Nabokov. “Pnin”)

### 7.2. PRIMARY EGOCENTRICALS AND FID

Primary egocentricals (such as the address, non-constative speech acts and parentheticals with meta-linguistic meaning) cannot contextualize through the character in traditional narrative. They may have this contextualization in FID. In traditional narrative they appear only in non-narrative fragments (lyrical digressions, etc.) that refer to the world of the communicative situation, where the narrator’s presence is legitimate.

Example (a) below demonstrates a character-oriented interpretation of an egocentrical, which is only possible in FID, while (b) demonstrates a narrator-oriented interpretation in non-narrative portions of traditional narrative.

b. How dull it is in this world, *gentlemen*!
   (Gogol. “How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich”)

(9) a. But clocks are *fortunately* quite immortal. (Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)
b. Afterwards, when — *frankly speaking* — it was already too late, various official institutions filed reports describing this man.
   (Bulgakov. “The Master and Margarita”)

(10) a. Lizaveta Ivanovna listened to him horrified. *So*, all these passionate letters, these ardent demands, `<...>` were not love at all.
    (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)
b. *So*, it was a white, shaggy December. (Bulgakov. “The White Guard”)

In (10a) personal interpretation of *so* is only possible because it is a character’s interior monologue, i.e., quasi-direct speech.

Strictly speaking, passages with character-oriented secondary egocentricals (which we earlier identified as traditional narrative) are ambiguous between traditional narrative and FID, cf. example (4a) and (5a).

Thus, in order to distinguish the voice of the narrator from that of the character we must know: 1) the nature of the egocentrical — whether it is a primary or a secondary one; and 2) the type of discourse — whether it is 1st-person narrative, traditional narrative or FID.
CHAPTER II.6
THE QUOTATION PHENOMENON

In order to understand the essence of FID fully we must distinguish it from related phenomena, first and foremost, from what we shall call, to use a term from Jakobson 1957/1972, quasi-quotation or even simply quotation, as in Wierbicka 1970.

Quotation is often confused with quasi-direct speech (QDS) and, consequently, with FID (cf. Kovtunova 1953, on the one hand, and McHale 1978, on the other), although in the light of the definition introduced for QDS and FID in Chapter II.5, quotation is an altogether different phenomenon. For example, in the following passage from “Dead Souls” the second mention of *works of nature* is a quotation inserted in the narrator’s text from the character’s speech (in the examples below the quotations are italicized; the author’s italics are indicated separately):

(1) Kogda policejmester vsponnil bylo o nem [osetre], skazavši: “A kakovo vam, gospoda, ēto proizvedenie prirody?”, podošel bylo k nemu s vilkoj vmeste s drugimi, to uvidel, čto ot proizvedeniɉa prirody ostavalsɉa vsego odin ẋvost.

‘Just as the chief-of-police was about to recall it [the sturgeon], by saying: “And what do you think of this work of nature here, gentlemen?”’, then going up to it with a fork accompanied by the rest of them, he saw that all that remained of the work of nature was its tail’.

Quotation is clearly distinguished from FID, in particular, in Banfield 1982 and in Kozhevnikova 1994: 228. In quasi-direct discourse the narrator transfers to the character his function of the subject of speech; whereas quotation may be presented as infiltration of the character’s voice in an utterance made, as a whole, entirely by the narrator. Thus, in quotation the narrator uses wording belonging to a character in formulating some part of his utterance (possibly even the whole utterance). But the speech act belongs to him: the narrator himself remains the subject of speech. That is to say, in spite of the fact that FID and quotation are both devices for reporting someone else’s speech,

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38 In Uspensky 1970 FID and quotation are consistently separated, but the terminology used by the author is confusing: FID is examined under the name “interior monologue” (although this latter term does not include many relevant contexts, for example, the use of FID in the context of an indirect presentation of acts of perception); and quotation is called “quasi-direct speech”, although this term is used in Russian specialist literature as the translation equivalent for the English “represented speech” and the French “style indirect libre”, i.e., for FID.
there is a clear distinction between them, namely, that in FID the character’s words enter the context of his own speech (mental, perceptive, etc.) act, whereas in quotation the character’s words are used to make up the speech act of the narrator.

A character may be quoted not only by the narrator, as in (1), but also by another character. A person can even quote himself: *Ja ved’ tebe už i prežde rastolkoval, čto ja ee “ne ljubov’ju ljublju, a žalost’ju”* ‘I have already explained to you that I love her “not with love, but with pity”’ (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”: 236). Quotation is possible in a dramatic work as well, as the following much cited example from Gogol’s “Government Inspector” shows:

(2) O s i p. Traktirščik skazal, čto [ča] ne dam vam est′, poka ne zaplatite za prežnee. ‘O s i p. The innkeeper said that <I> won’t give you anything to eat until <you> pay for what you’ve had’.

That we are dealing with a quotation in (2) is confirmed by the fact, noted in Uspensky 1970: 49, that we no longer feel that a rule is being broken if the particles *mol* or *deskat’* are added (cf. *The innkeeper said that, deskat’*, *[I] won’t give*): the role of the particle is precisely to indicate that this is a quotation.

Quotation in the sense in which we are now using the term, is widespread in conversational discourse as well; quotation includes many phenomena which are described in Nikolaeva, Sedakova 1994 as clichés.

We should distinguish between two syntactic contexts of quotation, namely:

1) quotation in the context of the subordinating PA-predicate;

2) quotation outside such a context.

Quotation in the context of the subordinating PA-predicate “quasi-indirect speech”, quasi-meaning distorted. Indeed, the direct evidence that we are dealing with a quotation is provided by any linguistic element which is alien to indirect speech and should be edited away when direct speech is conveyed in the form of indirect. However, generally speaking, the quotational nature of this or that portion of an utterance may not manifest itself in grammatical in-

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39 Therefore the term “quotation”, with its broad meaning, is far more suitable for the phenomenon under consideration than “quasi-authorial narration” (nesobstvenno-avtorskoe povestvovanie) in Kozhevnikova 1994.

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correctness, see example (1). So the term “quasi-indirect speech” is basically redundant.

1. Quotations in the context of a subordinating PA-predicate

From the linguistic point of view the most interesting cases of quotation are when there are structural markers of the “illegal” presence of this or that element in the said lexico-syntactical context: these markers testify to the fact that we are dealing with a quotation. In quotation the standard rules for the construction of the subordinate clause are broken: interjections, exclamations, emphatic repetitions and incomplete sentences, dialectisms and foreign words while being used in a subordinate clause serve as markers of quotation.

Not only the nomination of the object belonging to the OTHER can be quoted, as in (1), but also any construction characterized by syntactical non-embeddability; for example, so in its emphatic meaning is non-embeddable; hence the effect of quotation in (3):

(3) She said later, that she was so pleased with this evening.

In example (2) we detect quotation because of the syntactical non-embeddability of an utterance containing the deictic elements I and you, which are oriented towards the given speech act. The effect of quotation is of the same origin in example (4) — a non-embeddable deictic element finds itself in a subordinate clause:

(4) Afanasij Ivanovič govoril dolgo i krasnorečivo, prisovokupiv, tak skazat’ mimoxodom, očen’ ljubopytne svedenija, čto ob ětiž semidesjati pjati tysjačax on zaiknulsja teper’ v pervyj raz i čto o niž ne znal daže i sam Ivan Fyodorovič, kotoryj vot tut sidit

‘Afanasij Ivanovich spoke long and eloquently, adding, so to say, in passing, the most intriguing information, that this was the first time he had made any mention of seventy-five thousand and that not even Ivan Fyodorovich, who was sitting right here, had known about it’. (Dostoevsky. “The Idiot”: 55)

The beginning of this extract is indeed interpreted in the narrative register: in spoke we have the narrative past; the meta-linguistic parenthetical so to say refers to the narrator; and the evaluational epithet most intriguing <information> is also contextualized through the narrator. Whereas right here is contextualized through the character (Afanasij Ivanovich) — the exegetic

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40 Pages according to Dostoevsky 1957.
narrator of the novel is not sitting anywhere and cannot take part in the localization of objects. We understand that at a certain point a quotation from the speech of the character appears in the narrator’s speech while before the speech of this character was reported by the narrator in the indirect form.

In example (4) the particle *vot* ensures the unambiguous deictic meaning of the adverb *zdes’* ‘here’; but in (5) *vot* loses its demonstrative meaning and is used as a kind of substitute for inverted commas\(^{41}\):

(5) On dumal o tom, čto *vot* v ego žizni bylo ešče odno poxoždenie ili priključenie, i ono tože končilos’

‘He thought to himself that [*vot*] this was another escapade or adventure in his life, and now it too had come to an end’

(Chekhov. “The Lady with the Little Dog”).

In this respect *vot* is like the above-mentioned *mol* and *deskat’*, the only difference being that it belongs to literary, not conversational, language. In example (6) the repeated use of *vot* makes it possible to quote the speech act of the threat (the character’s direct speech can be reconstructed as: “I’ll write such a complaint about you, that it’ll serve you right!”)

(6) *...* Akakij Akakievic *...* skazal naotrez, *...* čto on prišel iz departamenta za kazennym delom i čto *vot* kak on na niž požaluetsja, tak *vot* togda oni uvidjat!

*...* ‘Akakij Akakievich *...* told them flatly, *...* that he had come from the department on official business and that *vot* he would write such a complaint about them, that *vot* it would serve them right!’ (Gogol. “The Overcoat”)

In example (7) *vot* performs the function of *mol*, i.e., justifies the mixed deictic pointers quoted: *we* stands, ungrammatically, for the subject of the reported speech; *you* meaning the addressee of the reported speech (who is also the subject of the hope expressed by the preceding *avos’* [“it must be”]) is also ungrammatical; with the help of *there* the doctor distances himself from the addressee:

(7) Čas, dva proxođat tak. No *vot* zvonok v perednej. Avos’ doktor. Točno, čto doktor, svežij, bodryj, žirnyj, veselyj, s tem vyraženiem — čto *vot* vy tam čego-to ispugalis’, a my sejčas vam vse ustroim. (Tolstoy. “The Death of Ivan Ilyich”) ‘An hour passed, then another. Suddenly there was a ring at the door. It must be the doctor. Yes, it was the doctor, fresh, cheerful, sleek and jolly, with an expression that said so *you* there have been frightened *by something* [for some reason], but we’ll put everything right now.’

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\(^{41}\) Examples (4) to (7) are taken from Kovtunova 1953, with a different argumentation.
Untranslatable čego-to is also a quotation. In fact, the subject of speech can express his own condition of vague fear, the cause of which is unknown, by the words čto-to “I have been frightened for some reason”; but this state of indefiniteness embodied in čto-to can only be expressed, not reported. So čto-to is not embeddable and in embedded position is perceived unambiguously as a quotation.

In example (8) the comic effect can be explained by the fact that the parentheticals (nakonec ‘at last’, vse-taki ‘all the same’, après tout), like the nominations (helpless youth, rogues), which Prince Vassily could have used in such a case, are cited in the narrator’s speech like quotations. And without any warning we find the motif of the large fortune which clearly belongs to the narrator himself, because it does not fit in with the preceding motif of compassion ascribed to Prince Vassily:

(8) Knəaz′ Vasilij imel vid čeloveka otɟagoščennogo delami ustalogo izmučennogo, no iz sostradanija ne moguščego, nakonec, brosit′ na proizvol sud′by i plutov ětogo bespomoščnogo junuşu, syna, vse-taki ego druga, après tout, i s takim ogromnym sostojaniem. (Tolstoy. “War and Peace”)

‘Prince Vassily gave the impression of a man weighed down by his affairs, tired, worn out, but too compassionate, when all was said and done, to abandon this helpless youth, who was after all his friend’s son après tout, to the tender mercy of fate and rogues, especially with such a large fortune.’

Cf. a simpler example of quoting a parenthetical (the speaker is quoting himself):

(9) Ja vynuždena budu emu skazat′, čto vy, vse-taki, prišli s cvetami

‘I shall have to tell him that all the same you did come with flowers’.

(Petrushevskaya).

Whereas in (9) the parenthetical is non-embeddable and therefore signals quotation by itself, in (10) we know that a quotation is coming only thanks to the author’s italics:

(10) Ty togda skazala, čto navernoe uezžaeš v Italiju

‘You said then that you would probably be going to Italy’.

(Chekhov. “A mistake in compensation”).

In Dostoevsky’s novels quotation and direct speech are often mixed up. If one considers not the punctuation, but rather the lexico-syntactical structure and meaning of the sentence, examples (11) and (12) can be identified as con-
taining one or several quotations. And the punctuation simply makes the text non-grammatical. Thus, in (11) the naming of the addressee in the 3ʳᵈ person contradicts the inverted commas; in (12) the conjunction that, which expresses indirect speech, is found inside the inverted commas of the direct speech:

(11) Даже general <...> ljubezno sprosil Lizavetu Prokof’evnu: “Ne svežo li ej, od-nako že, na terrase?

‘Even the general <...> asked Lizeveta Prokovievna courteously: “Didn’t she find it a trifle chilly, though, on the terrace?”’

(12) Pri ětom on [Ganja] gorjačo vyskazal svoe mnenie, čto knjazja ves’ma stranno i Bog znaet s čego nazvali “idiotom, čto on dumaet o nem soveršeno naprotiv i čto, už konečno, ětot čelovek sebe na ume”.

‘Moreover he [Ganya] ardently expressed the opinion that it was very strange that people, goodness only knows why, called the prince “an idiot, that he regarded him as quite the opposite and that the man was, of course, perfectly sane”.’

2. “DESCRIPTIONS OR QUOTATIONS”

With respect to the non-subordinate context the problem of quotation was raised at the very dawn of modern semantics, in 1970, in Anna Wierzbicka’s article “Descriptions or quotations?” (Wierzbicka 1970). It deals primarily with noun phrases that serve as nominations for people or physical objects (cf. such names as Velikij Kombinator ‘The Great Fixer’ from Ilf and Petrov’s novel “The Twelve Chairs”; dama prosto prekrasnaɉa ‘a really pleasant lady’ and dama prekrasnaɉa vo vseẋ otnošeniɉaɉ ‘a pleasant lady in all respects’ from “Dead Souls”; a very big hole; A good place for picnics from “Winnie-the-Pooh” and many others).

The question is put as follows. Why are expressions of the type a brilliant orator, a real artist, a complete idiot, a very tall man, a rather pretty girl, an utter scoundrel not used, as a rule, in the position of the subject, particularly the thematic subject? In fact, if used in this way, they are invariably perceived as quotations and not descriptions, i.e., normal names of the object, cf. The orator fell silent, but *The brilliant orator fell silent. The answer is that a subjective-modal component forms part of the meaning of these expressions: “an important part of the content of these predicates concerns not the person named, but the relationship between this person and the speaker or, more precisely, expresses the attitude of the speaker towards the person in question”, Wierzbicka 1970/1982: 244. Cf. another example:
He’s a real master = ‘He really is a master and no mistake’; i.e., the word real is not part of the description of the object, but serves to emphasize the statement. This interpretation detects the semantic component which explains why the word real is an expressive: really = ‘I am not exaggerating, I am telling the truth, believe me’. Thus, the most characteristic marker of a quotation is emphasis. In the semantics of expressive words the speaker plays the “strongest” of all his roles — the role of the subject of speech.

It is also important that in the abovementioned examples the noun phrase contains a component that would be more suitable in the predicate, and not in the subject of the proposition: “It is an empirically demonstrable fact that all the expressive elements of an utterance, all the elements that express the speaker’s attitude to what he is talking about, ‘hang’ on the predicate, and not on the subject” (Wierzbicka 1970/1982: 244). Thus, in the example below the noun phrase in italics is used in the predicate position and would be impossible in the position of the subject:

(13) Častye pripadki ego bolezni sdelali iz nego sovsem počti idiota (knjaz’ tak i skazal: idiot) ‘The frequent attacks of his illness had almost made a complete idiot of him (the prince actually used the word: idiot)’ (“The Idiot”: 32).

Thus, quotation in the sense of Wierzbicka 1970 arises not so much from the clash of two consciousnesses, but rather when a language element with an expressive meaning, i.e., bearing clear traces of the presence of the subject of consciousness, appears in a syntactical position for which it is not suited.

In example (14) from Chekhov’s story “The Butterfly”, the quotation is not diagnosed linguistically; the italicized expressions are perceived as quotations from the heroine’s speech, simply because the mode of expression is perceived as incompatible with the narrator’s voice:

(14) Každyj iz niẋ byl čem-nibud’ zamečatelen i nemnožko izvesten <...> ili že xoţja i ne byl znamenit, zato podaval blestjaščie nadeţdy. ‘Each of them was remarkable and rather well-known for something <...> or if not famous was expected to achieve great things.’

If there is no clear evidence that the character’s “word” (in Bakhtin’s sense) has been inserted into the narrator’s utterance, the text with expressive elements is naturally treated as FID. The sentence (15), for instance,
which in Kozhevnikova 1994: 244 is quoted as an example of quasi-authorial narrative, i.e., quotation, we are inclined to treat as quasi-direct speech, particularly as it is an account of Katerina Lvovna’s dream:

(15) A kot promotej eju i Sergeem tretsa, takoj slavnyj, seryj, rostyj da pretol-stjuščij-tolstojyj <...> i usy kak u obročnego burgomistra

‘And the cat that kept rubbing itself between her and Sergei, such a fine, big, grey one as fat as could be <...> with whiskers like a quit-rent collecting burgomaster’ (Leskov. “Lady Macbeth of Meensk District”).

From the foregoing it is clear that QDS and quotation are linguistically different ways of introducing the voice of OTHER. This is justified by linguistic considerations, but also by those of literary theory: preference for one or the other may be a characteristic of the writer’s style. For example, as noted in Kozhevnikova 1994: 242, quotations predominate in Turgenev’s prose, whereas Chekhov makes more extensive use of QDS.

3. QUOTATION AND FID

The influential article McHale 1978 complicates the problem of characterizing FID by identifying QDS with quotation. In this article QDS and quotation are examined as adjacent points “on a scale from the purely diegetic to the purely mimetic”, p. 258. Quotation and QDS are similar, of course, in that in both cases the narrator cedes his rights in part to the character. There is an important difference between these two phenomena, however. The QDS phenomenon consists of the narrator (SELF) handing over to the character (OTHER) the right to the speech act, i.e., he withdraws completely from the utterance in favour of the character. In quotation there is only a partial invasion by OTHER of the utterance made by SELF. This lack of distinction between QDS and quotation is, in the final analysis, the result of underestimating the role of the speech act in the structure of the text.

Quotation and QDS also differ functionally. In quotation there are two voices “singing together” (dvuxgolosie): to the voice of SELF, which is the rightful owner of speech, is added — wrongly from the point of view of the ideal grammatical model — the voice of OTHER. Whereas QDS tends towards the monological interpretation: the voice of OTHER (i.e., a character) can completely oust the voice of SELF (the narrator).
Finally, quotation differs from QDS in origin and sphere of use: FID is a purely literary phenomenon which appeared at a relatively late stage in the development of the literary process, namely, the 19th century (Banfield 1982: 257ff). Whereas quotation, both that which the modern literary language regards as an anomaly, as in the example from “Government Inspector”, and that which is regarded as the literary norm, with explicit or implicit inverted commas, is inherent in the conversational language and attested to in quite ancient texts, such as Hypatian Codex (Ipatiev Chronicle), cf. the following example (cited in Uspensky 1970: 50):

(16) Речь Иолги иказало ужест мъстила емь мужа своег„
‘And Olga did say unto them, that I have already avenged my husband’.

In marginal cases the difference is less clear, of course. The whole utterance may be a quotation, for example, when the speaker has recourse to stereotyped expressions. Thus, the phrase Sprosi menя́ мя́то или́е вро́шче! ‘Ask me something simpler!’ was at one time in Russian a common formula of the speech act (indirect) which expressed a refusal to reply, motivated by the complexity of the question. Quotation is the key to defining the concept of the skaz.

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42 Verbatim: речь Иолги иказало ужест мъстила емь мужа своег„. <sic!> (sub year 6454 [946 A.D.], on fol. 23r; see PSRL II 1908/1998: col. 47, line 10).
**Part III**

**ANALYSIS OF TEXTS**

**Chapter III.1**

**TENSE IN A TEXT**

1. **Traditional narrative and the narrative past**

For traditional narrative the basic tense is the narrative past. It is, as a matter of fact, the only tense for the narrative portions of the text in the traditional narrative. Temporal relationships in the text are expressed by alternating the forms of the perfective and imperfective aspects.

The figure of the observer, which proved to be essential for describing the semantics of aspectual opposition (see Chapter II.2) also accounts for the apparently unexpected semantic expansions displayed by aspectual forms in a coherent text. The rules governing these expansions were known (if one converts the aspectual system of the classical languages to the Slavonic ones) to the ancient rhetoricians (Maslov 1984: 191). We shall assume that a Russian verb in the perfective aspect indicates an event and in the imperfective aspect a process/state — which is true at first approximation (see Leech 1975: 4 on the contrast between states and events and its role in aspectual choice). Then these rules appear as follows:

**Rule A.** Juxtaposed or coordinated forms of the perfective aspect denote consecutive events:

1. Grigorij Ivanovič šumno vzdoxonul, vyter podborodok i načal rasskazyvat′. ‘Grigory Ivanovich sighed [Pfv] noisily, wiped [Pfv] his chin and began [Pfv] his story’ (Zoshchenko);


**Rule B.** Similarly juxtaposed or coordinated forms of the imperfective aspect denote simultaneous processes or states.

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43 Grammatical comments concerning Russian forms are inserted in the English translation — so that the reader might follow the argumentation.

‘Our regiments were returning [Ipfv] from abroad. People were running [Ipfv] to meet them. The music was playing [Ipfv] conquered songs’

(4) Staraɉa grafinɉa*** sidela v svoej ubornoj pered zerkalom. Tri devuški okružali ee. Odna deržala banku rumɉan, drugaɉa korobku so špil′kami, tret′ɉa <...>. Grafinɉa ne imela ni malejšego pritɉazaniɉa na krasotu, davno uvɉadšuɉu, no soẋranila vse privyčki svoej molodosti <...> i odevalas′ tak že dolgo i tak že staratel′no, kak i šeš′desɉat let tomu nazad. U okoška sidela za pɉal′cami baryšnɉa, ee vospitannica.

‘The old Countess*** was sitting in her boudoir in front of the mirror. Three girls were standing round her. One was holding a pot of rouge, another a box of hair-pins, and the third <...> The Countess did not possess the slightest claim to beauty, long since faded, but retained all the habits of her youth <...> and dressed with the same care and length of time as sixty years ago. By the window at her embroidery sat a young lady, her ward’. (Pushkin. “The Queen of Spades”)

The concept of the observer makes it possible to deduce the textual meanings of the forms of the perfective and imperfective aspects from their meanings in an isolated utterance. The imperfective (in its primary meaning, namely, in the progressive) presupposes a moment of observation placed statically “in the middle” of the situation; therefore the temporal position of the observer when he switches his attention from one situation to another can remain unchanged. When we say that in the sequence of forms of the imperfective the time does not move, we mean that the time of the observer does not move. This explains Rule B.

Meanwhile the perfective form by virtue of its very semantics contains a temporal perspective: the meaning of the perfective form cannot be described without mentioning three temporal moments — the first in which the event had not taken place, the second in which it appeared, and the third from which it was observed. Thus, each time an event is described with the help of a perfective verb, the narrator has to go forward (in time) in order to ensure a retrospective point of reference for the event. Hence Rule A. (Incidentally, our perception of time sometimes introduces into a set of situations an order which may not in fact be there at all, see Uspensky 1970: 103).

There are, of course, exceptions to Rules A and B. But generally speaking if a verb is in the imperfective, special steps must be taken to
move the narrator’s time forward, and if it is in the perfective, a special context is necessary so that the narrator’s time does not move.

We shall now examine from this point of view a few exceptions to Rule A which says that perfective forms denote consecutive events (examples from Paducheva 1989):

(5) Ja segodnja ubrala kvartiru, kupila produkty i zanaveski postirala.
    ‘Today I cleaned the flat, bought some food and washed the curtains’.

(6) a. Vse zašumeli, zadvigalis′, zagovorili.
    ‘Everyone began making a noise, moving and talking’;

b. Posideli, pogovorili, posmeɉalis′.  ‘[They] sat for a bit, talking and laughing’;

c. On raspolnel i postarel.   ‘He put on weight and aged’.

These exceptions have an obvious explanation: the events here are viewed from one and the same moment of time. For example, in the case of (5) it is “this evening”. The same applies to (6). Thus in order to exclude a sequential reading for some events denoted with the help of perfective forms, it is necessary to make the point of reference the same for all of them.

In order to make continuous events consecutive, i.e., to break Rule B, special devices are also required. For example, the Russian Ipfv with its progressive meaning can be supplemented with some ingressivity marker, cf. *I privjazyvala ‘*and was fixing’ in example (7a); or a modifier can be introduced denoting a completed time interval, example (7b); or an adverb like *then* in examples (7a) and (7c) (from Petrushevskaya’s short stories):

(7) a. Ja ždala iẋ celyj den′. A potom polezla na podokonnik i stala privɉazyvat′ kusok provoda.           ‘I waited [Ipfv] all day for them. Then climbed [Pfv] onto the window-sill and began [Pfv] to fix a piece of wire there’.

b. Oni ee neskol′ko mesɉacev deržali tam, a potom, čerez kakoe-to vremɉa,ėtu kvartiru raskryli.           ‘They kept [Ipfv] her there for a few months, but then, after a while, the police discovered [Pfv] this flat’.

c. Raisa s pjati let kleila korobočki dlɉa otca, on byl invalidom. Potom mat′ umerla.           ‘Ever since she was five Raissa made [Ipfv] little boxes for her father, he was an invalid. Then her mother died [Pfv]’.

Similar devices are needed to “shift” the tense forward in the case of a stative situation which should be mentioned in the context of the preceding perfective form: the imperfective form cannot be used: in a direct juxta-
position of the perfective and imperfective the time taken by the situation in the imperfective is rather understood as synchronous with the moment fixed by the preceding perfective form. In texts (8) and (9) one can sense a refined non-standard wording; in (8) the “normal” wording would have been Devuška stala ugovarivat’ ‘The girl began to try and persuade her’ or Devuška dolgo ugovarivala ‘The girl tried for a long time to persuade her’:

(8) Ona kinulas’ v kreslo i zalilas’ slezami. Devuška ugovarivala ee uspokoiťsɉa. ‘She flung herself into the armchair and burst into [Pfv] tears. The girl was persuading [Ipfv] her to calm down’ (Pushkin. “The Blizzard”)

(9) Ona posmotrela na molodogo carɉa ... i vyžidatel’no molčala. ‘She looked [Pfv] at the young car ... and said [Ipfv; lit. — was saying] nothing expectantly’. (Bunin. “Light Breathing”)

Examples of standard use:


Privalov pozdorovalsɉa s devuškoj i neskol’ko mgnovenij smotrel na nee udiv-lennymi glazami. ‘Privalov greeted [Pfv] the girl and for a few moments stared [Ipfv] at her in surprise’. (Mamin-Sibiryak)

Resistance to ingressive interpretation distinguishes the Russian Past Ipfv from many preterite verbal forms of other languages, e.g., from the Simple Past in English; for example, in the sentence At sunrise I walked eastward (example from Carlson 1981) the form of Simple Past cannot be translated into Russian with the Ipfv: *Kogda solnce vstalo, ja šel na vos-tok; instead the ingressive pošel should be used.

In Smith 1991 the flow of time in the text is represented as resulting from the interaction of two factors — lexical (situation type inherent in the semantics of the verb) and grammatical (aspectual form). Indeed, what is relevant for the time sequence of situations described in the text is the opposition “state in progress vs. event looked upon retrospectively”, cf. Leech 1975: 4. In English Progressive Aspect does indeed mark the meaning of a process (state) unambiguously; but the form of the Simple Past remains ambiguous: it may denote both state and event. Whereas the Russian aspectual system gives adequate expression to this very opposition “state vs. event” on which rules A and B are based. Situation types operate in Russian at the preliminary stage of selecting the aspectual form, see Paducheva 2009.
So in Russian the rules determining time sequence in the text may be formulated in grammatical terms. In Hopper, Thompson 1980 it was claimed that an important distinction between foregrounding and backgrounding information is connected with the idea of transitivity. Rules A and B seem to demonstrate that this distinction is reducible to the distinction of change expressed by Russian Pfv as opposed to stability, which is connected in Russian with the Ipfv Aspect.

Rules A and B naturally do not hold in cases where the connection between the juxtaposed sentences of the text is not temporal, but causal, explanatory or something else, see example from Bunin in Section 2.

We present the temporal structure of the text with the help of diagrams, approximately in the style of Maslov 1984: 184. For perfective verbs a short time interval is indicated, which records the moment of transition to a new state: o. The perfective state, which comes into existence after the transition has taken place, may also come into play, and in this case it is also indicated: o——. For imperfective verbs a distinction is made between short intervals ——— for processes and long intervals ——— for stable states. Other differences in the length of time intervals are not reflected in our structure representations as they have no structural significance. The placing of one interval under another indicates simultaneity, and to the right of the other — consecutiveness. As a result, the diagram indicates not only the order of the situations in time, but also their coexistence, as it were, in space. Forms that are to be interpreted in the syntactic register are put in square brackets, in which case the precedence relation of the denoted event to other events in the current textual time is not stated. The horizontal axis corresponds to the flow of time. The vertical axis corresponds to the “flow of text”: all the finite verbs are numbered in order of their appearance in the text.

The Diagram 1 below presents the time sequence of the situations in a passage from Pushkin’s “The Blizzard”:

1. Oni nasilu došli do konca sada.
   ‘They fought [Pfv] their way to the end of the garden.’
2. Na doroge sani dožidalis’ iž. ‘On the road the sledge was waiting [Ipfv] for them’
3. Lošadi, ozjabnuv, ne stojali [Ipfv] na meste.
   ‘The horses, chilled to the marrow, would not stand [Ipfv] still.’
4. Kučer Vladimira *rasxažival* pered oglobljami, uderživaja retivyx.
   ‘Vladimir’s coachman was walking up and down [Ipfv] in front of the shafts, trying to restrain the ardent (horses).’

5. On *pomog* baryšne i ee devuške usest′sja i uložit′ uzly <....>
   ‘He helped [Pfv] the young lady and her maid to take their seats and to put in their bundles <....>’

![Diagram 1](image_url)

The forms of the imperfective verbs *dožidalis’* ‘was waiting’, *ne stojali* ‘would not stand still’ and *rasxažival* ‘was walking up and down’ denote situations synchronous to the moment which is given by the form of the perfective verb *doshli* ‘fought their way’, and only the perfective verb *pomog* ‘helped’ moves the time forward (in relation to the point which was fixed by the preceding perfective, i.e., the verb *došli*).

In this passage the role of the observer, which is required by the semantics of the basic aspectual meaning of the imperfective and perfective, is performed by the narrator.

The narrative interpretation of temporal and aspectual forms is characteristic not only of prose, but also of epic poetry. For example, in J. Brodsky’s poem “Sreten’e” the aspectual-temporal forms are interpreted consistently in the narrative register.

1. Kogda ona v cerkov′ vnesla
2. mitja, *naxodilis’* vnutri iz čisla
   ljudej, naxodivšišsja tam postojanno,
   Svjatoj Simeon i proročica Anna.
3. I starec *vosprinjal* mладенca iz ruk
   Mariii; i tri čeloveka vokrug
4. mладенca *stojali*, kak zybkaša rama,
   v to utro, zaterjany v sumrake ārama.
5. Tot ŋram *obstupal* ič, kak zameršij les.
   Ot vzgljadov ljudej i ot vzora nebes

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<th>Diagram 1</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. došli [Pfv]</td>
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<td>2. dožidalis’ [Ipfv]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ne stojali [Ipfv]</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. rasxažival [Ipfv]</td>
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<td>5. pomog [Pfv]</td>
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</table>

When Mary first *came* to present the Christ Child to God in His temple, there were — of those few who fasted and prayed there, departing not from it — devout Simeon and the prophetess Anna.

The holy man *took* the Babe up in his arms.

The three of them, lost in the grayness of dawn, now *stood* like a small shifting frame that surrounded and guarded the Child in the dark of the temple.

The temple *enclosed* them in forests of stone.

Its lofty vaults *stooped* as though trying to cloak
6. veršiny skryvali, sumev rasplastat’sja, 
v to utro Mariju, proročicu, starca.

7. svet padal mladencu; no on ni o čem
8. ne vedal ešće i posapyval sonno, 
pokojas’ na krepkiх rukaх Simeona.

9. A bylo povедано starcu semu
10. o tom, čto uвидит on smertnušču 
11. ne prežde, čem Syna uвидит Gospodnja.
12. ne prežde, čem Syna uвидит Gospodnja.

13, 14. Sveršilos’: i starec promolvil: [“Segodнja,
rečennoe nekogda slovo xranja,
Ty s mirom, Gospod’, otpuskaeš’ menja,
zatem čto glaza moi videli еto
ditja: on — Tvoe prodolžen’e i sveta
istočnik dlja idolov чtjaščix plemen,
i slava Izraela v nem.”] — Simeon

15, 16. umolknul. Ix vseх tišina obstupila.
Liš’ éxo teš slov, зadevaja stropila,

17. kružilos’ kakoe-to vremjo spustja
nad iк golovami, slegka шelestja
pod svodami xrama, kak nekaja ptica,
čto v silaх vzletet’, no ne v silaх spus-
tit’šja.

18, 19. I stranno im bylo. Byla tišina
ne menee strannoj, čem reč’. Smuščena,
20. Marija molčala. “Slova-to kakie...”
21. I starec skazal, повернувšis’ k Marii:

[“V ležaščem sejťas na ramenax tvoix
paden’e odňi, vozvyšen’e drugiň,
predmet prerekanij i povod k razdoram.
I tem že oruž’em, Marija, kotorym

the prophetess Anna, and Simeon, and Mary —
to hide them from men and to hide them from
Heaven.

A chance ray of light struck the crown of the head
of that sleeping Infant, who stirred but as yet
was conscious of nothing. He blew drowsy bubbles;
old Simeon’s arms held him like a stout cradle.

It had been revealed to this upright old man
that he would not die until his eyes had seen
the Son of the Lord. And it thus came to pass.

And he said: [“Now, o Lord, lettest thou thy
poor servant,
according to thy holy word, leave in peace,
for mine eyes have witnessed thine offspring, this
Child —
in him thy salvation, which thou hast made ready,
a light to enlighten the face of all peoples
and carry thy truth to idolatrous tribes;
bring Israel, thy people, its Glory in time.’] Then Simeon paused. A thick silence engulfed them,
and only his echoing words grazed the rafters,
to spin for a moment, with faint rustling sounds,
high over their heads in the tall temple’s vaults,
like some soaring bird that flies constantly upward
and somehow is caught and cannot return earth-
ward.

A strangeness engulfed them. The silence now seemed
as strange and uncanny as Simeon’s speech.
And Mary, confused and bewildered, said nothing —
so strange had his words been. The holy man,
turning
to Mary, continued: [‘Behold, in this Child,
now close to thy breast, is concealed the great fall
and rising again of many in Israel;
a source of dissension, a sign to be spoken

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terzaema plot′ ego budet, tvoja
duša budet ranena. Rana siya
dast videt′ tebe, čto sokryto gluboko
v serdačx čelovekov, kak nekoe oko.’’

against. The same weapon which tears at his flesh
shall pierce through thine own soul as well.

Thy wound, Mary, like a new eye, will reveal to
thy sight what in men′s deepest hearts now lies
hidden.’’

He ended and moved toward the temple′s great door.
Old Anna, bent down with the weight of  her years,
and Mary, gazed after him, perfect in silence.

He moved and grew smaller, in size and meaning,
to these two frail women who stood in the gloom.
As though driven on by the force of  their look,
he strode through the cold empty space of  the temple
and moved toward the whitening blur of  the
doorway.

The stride of  his old legs was audibly firm.
He slowed his step slightly when Anna began
to speak, far behind him. But she was not calling
to him; she had started to bless God and praise Him.

The door came still closer. The wind stirred his robe
and touched his cool brow, while the roar of  the street,
exploding in life by the door of  the temple,
beat stubbornly into old Simeon′s hearing.

He went forth to die. It was not the loud din
of streets that he faced when he flung the door wide,
but rather the deaf-and-dumb fields of  death′s
kingdom.

He strode through a space that was no longer solid.

The roaring of  time ebb ed a way in his ears.
And Simeon′s soul held the form of  the Child –
its feathery crown now enveloped in glory –
aloft, like a torch, pressing back the black shadows,
to light up the path that leads into death′s realm,
where never before until this point in time
had any man managed to lighten his pathway.

The old man′s torch glowed and the pathway grew
wider.

22, 23. On končil i dvimumsja k vyxodu. Vsled
Marija, sutuljas′, i tjažest′ju let
24. sogbennaja Anna bezmolwno gliadyeli.
25. On šel, umen′šas′ v značen′i i tele
dlja dux ětić ženߧčin pod sen′olu kolonn.
Počti podgonēem iđ vzglapidami, on
26. šagal po zastyvšemu xramu pustomo
k belevsому smutno dvernomu proemu.

27. I postup′ byla starikovski tverda.
Liś ′ golos proročicy szadi kogda
28. razdalsja, on šag prideržal svoj ne–
mnogo:
29. no tam ne ego oklikali, a Boga
30. proročica slavit′ uže naçała.
31. I dver′ približalas′. Odežd i čela
32. už veter kosnulsja, i v uši upr̆amo
33. vryvalsja šum žizni za stenami xrama.
34. šum žizni za stenami xrama.
35. On šel umirat′. I ne v uličnyj gul
36. on dver′ otvorivič ruκami, šagnal,
no v glužonemey vladenija smerti.
37. On šel po prostranstvu, lišennomu tverdi,
38. on slyšal, čto vrem′a utratilo zvuk.
I obraz Mladenca s sijan′em vokrug
pušistogo temeni smertnoj tropoju
39. duša Simeona nesla pred soboju,
40. kak nekij svetilnik, v tu ērmnuju t′mu,
v kotoroj dotole ešče nikomu
41. dorogu sebe ozarjat′ ne slučalas′.
42, 43. Svetil′nik svetil, i tropa rasširjalas′.
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Commentary on individual verb forms.

10. The form of the Past Pfv Passive — Passive Participle + Past Tense of the copula bylo povedano ‘it had been told’ — in the statal interpretation (see Knyazev 1989) expresses anteriority. Hence the flashback. In this case the conjunction a ‘but’ takes part in the expression of anteriority: the use of i ‘and’ instead of a would make an actional interpretation of the verb possible, in which case the Pfv form would be interpreted normally as a following event, in accordance with Rule A.

11 and 12. The Future Pfv forms are interpreted in the syntactical register; the point of reference is fixed by the event ‘it had been told’.

30. The Past Ipfv oklikali ‘hailed’ in the sentence No tam ne ego oklikali, a Boga proročica slavit′ uže načala ‘Yet it was not he who was hailed, but God whom the prophetess had begun to praise’ can be interpreted in two ways: 1) in the sense of a state synchronous to the point of reference, which is possible in verbs of speech (on the stative meaning of performative verbs see Kustova, Paducheva 1994) and 2) in the general-factual meaning of the Ipfv, i.e. in the meaning of an event preceding the point of reference.

41. The flashback is expressed lexically — with the help of the adverb dotole ‘hitherto’. Note that here the Ipfv form, used in the general-factual sense, expresses an event, not a process as is usual for the Ipfv.

It must be said that diagrams such as the one above are possible only for portions of text in which the flow of time is subject to one consciousness. In this particular example it was the consciousness of the narrator. In the presence of several consciousnesses the space-time continuum breaks up into separate disconnected fragments. In such cases the narrator sometimes intervenes to ensure synchronization. Such a situation is noted by Vinogradov (Vinogradov 1980) in Pushkin’s “The Queen of Spades”, where in Chapter 2 we read:

One day — it happened two days after the evening described at the beginning of this story and a week before the scene on which we have just dwelt — one day Lizaveta Ivanovna <...>.

Thus, in traditional narrative the basic tense is the narrative past; the forms of the present and future tense are interpreted largely in the syntactic key. Below we shall discuss more refined literary tense forms, such as the speech present, the narrative present and the personal present (in FID).
2. **Speech Register and the Speech Present**

A good example of a narrative text in which time is interpreted in the speech register is part 1 of Yuri Olesha’s novel “Envy”, see Pavan 1981 on time and tense in this novel.

The speech regime is characteristic of works written in the form of a diary. Cf. the following passage from Bunin’s diary “Cursed Days”:

1. Vstretili Hal’berštata ... ‘We met [Pfv] Halberstat ...’
2. I etot “perekrasilsja”. ‘This fellow has “changed [Pfv] his colours” too’.  
3. On, včerašnij belogvardeec, ... uże pristroilsja pri gazete “Golos krasnoarmejca.” ‘Yesterday’s White Guardsman, ... he has already found [Pfv] a job at the “Voice of the Red Army Man” newspaper.’
4. Vorovski şeptal nam, čto on “soveršenno razdavlen” novostjami iz Evropy. ‘Furtively whispered [Ipfv] to us that he is “absolutely shattered” by the news from Europe.’

Diagrams 3–6, as opposed to 1, 2 contain the moment of speech (MS):

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Diagram 3
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1. vstretili [Pfv]  
2. perekrasilsja [Pfv]  
3. pristroilsja [Pfv]  
4. şeptal [Ipfv]

Commentary on the diagram. The Pfv forms in 2 and 3 express simultaneous events (in spite of Rule A), since they are referentially identical: pristroilsja is a concretization of the cataphorically used “perekrasilsja”, i.e., reveals its content. Strictly speaking, it is not the events themselves that are connected by simultaneity, but their perfective states. The temporal relationship between 1 and 2 (also simultaneity) derives from the simultaneity of the perfective state 2 (has “changed his colours”) and event 1 (met). The moment of speech takes part in the interpretation of this text, because everything said refers to the past. The Ipfv şeptal ‘whispered’ denotes a simultaneous situation according to the Rule A, though it conveys foregrounding information.

For comparison we shall demonstrate the speech register in Anna Akhmatova’s poem “The swarthy youth...” which was written in 1912, the year of the centenary of the founding of the lycée, whence its obvious allusion to Pushkin):
1. Smuglyj otroк *brodil* po allejam, A dark-skinned youth *wandered* along these alleys,
2. U ozernych *grustil* beregov, By the shores of this lake he *yearned*,
3. I stoletie my *leleem* And a hundred years later we *cherish*
   Ele slyšnyj šelest šagov. The rustle of steps, faintly heard.

   Igly sozen gusto i kolko A layer of pine needles *covers*
4. *Ustilajut* nizkie pni... The stumps with a thick, bristly mat...
5. Zdes' *ležala* ego treugolka Here *lay* his three-cornered hat
   I rastrepannyj tom Parny. And his tattered copy of Parny

1912

Diagram 4

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<td>1. <em>brodil</em> [Ipfv Past]</td>
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<td>2. <em>grustil</em> [Ipfv Past]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <em>leleem</em> [Ipfv Present]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stoletie</td>
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<td>4. <em>ustilajut</em> [Ipfv Present]</td>
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<td>5. <em>ležala</em> [Ipfv Past]</td>
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Many other poems by Akhmatova are interpreted in the speech register, for example, *Ja vižu vsë...* “I see all...” and *Na šee melkiх ěctok rjad* “A small rosary around her neck...”.


On <God>, buduči na mnogoe gorazd,
Ne sotvorit — po Parmenidu — dvaždy
Sej žar v krovi, širokokostnyj ùrst,
Čtob plomby v pasti plavilis’ ot žaždy
Kosnut’šja — “bust” začerkivaju — ust.

The last two lines can be translated litteraly as follows:

‘So that fillings would melt in my mouth from the burning wish to touch [your] — [Ipfv] cross out “bust” [and put] — lips.’

Here we find an imitation of the speech act of self-correction (discussed in Chapter II.3), so that the poem’s genre is identified as “quasi-impromptu”. In traditional narrative, for which the basic tense is the past, the speech act
of self-correction is impossible. In fact, one of the functions of the grammatical past in traditional narrative is the separation of the time of the narrative from the time of the reader’s perception of the text, while self-correction presupposes speaker-addressee simultaneity.

A lyrical poem not only has a speaker in the first person but also imitates the presence of a synchronous listener (Kovtunova 1986), which creates a suitable context for self-correction. The lyrical hero, unlike the narrator, may imitate the creation of the text simultaneous to the perception of the text by the addressee. This text may express feelings that the hero is experiencing as it were at this particular moment.

Vinogradov (1986) mentions the “play of tenses” in Akhmatova’s poetry as a characteristic feature of her style. The modern technique of grammatical analysis makes it possible to formulate Vinogradov’s observation in more precise terms: the “play of tenses” is the change in regimes of interpretation. In fact, Akhmatova often makes a shift from the narrative regime to the speech regime of interpretation. Below we give a diagram for her poem “Confusion”.

1. *Bylo dušno* ot žgučega sveta, *It was stifling in the burning light,*
2. *A vzgljady ego, kak luči.* *And his glances — like rays.*
3. *Ja tol’ko vzdrognula: etot* *I merely shuddered: this one*
4. *Možet menja priručit’.* *Could tame me.*
5, 6. *Naklonilsja — on čto-to skažet.* *He bowed — he will say something.*
7. *Ot lica otšlynula krov’.* *The blood drained from my face.*
8. *Pust’ kamnem nadgrobnym ljažet* *Let love be the gravestone*
   Na žizni moej ljubov’. *Lying on my life.*

*Diagram 5*
Commentary on individual verb forms.

2. The poem begins in the narrative regime (cf. the narrative past of the 1st sentence Bylo dušno ‘it was stifling’); consequently the present tense in vzgljady ego kak luči ‘[are] like rays’ is, strictly speaking, incorrect: it should be the past Ipfv — byli kak luči.

6. The future tense of the verb skažet ‘will say’ is in fact interpreted in the syntactical key — with regard to the implicit ‘I realized’: ‘he bent down <at some moment of textual time> and I realized <at that moment> that he was going to say something’; so the future tense is read anaphorically — as following the point in time fixed by the act ‘he bent down’, and not deictically, as following the moment of speech.

7. The time of the event [krov’] otخlynula ‘[the blood] drained from’ is counted from the time of naklonilsja ‘bent down’, the last event in the world of the text, and not from the last tensed form skažet ‘will say’, which denotes an event in the heroine’s inner world, not correlated with the main time axis.

8. The last sentence is marked by a transition to the speech register: the future tense lžažet [lit. “[the gravestone] will lie down”] is interpreted as following the moment of speech, and not the last moment of the textual time, recorded in the text by the event otخlynula ‘drained from’, see Vinogradov 1986: 432. Thus the time relation between otخlynula ‘drained from’ and lžažet ‘will lie down’ is not the same as the earlier one between naklonilsja ‘bent down’ and skažet ‘will say’: in skažet the future is counted from the moment in time fixed by the preceding event in the text, i.e., from the time of ‘bent down’; whereas the form lžažet denotes the future in relation to the lyrical heroine’s present moment and is in no way connected with the textual time.

As we can see, the poem “Confusion” demonstrates an intriguing phenomenon — a change in the interpretation regime inside one text. This change is perceived as introducing a kind of “gap” before the last couplet. The future suggests the presence of the present tense determined by the moment of speech which was not there up to the last sentence of the poem. Something similar takes place in the narrative on the border between the main narrative and the epilogue, which usually has the present as its basic tense, cf. the epilogue in “The Queen of Spades” or in Chekhov’s story “Ionych”.
Our diagrams do not reflect one important point — namely, the dynamics of the perception of the text. The play of tenses consists, inter alia, in the fact that we are not immediately aware of the participation of the moment of speech in the interpretation of the text. The beginning of the poem is interpreted in the narrative register, i.e., it was stuffy does not suggest any precedence to the moment of speech; the past is understood as the narrative past, which records a textual moment in time, not correlated with the moment of speech, as in the opening sentences of famous narratives of the sort *Ja približalsja k mestu moego naznačenija* ‘I was going in the direction of my place of destination’ (Pushkin. “Captain’s daughter”, Ch.II) or *Ja ežal na perekladnyx iz Tiflisa* ‘I travelled by post-chaise from Tiflis’ (Lermontov. “The hero of our times”). The unexpected change of the point of reference at the end of the poem, i.e. the transition from one interpretation regime to another, forms the essence of the literary device: the poem does not fit into a solely speech or solely narrative register of interpretation (on the device as a violation of the norm, see Lotman 1970).

There could be a similar play in the poem “The swarthy youth...”: the reader, brought up on the narrative, will at first probably understand the Past Tense in *roamed* and *was sad* mistakenly in the narrative meaning as having no reference to the moment of speech. However, the speech register becomes obvious as early as the third line, and the false initial hypothesis is simple discarded.

In Akhmatova’s poem “Zvuchala muzyka v sadu...” ‘Music sounded in the garden ...’ in the middle of the second stanza we find the present tense and even non-narrative speech acts, cf.

*Kak nepožoži na ob”jat’ja
Prikosnovenja ětiḫ ruk!
‘How unlike embraces
the touch of these hands!’*  

The verb forms, however, do not permit a consistent interpretation in the speech register: the present *pojut ‘sing’* in the final stanza (*A skorbnyx skripok golosa pojut za steljuščimsja dymom*) is understood as the narrative present: the moment described by this present tense is identical to that one that was previously described by the Past Tense form.
The reverse shift is also possible, i.e., from the speech to the narrative regime. Thus in the opening lines of the poem “Beside the sea” —

Buşt́y izrezali nizkij bereg, The bays indented the low seashore
Vse parusa ubežali v more, And all the sails fled out to sea
A ja sušila solenúɉu kosu While I was drying a salty braid

the Past Pfv forms indented and fled presuppose a speech register interpretation: they are perfective states continuing at the moment of speech. This moment of speech does not arise, however. The following Past Ipfv form was drying is interpreted in the narrative mode.

A change of point of reference during the development of the text may be seen as a change of priority subject of consciousness, as a transition from the viewpoint of the narrator to that of the lyrical hero, though in this particular case these two are combined in the same person.

3. The narrative present

One of the ways in which the narrative present differs from the narrative past is that, by virtue of the ambiguity of the form of present, it gives broad scope for a play of interpretations: the form of the Past Ipfv narrative is unambiguously correlated with the present moment of the textual time; whereas the form of the Present allows freedom of choice in interpretation — it may denote the moment of speech (the speaker’s time); the textual time as the time of the narrator; and the personal time of the character. The Past Pfv form is neutral in relation to the interpretation regime and possible in all forms of discourse.

Pasternak’s use of tenses is illuminating in this respect, for Pasternak makes extensive use of the narrative present. His use of tenses may be characterized as “lapsing into narrative” — the transition from speech register to the narrative. This type of breakdown in the interpretation of verb forms can be seen, for example, in the poem “Dawn” (the diagram goes up to line 14, after which the time does not move).

1. Ty značil vse v moej sud’be. You were my life, my destiny.
   1. T y značil vse v moej sud’be.
   2. Potom prišla vojna, razruļa, Then came the war and ruin, too,
   I dollgo-dolgo o tebe And for a long, long time I had
   3. Ni sluļu ne bylo, ni duļu. No word, no scrap of home from you.

   2. Potom prišla vojna, razruļa,
   I dollgo-dolgo o tebe
   3. Ni sluļu ne bylo, ni duļu.
I čerez mnogo-mnogo let
4. Tvoj golos vnov' menja vstrevožil.
5. Vsju noč' čital ja tvoj zavit
6. I kak ot obmoroka ožil
7. Mne k ljudjam xočetsja v tolpu,
   V ič utrennee oživlen'e.
8. Ja vse gotov raznest' v ščepu
   I vseč postavit' na koleni.
9. I ja po lestnice begu,
10. Kak budto vyxožu v pervye
    Na ėti ulicy v snegu
    I vymeršie mostovye.
11. Vezde vstajut, ogni, ujut,
12, 13. P'juč čaj, toropjatsja k tramvjam.
14. Vid goroda neuznavam.
15. V vorotač v'juga vjažet set'
   Iz gusto padaļuščiči xlopev,
16. Vse mčatsja nedoev nedopiv.
17. Ja čuvstvuju za nič za vseč,
18. Kak budto pobyyav v ič škure,
19. Ja taju sam, kak taet sneg,
20. Ja sam, kak utro, brovi xmurju.
21. So mnogo ljudi bez imen,
    Derev'ja, deti, domosedy.
22. Ja imi vsemi pobežden,
23. I tol'ko v tom moja pobeda.

Now after many, many years
Your voice stirs memories of pain.
All night I read your testament,
And rouse myself to life again.
I long to be with people, crowds,
To share their morning animation,
Prepared to smash to smithereens
Their wrongs and fears, their desolation.
And so each morning I run down
The stairs, at breakneck speed below,
As though this were my first release
To long deserted street in snow.
The lights come on in cozy rooms.
Men drink their tea, and hurry down
To trolley lines. Within an hour
You’d hardly recognize the town.
The blizzard weaves its nets of snow
Around the gates. In each family,
To get to work on time, the men
Gulp down their porridge and their tea.
My heart goes out to each and all,
To everyone who feels he’s down;
I melt myself as melts the snow,
And as the morning frowns, I frown.
As wives, as children, or as trees,
These people are a part of me:
They rule my life, and by that sign
I know my sole true victory.
Commentary on individual lines of the Diagram 6.

1. The imperfective značil ‘meant’ is understood unambiguously in the sense of the speech past — as a state which has finished by the moment of speech, and not as the narrative past, i.e., not as a state which is continuing at a certain point of textual time and presupposes a synchronous observer (as in Akhmatova’s “Zvuchala muzyka v sadu...”). So from the very first sentence the text is interpreted in the speech regime, and the reader waits for the moment of speech to appear. Why it is so? Firstly, because verbs of stable state, unlike those of action or process, are incapable of recording a moment in time — that is their lexical property, cf. Bulygina 1982. This makes it impossible to understand the Ipfv form značil in a narrative sense. Secondly, the deictic you and my enable us to see it as a speech regime, see Paducheva 1986 (similar unambiguous retrospection in Pushkin’s “Ja vas ljubil ...” ‘I loved you once...’).

4, 5 and 6. The events vstrevožil ‘disturbed’ and ožil ‘rouse to life’ are connected by coreference. The events čital ‘read’ and ožil ‘rouse to life’ are con-
nected by a causative relation. Consequently the temporal relations are not the essential ones in this place. Strictly speaking, Rules A and B do not hold here.

7. The present tense want may be understood in the speech register: the hero is telling us about his state at the moment of speech. The moment of speech we have been waiting for arrives at last. But only in order to disappear immediately afterwards.

9. The form begu ‘run’ cannot be interpreted in the speech regime. The lyrical hero could not be running as he utters the text which is perceived at the same moment by the addressee-reader. Here the present tense form should be understood as the narrative present: the poet is recounting what happened to him at a certain moment in the past (cf. the usual narrative I vot ja idu po ulice ‘And here I am going along the street’), and not what is happening to him now (thus, the synchronicity of the forms 9, 10 with moment of speech is dubious). But in that case the interpretation just offered for want must be questioned: run relates to a later point in time than want and in the speech regime no point can be later than the present without being the future.

14. The sentence V tečen'e neskol'kič minut Vid goroda neuznavaem [lit. “In the course of a few minutes the town is unrecognizable”] can actually be understood in two ways: either a) the town became unrecognizable in a few minutes, or b) it was unrecognizable for a few minutes, and then stopped. What is said literally is b), although common sense suggests a), of course. How can the interpretation a) be explained linguistically, however? It could be represented as the result of the transformation which perfective verbs denoting events undergo in the historic (narrative) present: perfective aspect does not exist in the present tense, and in present narrative events that normally require Pfv are denoted by the Ipfv; so, in Present narrative a verb in the Ipfv can be understood in the meaning of its perfective aspec-tual counterpart. For example, In the course of a few minutes I understand = ‘understood’. Likewise, In the course of a few minutes unrecognizable = ‘became unrecognizable’: here a deverbative adjective unrecognizable is subject to this transformation of surface imperfectivization. This analysis confirms the narrative interpretation register for l4.
17. However feel and the rest of the text is again interpreted in the speech regime.

Another revealing example of Pasternak’s lapsing into narrative is the poem “Razluka” ‘Parting’:

1. S poroga smotrit čelovek, He stands and stares across the hall
   Ne uznava doma. And does not know his home.
2. Ee ote’ezd byl kak pobeg, Her sudden leaving was a flight,
4. Povsjuđu v komnata xoas. He does not try to master why
   On mery razoren’ja The havoc of the rooms,
5. Ne zamečaet iz-za slez Because his headache makes him faint,
   I pristupa migreni. And tears obscure his eyes.
6. V uša x s utra kakoj-to šum. A throbbing pain rings in his ears.
7. On v pamjati il’ grezit Is he awake or dreaming?
   I počemu emu na um And why so constant in his mind
8. Vse mysl’ o more lezet? The vision of the sea?
9. Kogda skvoz inej na okne When you no longer see the world
   Ne vidno sveta bož’ja Behind hoar-frosted panes,
   Bezvyxodnost’ toski vdvojne The hopelessness of sorrow’s more
10. S pustynej morja sxoža. Then the loneliness of desert seas.
11. Ona byla tak doroga And yet he drew her close to him,
    Emu čertoj ljuboju, One dear in every feature,
12. Kak morju blizki berega As the shore is closer to the sea
    Vsej linij priboja. With each inflowing tide.
13. Kak zapolnjaet kamyši As reeds sink downward in a storm
    Vloen’e posle štorma, With seas in agitation,
14. Ušli na dno ego duši The form and grace of her sank deep
    Ee čerty i formy. Within his secret soul.
15. Byla k nemu pribita. She reached to him for help.

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Sredi prepjatstvij bez čisla, Amidst the endless obstacles
Oпасности минуя, And perils of the sea,
16. Volna nesla ee, nesla The waves had borne her on, but near,
17. I prignala vplotnuju. And nearer to him still.
18. I vot teper′ ee ot"ezd, And now her sudden flight — perhaps
Nasil′stvennyj, byt′ možet! Not by her choice at all.
19. Razluka iḫ oboix s"est, This parting may bring on new grief
20. Toska s kostjami sgložet. And suffering unto death.
21. I čelovek gljadiť krugom: He looks around this room again.
   Ona v moment uxođa In the hurry of her leaving,
22. Vse vyvorotila vverẋ dnom She turned each old familiar thing
   Iz jaṧčikov komoda. In every drawer upside down.
23. On brodit, i do temnoty He paces up and down in darkness,
24. Ukladyvaet v jaṧčik He stoops, keeps putting back
   Raskidannye loskuty The scattered scraps of sewing
   I vykrojki obrazčik. And patterns in their places.
   I, nakolovšis′ ob šit′e And having pricked his finger on
   S nevynutoj igolkoj, A needle in the cloth,
25. Vnezapno vidit vsju ee He sees the whole of her in life

Although there is no lst person in the poem (the 3rd person character here behaves as in FID), it begins in the speech regime: the speech present in smotrit ‘looks’ and 5 ne zamečaet ‘does not notice’; the retrospective past in 2 byl kak pobre ‘was like flight’, 11 byla <...> dorogá ‘was precious’ and 15 byla <...> pribita ‘was nailed’; and the speech future in 18, 19 and 20. But in the last two stanzas the speech interpretation of the present forms becomes impossible due to the laws of combinability of the verb with time adverbials. The sentence On brodit i do temnoty ukladyvaet v jaṧčik raskidannye loskuty [lit. “He roams about until the dark and puts tossed rags back in the drawer”] does not permit the synchronous position of the observer which is required for a speech interpretation of the present tense form. The adverbial until the dark, like all adverbs of duration with a com-
pleted time interval, requires retrospection and, consequently, the past tense (see Paducheva 1992): it is a transformation to the narrative present of the sentence *He roamed about until the dark and put* <...>. Likewise, the combination *suddenly sees* is the result of the narrative transformation of the combination *suddenly saw* with the verb in the perfective past.

The poem “Marburg” shows frequent changes in the interpretation register of tense forms. In one case the change is marked by delineation (before the line *Here lived Martin Luther. There — the brothers Grimm.*). But if we take it for granted that there should only be one interpretation regime in each section, two more such delineations should be made (so that there are four sections altogether). The fact is that in the lines:

... Ja sdelal *sejčas* predložen’e,
No pozdno, ja sdrejfil, i vot mne otkaz.
Kak žal’ ee slez! Ja svjatogo blažennej!

the word *sejčas* ‘now’ is used in the sense ‘*sejčas*-2’, i.e., ‘just before’ (see Chapter II.1), in which it can be used only in the conversational regime. But in that case the opening section —

Ja vzdragival. Ja zagoralsja i gas.
Ja trjassja.

should also have been put in the speech register. As it is it can be understood only in the narrative. Thus, between the first and second sections we witness a change in the point of reference: the first section records the textual time (the moment of observation), whereas in the second a transfer to the speech regime takes place, i.e., the moment of speech arises.\(^{44}\)

In the third and longest section, which is consistently written in the narrative regime, only Past Ipfv forms are used: time stands still here, moving neither forwards or backwards — right up to the last stanza, where the Past Pfv form appears for the first time (*When I fell down before you* ...), which moves the time back — to the moment when he was refused. Then follows the interior monologue: *How beautiful you are!* etc. Forms *Propalo* 

\(^{44}\) We leave open the question of whether this is a linguistic failure or a literary device. Cf. the setting of this task — on different material — in Shmelev D. 1990.
‘Finished’ and *Otvergnut* ‘Rejected’ refer to what has happened before and do not record actual moments of textual time.

In the fourth and final section we find speech register and a rich gamma of tenses: the past (*Zdes’ žil Martin Luther. Tam — brat’ja Grimm* ‘Here lived Martin Luther. There — the brothers Grimm’), the present (*I vse ěto pomnjať* ‘And remembers it all’) and the future (*Net, ja ne pridu sjuda zavtra* ‘No, I shall not go there tomorrow’). The deictic pronouns *here* and *there* confirm the identification of the register as a conversational one, although the speaker’s interlocuters are rather pathetic: *Čto stanet so mnoɉu, starinnye plity?* ‘What will become of me, ancient stones?’ Pasternak goes on to describe the sequence of events in a time interval from the middle of the day to the following morning, without leaving the speech register at any point. Having answered the question “What will become of me?”, the writer shifts to the future tense to which the answer belongs (*Toska passažirkaj skol’znet po toman I s knižkoɉu na ot-tomanke pomestitsɉja* ‘A passenger’s tedium will slide over the tomes and settle on the sofa with a book’, i.e., the hero will settle on the sofa with a book). The present tense of the imperfective aspect in the following line —

*Akaciej paẋnet i okna raspaẋnuty*

‘There’s a scent of acacia and the windows are open wide’ — is understood as introducing to a new point in time: it is already evening. Further on we find the speech present in the figures stand aside. There can be no question here of a narrative transformation of the Pfv form stood aside. The tense of *The night triumphs* must also be interpreted as speech present. Finally, in *I recognize the face of white morning* we find the speech present in the instantaneous meaning (Leech 1975: 2). The poet makes masterly use of the speech register to portray the sequence of events — for which it is not well equipped: in the narrative register perfective forms (or imperfective in the sense of perfective) are used to express shifts in the current time; in the speech regime this can be achieved by non-grammatical devices only: time flows between utterances, each of which describes a static situation.

4. The present tense in FID

The present tense in FID differs from the narrative present because it is the “real” present: it denotes the present moment of the character. But it also
differs from the speech present, primarily because the characters, unlike the participants in a speech situation, not only speak, but also act. Time moves. Therefore in FID the Present Ipfv may alternate freely with the Past Pfv, which was not the case in the lyrical passages with speech time. Another distinguishing feature of FID is that in order to denote the character’s present moment use can also be made of the narrative past, which is the narrator’s time.

We shall now examine the use of tense forms in FID as illustrated in a passage from Bulgakov’s novel “The White Guard”.

A FID typology has not yet been elaborated, but two types can be clearly distinguished. The first is monological, when the viewpoint is consistently maintained of one character, the experient, who to some extent combines the functions of character and narrator, see the description of the semantics of the present tense in this type of FID in Chapter III.3. The other type is polyphonic, and “The White Guard” is polyphonic to a very high degree. There are several main characters, and with rare exceptions (as, for example at the beginning: O, Santa Claus of ours!), their voices do not blend into one, but each sound separately. In addition there is a narrator as a representative of the author. And, most importantly, as one would naturally expect, Bulgakov plays on the ambiguity and indefiniteness of the point of view. That is to say, ambiguity becomes a poetic device (as was shown on other examples in Jakobson 1960): the author demands an attentive reader, who will reflect on the indefiniteness and unravel the puzzles, such as the Ah... Ah..., which belongs, it later transpires, to Nikolka, and acts as a kind of “Nikolka” call sign radio station, cf. Ivanov 1978: 137).

The presence of the narrator in FID narrative makes it easier for the reader to understand the time relationships in the text: the characters are not able to bear the whole burden of expressing the time order of events, particularly if there are several of them. The basic time frame is constructed by the narrator, and the fragments where the character rules supreme are inserted close-ups: the narrator gives the character the floor for a minute or two.

In FID the present tense of imperfective verbs denoting static situations in the character’s actual or non-actual present is combined with the perfective past for current events: the perfective forms shift the point of the actual pre-
sent. The register of use of aspectual-temporal forms in which the basic time is the present and denotes the character’s present moment may be called the personal regime. The personal regime makes effective use of all tense forms.

Below we trace the use of tenses in the short first chapter of part one of “The White Guard”.

The text is closely anchored in the absolute chronology — the December of 1918. The textual time begins with the mother’s funeral. The personal and narrative interpretations of tense forms alternate. In the first paragraph we find the past tense narrative (*It was a great and terrible year...*). In the second the past tense gives way to the present; the narrator is gradually giving way to the character: cf. the beginning —

But the days fly like arrows in years of peace and of bloodshed too, with the end — O, Santa Claus of ours <...>! Mama, our radiant queen, where are you now?

The third paragraph contains the narrative past and an omniscient narrator:

A year after the daughter Elena had married Captain Sergej Talberg..., but in the following fourth paragraph the past tense is already interpreted as a “reminiscence” justified by the speech act, i.e., it is the personal past:

When [we] were burying mother it was the May <...> the diakon gloomily rumbled the words of religious farewell to Mama who had abandoned her children.

The fifth paragraph begins in the narrative past and ends with Nikolka’s interior monologue (*Why such an insult!*), Nikolka serves as a focus of the author’s empathy for the next two paragraphs though they are entirely in the narrative past. The final *Ah ... Ah!* is almost the character’s direct speech.

After the break a new section begins, for which the basic tense is the present:

In reply to the bronze one, with a gavotte, which stands [Present] in mother’s, and now Elena’s, bedroom, the black grandfather clock chimed in the dining room.

From this present is counted the past with a retrospective meaning (imperfective aspect in the general-factual meaning) — *Father bought it a long time ago*. The first sentence of this section uses the personal past:

Many years ago <...> the tiled stove in the dining room had warmed and brought up Elena when she was little...;

and the last one the present:
But clocks are fortunately quite immortal.

Thus, time in this section has a personal interpretation. Correspondingly, other egocentrical elements are contextualized through the characters as well, for example:

Everyone was so used to it [the clock], that if it had ever miraculously fallen off the wall, they would have mourned as if some dear voice had died and there was nothing to fill the empty spot.

The same personal discourse continues up to the end of the section.

The following section, which begins with the words But how were they to live? How? (in relation to their dying mother’s behest Live in harmony!) is all in the present tense (Turbin ... is twenty-eight; and whirls and whirls and does not stop; thinks; does not begin; becomes; the blizzard howls and howls etc.), and the voices of the characters finally drown the narrator here.

This is followed by the future tense — prolepsis, a clear breach of the chronology (“cataphonic reference to events that have not yet occurred in the story-world at the point of the text at which they are reported”, Fleischman 1991). This is the narrator making himself heard again:

the walls will collapse, the falcon will fly away from the white mitten [on the carpet], the light in the bronze lamp will go out <...> And they will have to suffer and die.

So the general principle in “The White Guard” is the past narrative for the narrator and the personal present for the characters. But in those sections where the voices of the narrator and characters merge, the register for the use of tenses merge too. The narrator does not give way to the character, as in monological FID, but on the contrary stresses his presence.

The norms for the use of the present tense in FID are different in different languages. Thus, the Russian Present Tense passages in the English translation of the novel often shift to the past tense. For example, No, kak že žit’ = ‘But how, how were they to go on living?’ and Nu, dumaetsja = ‘Now, they thought’. The Russian narrative in general uses the present tense far more widely than the English. This is true not only of FID, but also of traditional narrative. An explanation of this fact has yet to be found.
5. The Narrator’s Time and the Hero’s Time
(as illustrated by Nabokov’s novel “Pnin”)

Time is one of Nabokov’s favourite themes, see Saputelli 1986. In the novel “Pnin” Nabokov endows his hero, a professor of Russian literature, with some of his own observations on time in “Anna Karenina”. One of them is that for Anna and Vronsky the action of the novel covers about four years, but for Kity and Levin just over two. This problem, the connection between the flow of time and the character, deserves attention. The novel “Pnin” enables us to to make certain points on the separate flow of time of the character and the narrator.

The figure of the narrator (initially exegetic) in “Pnin” is frankly artificial and deliberately contradictory (the novel in general is famous for its uninhibited narrator). We should like to note a number of facts concerning the first chapter only.

1) In the opening paragraph of the novel, the now which was discussed in Chapter II.l. stresses the presence of the narrator in the role of a synchronous observer; at the same time it turns out that Pnin is sitting next to an empty seat opposite two unoccupied ones, and a few lines later we read:

This is how a fellow passenger would have seen him, however, except for a soldier sitting at one end and two women busy with a baby at the other, Pnin was alone in the compartment.

If this is the case, where was the observer who must have seen what trousers Pnin was wearing and how he was sitting.

2) The conductor with whom Pnin is later to discuss the train timetable is at the other end of the train and, therefore, should not be able to be seen by the narrator, since the latter has Pnin in his field of vision. Nevertheless the narrator can see the conductor just as well as he can Pnin.

It follows that the narrator and the character are in incommensurable spaces. But this is not all. It transpires that the narrator’s time is also flowing separately, as it were, from Pnin’s: the narrator does not follow the character in time (as, say, Pushkin in “The Queen of Spades”), but lives in his own time. In support of this we shall quote a number of facts concerning the semantics of some time modifiers and particles.

45 Cf. Vinogradov 1980 on time in “The Queen of Spades”.

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1. The flow of textual time is narrator-oriented: in the phrase *now they are in flannel trousers* the word *now* records the present moment of the narrator irrespective of any events with the character.

2. What does *teper’* ‘now’ mean in the sentence *We shall now reveal a secret: Professor Pnin had got onto the wrong train by mistake*? In fact Russian *teper’* means “now after something”. But this *teper’* cannot mean “after something that has happened to the hero” because so far nothing has happened to Pnin who is travelling on the train: we have been told about the forties and his life in Europe, but the present-day Pnin is described only in the extended present (*Now, at the age of fifty-two, he was obsessed with sun baths* etc.), but not in the actual present. Consequently, *teper’* means “after the narrator has said what he has said”.

3. Then we are given some general information about Pnin — about his college and the fact that Pnin does not get on with things, etc. — and then there is a second returning to Pnin’s actual state, again quite unmotivated:
   Which, incidentally, does not alter the fact that Pnin was on the wrong train.

4. The third return to the actual Pnin is particularly characteristic:
   And he *still* didn’t know that he was on the wrong train.
   This *still* does not refer to any time interval of the diegetic world. In that world time is still not moving, because no events have happened in it; *still* relates to the narrator’s time, namely, to the time interval which has passed between the two last returns by the narrator to the actual situation on the train\(^{46}\).

   Thus we conclude that not only the narrator is localized in a separate space, but he also has separately flowing time: this time is determined solely by the events which are happening to him, the narrator, and does not include the character\(^{47}\).

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\(^{46}\) *Cf.* an example of separate flow of time from Gogol’s “Dead souls”:
Manilov led his friend into the room. Though the time during which they will go through the corridor, the dining-room and the living-room, is rather short, let us try *<...*>* to use it in order to say something about the host.

\(^{47}\) It should be noted that the time schemes from Section 1, which give one a fairly good idea of single-plan time, are not suitable in such a case as this one of the separate flow of time of two different subjects of consciousness.
Chapter III.2

The Destruction of the Illusion of Reality as a Literary Device

The points of correlation between the real world and a world that has been fabricated is one of Vladimir Nabokov’s favorite themes; see Levin 1990 on bi-spatiality as a device in Nabokov’s works, or Alexandrov 1991 on the Nabokovian “other worlds.” The following discussion will concern the story “Recruiting,” in which this theme plays out in a new way.

The story “Recruiting” (written in 1935) makes for one of the most effective Nabokovian mockeries of the reader. Still, the reader does have a means of revenge against the author, since it is possible to read the story through and remain without a clue — i.e., just as the author would have it — only the first time around.

The story, in its entire complexity barely five pages long, consists of three untitled parts.

The first part describes an elderly gentleman, a Russian emigré (his name — Vasily Ivanovich — appears only in Part Two), who, while returning home by tram from the funeral of a certain Professor D., falls into reminiscing about his sister who died several years back. The narrative is characterized by all possible signs of personal style: the hero is marked as the subject of consciousness and serves as the frame of reference for all egocentric elements. Cf. *nynče, v tramvae, vozvraṧčajas’ s kladбиṧča* ‘today, in the tram, returning from the cemetery’: time of the narrative corresponds to the chronological present of the hero; exclamations and parentheticals belong to the hero; and, in general, all internal states and attitudes are related from within and are not subject to the narrator’s mediation, whether the narrator has the role of synchronic observer, or any other role:

<...> чуднaja, чудnaja duša, na pervyj vzglјad živiущјa umno, umelo, bojko, no kak ni stranno, s udivитel’nymi prosvetami grusti, izvestnoj emu odnomu, za kotorуje, sobstvenno, on i ljubil ee tak. ‘<...> a marvelous, marvelous soul [about his sister], who, at first glance, seemed to live intelligently, competently, with a certain vivacity, yet strangely enough, was visited by unexpected moments of pervasive sadness that he alone detected, and, as a matter of fact, for which he loved her so’48.

48 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the omniscient narrator from the absence of a narrator. Here our point of departure is that if in a certain fragment of a text there are no traces
The third person “he” (as yet unnamed) here subtly works as a substitute for “I”, insofar as the speech approaches free indirect discourse.

However, in Part Two the first-person pronoun appears unexpectedly, and it is clearly in reference to the narrator, who, as we must now conclude, was a synchronic observer of everything involving Vasily Ivanovich (V.I.) in Part One, although the narrator did not reveal himself as such. In the first paragraph of Part Two, the first-person pronoun appears twice, both times in parentheses; and in the second set of parentheses the reader begins to suspect incongruity:

Nakonec (i `tot moment ja kak raz i šxvatil, posle čego uže ni na minutu ne upuskal iz vidu rekruta) Vasilij Ivanovič vyšel.

‘Finally (and I happened to catch just this moment, after which I didn’t allow the recruit out my sight even for a moment) Vasily Ivanovich came out [of the tram].’

For what reason does the narrator call his hero a recruit?

The initial appearance of the first-person pronoun within the first set of parentheses is odder still:

V tramvae <...> do samogo konca ucelel <...> staryj prisjaznyj poverennyj (tože nikomu, krome kak mne, ne nužny).

‘In the tram <...> until the very end remained undisturbed <...> an old barrister (also needed by no one save myself).

In the second paragraph of Part Two (where V.I. decides not to return home quite yet, but rather to sit for a bit on a bench in the city square) the narration returns to the tranquil personal style observed in Part One. Deictic elements — nedavno ‘recently’, vot sejchas ‘just now’ — are interpreted through the hero; the subjectless dvojnoe vpečatlenie (‘double impression’) is as well; and even čuvstvo <...> utomlenija, prijatnost’ (‘a feeling <...> of fatigue, a pleasantness’) is deliberately described from an interior perspective. V.I. appears as the subject of consciousness in all instances.

However, in the third paragraph metatextual elements increase:

Xotelos′ by vse-taki ponjať, otkuda ono, ěto ščast′ye... Ved′ pomilujte, čelovek star, bolon, na nem uže metka smerti.

‘Surely it would be nice to know where it comes from, this happiness. Since, for goodness’ sake, the man is old and sick 49 — he already has the mark of death.’

of the presence of a narrator, then this fragment must get personal interpretation — at least if the hero’s voice can be detected in a neighboring fragment.

49 We should note that the utterance Čelovek star ‘the man is old’ itself is somewhat ambiguous in terms of point of view: it could belong to the narrator, but it could also just as well come from the point of view of our hero — in relation to himself, but addressed to someone else
Now, the third person pronoun of V.I. is no longer a substitute for the first person, as it was in the first part; here, one can assume the presence of a narrator: one hears — although not quite distinctly — a voice that does not belong to V.I. The narration continues with accounts of V.I.’s past that are also more natural coming from the perspective of the narrator rather than from that of the hero. Although an omniscient narrator would be more befitting here, the narrator who was introduced to us in the first paragraph, as we know, “caught sight” of his hero in the tram car just then.

The fourth paragraph again reflects the inner state of V.I. as described from within. We should note, in particular, the parenthetical sentence (insofar as parentheticals are the cornerstone of narratology):

...bezumno bożalas’ pokojnikov, potomu čto, kak govorila, ne verila v boga.
‘...[she] had an irrational fear of the dead because, as she would say, she didn’t believe in God.’

Here, V.I. assumes the role of the speaking Subject, the narrative equivalent to the Speaker, who sympathetically relates another’s words by means of a parenthetical aside: it is the sister who used to say that she didn’t believe in God, while V.I. accepts this as a fact which serves to explain to him the kind of fear of the dead that she experienced.

But then in the fifth paragraph the narrator comes into full play. He refers to himself in the first person (again in parentheses: po-moemu... ‘I believe...’), though he makes his presence known from the very beginning of the paragraph with the metatextual tak vot ‘and so, to continue’ and below with ėtu sestru ‘this sister’: V.I. could not refer to his own sister as ‘this sister.’ This point confirms that the question of the sources of V.I.’s happiness posed in the third paragraph is of interest to the narrator and not to V.I. himself; and, thus, it is precisely the narrator’s voice in the third paragraph. Before our very eyes

(a glance at oneself from afar), as, for instance, in the example Ne davi živyj ljud’ja, ja ešte ne umerla ‘Don’t choke living people: I haven’t died yet’. Likewise, vse-taki ‘after all’ and pomilujte ‘for goodness’ sake’ do not attest unambiguously to the existence of someone on the outside of the character. Only after metka smerti ‘the mark of death’ are all previous ambiguities resolved in the narrator’s favor. The ambiguity of point of view, certainly, is intentional. Cf. the ambiguity in the Russian word nabór ‘conscription, recruitment, recruiting’ and ‘set’, which serves as the story’s title (in the English translation — “Recruiting”) Nabokov did not succeed in preserving this ambiguity. Incidentally, English translations of Nabokov’s works in general, as a rule, do not count on the reader’s spontaneous understanding to the same degree as the Russian originals.

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the narrator concisely summarizes his observations — *kak budto prokrucivaet plenku* — with the aim of clarifying the source of the hero’s happiness:

so heavy, weak, lethargic, that he could neither raise himself from his knees nor depart from the tram stop (the conductor’s arms mercifully protracted downward — and, I believe, one of the passengers helped as well.).’.

A “counterpoint” of the points of view arises: V.I. himself, as we know, noticed only the help of the conductor. Now V.I. is described through the eyes of an external observer — clearly, the same observer who is presently assessing the scene):

‘He sat quietly setting apart his wide thighs....’

The landscape sketch at the end of the second part is extremely significant. It is the narrator, foremost, who sees this landscape, and not V.I.:

‘Bees were servicing blossoming linden above him...’

Afterwards it will become clear that V.I. also held some elements of this landscape within the scope of his attention, i.e., that V.I. and the narrator comprised a sort of singular observer of this landscape. It is important that up to this point V.I., with all of the characteristics and conditions ascribed to him — including the “unseemly”, or rather inappropriate in his situation, happiness — makes sense. The appearing and disappearing narrator provides the only point of tension, acting as a synchronic observer of events, and, therefore, in some unclear manner, fitting into the closed space of the narrative — such as that of the tram car or the bench in the park.

A real test awaits the reader in the third part. Here, in the very first lines, a pronoun of the first-person *I* appears (*kogda s nim i so mnoj slučalis’ takie pripadki sčast’ja*) ‘when such surges of happiness would overtake him and me’; furthermore, this *I* can no longer be confined to the role of narrator-observer — beginning with the fact that *I* is the subject of an emotion. Meanwhile, the emotion of the narrator is not such that it concerns the events being narrated — something which is permitted in tradi-
tional narration (Cf. Uvy, bylo pozdno ‘Alas, it was late’). Narrator’s emotion is presented to the reader as a fact of independent significance which means switching from one narrative form to another.

After several lines the mystery of the first person is revealed: the reader at this point falls out of the frying-pan into the fire! It turns out that this I signifies the author-creator of the given text; therefore, everything that has happened up to this point is nothing more than the fruit of the creative imagination of this I. (We denote the subject who stands behind the first I of the text, the narrator, as I₁, and the subject who is behind the second I, the author-creator, as I₂).

Whereas, with the appearance of the narrator in the transition from Part One to Part Two, the reader merely has to revise his or her prior picture of narrative events (by adding to it the figure of the narrator-observer belonging to the textual world), he must now fully abandon the entire picture that has developed up to this point. The creative framework (Levin, 1990), which destroys all illusion of reality, has been exposed.

It turns out (within the fictive world of the text) that there is no Vasily Ivanovich in the sense of a man by that name, of that nationality (and corresponding orientation toward the world, cf. sredi čužoj berlinskoj tesnoty ‘within the unfamiliar, cramped space of Berlin’); with a sister; who is on his way home from a funeral. There is only the man whom I₁ “recruited” in the tram, and beside whom I₂ took a seat on the bench. All remaining facts of the biography and inner life of V.I. are essentially the creation of our “author” I₂ — the fruit of his creative imagination:

i vot, speša kak-nibud′ pomračnee i potipičnee meblirovat′ utro V.I., ja i ustroil emu ėtu poezdku na poẋorony
‘And so, hurrying to furnish VI.’s morning somehow in a bit more gloomy and more distinctive fashion, I arranged for him this excursion to a funeral’;

the sister arose out of the similarities between “V.I.” and a generous lady socialite, kotoruɉu pomnɉu s detstva ‘whom I remember from childhood [it

50 It is not entirely clear what I₁ recruited “Vasilij Ivanovich” for, since I₂ writes the story, and not I₁; cf. also byl zapovedno svjažan so mnoj, obrečennyj pojavitišja na minutu v glubine kakoj-to glavy na povorote kakoj-to frazy ‘he was intimately connected with me, doomed to appear for a moment at the turn of some phrase in the middle of some chapter’ (we must note here the allusion to the famous point in Gogol’s “The Overcoat”: ‘not in the middle of a line, but rather in the middle of the street’): here, ‘with me’ = with I₂.
is I₂ who remembers].

<...> I vse èto soveršilos' s golovokružitel'noj skorost'ju, potomu čto mne vo čto by to ni stalo nužno bylo vot takogo, kak on, dlja epizoda romana, s kotorym vožus tretij god. ‘And all of this came about with dizzying speed because, no matter what, I needed this sort of man, just like him, for an episode of my novel that I’ve been struggling with for three years now.’

It turns out, further on, that Part Two was dedicated not to V.I.’s feeling of joy, but to the “author’s” upon finding his character model — it was creative joy. We shall return to the question of why the “author” želal, čtoby <...> Vasilij Ivanovič razdeljal by strašnuju silu moego blaženstva ‘wanted V.I. to share the frightening power of my bliss’.

As evidenced above, the entire text that we have just read through, right up to the appearance of I₂, is the creation of the “author” I₂. By analogy with the situated narrator (as, e.g., Tomsky in “The Queen of Spades”), we can call the “author” I₂ the “situated author.” The main distinction between the situated narrator and the situated author is that the reader is not forewarned of the latter’s existence: up to that moment, we understood as fiction of the first order (i.e., as reality, so to speak) that which, as it now turns out, was fiction of the second order.

When Gogol, at the end of Part One of Dead Souls, says that he fears that by mentioning his name he will wake Chichikov, an absurd situation arises:

No my stali govorit’ dovol’no gromko, pozabyv, čto heroj naš, spavšij vo vse vremja rasskaza ego povesti, uže prosnuls’ i legko možet uslyšat’ tak často povtorja-emuju svoju familiju. ‘But we have begun to speak rather loudly, forgetting that our hero, who, having slept through the entire recounting of his story, has already awoken and could easily hear his so frequently repeated name.’

Such a point of collision between the real and fictive world does not afford a sensible interpretation (the picture assembled from the juxtaposition of textual and metatextual elements is contradictory). Nabokov, meanwhile, safely avoids descending into the absurd; the reason for this is that his “author” turns out to be not a real author but a special kind of character: he belongs to the world of fiction just like his recruit. This becomes obvious in the last paragraph of the story: the one whom we have up to now called the
“author” I₂, i.e., who has been sitting on the bench with “V.I.”, is referred to as moj predstavitel’; ‘my representative’:\footnote{Via this the reader must, generally speaking, reach the end of the story for a full understanding of the character of I₂. Indeed, theoretically there is nothing imperative in this: as soon as any sort of metatextual predicate is attached to the subject I, he becomes a character, cf. Connolly 1992: any narration about oneself turns oneself into a character.}

Moj predstavitel’ byl teper’ odin na skamejke, i tak kak on peredvinulsja v ten’, gde toľko čto sidel V.I., to na lбу u nego kolebalas’ ta že lipovaja proxlada, kotoraja venčala ušedšego. ‘My representative was now alone on the bench, and since he moved into the shadow where V.I. had just been sitting, the same coolness\footnote{The linden’s shadow or the coolness figures into the story several times as a symbol of world which is juxtaposed to the real world — either as the world of the afterlife, as at the cemetery, or some other world in general, in the given instance, the fabricated world, see: Alexandrov 1991.} of the linden, which had wreathed the one who departed, played on his forehead.’

This I, to which the possessive pronoun ‘my’ here refers, is, so it seems, already the I of Nabokov himself (I₃). Consequently, the situated author I₂ is a fiction: he is the same kind of figure, created by a higher-standing consciousness, as V.I. from Parts One and Two, who is a figure created by the situated author. The “author” I₂ is the double of the real author. If in traditional narration the author has a right to one representative, then here there are three.

In the English translation of the story (belonging to Nabokov himself) the unmasking of the situated author in the concluding paragraph leaves even less ambiguity: “My representative, the man with the Russian newspaper”. The double-identified character of I₂ is addressed in the third person when his membership in the world of characters is not subject to doubt. But the transgression of boundaries between the fabricated and the real worlds does not occur (remember “Dead Souls”): it is not the creator who sits on some bench with the hero, but rather there are two heroes. The issue here is simply a matter of linguistics: the range of possible interpretations for the pronoun I in the narrative widens.

So the relationship between I₂ and I₃ is clarified. Let us look now at I₁ and I₂. The character I₁ from Part Two can be identified as the narrator — and the reader accepts this determination readily. On the other hand, I₂, who destroys the illusion of reality, is introduced in Part Three as a new character:

Rjadom, na tu že <...> skamejku, sel gospodin s russkoj gazetoj. Opisatʼ étogo gospodina mne trudno da i nezačem, avtoportret redko byvaet udačen.
'Right beside [him], on the very same <...> bench, a gentleman with a Russian newspaper sat down. It would be difficult for me to describe this gentleman — and there is no need to do so, since self-portraits are so seldom successful.'

And further on, the following is said about “V.I.”:

Počemu ja rešil, čto čeloveka, s kotorym ja sel rjadom, zovut Vasilij Ivanovič?

‘Why did I decide that the man I sat next to was named V.I.?’

— as though I2 had not had the previous joint excursion in the tram with V.I.

In the final analysis, it is true that I1 and I2 merge identities, but it is as though unintentionally: in the last scene V.I. is presented as

čelovek, kotorogo ja snačala uvidel opuskaemym iz tramvaja i kotoryj teper′ sidel rjadom

‘a man whom I first caught sight of being let out of the tram and who was now sitting beside [me].’

Nabokov deliberately does not want I1 and I2 to be one and the same person who first noticed “Vasily Ivanovich” in the tram, and then sat beside him on the bench. Indeed, these must be different consciousnesses: after all, I1 figures in the picture when V.I. still has his entire biography intact, including his state of happiness. I1 is interested only in its reason; meanwhile, from the moment of I2’s appearance, it was as though V.I.’s happiness had never been. At the same time, the person in the tram still had his name, that is, while he was still under the authority of I1; thus, at the very least, I1 and I2 exchange some information. Between I1 and I2 we find the kind of relationship typical for doubles, which is usual for Nabokov. This relation is a relatively smooth means of mastering the kind of absurdity with which a collision of the real world with a fabricated world is fraught53.

We should return now to that moment in textual time when I2 says

Počemu ja rešil, čto čeloveka, s kotorym ja sel rjadom, zovut Vasilii Ivanovičem? ‘Why did I decide that the man I sat next to was named Vasilii Ivanovich?’.

The “author” and “V.I.” — the elderly gentleman on the bench — remain in our field of vision. And from this moment the story corresponds compositionally to Vermeer Delft’s “The artist and his model”: there is an “author” (entering the picture as a character); there is a model (an elderly gentleman sitting next to him on the bench); and there is a canvas, which is the text of

53 When worlds enter into one another, a problem of cross world identification arises, known to be a highly sophisticated problem of logic.
Parts One and Two of the story. At this given moment, the canvas need not appear particularly accurate, just as in Vermeer’s picture, where the artist partially obstructs it with his own body. Beginning at this moment, we clearly understand that the theme of our text from now on (and, generally speaking, also from the very beginning) is not at all the fate of a Russian emigré, but “about the poet and poetry.” At this moment, where we now find ourselves, the situated author I₂ narrates in the modus ‘Ich-Erzählung’ about his reservations concerning what has occurred. Simultaneously, he also acts as the synchronic observer of what takes place with regard to “V.I.” further on; i.e., he assumes the role of narrator. The question Počemu ja rešil<...>? ‘Why did I decide <...>?’ is directed to the reader; I₂ has a right to ask this question as narrator never violating the conventions of the corresponding narrative form.

In other words, the story, having produced this inconceivable twist, returns, as though nothing had happened, to the route of traditional narration. The situated author, assuming the role of narrator, on the one hand, describes to us his own state and, on the other, that of “V.I.”, sitting next to him. “V.I.” is now presented through the eyes of an outside observer. What he does, what he is looking at — all of this the narrator judges according to the external manifestations (for example: toľ'ko snovali zrački za steklami ‘only the pupils darted about behind pieces of glass’); the result is almost a parody of the observer’s external position as per Uspensky 1970/1973.

Textual time does not move right up to the moment when V.I. begins to leave. The past tense of the verbs is interpreted as narrative past; i.e., tense is not correlated with the present moment as the moment of speech. In narrative past, in particular, the situated author describes his emotions at the given moment:

Kakoe mne delo, čto tolstyj staryj čelovek, kotoryj <...> teper’ sidel rjadom, vovse, možet byt’, i ne russkiy? Ja byl tak dovolen im!
‘What business was it of mine that the fat old man who was now sitting next to me was, perhaps, not Russian at all? I was so happy with him!’

The situation has nothing to do with the absurd. That is to say, the two heroes have grown so similar in the created picture that Nabokov makes a special effort to restore our sense of the artificiality of what is taking place; he thus reminds us that one of the two characters, after all, is not a typical
hero, but — in one way or another — his, Nabokov’s, representative, that
is a figure from the other world:

Vasilij Ivanovič <...> vzgljanul na moju gazetu, na moe zagrimirovannoe pod čita-
telja lico

meaning to say that, in fact, I am not a regular reader (of the newspaper),
but am even the writer who has already written — though, truthfully, not
very clearly at times — the given text about him (its first and second parts),
and who will still write a novel.

Still it is not a normative traditional narrative. For example, the use of
vot ‘there is’ from the standpoint of the traditional norms of grammatical
correctness raises the reader’s doubts when it occurs in parentheses within
the description of the toy wooden car that V.I. follows with his eyes: vot
upal nabok, no prodolžal exat’ ‘There it fell on its side, but continued to
move’. The point is that normal usage of such a vot requires a context of
the present tense (see Chapter II.2), cf.

Vot begaet dvorovj malčik (Pushkin) ‘There is the house boy running’;
Vot paradnyj pod”ezd (Nekrasov) ‘There is the main entrance’.

A valid use of vot with the past tense we encounter at the end of the story
within the context of the action of the main character, who propels textual time:

Vot s usiliem on podnjalsja, vyprjamilsja, pereložil trost’ iz odnoj ruki v druguju i <...>
spokojno dvinulsja proč’.

But this is the perfective aspect, that finds a place for itself in both tenses.

And another violation occurs in the form of the present tense: esli ne
ošibajus’, naveki. ‘If I’m not mistaken, forever.’ How does I₂ manage to use
the present tense? After all, up to this point, his referential time was only the
past. In principle, the difference between ‘I’ and ‘he’ in traditional narrative
consists of the fact that for ‘he’ the present moment does not exist (the third
person’s present tense is characteristic for FID). Meanwhile, we can imagine
the first person as having a present moment beyond the confines of the text:
this is the present tense of the author-creator of the text. But I₂, after all, is

54 Again an intentional lack of singularity of meaning: the reader of the newspaper, as well
as the reader, is a “usual” person — in contrast to the writer, creative conscience of a higher order.
the situated author! Is it not I₃, i.e., Nabokov himself, who stands behind this present tense and who will raise his visor in the next paragraph?

As we see, the experiment met with success: the situated author, i.e., the author-creator, provides a double layer of fictiveness, and nearly everywhere this complicated narration lends itself to an unambiguous semantic interpretation.

The narrative construction with the situated author arises, of course, on the basis of the figure of situated narrator. But the situated narrator is usually made explicit in advance, whereas the construction with the situated author invariably leads the reader through a world from world transgression, i.e., the destruction of the illusion of reality. ⁸ Eichenbaum writes with regard to the metatextual fragments in “The Overcoat” that they “create an impression of play with narrative form”. The story “Recruiting” is not already a play, but rather a “developing attack” in the area of the new possibilities of genre.

We will now formulate the main points of divergence from the standard structure of the narrative demonstrated by the story “Recruiting”. It is possible to concentrate them around a number of topics of Nabokov’s permanent interest.

1. The relationship between the author’s creative consciousness and the images generated by his imagination.

2. The approach to a particular consciousness as a foreign consciousness (see: O’Connoly 1992).

3. A purely formal concern — the conventions of narrative genre.

The first topic reveals itself most clearly in the multiplicity of the subject of speech. The traditional figure of the narrator divides into two: it would be normal for the narrator-observer to be the real author’s representative within the text (the real author-creator having no place within the text by definition). Here, first the usual narrator arises; then the author-creator of the given text appears; and at the very end, this latter turns out to be nothing more than a character.

On the other hand, in the background of this series of author-doubles ensues a logical line of allusions which suggest that I and V.I. are one and
the same person, or at least similar personalities; that Vasily Ivanovich is
the alter ego of I:

— *s nim i so mnoj slučalis’ takie pripadki sčast’ja* ‘— such surges of
happiness would overtake him and me’;

— “V.I.” and the “author” together comprise a total observer of the
landscape with the tram and the truck in Part Two;

— finally, the fixed desire of the “author” that “V.I.” share his feeling
of happiness.

All of these allusions are also an effective play with the laws of narra-
tive genre, which allows the author to enter into the figure of the hero, to
empathize with him, and, on one level or another, to merge his own identity
with his. In the meantime, Nabokov parodies traditional narration, insofar
as it is normal for the author to share those feelings experienced, in the
course of events, by the hero; and here, the hero is made to experience
those feelings that have swept over the author (admittedly, in connection
with the hero, but in his hypostasis as a recruit on the “literary front”).

The second topic develops in the differentiation of deictic elements of ref-
erence relating to one and the same character: one and the same character is re-
ferred to — in the author’s speech — sometimes in the first person and some-
times in the third (see, above, *avtoportret redko byvaet uдаčen* ‘self-portraits
are seldom successful’); such a shift in point of view is not allowed in tradi-
tional narrative. This topic is worked out in more detail in the story “Heavy
Smoke” (not to mention “The Gift”), while here it is of secondary importance.

In this connection, the figure of the barrister arouses suspicion:

‘In the tram <...> until the very end remained undisturbed one more from among
those who had been at the funeral — a mere acquaintance of V.I., an old barrister
(also needed by no one save myself), and V.I. for some time mulled over the ques-
tion of whether to start up a conversation with him’.

It is difficult to assume that this is an incidental character who does not fit in
later on, since it has been said precisely of him that he is “needed.” In appear-
ance, he bears a resemblance to V.I. (cf. *s vyraženiem ironii na sil'no zapuščennom lice* ‘with an ironic expression on [his] terribly neglected face’) and, because of the situated author’s empathy towards V.I., to the situated author as well. A merging of identities with I₂ would serve to explain *nikomu, krome kak mne ne nužnyj* ‘needed by no one save myself’ — ‘by myself’ meaning that it is by the author that the barrister is needed, insofar as he is *my representative*, i.e., I myself. However, the assumption that it is the very same person who in Part Three will sit on the bench next to V.I., i.e., that it is the “author” I₂ (but in that hypostasis in which he is still depicted in the third person, as when he appeared in the park) leads to a contradiction: if the barrister is I₂ then that means that I₂ was at the funeral; furthermore, V.I. is distantly acquainted with the barrister, but not with the person who sits next to him on the bench. It is possible that the introduction of this strange figure is qualified by Nabokov’s desire to confuse the relation between I₁ and I₂.

Now, having uncovered the devices and experiments with narrative style, we can present what the case was (just as Vygotsky (1968) restores the “fabula” of Bunin’s story “Light Breathing” upon which its “sčužet” is composed).

In traditional narration, there are: 1) the author, 2) the hero, and 3) the representative of the author in the world of the hero — the narrator; the narrator can tell a story from his own life, and then 2) = 3) = I. This does indeed take place in our story (the recruit is not the hero, but more an element of the landscape, insofar as he is important only in terms of his exterior). As a result, the theme of the story “Recruiting” becomes how I found a person suited in appearance for *My* novel, threw together a sketch on this theme, and experienced joy from *My* creative success.

The story “Recruiting” is of interest not only as an experiment with the structure of narration, but also from a purely linguistic point of view: in particular, in connection with the findings regarding the text’s meaning. The story briefly illustrates what it is natural to refer to as the ‘meaning’ of a text, distinct from the ‘meaning’ of a sentence: if the structure (static) depicts the meaning of a sentence adequately, then the meaning of a text is essentially not its static structure, but the process by which one understanding takes the place of another.
CHAPTER III.3
MONOLOGICAL FID: THE SHORT STORIES OF RUSLAN KIREEVEV

1. EXPERIENT: ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AUTHOR

The short story “Seven o’clock sharp at the Metro” is a typical example of monological FID. It is a kind of story within a story, only the place of the storyteller is taken by a character whom we shall call the experient: the role which in traditional narrative is played by the storyteller is taken over by the experient in FID. Before it reaches the reader everything that takes place passes through the consciousness of the experient: the reader sees what the experient sees; imagines what the experient is imagining or remembering at a given moment; hears what the experient is thinking (insofar as the latter for the most part talks to himself rather than simply thinks — and it is important with what words he expresses his thoughts, see Lotman 1970: 326); etc. No significant event takes place on its own; the reader learns about each event only through the reaction which it produces in the experient.

The communicative situation which forms the basis of FID is not a “narrator — reader” one as in ordinary narrative (where the narrator narrates and the reader listens), but a “character-reader” one: the character passes through a sequence of inner states — mental, perceptual, emotional, etc., — and the reader witnesses them. FID is practically impossible in the pure form; so, what we want to demonstrate is that even in FID the narrator partially retains his positions.

The heroine-experient of the story “At seven o’clock sharp” is a middle-aged woman (she is called Vera; the name is not introduced in the beginning, which is typical of FID), who came to Moscow many years ago to find a job and works as a controller in the metro. Her husband (or perhaps he was still a fiance) went missing in the war, and she has lived all these years alone in a small (“plo xo j”) room. At the moment when the time of the narrative begins, just before seven o’clock in the evening, a woman at work comes up to Vera to tell her some “news” (“Vol o d ka Opryatov has been seen with Zagorodnaya”); but Vera’s attention is completely focused on a young girl (Vera calls her “Cesarochka”), who is wait-

55 The beginning of the story sounds like follows: Ne na lica smotrela — na ruki. Kto proezdnoj pokazyval, kto soval talončik, i ona, porvav, brosala kločok v vysoku žestanju urnu.
ing for her boyfriend at the usual place by the ticket office in the metro). As we learn from what comes later, the affair, which has developed before Vera’s very eyes, is probably nearly over, and the simple “action” of the story is basically that the young man does not turn up.

Everything that happens to Vera in the external world of events is trivial and uninteresting. Her real world is the world of “epistemical events”, now connected with the young girl.

The following examples show how Vera “works” in the role of experient:

1. Rasufyrennaja damočka gnevno vskinula golovu. <...> nakrašennye guby priotkrylis’, i ottuda vypolzlo: “Grubijanka!” Vstala na eskalator, vniz poexala. The flashily dressed woman tossed back her head angrily. <...> Her heavily painted lips opened and out slid: “Foul-mouthed hussy.” [She] got onto the escalator and went down.

2. “A nu-ka!” — oklixnula ona šmyggnuvšego mimo mužčinu. <...> Zagorel kak negr; zuby blesstjat. Vera otvernulas’. ‘Look at him!’ she called to a man darting past. <...> Tanned as a black and [his] teeth are shining. Vera turned away.

3. Pridirčivym vzgladom Vera obvela vestibул’. <...> V storone, u Fedjuškino lotka <...> stojala Cesaročka. Vera cast a critical glance at the vestibule. <...> Standing on her own, by Fedyushka’s stand, was Cesarochna.’

4. Bespokojno ogljanulas’. Cesarochna stojala vse tam že, ždala. [She] looked round anxiously. Cesarochna was still standing there, waiting.


6. Vnizu prošumel očerednoj poezd, i ne prošlo minuty, naverẋ vzletel angeloček so šlɉapoj v ruke. <...> Vera gljadela poverẋ golov, vysmatrivaɉa Cesaročkino. ‘Another train came in noisily, and a moment later a cherub flew up, with a hat in his hand. <...> Vera was looking over the heads, trying to see Cesarochna’s.’

7. A Cesaročkino net. ‘But Cesarochna’s wasn’t there.’

8. Angelоček <...> dvinulsja obratno, no ne odin, s podružkoj. Gvozdiki nɉuẋa-la...Otkuda, interesno, vzjalis’ oni? Liš’ šljaпа byla v ruke u nego, ničego bol’še. ‘The cherub <...> came back, but not alone, with a girlfriend. [She] was smelling some carnations... [lit.: “[she] carnations\ was smelling”] Where could they have come from? He had only been carrying a hat [when he went down], nothing else.’

9. Na eskalator smotrela Vera. Černen’kij, v svetlom plaṙčе... Ona sžala šholodnyj poručen’. No net, ne on. ‘Vera looked at the escalator. Black hair, in a light-coloured raincoat ... She clutched the cold rail. But no, it wasn’t him.’

The sentences in italics are a description of perceptions of events, and not of the events themselves. This is clear not only from the lexical context (looked round, turned away, etc.), but also from other specific features of the text structure. Cf. the word order in (8) — гвоздик нюхал; or the assertions of absence in (7) and (10): a proposition concerning absence of something cannot be just a state-description in the sense of Carnap: there must be a subject of consciousness registering this absence; and this is obviously the experient. Or take the omitted subjects in (1), (8) and (9): the subject is omitted because it is prominent in the context in which the experient is — it is obvious for the experient.

Let us now consider examples in which the development of the narrative proceeds through the emotional reactions and thoughts of the experient (emotions are based on thoughts, see Wierzbicka 1988). To be more precise, they are not thoughts, but inner speech. This includes a large number of expressive and dialogue-oriented constructions — constructions that acquire their full meaning in the speech regime, are excluded in traditional narrative, but permitted in FID:

(11) a. Visitors [lit. “those who came from outside”] — they were such a nuisance. Either stood there like a post, or put a ten-copec piece in instead of five copecks <...> provincials!

b. Everyone went there [to the south] these days! It was the fashion. But she personally wouldn’t go if you paid her to. She’d lived there, I’ll have you know, before you were even born (in her anger, she was talking to no one in particular).

c. <...> set off, fat-arse, in a her coat almost down to her ankles. Couldn’t even take up the hem!

d. This time only a few came up, and all of them women for some reason. Out on a spree!

The phrase Ej лиčno darom ne nužno ‘She personally wouldn’t go if you paid her to’, from (11b), is a typical unspeakable sentence (in the sense of Banfield 1982) — a sentence of the narrative, excluded in the conversational discourse). In the speech regime this лиčно ‘personally’ may be used only in first-person sentences:

Mne лиčno darom ne nužno [lit. “As for me personally, I don’t need it free of charge”]. This personally is possible in (11b) only because in FID the third person behaves like the first in all essential respects.
Any description of an event of the external world in FID is set in this or that modal frame — the epistemical attitude of the subject of consciousness; consequently, each utterance has its own modus, if only an implicit one — this may be the modus of perception, judgement, emotional reaction, etc. The inferential modus is of interest. In (12) the sentences in this modus are italicized; they are conclusions that Vera makes for reasons that are sometimes known to her alone:

(12) Cesaročka was standing apart <...> It must be seven o’clock then. They always met at seven [the last sentence is a concession to the reader].

(13) Half past seven? The vestibule would soon be empty [because — Vera knew — the next time for a rendezvous was eight].

The specific modus of FID sentences, particularly perception modus, reveals itself in the syntax. For example, omission of the subject of the sentence we spoke about above typically occurs in the context of perception modus. But it can be modus of thought as well, cf. RanŠe vsegda pervym prixodil ‘Before [he] always used to arrive first’; Snizošla-taki ‘So [she’s] gone down after all!’ and many others.

See below some other examples of egocentrical elements and constructions for which the priority subject of consciousness is the character-experient, which fact enables us to identify the text as FID.

1) Subjective modality, for example, indirect speech acts: Only how would she go away from here? (= ‘she can’t possibly’).

2) Interpretation of behaviour: Snizošla-taki ‘So she’s gone down after all!’ [about Guseva]. Vera smiled to herself. The mention of the smile shows the reader that the previous wording was a mere irony on the part of Vera: she gives an interpretation of Guseva’s behaviour that fits in with her story, but does not believe the story herself.

3) Moduses that ensure time shifts are of special interest. Prolepsis is created by the prediction modus: He’ll turn up soon; or by modus of fear: She’ll go away now. In general, the form of the future tense usually requires a subject of consciousness for its full interpretation.

Analepsis (flashback) is ensured by the modus of remembering or imagining. In the sentence Ona vyplyvala, ne deržas' za poručen', prjama.
tonen'kaja ‘She flew in, not holding the poruchen’, straight and slim’ the past tense is interpreted as referring to the past because it is in the scope of modus of remembering. This is Vera thinking to herself and only because of this the reader learns about it at this very moment of the textual time.

The semantic analysis of the text in FID requires the reconstruction of moduses for all FID-sentences.

A characteristic feature of FID is that epistemic predicates in parenthetical use with no overt subject (i.e., in an egocentrical construction) contextualize through the experient, not the narrator, as in traditional narrative:

(14) She’ll split herself [Guseva], [she] knew.
How fond we all are, [she] thought, of lying!
Where, [she] wondered, had they come from?

Knew and thought relate to Vera, and so does wondered.

The particle deskat’ with its stereoscopic semantics is also at the disposal of the experient in FID:

Lob namorščila [Guseva] — ne ponimaet, deskat’.
‘[She — Guseva] has wrinkled her forehead — to say [Russ. deskat’] she doesn’t understand.’

This is Vera realising that Guseva is pretending.

There is a parenthetical phrase in the text, however, for which the experient cannot be the hypothetical subject of consciousness:

(15) Xlopnul turniket. Guseva dosadlivo obernulas’ i — delat’ nečego! — pošla, tolstozadaja, šinel’ že čut’ ne do ščikolotok.
‘The barrier slammed. Guseva turned round angrily and — there was nothing else for it [delat’ nečego] — set off, fat-arse, in her coat almost down to her ankles. Couldn’t even take up the hem!’

Here as before the situation is presented in Vera’s perception of it; her assessment (fat-arse) and criticism of Guseva for her long coat. But delat' nečego ‘there was nothing else for it’ expresses Guseva’s regret. Thus in a single sentence we find the points of view of two different characters.

Let us now turn to those aspects of the story that presuppose the figure of the narrator, and to the distinguishing line between the jurisdiction of the narrator and that of the character. Although events come to the reader through the consciousness of the experient, the narrator stands behind the
actual denotation (in the text) of the act of perception or thought. Thus, passages (16) and (17) could also have been taken from traditional narrative:

(16) — Namazala rožu, — procedila Vera vsled.
    ‘— Painted [your] face, — Vera hissed after her.’

(17) Vera gljadelapoverčgolov, vyusmatrivajacesarolčinkogo. Daže nacyločkivstala.
    ‘Vera looked over the heads, searching for Cesaročka’s. Even stood on tiptoe.’

In fact, hissed in (16) discloses the external point of view. In (17) the presuppositions of the word even (such as ‘She could have done something else’; ‘Who could expect that she would do thus much!’, see Boguslavsky 1985) are interpreted, in the context of the first sentence, as also belonging to the narrator.

The narrator’s presence can be suspected also in the flashback revealing the pre-history of “Cesarochka’s” relations with her beloved. True, only Vera is responsible for the expressives in this passage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>laps</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ves’ prijamo-taki vytjagivaloja</td>
<td>‘he stretched right out’;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ščastlivye byli denečki!</td>
<td>‘They were happy days!’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The syntax with the omitted subject also corresponds to Vera’s referential position: the names of the characters are omitted on whom she focuses her attention. In that case, however, the modus of this flashback cannot be identified: is it Vera reminiscing? No. Or a story told to an invisible listener? No, again. The end of this passage eventually gives Vera an alibi:

[They] greeted one another behind the heavy <...> doors, but Vera did not see this.

The obvious difficulty which the author experiences at this point is of a general nature. The fact is that epistemical attitudes vary in their degree of “suitability” for the author who selects FID as a narrative form: the perceptions, judgements, deductions and predictions of the character-experient interweave easily into the thread of the narrative, because in these moduses the experient is on the same side of the epistemical barrier as the reader — what is new for the reader is new for the experient as well, and this naturally comes within the scope of the narrative. The modus of knowledge is much more difficult to handle: indeed, there is no point in the character displaying his knowledge without good cause. So the author has to make a special effort to justify “switching the attention” of his experient to some section of his sphere of knowledge. This is usually done with the help of the “remem-
bering” or “imagining” modus. Cf. the description of the room where Vera lives, which is introduced in this modus, though somewhat clumsily:

And she immediately remembered — it came to her all of a sudden — her own tiny room.

Thus, taking this story as an example, we see that in FID the experient is the author’s representative in the world of the text, just as the narrator is in traditional narrative.

2. Narrator and Tense

As we know, the story teller in traditional narrative may to a greater or lesser extent be a character of independent interest. The same is true of the experient in FID. In the short story “An Unsuccessful Attempt to Go to a Café on a Public Holiday” the experient is to a greater extent the main character and to a lesser extent a perceptive frame for the story within a story; it is significant that the story’s title reflects here the line of the experient and not of the inserted character only, as in the preceding story. In “An Unsuccessful Attempt” the proportion between FID and traditional narrative is even more in favour of FID, at least at the beginning. Here a typical FID device is fully exploited, that appeals to the experient’s modus of knowledge: the story is a description of the character’s inner states which are a reaction to certain events. For the character these events are merely the source (and in part the content) of her present emotions, and only these emotions are depicted, whereas the reader must guess from individual details and hints what actually happened.

If one removes the device (namely, the portrayal of events through the consciousness of the experient) in “An Unsuccessful Attempt”, what is left is rather banal. An elderly loving couple, Lidia Alekseevna and Ivan Matveevich, have arranged with their married daughter that she and her husband will come to their place to celebrate the holiday, but at the last moment, when all the preparations have been made, the young couple back out and to make up for the disappointment Ivan Matveevich invites his wife to a café; the excursion is a failure, because an outing to a Soviet café, as we all remember well, was only for those with nerves of iron.
As before, the experient is a female character. Even where the references are clearly to the inner states of Ivan Matveevich, Lidia Alekseevna formulates them for him, because in a sense they are her own as well:

(1) '<...> pominš’ pjet’desjat vtoroj, vsju noč’ guljali? On snisxoditel’no gmykal. Čto emu pjet’desjat vtoroj, on i sejcas xot’ kuda — kavaler, vser’ez ozabočennyj tem, kak pointeresnee razvleč’ damu

‘<...> remember fifty-two, we stayed out all night? [This is supposed to be L.A. talking] He hemmed condescendingly. What was so special about fifty-two, he was as game as ever now — a gentleman with one thought in his head, how to entertain his lady.

This idea of the translation of the inner state from an external character to the experient is made explicit at the end of the story: She sensed the mocking glances of the silent young queue, not on her own back, but on his. One cannot help recalling I weep with your tears from Tchaikovsky’s opera “The Queen of Spades”.

The character’s interior speech is presented as ordinary speech, cf. the repetitions in (2a) and (2b) and anticipatory pronouns in (2c), all characteristic of conversational speech:

(2) a. We ourselves make life difficult for us. Ourselves.
   Why did they have to go there, why?
   She would survive, she, a woman, would survive a lot.
   b. And all the time they were as busy as bees. Him and her.
   c. But now what, now just shut up!

The beginning of the story is based on things being left unsaid. The opening sentences:

For her it was not unexpected. [What is “it”? ] Deep down she had been afraid for a long time, that the children would change their mind on the day. [Change their mind about what?].

The heroine’s distress is connected with a telephone call, but it is not clear at first, how this call is localized in time, because in general the temporal and spatial localization of the events that caused the inner states of the heroine shown to us are not clear. The planned flow of time begins with a sentence containing the word now, which fixes the present moment, the point of reference for the whole text:
Well, for example, why not say now: “Vanya, you’re worried because of me, aren’t you ...”\textsuperscript{56}

It now transpires that the whole chain of the heroine’s inner states just presented to the reader (when the textual time did not move, because we were not told of any events actually happening) takes place in the rain, when Lidia Alekseevna and Ivan Matveevich are going to the café, and concerns the events which preceded their departure. From the moment fixed by this now, the flow of time enters the usual narrative regime.

The narrative use of the imperfective past brings the narrator into the arena: behind the phrase \textit{Lidia Alekseevna quickened her pace} the synchronous observer inevitably appears. The further development of events in time is ensured by the usual alternation of perfective and imperfective forms with the narrator in the role of synchronous observer, who provides a kind of synchronous reporting. Note the sentence \textit{She splashed in [to a puddl]} \textit{twice:} according to the general rule (see Wierzbicka 1967, Paducheva 1989, Barentsen 1992) an adverb expressing the number of times an action is performed (\textit{twice}) requires a retrospective point of reference and, consequently, this sentence should be understood as meaning that both “splashings” had already taken place by this moment.

Past forms interpreted in the narrative regime create, in the final analysis, an unambiguous time frame for the narrative. Each verb with the narrative meaning of a temporal form denotes, as it were, a combination of FID with traditional narrative, because the character-experient appears here in both his own role and in the role of narrator.

There is one place in the story which contradicts the treatment of the narrative in this story as synchronous reporting — Lidia Alekseevna, about to lapse into reflections on death, breaks off with:

\begin{quote}
Go away! Go away! [She] began to speak carelessly about something — about the illuminations, perhaps.
\end{quote}

The parenthetical \textit{perhaps} in this context can mean only “I don’t remember exactly”, and this destroys the reader’s illusion that he is a direct witness of

\textsuperscript{56} In fact, time analysis of a narrative should begin by fixing the initial moment of the textual time see, e.g., Toolan 1992: 63. For example, for Nabokov’s novel “Pnin” this moment is his train journey which takes place in 1950, although there are episodes which take us back to his childhood, years in Europe, etc. For the novel “The White Guard” it is 1918, right after mother’s funeral.
the inner states of the experient which are replacing one another in time at
the present moment of his: indeed, the modus of remembering appears — in
relation to one of the events included in the chain all the other links of which
have a synchronous modus. This may simply be an oversight by the author.

The use of tenses in the story is also worthy of comment. The main fea-
ture of FID is the use of the present tense interpreted in quasi-conversational
key, see Chapter III.1. The present tense in FID is quite different from the
narrative present (the so-called historical present) — the form of the present
tense in FID denotes simultaneity with the present moment of the character.

(3) He’s busy trying to please her, not himself, does his best to amuse and dis-
tract her [it is what Lidia Alekseevna thinks about Ivan Matveevich].

The uses of the present tense in the story can be divided into two classes.

1) The present tense is used in a context where the state of the exper-
ient is described by direct quotation of his interior speech, i.e., in the con-
text of the indirect speech act:

(4) Well, never mind, it’s up to them;
(5) She isn’t too bad, but that old Ivan Matveevich ...;
(6) Tanya’s rung — who else could it be? —[she] said she’s sorry but they can’t
come because <...> But what does it matter — why <...>!

Here the present tense belongs to the character who has ousted the narrator.
The syntactical structure of the sentence is such that a different tense is gram-
matically impossible.

2) The present tense is used for a verb that denotes a static situation —
either inserted into the chain of events (actual present); or belonging to the
extended present, as in example (8); or omni-temporal. In this the present
tense competes with the past imperfective of the narrator, which can also
describe a static situation taking place at a given time point of the narrative.
The choice of grammatical tense here is free to some extent, and sometimes
the present imperfective may be replaced by the past imperfective and vice
versa. This suggests that the past tense in this context corresponds to the
narrator’s viewpoint, while the present expresses the viewpoint of the char-
acter. Thus, the past tense in the context of the sentence

(7) But there is only four years’ difference between them would mean a view
from a distance and the “surfacing” of the narrator:
(7') But there was only four years’ difference between them.

Another example where the present can be replaced by the past with the same effect:

(8) It is hard to believe, but over the years they had become increasingly shy of each other.

In (9) the past imperfective is used; but the present is also possible.

(9) She felt this each time she embraced him.

True, in (10), with the imperfective in the habitual meaning, the past tense is doubtful; the same with (11), where the imperfective denotes a permanent state which refers not only to the past but also to the future:

(10) Each time he pretends that he doesn’t see anything special in it;
(11) The kids love them [cream doughnuts].

The present cannot be replaced by the past, however, if the state at the given moment in the textual time is contrasted with the absence of that state at a different moment. For example, in (12) it would be possible to replace the past with the present if not for the comparison with earlier years:

(12) However this shyness, which is perhaps fitting in young people, did not dis-unite them, but engendered a sense of togetherness, unknown in earlier years.

Sentences in which the past tense should have been expressed by the copula byt’ ‘to be’ omitted in the present tense are a special case. The absence of the copula and, consequently, the use of the present tense is clearly preferable in Russian:

(13) Although this café is now nothing at all to her;
    Maybe her Sunday breakfasts, say, are nothing to him as well;
    His feet are dry, so is he likely to think that someone might have wet ones?

The present tense molčit ‘says nothing’ in (14), a direct continuation of (4), is interesting:

(14) And what’s the point of dragging it out now? She says nothing too, doesn’t ask any questions, as if she doesn’t care about the “mysterious” phone call.

There is no emphasis here as in (6), but the experient describes her condition, so the past tense is not excluded. Evidently the present tense here shows that the condition “says nothing” is synchronous to the initial moment $t_0$ of the textual time, which arises a few sentences later (the past tense said nothing would mean silence in the past, at the moment immediately preced-
ing the phone call). In that case (6) Tanya’s rung should be ascribed to the modus ‘now Lidia Alekseevna is worrying over what she guessed then’.

Russian is characterized by a more extensive use of the present tense in FID (and in narrative in general) than, for example, English. For instance, in example (1) the tense is present, though with English translation past forms sound more natural. Or take the example (15) from Section 1: in Russian — Ukorotit′ ne možet! [Present] in English — “Couldn’t [Past] even take up the hem!”

The form of past imperfective can be understood — and in FID this is more natural than in traditional narrative — in the meaning of the natural past, as a moment preceding the present moment of the character. Thus, in the opening sentence For her it was not unexpected the imperfective was not means ‘had not been’ or, in other words, ‘did not appear’ at a moment preceding the present one. The future tense also has the present moment of the character as its point of reference:

(15) Well, never mind, we’ll sit on our own.

So we see that the narrator — with his past narrative tense — invariably disappears in sentences that express emphasis or some speech act of the experient (Well, never mind, it’s up to them!), and invariably resurfaces in those portions of the text that give a view of the experient from a distance (Lidia Alekseevna quickered her pace). In passages where the choice of tense is free, as in (5), the present denotes the viewpoint of the character, whereas the past testifies to a changeover to the viewpoint of the narrator.

The general conclusion is that in FID, even in its monological variety, two consciousnesses are present: the narrator does not disappear entirely; perhaps he has no separate ideological position, different from the central character, but he unvariably retains a temporal one.

An analysis of FID texts shows that in addition to those aspects of the text’s semantic coherence that are already known, such as referential, connectory and temporal (see Ehrlich 1992), attention should be paid to coherence on the level of the hypothetical moduses (speech and mental acts) of the experient.
CONCLUDING WORD

As Gukovsky writes, “all portrayal in art forms an impression not only of what is portrayed, but also <...> just as clearly of the portrayer” (Gukovsky 1959: 200). This applies to literature to a greater extent than to any other art because it derives from the very nature of language: egocentricity — the orientation on a speaking subject — is embedded in a multiplicity of ways in the structure of language; without orientation on a speaking subject language would not possess the unique and remarkable ability of describing precisely and unambiguously, with the help of very limited means, real and unreal worlds infinite in space and time. The variety of devices by which the speaker depicts himself in a linguistic text only recently attracted the attention of linguist. By now, however, linguistics has accumulated quite a lot of material in this area. And it is this material which provides the basis for the study of narrative in the present work.

We have investigated problems of narrative which are concentrated around the concept of the speaking subject, namely, similarities and differences between the narrator in narrative and the speaker in conversational discourse. The results of these investigations can be considered from two different aspects: from the point of view of linguistics as such and on the level of the study of a literary text. Let us begin with linguistics.

In natural language we find a powerful layer of words and constructions which we call egocentricals, because their semantics is orientated towards the figure of the speaker. Study of narrative makes it possible to describe the semantics of egocentrical elements in a wider sphere of use, that is to say, it enables us to add to the canonical communicative situation of ordinary speech the non-canonical one, conventional, defective, and occasionally intentionally complex and artificial, which arises between the author and the reader in narrative. Projection onto this situation enables us to see new aspects of meaning in egocentrical elements of language. The special narrative significance of egocentricals is shown in the present work to be generated by the non-canonicity of the communicative situation implied by narrative.

A central role in the present work is played by the concept of the interpretation register of the egocentrical element. Here we pro-
ceed from the opposition introduced by Benvenist — between the narrative plane and the plane of discourse. But the register is not the same as the plane: in Benvenist the whole text has to belong to the same plane; whereas interpretation modes can change throughout the text, see the examples in Chapter III.2. Moreover, in one and the same sentence different egocentri-
cals may be oriented towards different subjects. So it becomes necessary to turn to the concept of contextualization of the egocentrical element (see Lyons 1978: 574, 588, Fillmore 1981) — contextualization concerns an individual egocentrical separately from the rest.

The concept of the interpretation register enables us to extend the conceptual apparatus of regular (polysemy) ambivalence: the interpretation mode is a new parameter of the context which was formerly not taken into account. A change of interpretation mode changes the referential support of the egocentrical element, without changing its meaning. The concept of the interpretation mode enables us to provide a semantic explanation for a large layer of language facts — from the variation of specifically aspectual meanings to the use of tenses in parentheticals.

A classification of egocentrical elements (according to various markers) is proposed and the relevance of these classes for the structure of the narrative is demonstrated.

1) From the viewpoint of the role played by the speaker in interpretation, egocentrical elements can be divided into those which assume a speaker in the role of the subject of speech; subject of consciousness; subject of perception; and subject of deixis. The subject of consciousness is in no way diminished by the inadequacy of the communicative situation, so that the words and constructions which imply a speaker in the role of the subject of consciousness shift from conversational discourse to narrative without semantic deformation. This is not the case with the speaker as the subject of deixis: the author of the narrative may express his views just as the speaker does; but he cannot identify objects or stretches of time/space by reference to his own spatial-temporal position, because, unlike the canonical speaker in conversational discourse, he is separate from his statement — in the world depicted he has neither a time nor a place.
2) Depending on the degree of definiteness with which egocentrical elements are oriented in their contextualization on participants in the speech act, they are divided into primary (*itak* ‘and so’, *vot takoj* ‘like that’) and secondary (*vdrug* ‘suddenly’, *pojavit'sja* ‘to appear’): primary egocentricals are used exclusively with speech-act interpretation; secondary ones are less rigid. In conversational discourse secondary egocentricals are characterized by the fact that, as well as a speech-act, they allow of a syntactical interpretation (i.e., they are contextualized through the subject of the embedding clause). In narrative, even in the auctorial form, secondary egocentricals permit of personal interpretation (oriented on a character); in this respect they differ from primary ones, which are contextualized in traditional narrative only through the narrator.

There are inner connections, albeit not monosemous, between the first and second classifications: an egocentrical with an implied speech subject is always a primary one and with a subject of consciousness or observation always a secondary one, but an egocentrical with a subject of deixis may be both primary and secondary.

The difference between primary and secondary egocentricals has been demonstrated by Yu. D. Apresyan in the realm of deixis. It transpired that the sphere of application of this difference can be far broader. For example, presuppositions that can have as their subject not only a speaker, but also a syntactically embedded subject, were also something of a puzzle. Now words and categories with such presuppositions simply fall into the broad and fairly well described class of secondary egocentrical elements. Another phenomenon which “finds its place”, in the class of secondary deictic elements, is the relative use of tenses, so widespread in Russian.

The behaviour of an egocentrical element in conversational discourse (for example, the possibility of a syntactical interpretation) predicts to a large extent its behaviour in narrative, i.e., the possibility of a textual — anaphoric — interpretation. However, secondary and narrative deixis is not the same thing (cf. a different point of view in Lyons 1978, Apresyan 1986). The difference between syntactical and narrative interpretation may be compared to the difference between reflexivization and anaphora.
3) The main semantic sub-classes of egocentrical elements are deictic and modal (a large number of egocentricals fall into one of these sub-classes, but some constructions are possible only in the speech mode of the use of language, although they cannot be classed as deixis or modality, for example, auto-correction: *Ja videl ee včera — net, pozavčera* ‘I saw her yesterday — no, the day before’ (example from Banfield 1982). The study of egocentrical elements with modal meaning is just beginning. A clear definition of such classes as the expressive egocentrical (as opposed to the neutral) element and the dialogical (as opposed to the monological) remains a task for the future. It is clear that the interpretation of the dialogical element includes not only the figure of the speaker, but also that of the addressee (cf., *pravda?* = ‘isn’t that so? Say it is’; *razv?* = ‘I don’t think that’s right, do you?’). But does not the concept of the speaker in itself imply the presence of an addressee? It would seem, however, that the words *I* and *here* imply *you* and *there* respectively to a lesser extent than the other way round. Consequently they are less dialogical.

One of the tasks of the present work is to investigate the analogies between deixis and subjective modality. The study of all shifters in a single system, above all, the approach to modality from the viewpoint of deixis as a more studied category of egocentricals, proved to be productive. The parameters which arise during the study of deixis were shifted to modality, in particular, the difference between primary and secondary egocentricals. At the very dawn of structural linguistics such pairs as *zavtra — na sledujúščij den’* (‘tomorrow — the next day’) and *skoro — vskore* (‘soon — shortly afterwards’), in which the first word is deictic and the second anaphoric, attracted attention. Similar pairs exist in the sphere of modality also. There are expressions which can be used only in indirect speech, for example, *ni v kakaju* ‘not having any’:

*Ja ego ugovarivaju, a on ni v kakaju* ‘I’m trying to persuade him, but he’s not having any’; in direct speech (about yourself) you should say *Ni za čto!* ‘Not on your life!’.

A great deal of research has been done on the typology of narrative forms. The concept of narrative form is talked about, but has not yet been generally recognized (cf., the term “type of narrative” in Kozhevnikova 1994). Of the classical studies on this subject in the Russian tradition the richest in mate-

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rial (such as Vinogradov 1980; Gukovsky 1959) deal exclusively with traditional narrative. In recent years interest in non-traditional narrative forms has risen sharply, which increases the need for a generalising concept.

We have dwelt on the term “narrative form” because it has already begun to appear in the literature (cf. Mann 1992). It may be more accurate to speak of communicative form (of a narrative, poem and, in general, any text), because the linguistic description of the three main forms is based on the communicative situation implied by them. The advantages of this term are even more obvious if we take into account the lyrical form also (where the communicative situation includes an addressee) which is used not only in lyrical poetry and prose, but also sporadically in narrative: Du-Erzählung is a “corrupt” lyrical form.

One of the main language categories in the study of non-traditional narrative forms is that of quasi-direct speech. Up to now this category has been studied mainly by specialists on literature, cf. first and foremost, Voloshinov 1930 (in Grammatika 1954 there is a chapter on quasi-direct speech written by V. D. Levin, but later this subject ceased to engage academic grammarians, in spite of the fact that in Jakobson 1957/1972 reported speech is called a “cardinal problem of linguistics and stylistics”). In the present work the structure of quasi-direct speech is described anew; the constituent role of parentheticals in the genesis of quasi-direct speech is established. Parentheticals are considered as the syntactical stage at which the narrator disappears from the scene, giving up his place (or, to use Bakhtin’s metaphor, his voice) to a character.

The present work attracts attention to a previously undetected aspect of the coherence of a text, i.e., coherence on the level of the modus (modal framework). The role is discovered of illocutionary and meta-textual markers in the mechanism of the coherence of a text, which has been highlighted in recent years thanks to the works of Anna Wierzbicka. The concept of the meta-textual body of the text still awaits its turn.

Now about narrative in the aspect of poetics (or, to use a somewhat unsuccessful term from Morson, Emerson 1990, “prosaics”). The present work provides a linguistic base for the concept of narrative form. A description is given of the two main forms, very different in their linguistic
parameters, namely, traditional narrative (what Stanzel calls the auctorial form) and free indirect discourse, the linguistic base of which consists of quasi-direct speech. First-person narrative (Ich-Erzäh lung) attracts less attention as a form closer to conversational language and therefore clearer.

To define narrative form in linguistic terms it is enough to characterize it according to the following two parameters:

1) which egocentricals are possible in a given form; and

2) who disposes of them, i.e., who takes the place of the speaker in the production of the form in question.

In traditional narrative (that is to say, the main body — lyrical digressions imitate the canonical communicative situation and are not taken into account) dialogical egocentricals are not used, only egocentricals proper; primary egocentricals are contextualized only through the narrator. In free indirect discourse all types of egocentrical elements are used, including expressive and dialogical ones, as in the first-person form; and all of them can be at the disposal of a character. Free indirect discourse generates a figure unknown in ordinary language — the speaker in the third person.

A differentiating role in the identification of narrative form is played only by primary egocentricals: secondary ones are used in all forms and have a mainly personal interpretation everywhere (i.e., are contextualized through a character), although a narrative interpretation is also not ruled out.

Our more precise definition of narrative forms (and the detection of more subtler formal properties of the units which characterize each of them) became possible thanks to the use of speech act theory. Attention to the illocutionary component of a sentence enabled us to throw light on problems of the typology of reported speech (“čužaja reč’”). The need to distinguish between free indirect discourse and reporting (which was not done in Voloshinov 1930) is proved. In the case of reporting the character’s words are divorced from his speech act: reporting is peppering the narrator’s speech with egocentricals which belong to a character (and, in general, the speech of one subject with words which belong to another subject); this combination of different voices into a single statement is not found in quasi-direct speech.
The theory, expressed in sharply polemical form in Banfield 1982, that the narrator disappears in free indirect discourse is disproved: it is shown that the narrator is present in all free indirect discourse with the narrative past as its basic tense. And the form of the narrative past in free indirect discourse can only be explained as the presence of the narrator: for a character the tense of the events happening to him is the present only.

One of the incentives behind the present work was Bakhtin’s accusation (addressed to “structural”, i.e., “non-pragmatic” linguistics) of not differentiating between the sentence and the statement and of ignoring the statement completely. In the last decades the formal apparatus of the statement has been elaborated fairly thoroughly in linguistics. Thus it has become possible to give a precise meaning to Bakhtin’s metaphors, such as *golos* ‘voice’ and *dialog* ‘dialogue’. One of these valuable metaphors is the *oprava* ‘mount’. Bakhtin says that in a statement a sentence is placed in a mount of a completely different nature. A mount is the speech act in the context of which the sentence is used.

It was important to realize that in a coherent text the settings of various sentences are united in a single body ("karkas"). The formal analogy of Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue could be the concept of the meta-textual body of the text (in the sense of Wierzbicka 1970). Wierzbicka speaks of the need to differentiate between two heterogeneous components — text and meta-text. One can go further, however, and raise the question of the meta-textual structure of a text. Actually the analysis of a text should reveal its meta-textual body.

This is one aspect of the coherence of a text, which has not received attention before. Both Vinogradov (1980) and Gukovsky (1959) proceeded from the fact that the structure of a text is determined by the unity of the consciousness behind it, and this was obviously the consciousness of the narrator: only the narrator does Gukovsky describe as “the bearer of evaluations, the bearer of comprehending, understanding what is depicted”; “the image of the bearer of sympathy or dislike, the bearer of attention for what is depicted” — all this is only the narrator. That is to say, we are dealing with a single consciousness, a single point of view, “which determines the whole composition of what is depicted in a work” (p. 200). The present work
shows the linguistic devices by which the text reflects not only the consciousness of the narrator, but also the consciousness of the characters. One such device, already mentioned, is secondary deixis. Quasi-direct speech with all its linguistic attributes is another. In free indirect discourse of the monological type of character, the perceiver simply replaces the narrator. As for polyphonic free indirect discourse, various consciousnesses coexist in this and in order to understand the text one must find the meta-textual body which combines all these consciousnesses in a kind of single composition.

The concept of the observer, which arose comparatively recently in linguistics but is becoming increasingly prominent, should be of direct value for the analysis of a literary work. Semantic analysis of the figure of the speaker pinpoints as one of speaker’s roles that of the subject of observation. Thus arises one of the speaker’s hypostases, that of the observer. The observer relates directly to the important opposition of scene vs. summary, see Friedman 1955): the scene differs from summary in that it implies a direct observer of what is taking place, which is not essential for the summary. In classical first-person narrative one frequently finds violations of authenticity connected with the fact that the story-teller cannot be the direct witness of the scene he is describing. Expressive examples of this are found by Gukovsky in Gogol’s “Old World Landowners” (Gukovsky 1959: 217), cf.:

such profound, such overwhelming heartfelt pity, was expressed on her [Pulkheria Ivanovna’s] face that I do not know if anyone could have looked at her at that moment and remained indifferent.

It is quite possible that Gogol is not against this violated authenticity and that here (as in many other passages) there is a play on the storyteller a la Nabokov. It must be emphasized that now the discovery of this kind of fact no longer requires a special “literary perception”: the observer is pinpointed in the text through ordinary semantic analysis. Thus, the presence of the observer in the above example is predicted by the lexical semantics of the words was expressed.

57 For example, we find the same contradictory — but here on the ideological, rather than the perceptive level — image of the storyteller in Gogol’s “The Tale of the Quarrel...”: throughout the whole story he is an ordinary inhabitant of Mirgorod, but at the end he turns into a boleššik for the human race and cries: “How tedious it is in this world, gentlemen!” (Gukovskij 1959: 222).
We shall illustrate the application of the proposed linguistic approach to the analysis of the composition of a text using a “classical” subject of literary critical study, namely Bunin’s short story “Light Breath”. Vygotsky (1968) brilliantly revealed the essence of the device used by Bunin, namely, the destruction of “plot material”, above all, of the time links between events. Moreover, as is pointed out in Zholkovsky 1992: 135, to our mind quite rightly, Bunin’s narrative technique in this story cannot be called modernist. Why not?

Below is a diagram of the passage of time similar to that used in Chapter 10, but more condensed: it is made up not of separate aspect-tense forms, but whole blocks of narrative. The square brackets contain those parts which are written not in the person of the narrator — an account by a character, diary, reminiscence, etc.

1. at the cemetery
2. the school years of Olya Meshcherskaya
3. a visit to the head
4. murder
5. the Cossack officer’s story
6. the diary of Olya Meshcherskaya
7. a classy lady
8. a classy lady’s past
9. a continuation of 7
10. light breath
11. the wind

The time scheme is an unusual one, of course: the textual time does not move forward throughout the narrative; the story finishes at the same point in textual time as it started. However, the time scheme is not the only type of structural relations in the text. The main role in the story is played by modus relations.

The blocks which go to make up the story each have an explicit modus. Each part is either a summary of events or a scene. A scene, as mentioned earlier, requires an observer, who can be either the narrator or a character (or
both). A summary does not require an observer, but nor does it exclude one: in fact the subject, in any of its four hypostases, can be anywhere.

1. At the cemetery (scene). There is one subject here — the narrator. He is clearly visible in the role of observer and also the subject of consciousness: for example, he is the subject of a most important positive emotion (*the new cross of their oak, so strong, heavy and smooth that it was a pleasure to look at*): a pleasure for whom if not the narrator? The base tense of the story is the speech present.

2. The grammar-school years of Olya Meshcherskaya (a summary by the narrator). An observer is not necessary here. The narrator retells “gossip”.

3. A visit to the head (a scene which begins with the words *she was unexpectedly summoned to the head* and from which the reader learns about the “fall”). The observer and perceiver in this scene is not only the narrator, but Olya Meshcherskaya herself. She is the implied subject of *unexpectedly*. It is quite clear that in this scene she is the object not only of the narrator’s empathy, but of the author’s sympathy (contrary to Vygotsky).

4. The murder (a summary by the narrator): *And a month later <...> shot her on the station platform*.

5. The Cossack officer’s story (summary by the officer).

6. Diary (summary by Olya Meshcherskaya).

7. The classy lady Olya of Meshcherskaya. This is a scene, but of the “visual example” kind typical of narrative which uses the present as its base tense: all the events are represented as repeated ones. The observer is the narrator, who follows the character constantly in each of his monotonously repeated actions (*and then, when you have made your way through the puddles under the monastery wall and turn left, you see...*).

8. The past of a classy lady (summary by the narrator).

9. A continuation of block 7: the classy lady on Olya Meshcherskaya’s grave.

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58 Cf., for example, in Yuri Olesha’s novel “Envy”: He *washes* himself like a boy, piping, hopping about and snorting <...> And *squawks* as he *gargles*. People *stop* under the balcony and *stare up*. <...> In the morning he *drinks* two glasses of cold milk: *takes* the jug out of the sideboard, *pours* it out and *drinks* it standing up.
10. In the modus of a reminiscence by the classy lady, a conversation overheard by her about light breath is inserted.

11. light breath has again dispersed in the world <...> in this cold spring wind.

The aim of our analysis is to show that in spite of all the “clever skipping about of the story” (Vygotsky 1968: 202) it fits strictly into the framework of traditional narrative. Gukovsky (1959: 209) says of a second-class writer of the 1830s that he “skips about easily and without motivation from one character to the other, hopping over time and space”. With Bunin all the narrator’s journeys in time and space are strictly motivated.

There is not a single unmotived skip in time: the analepsis in parts 2 and 8 is a journey back into the past “along the character”, whereas the analepsis in 5, 6 and 10 is explained by the fact that this is, respectively, a story, diary and reminiscence.

The change of character is part 7 is compensated for by the fact that the new character appears in a time and space already introduced. Cf., the beginning of this part: Over these April days the town has become clean and dry. This sentence returns the narrative to the time and place to which the beginning of the story belongs (It is April, but the days are grey).

The story is rich in polyphony — Olya Meshcherskaya is reflected in a whole range of voices, including her diary, the classy lady’s recollection of the overheard conversation with her friend; the “gossip”, the statement by the Cossack officer to the legal investigator, and the classy lady’s reflections (and how could you combine with this pure glance the terrible thing now associated with Olya Meshcherskaya’s name and so on). But each voice is introduced with the help of an explicit modal framework, and the narrator manipulates these frameworks. He shows events through the eyes (and consciousness) of different people, but always from his hands. The wholeness of the composition is ensured by the unity of the consciousness behind the text — the consciousness of the narrator. It is precisely these structural properties of the story that give us the impression of traditional narrative. The standards which, if broken, could be perceived as modernism, are strictly observed here.
As an example of modernist narrative we examine Nabokov’s story “The Circle”\(^{59}\).

As in Bunin, the beginning and the end of the story relate to one and the same time and place: this is a Paris café in the late 1920s. The story’s main content, however, concerns Russia and the time is much earlier — it is presented in the form of reminiscences into which the hero lapses sitting in a café after a chance encounter, here in emigration, with a woman he had known as a girl in Russia.

The scene in the café is divided into two parts which, for no apparent reason, are presented to the reader in the reverse order from that in which they took place. This provides the story with its splendid beginning —

And secondly, because it filled him with a terrible yearning for Russia.

Thus it is only in the last paragraph that we learn about the event which prompted the hero to delve down into the depths of his memory:

Crossing the square, he went into a café, ordered a drink and stood up to pull his squashed hat out from under him. There was a terrible anxiety within him.

But even more interesting is the modernist device in the story — it consists of the regular interference by the narrator, also unmotivated, in the represented consciousness of the hero.

The mode of remembering is introduced explicitly, which is a great bonus for the reader:

he recalled the past with an aching heart, with sadness \(<...>\) The whole of this past rose up together with the sigh in his rising chest.

Memories are a natural excuse for turning to free indirect discourse. And the formal indicators of FID are present here indeed in large numbers: quasi-direct speech (\textit{and dear God, how he hated the lot of them}); dialogical elements in which the hero appears in the first person: Yes, he felt like a strict plebian; and in the sentence \textit{And how deep down you go, my God!} the second person is almost the first. The mode of remembering is emphasized in all sorts of ways. For example, sometimes there are lists not of events, but only of images rising up in the mind of the hero, such as:

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\(^{59}\) My attention to this story was attracted by Margherita di Ceglie.
— and if you delved down a bit further you could remember them demolishing the old school at the end of the village and building a new one. The laying of the foundations, the prayers in the wind, K. N. Godunov-Cherdyncev throwing in a gold piece, the coin sticking sideways in the clay…(and suddenly — a milky cloud of bird cherry amid the pine needles).

In this stream of memories, however, a strange voice breaks in now and then. This voice defies any uncontradictory attribution. In some cases it can be interpreted as the hero looking at himself in the past from the present (i.e., from the café). For example

In early youth Innokentij had readily believed the stories (idiotic) about his [Godunov-Cherdyncev’s] travelling concubines.

But this voice refers to itself as we, meaning it can only be a consciousness that is separate from the third-person hero; most likely it is the narrator who, nevertheless, has no place in the hero’s stream of consciousness (or rather, would not have in traditional narrative):

he remembered the past, with sadness — with what sadness? with a sadness as yet insufficiently studied by us.

let us not forget, moreover, the feelings of a certain section of our intelligentsia which despises all non-applied natural experiment;

she was walking quickly, in high laced boots, <...> lashing herself — what with? — a leather dog’s lead on her blue pleated skirt, it seems.

In the last example the question what with? could have been asked by the hero who is doing the remembering, but more likely it is the self-same narrator who has just chosen the epithets for sadness. One can even assume that the narrator is the hero himself, but this does not help. The play on ambiguity is undoubtedly deliberate.

A multiplicity of interpretations is what links a great literary masterpiece with run-of-the-mill absurd. Vygotsky (1968) quotes dozens of interpretations of Shakespeare’s “Hamlet” — different explanations of the contradictions in the hero’s behaviour. But a multiplicity of semantic interpretations means the absence of any logical explanation at all, i.e., the absurd. The basis for trying to find new interpretations is ultimately the contradictory nature of the text. In any case the presence of one straightforward explanation reduces the chances of the text being interesting. Thus, here we find two deviations from the norms of traditional narrative: one is when the
narrator violates the boundaries of someone else’s consciousness; the other — uncertainty as to the identity of the narrator.

The middle part of the story, which describes dinner at the Godunov-Cherdyncevs, is portrayed entirely from the external viewpoint. What is more the change of narrative form, the shift from free indirect discourse to traditional narrative and handing over control of egocentrical elements to the narrator, is effected most impressively:

After this there were a few more chance encounters, but then... All right then, if you insist: one hot day in the middle of June ...

One hot day in the middle of June the mowers were moving with great sweeps along the roadside, “More power to your elbow”, said Il’ja Il’ich as he walked past; Innokentij strode alongside in silence, his mouth moving round (he was cracking sunflower seeds).

In this part the narrator openly appears in the role of direct observer of the events; thus, when a clumsy movement by Innokenty knocks a piece of pie under the table, this voice announces, in brackets: (and that’s where we’ll leave it). At the end the narrator disappears again and the hero is once more the dominating subject of consciousness, speech and perception; however, it is now no longer reminiscences, but events which develop in actual time:

and he kept being surprised that both Tanya and her mother did not talk about the dead man and spoke so easily about the past, and did not weep bitterly, as he, a stranger, felt like weeping — or perhaps they were putting on an act? [the character’s question]. A pale dark-haired girl of about ten appeared [the character’s perception].

From here to the end of the story there is ordinary free indirect discourse (cf., Strange: his legs were shaking. What a shattering meeting), not counting the last sentence which begins firstly, but to get to the secondly and thirdly you have to go back in a circle to the beginning of the story.

Just as narrative enables us to understand more clearly the meaning of the conversational elements of language, so modernism highlights that which serves as the norm for traditional narrative. But that is a subject for a separate study.
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## Transliteration of Cyrillic

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